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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines models for the delivery of telecommunications universal services 
in Vietnam and New Zealand. The focus is on identifying obstacles to effective and 
economically efficient performance of services delivery in Vietnam, and proposing 
solutions for substantial improvements to legal frameworks and institutional structures. 
The central argument of the thesis is that the universal service scheme in Vietnam and 
the supporting laws and agencies responsible for implementation of the scheme need to 
be improved in order to contribute to the achievement of social targets.   
The universal service funding mechanism in Vietnam, including the allocation of 
industry levies and subsidies, is not linked to real costs, nor is it efficient. The laws and 
legal instruments governing the universal service scheme are incomplete and in parts 
contradictory. Moreover, the institutional structures reflect diffuse and duplicated 
accountability among the authorities involved, lack of transparency, and insufficient 
external monitoring mechanisms. Performance information systems and involvement of 
the public and stakeholders are also insufficient.    
The insufficiencies in the Vietnamese structure are illustrated in the thesis by comparing 
them to the key elements of a best practice model. They are also compared with 
elements of the New Zealand model that reflect features closer to the best practice: 
transparency, effective monitoring and performance accountability. These features serve 
as a basis for the principal proposals for improvements to the legal framework and 
institutional structures in Vietnam and for economically efficient and competitive 
funding arrangements.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION  
 
I Overview   
This thesis examines models for the delivery of telecommunications universal services 
in Vietnam and New Zealand. The focus is on identifying obstacles to effective and 
economically efficient performance and administration of services delivery in Vietnam, 
and proposing reforms to legal frameworks and institutional structures.  
Universal service is a key policy and regulatory issue for major network industries such 
as telecommunications and electricity, and also a central building block of the concept of 
‗service to the public‘ in most countries.1 The central idea of a universal service policy is 
that specific infrastructure services should be available to every person.
2
  
In the telecommunications industry, universal service policy aims to ensure the 
provision, at affordable rates, of either a full range or a basic package of 
telecommunications services to everyone, especially those living in rural and isolated 
areas or with low incomes.
3
 While sector reform and liberalisation of telecommunication 
markets worldwide since the 1990s have led to greater efficiency in the sector, a 
phenomenal growth rate of service penetration, along with lower prices, and improved 
choice and quality of services, ensuring the provision of these services remains a 
challenge in an ever-changing market environment and amidst continuous technological 
developments.
4
  
                                               
1 Helmuth Cremer, Farid Gasmi, Andre Grimaud and Jean-Jacques Laffont ―The Economics of Universal Service: 
Theory‖ (1998) World Bank, at 1 <info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/64602/theory.pdf>. 
2 Scott Wallsten ―Using Competitive Bidding to Reform the Universal Service High Cost Fund‖ (2009) Technology Policy Institute, at 6 
<www.techpolicyinstitute.org/files/using%20competitive%20bidding%20to%20reform%20the%20universal%20service%20high%20
cost%20fund1.pdf>.  
3 American Telecommunications Act 1996 § 254. 
4 International Telecommunications Union ―Recent Regulatory Trends from Around the Globe‖ (2010) ICT 
Regulatory News, at 9 <www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg/publications/ICT-Reg-News-e.pdf>.  
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Throughout the 20
th
 century, telecommunications policies in most countries promoted 
‗universal service‘ for voice calling, using fixed-line telephony.5 The definition of 
universal services has however varied according to market conditions, public demand
6
 
and changes in technology and services.
7
 Today, a call is no longer simply a signal sent 
over a fixed line to a receiver on another fixed-line.
8
  
A widely available voice calling service is well established in most developed countries, 
with the provision of services to nearly all households.
9
 However, it has remained a 
long-term goal in most developing countries.
10
 In the least developed countries, more 
than 50% of the population is rural, but only 12% of the total fixed telephone lines 
serves these areas.
11
 For example, voice service is still an issue for a considerable part of 
the population in African countries.
12
  
At the same time, broadband Internet access has moved quickly from being an expensive 
service to being an essential service comparable to voice calling, and therefore is 
included within the scope of universal service policies.
13
 Developing countries lag well 
behind in their ability to access and use broadband services.
14
 Nearly three-quarters of 
the world‘s population in 2010 did not have access to the Internet.15 In addition, there is 
a wide disparity of broadband penetration between developed and developing countries, 
and between various regions of the world.
16
 While 23.6% of inhabitants in developed 
countries were using fixed broadband services by the end of 2010, only 4.2% of 
                                               
5 Mandlesino Msimang ―Universal Access and Universal Service: An Overview‖ in John Alden (ed) Trends in 
Telecommunication Reform 2003: Promoting Universal Access to ICTs, Practical Tools for Regulators (ITU, Geneva, 
2003) 29 at 29.    
6 InfoDev Programme of the World Bank Telecommunications Regulation Handbook (Washington, 2000), at [6.2.2].  
7 International Telecommunications Union, above n 4, at 9.  
8 James Alleman, Paul Rappoport and Aniruddha Banerjee ―Universal Service: A New Definition?‖ (2010) 34 
Telecommunications Policy 86 at 86.  
9 Stanford Levin ―Issues and Policies for Universal Service and Net Neutrality in a Broadband Environment‖ (paper 
presented to the First Asia-Pacific ITS Regional Conference, Wellington, August 2010) at 1. 
10 Msimang, above n 5, at 29. 
11 International Telecommunications Union World Telecommunications Indicators Database (Switzerland, 2004). 
12 Intelecom Research and Consultancy Limited ―Universal Access and Service (UAS) and Broadband Development‖ 
(paper presented to the World Bank Workshop on Universal Access and Service (UAS) and Broadband Development, 
Washington, 2009) at 13.  
13 Levin, above n 9, at 2. 
14 Nancy Sundberg ―Overview of Trends in the ICT Market and in ICT regulation‖ in Theresa Miedema (ed) Trends 
in Telecommunication Reform 2010/2011: Enabling Tomorrow‟s Digital World (International Telecommunications 
Union, Geneva, 2011) 1 at 7. 
15 John Alden ―Postcards from the information society: living with always-on technology- the good, the bad, and the 
just plain baffling‖ in Theresa Miedema (ed) Trends in Telecommunication Reform 2010/2011: Enabling Tomorrow‟s 
Digital World (International Telecommunications Union, Geneva, 2011) 311 at 312.  
16 Sundberg, above n 14, at 7. 
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residents in developing countries were fixed broadband subscribers. In order to provide 
equal opportunities to all citizens to access and use telecommunications services, many 
countries have begun to re-examine their policies on universal service obligations.
17
 
In Vietnam, a developing country with 87 million people
18
 and with about 73% of its 
population living in rural areas,
19
 the coverage of fixed telephone service does not reach 
all of the population. The fixed telephone density is lower
20
 than that of developed 
economies and average world density, both for Internet access and fixed (wired) 
broadband subscriptions.
21
 There is a big gap in telecommunications penetration 
between urban and rural areas in terms of telephone density, especially in the number of 
fixed telephones. The situation is similar with the percentage of households with Internet 
access and the number of individuals using the Internet frequently.
22
 Most key indicators 
put Vietnam behind the average penetration rates of either developing countries 
generally or Asian-Pacific countries.
23
   
Existing research related to the Vietnamese universal service scheme focuses mostly on 
financial aspects, such as funding sources, administration of funds by the regulator, and 
financial aspects of universal service projects.
24
 Most of these studies relate to the first 
period of the implementation of the 2006-2010 universal service programme.  
Other studies focus on micro-/macro-financial and economic analysis with forecasting 
and budgeting models
25
 or the development of universal Internet service in rural areas 
                                               
17 Sundberg, above n 14, at 9. 
18 General Statistics Office <www.gso.gov.vn/default_en.aspx?tabid=467&idmid=3&ItemID=11728>.   
19 General Statistics Office <www.gso.gov.vn/default_en.aspx?tabid=467&idmid=3&ItemID=8647>.     
20 In Vietnam, there were low telephone densities both in fixed and mobile services in 2002. Recently mobile 
subscriptions increased sharply and reached around 175 per 100 inhabitants; however the majority of those are in 
urban areas and used by only 30 million out of total 87 million people. Moreover, there were only 32.8% of these 
users in rural areas. See the Report of the Ministry of Information and Communication on the nationwide survey of the 
current status of telephone, Internet and broadcasting services in 2010 (2011), at 3. 
21 International Telecommunications Union ―Key Global Telecom Indicators for the World Telecommunication 
Service Sector‖ (2012) <www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/at_glance/KeyTelecom.html>.  
22 Apart from income disparity between urban and remote areas, a common contributing factor is the problem of 
power supply in remote areas. Fixed lines do not work without power. The same applies to PCs. See MIC‘s Document 
28/BC-BTTTT reporting to the Prime Minister on the nationwide survey of the current status of telephone, Internet 
and broadcasting services in 2010 (2011). 
23 See Chapter Four III.C.1.(c). 
24 Nguyen Hoang Long ―Telecommunications Development towards Universal Services‖ (Master, National Economic 
University, 2001) and Nhat Le Tran ―Telecommunications Universality - Evaluation of Telecommunications 
Universality in Vietnam‖ (Master, Waseda University, 2004). 
25 See Bui Xuan Chung ―Financial solutions for socialising the universal service delivery in Vietnam‖ (PhD, National 
Economic University, 2010).  
20 
 
only.
26
 Other research reviews the current implementation of universal service delivery 
(with the main focus on the Vietnam Public Utility Telecommunications Service Fund)
27
 
and makes only general suggestions about universal service objectives, and the 
development of universal service within the international economic integration of the 
telecommunications market.
28
  
Overall, none of these studies provide a comprehensive examination of the universal 
service legal framework and institutional arrangements, or propose suggestions for 
regulatory and institutional reforms. Moreover, none of these studies give attention to 
identifying specific obstacles particularly to the economic efficiency and effectiveness of 
universal service policy/programmes in Vietnam, and to the legal framework and 
institutional structures. This thesis, thus, after an analysis of the legal framework and 
institutional arrangements, makes specific proposals about changing laws and 
regulations so as to promote efficient and effective universal service delivery.  
II Thesis Questions and Hypothesis  
Issues in relation to the provision of universal services and funding mechanisms are 
topics of never-ending political debate in most countries. In the light of technological 
innovations and increasing competition, it is necessary to re-evaluate institutional 
arrangements for the administration of universal service and the legal frameworks for 
allocating levies, selecting universal service providers and subsidies. Almost all 
countries, both industrialised and developing, face this challenge.   
In Vietnam, during the fifteen years of economic reforms up to 2001, there was no 
specific determination or regulation of universal service, or any allocation of universal 
service levies amongst telecommunications operators. The Post and 
Telecommunications Ordinance 2002 was the first time the Government defined the 
provision of universal services and obligations of telecommunications operators to 
                                               
26 See Nguyen Viet Long ―The Universality of Internet services in Rural Areas‖ (PhD, Korean National University, 
2010). 
27 Vietnam Public Utility Telecommunications Service Fund is a separate department of the Ministry of Information 
and Communications having the main responsibility for the implementation of universal service programmes in 
Vietnam.  
28 See Tran Manh Dung ―Development of universal services in Vietnam within the international economic 
integration‖ (PhD, Vietnam Institute of Commercial Research, 2011).  
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provide those services or pay levies.
29
 There followed a range of subordinate legislation 
in order to complete the universal service legal framework and institutional 
arrangements in Vietnam.
30
 In addition, numerous ministerial documents have been 
issued to provide instructions for the administration of the universal service scheme.   
There have been many obstacles to the efficient delivery of universal services in 
Vietnam. Most have stemmed from the shortcomings of institutional structures and legal 
frameworks for funding mechanisms. My hypothesis is that the Vietnamese universal 
service legal framework and institutional arrangements can be improved by borrowing 
from funding arrangements and legal structures, and elements of best practice from other 
jurisdictions.  
In order to propose reforms for the universal service legal framework and institutional 
arrangements in Vietnam, this thesis poses the following key research questions:  
(1) What is the best practice model for universal telecommunications services? 
(2) How could the delivery of such universal services be improved in Vietnam? 
(3) How has universal service developed elsewhere in a particular jurisdiction?  
(4) If the Vietnamese universal service model could be improved, what changes 
should be made in institutional structures, legal and regulatory structures, funding 
models, universal service provider criteria, and in systems for management of 
universal service financial resources, monitoring, and achievement of transparency 
and competitive neutrality? 
In order to answer these questions, the thesis will look at the New Zealand and 
Vietnamese universal service structures, and the development of universal service 
delivery. The thesis takes the development of universal service in New Zealand as a 
principal case study. The New Zealand model of universal service delivery reflects 
practical experience closer to the best practice: transparency, effective monitoring and 
performance accountability. Its funding arrangements are aimed at economic efficiency, 
                                               
29 The Post and Telecommunications Ordinance 2002, arts 49-51.  
30 They include Decree 160/2004/ND-CP, Decision 191/2004/QD-TTg established the Vietnam Public Utility 
Telecommunications Service Fund, Decision 74/2006/QD-TTg promulgating the universal service programme 2006-
2010, and Decision 1643/QD-TTg promulgating the universal service programme 2011-2015.  
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cost-effectiveness and competitive neutrality. In particular, universal service institutional 
arrangements and legal frameworks for universal service funding mechanisms in the two 
countries will be examined in order to identify:  
(1) How universal service develops within different political cultures; 
(2) Where the emphasis lies in the New Zealand universal service model - issues 
such as transparency, performance accountability, public and stakeholder 
involvement, performance information and reporting systems; and geographical 
features of universal service delivery;  
(3) Where the emphasis lies in the Vietnamese universal service model; 
(4) What factors in the New Zealand model could contribute to reform in the 
Vietnamese universal service model; 
(5) What practices from other jurisdictions would contribute to the Vietnamese 
universal service model.  
The reasons for including improvement/reform in the title of this study are based on the 
current situation of the universal service legal framework in Vietnam, the current 
obstacles to efficiency and effectiveness in delivery, and things to be improved or 
amended if universal service is to be efficient and effective. There are three main options 
for the reform of the universal service scheme in Vietnam:  
(1) abandon the current universal service model and begin again;   
(2) import a model or structure from another jurisdiction; or  
(3) make significant changes and reforms within the current model.  
For several reasons the option chosen here is for both improvements (short-term – 
amendments to subordinate documents) and reform (longer term – amendments to the 
Telecommunications Act), and for borrowing valuable experiences from other 
jurisdictions: 
23 
 
(1) the structure of the State, the Communist Party‘s dominant leadership, and the 
multi-level regulatory system mean that no radical or complete reform is possible 
in the short term;  
(2) elementary universal service structures exist, although they do not yet function 
efficiently or effectively. 
In order to propose reforms, this thesis presents proposals for creating and revising 
universal service policies where they either do not exist, or are poorly defined or unclear 
in their current form. In particular, concrete proposals are given for revising laws so as 
to produce better performance outcomes (precise proposals for new regulations are given 
throughout Chapter Five).  
In addition, this thesis proposes new institutional structures and arrangements for 
monitoring of universal service performance, makes suggestions for improved 
coordination between government departments and agencies, and advocates effective 
public and stakeholder involvement, improved performance information and reporting 
systems of universal service delivery, and the establishment of clear and closely 
monitored funding processes. 
It should be noted that there is currently a considerable range of challenges in the 
Vietnamese context for the implementation of the reforms outlined in Chapter Five. 
These challenges are concerned not only with the socialist political reality, but also with 
the willingness of the Government to propose and impose reforms, financial priorities 
and realities for the government in Vietnam, and restructuring and monitoring of 
legislation. The challenges should not be underestimated, but they are not subject of this 
thesis.  
III Approaches to the Research  
This thesis employs three main methods in its examination of the universal service legal 
framework and its institutional arrangements in Vietnam:  
(1) legal analysis;  
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(2) comparing Vietnam universal service delivery with New Zealand TSO
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delivery; and  
(3) interviews.    
A Legal Analysis 
The analysis of primary legal documents (legislation) in context, and especially in 
Vietnam case is the principal research method in this thesis. The Vietnamese legal 
framework for universal service delivery and institutional arrangements is presented 
exclusively in legislation. Thus, in order to improve the legal framework for efficient 
and effective universal service delivery in Vietnam, it is essential to examine the 
legislation that governs the performance of universal service delivery and its institutional 
arrangements, understand what it says, and how it works.  
Secondary sources are also examined. Secondary sources most notably include: (1) 
reports by international organisations such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU), and the World Bank; and (2) academic 
and scholarly research, articles and books. 
B Comparing Vietnam Universal Service Delivery with New Zealand   
Comparative law or cross-national legal comparisons are of great importance.
32
 They 
can be used as a legal research methodology and a tool for policy-makers to source 
legislation and law reforms in countries with either common law or civil law systems.
33
 
A wide knowledge of the possible range of solutions to legal problems is now available 
from other jurisdictions. In addition, comparing Vietnam universal service delivery with 
New Zealand TSO delivery helps to make clearer the functions and purposes of the rules 
originating or currently operating within different jurisdictions, and working within 
different socio-economic, political and cultural factors.  
                                               
31 TSO is the terminology used in the New Zealand legislation for a telecommunications universal service obligation. 
32 Mary Glendon, Paolo Carozza and Colin Picker Comparative Legal Traditions in a Nutshell (3rd ed, Thomson West 
Publishing Co, St. Paul, 2008) at 3.  
33 Peter De Cruz (ed) Comparative Law in a Changing World (3rd ed, Routledge-Cavendish, New York, 2007) at 19-
20.  
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A comparative methodology is particularly appropriate for examining the legal 
framework of universal service delivery in Vietnam. It can contribute not only to 
proposals about the use of legal transplants from foreign jurisdictions, but also locates 
the legal framework in Vietnam for universal service delivery within the global legal and 
regulatory context.  
This study compares the Vietnamese universal service legal framework with that of New 
Zealand. The universal service legal framework and institutional arrangements in New 
Zealand have operated since 1989 within a competitive environment and universal 
service levies since 2001. Moreover, universal service delivery in New Zealand 
exemplifies a focus on good governance (performance accountability, transparency and 
stakeholder involvement) and economic efficiency.  
C Interviews 
In order to arrive at answers to the research questions and propose solutions for reforms 
to the universal service legal framework and institutional arrangements in Vietnam, this 
research included interviews with a limited number of key government and industry 
representatives in Vietnam. Discussion with and responses from participants involved in 
the universal service scheme and legal professionals helped to identify shortcomings of 
the universal service legal framework and institutional arrangements. Interviews with 
telecommunications operators threw light on impacts on the telecommunications 
industry of the universal service scheme.  
Interviews were based on a set of specific questions, followed by further ad hoc 
questions to individuals. Seventeen people in total were interviewed separately between 
December 2011 and January 2012: five from government departments and agencies, 
seven from telecommunications operators, and five from academia. These interviewees 
were selected through my own networking experience and direct contacts in the 
telecommunications industry in Vietnam. They are mostly involved directly in universal 
service delivery at a senior level either in government agencies or telecommunications 
operators. Some are academic professionals with law, economics or telecommunications 
backgrounds. Their responses were their own personal ideas based on their experiences 
and did not reflect opinions of, or speak in a representative capacity for, their 
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organisations.
34
 Grouped responses are presented throughout the thesis, particularly in 
Chapter Four and Chapter Five, but participants are not identified by their name or 
office. 
To increase participants‘ openness in sharing experiences and viewpoints, interviewees 
were assured of complete confidentially and anonymity about reporting the results in this 
thesis. Interviews were recorded and relevant information for the thesis was then 
transcribed and translated into English. Interviews began with a brief introduction and 
then a conversation about the thesis, and moved towards the research questions.
35
   
Most interviews began by asking questions covering four key themes:  
(1) universal service institutional arrangements (questions 1-3); 
(2) the scope of universal service in Vietnam (questions 4-6);   
(3) universal service funding mechanisms (questions 7-10); and 
(4) competitive neutrality (questions 11-13).  
Additional questions were then posed, based on the responses of the interviewees in 
order to capture their general perspectives. Responses to questions from interviewees 
varied. Some participants had some hesitation in speaking out, but most provided 
significantly similar evaluations, estimations and critiques about the current situation of 
universal service delivery in Vietnam. The responses of interviewees demonstrated high 
awareness of the strengths and weaknesses of the current institutional arrangements and 
structure of universal service, and of the need for more efficient, effective structures and 
funding mechanisms.  
IV Structure of the Thesis  
This thesis is organised into six chapters. In addition to this introduction, there will be 
five further chapters.  
                                               
34 A full list of the institutions concerned set out in Appendix One. No names of participants are listed, and details of 
roles that may make identification of interviewees possible are not given. 
35 Principal questions are set out in Appendix Two.  
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Chapter Two of the thesis deals with three principal issues. Part I provides a framework 
for analysis of universal service policies. Basic definitions of universal service and 
various universal service funding approaches are reviewed. They include (1) universal 
access and universal service approaches with their hallmarks of availability, affordability 
and accessibility; (2) rationales for universal service policy; and (3) universal service 
funding approaches, including allocation of levies and subsidies.  
Part II reviews basic concepts of public management that are related to universal service 
institutional arrangements and funding administration, namely (a) performance 
accountability; (b) transparency; (c) performance information and public involvement; 
and (d) performance budgeting.  
Part III outlines how all these fundamental factors are mirrored in a possible best-
practice universal service model for efficient and effective universal service 
performance, which is drawn from International Telecommunications Union (ITU) 
recommendations and international practical experience. 
Chapter Three provides a description of New Zealand TSO delivery during three 
periods: (1) the State monopoly period (up to 1987); (2) the light-handed regulation 
period (1987-2000); and (3) the industry-specific regulation period (since 2001). The 
chapter pays particular attention to the current legal framework and institutional 
arrangements of the New Zealand universal service model. It examines the institutional 
structures and funding mechanisms of universal service delivery, with particular regard 
to four important issues: (1) transparent performance information and reporting systems; 
(2) effective performance accountability; (3) public and stakeholder engagement; and (4) 
economic cost-effectiveness, and competitive and technological neutrality.  
The key features in regard to the best practice model are also reviewed. The New 
Zealand universal service model reflects features close to the key best practice: 
transparency, effective monitoring with public and stakeholder involvement, and 
performance accountability. Moreover, universal service funding arrangements aim at 
achieving economic efficiency, cost-effectiveness and competitive neutrality. 
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Chapter Four examines the evolution of the legal frameworks and institutional 
arrangements for the delivery of universal services in Vietnam. Particular attention is 
given to the following issues: (1) the multi-level State legal apparatus: Acts, 
Government Decrees, Prime Minister‘s Decisions, and Ministerial Decisions; (2) the 
development of universal service in the last 20 years; (3) the key obstacles and 
underlying reasons to the effective and economically efficient performance and 
management of universal service delivery, and (4) the most significant defects or 
problems in the current universal service legal framework and institutional 
arrangements.  
Chapter Five gives concrete proposals for improvements/reform of universal service 
institutional arrangements and the legal framework in Vietnam. Some could be improved 
immediately (short-term) by amending the Prime Minister‘s Decisions and Ministerial 
legislation. Other reforms require amending the Telecommunications Act (long-term). 
The proposals focus on two key areas:  
(1) Institutional arrangements for effective and efficient universal service performance, 
in particular: (a) the setting up of suitably independent institutions, managing conflicts 
of interests, and improved performance accountability; (b) performance-based 
information-gathering and reporting systems; and (c) effective public and stakeholder 
involvement in universal service delivery. 
(2) The establishment of effective and efficient funding mechanisms and formulae, in 
particular: (a) the estimation of necessary financial resources (universal service funds); 
(b) establishing structures for competitive neutrality including bidding models; (c) the 
determination of universal service levies on telecommunications operators; and (d) the 
subsidy of universal service funds to universal service providers and 
household/individual subscribers. 
Chapter Six summarises the main issues and proposals presented in the thesis. In 
particular, the chapter points out key paths for Vietnam to improve universal service 
delivery both in the short-term and in the long-term. It also suggests key points of 
departure for the improved universal service which might be put into the next five-year 
universal service programme in Vietnam. 
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The cut-off date for laws, including subordinate legal documents, and other materials 
used in this thesis is 31 December 2012. Some references in regard to New Zealand, 
international experience and telecommunications statistics data are to materials from 
2013.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
A FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNIVERSAL SERVICE 
 
I Overview 
Universal service is a cornerstone of industrial and regulatory policies of most countries 
in their major network industries, including telecommunications.
1
 While not every 
resident of a country can afford essential telecommunications services, subsidising the 
delivery of those services is a means of ensuring wide uptake and usage. This has direct 
social benefits both for subsidised and other users, and spill-over benefits for the 
economy.  
Historically, the delivery of these services was provided by a state-owned operator as the 
sole provider of telecommunications services. Subsequent market liberalisation leading 
to a multi-operator environment has made this obsolete. Regulatory authorities now face 
the problem of organising the provision and financing of universal telecommunications 
service in a competitive environment.  
Although there is a wide range of mechanisms for collecting and disbursing funds that 
support universal service delivery, most nations face a common set of goals. Challenges 
vary from country to country.
2
 The emergence of increasingly competitive 
telecommunications service providers and multiple technologies requires amendments in 
universal service policies.
3
 The difference is sharpest between a single monopoly 
supplier, which is directed by the government to achieve universal service targets, and a 
multi-supplier and multi-technology environment, where all suppliers benefit from 
universal service policy and should contribute to the costs of the policy.
4
  
                                               
1 Cremer, Gasmi, Grimaud and Laffont, above ch 1, n 1, at 1.  
2 Federal Communications Commission (FCC) ―Connecting the Globe: Regulator‘s Guide to Building a Global 
Information Community‖ (1999), part VI <transition.fcc.gov/connectglobe/sec6.html>.  
3 International Telecommunications Union ―Trends in Universal Access and Services Policies: Changing Policies to 
Accommodate Competition and Convergence‖ (paper presented to the 9th Global Symposium for Regulators,  
Lebanon, November 2009), at 2. 
4 Patrick Xavier ―Rethinking universal service for a next generation network environment‖ (2006) OECD 
Telecommunications and Information Services Policy, at 4 <www.oecd.org/sti/broadbandandtelecom/36503873.pdf>. 
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Many governments are now challenged by the difficulties of ensuring social benefits and 
economically efficient delivery of universal services, while avoiding negative impacts 
on competition policy in competitive telecommunications markets.
5
 A major task of 
governments today is to ensure effective public policies/programmes in achieving a very 
complex range of political, economic and social objectives.
6
    
Effective and efficient universal service delivery is dependent on several factors. Firstly, 
governments need to establish a clear long term statement of universal service 
objectives. The starting-point is to define the problem, identify a solution, and then set 
up adequate legal frameworks, establish effective institutional arrangements, and work 
out the financial resourcing and funding models that should effectively underpin these 
goals. Appropriate direction to the organisations which deliver universal services is a 
fundamental task of government. The management strategies and practice of those 
organisations are crucial to the effectiveness and efficiency of universal service policies. 
This chapter will first outline a conceptual framework, focusing on the interaction 
between economic efficiency and social objectives, and on how to improve the design 
and implementation of universal service policies. There follows a review of universal 
service objectives, universal services and funding arrangements, including financial 
resources, administration and subsidy. This is followed by an outline of basic concepts 
of performance management related to universal service institutional arrangements and 
funding administration. The  key factors for efficient and effective universal service 
delivery are (1) performance accountability; (2) transparency with regard to performance 
information and public involvement; and (c) performance budgeting. The chapter 
concludes with a schematic outline of these factors as they might be mirrored in a best-
practice universal service model. This best practice model is drawn from ITU 
recommendations and international experience. 
The conceptual framework outlined in this section will be used in Chapters Three and 
Four to analyse the Vietnamese and New Zealand universal service schemes. 
                                               
5 Helnuth Cremer, Philippe Donder, Francois Boldron, Denis Joram and Bernard Roy ―Social Costs and Benefits of 
the Universal Service Obligation in the Postal Market‖ (2008) Institut d‘Economie Industrielle, at 2 <neeo.univ-
tlse1.fr/671/>. 
6 Nicholas Rose and Peter Miller Governing the Present (Polity Press, Cambridge, 2008) at 42.  
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II Universal Service Conceptual Framework  
A The Concept of Universal Service 
The concept of ‗universal service‘ refers to the idea that infrastructural utility services, 
such as electricity, transportation or telecommunications, should be available to every 
citizen.
7
 These services should be provided at affordable rates regardless of region or 
location, socio-economic status, ethnicity, gender or disability.
8
  
The modern concept of universal service originated in the United Kingdom in the 
nineteenth century with regard to the postal service.
9
 At its core was the concept of 
universal access to mail services.
10
 This concept appeared in telecommunications where 
it was first put forward by Theodore Newton Vail in 1908 with the slogan ―One Policy, 
One System, Universal Service‖ - this was in an American Telephone & Telegraph (AT 
& T) advertisement.
11
 In general, this phrase encapsulated an economic and legal 
concept referring to the provision of basic telephone services to every resident of the 
country at a reasonable or affordable price. It was eventually adopted as a national 
policy in the United States Communications Act 1934
12
 and then further codified in the 
United States Telecommunications Act 1996. It was also adopted more widely in 
Europe, such as in the EU Postal Services Directive 97/67/EC and the 
Telecommunications Directive 2002/22/EC (2002).
13
 It is now used widely in the 
contexts of health care, primary schooling, electricity and energy supply, water and 
                                               
7 Scott Wallsten ―Using Competitive Bidding to Reform the Universal Service High Cost Fund‖ (2009) Technology Policy Institute, at 6 
<www.techpolicyinstitute.org/files/using%20competitive%20bidding%20to%20reform%20the%20universal%20service%20high%20
cost%20fund1.pdf>. 
8 InfoDev Programme of the World Bank ―ICT Regulation Toolkit: Module 4 Universal Access and Service‖ (2012) 
InfoDev and International Telecommunications Union, at 1 <www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/en/index.html>.  
9 The hallmarks of early universal service originated from Rowland Hill‘s proposals in 1837 for post office  reforms 
with a reduction of postal rates to uniform affordable rates and irrespective of distance of transmission throughout 
England, which was reviewed and reported by the Government in 1839 then introduced in 1840. See A D Smith ―The 
Development of Rates of Postage: A Historical and Analytical Study‖ (PhD, University of London, 1917), at 24. 
10 Robert Cohen, Matthew Robinson, John Waller and Spyros Xenakis ―The Cost of Universal Service in the U.S. and 
Its Impact on Competition‖ (paper presented to the Future of Universal Postal Service in the United States, The 
Brookings Institution, 18 June, 2002), at 1 <www.postalreporter.com/cost.htm>.  
11 History of AT & T ―One Policy, One System, Universal Service‖ <www.corp.att.com/history/milestone_1908.html>.  
12 The United States Communications Act 1934 s 1 defined its purpose as ―to make available, so far as possible, to all 
the people of the United States… with adequate facilities at reasonable charges‖.  
13 European Parliament and the Council‘s Directive 2002/22/EC 2002 s 8 stated that ―A fundamental requirement of 
universal service is to provide users on request with a connection to the public telephone network at a fixed location, 
at an affordable price‖.    
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sanitation.
14
 By the end of 2009, some 132 of 193 countries worldwide had adopted 
universal service obligations in telecommunications.
15
  
1 Universal service 
Universal service policies in telecommunications target service delivery either at 
household or community level.
16
 In the latter case, the service is commonly described as 
‗universal access‘, which implies that use of the service is shared, such as at public 
payphones or telecentres. Universal access is seen as the precursor to universal service.
17
 
While universal service is usually measured as the percentage of individual or household 
penetration, the focus of universal access is on the public points where everyone can 
access the service.
18
 Hence, assessment of universal access is often based on a 
percentage of geographical coverage, particularly in rural areas.
19
  
While universal service may be a feasible policy objective in developed countries, a 
focus on universal access objectives seems more achievable and practical for developing 
countries.
20
 The focus of universal service policy on universal access, with the use of 
universal services at shared levels, would mitigate subsidies to rural populations and 
minimise levies on telecommunications operators in developing countries, which 
typically challenge the limited financial resources and low density of 
telecommunications services, particularly in rural and isolated areas.  
2 Availability, affordability and accessibility 
Availability, affordability and accessibility are the hallmarks of universal service 
policies.
21
 These three criteria are important for and relevant to both approaches 
(universal service and universal access) but in different ways and to different degrees. 
                                               
14 InfoDev Programme of the World Bank, above n 8, at [1].  
15 International Telecommunications Union ―Recent Regulatory Trends from Around the Globe‖ (ICT Regulatory 
News, 2010), at 9. 
16 InfoDev Programme of the World Bank, above n 8, at [1.1.1].   
17 Ibid, at [1].   
18 Ibid, at [1.1.1]. 
19 Karine Perset ―Leveraging Telecommunications Policies For Pro-Poor Growth Universal Access Funds With 
Minimum-Subsidy Auctions‖ (paper submitted to the POVNET Infrastructure for Poverty Reduction Task Team 
workshop, Berlin, 27-29 October 2004), at 5. 
20 Patrick Xavier ―Universal Access to Telecommunications in a Competitive Environment‖ in Aaditya Mattoo, Julia 
Nielson and Hindegunn Kyvik Nordas (eds) Liberalisation and Universal Access to Basic Services: 
Telecommunications, Water and Sanitation, Financial Services, and Electricity (OECD and The International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, The World Bank, 2006) 25 at 27. 
21 InfoDev Programme of the World Bank, above n 8, at [1].  
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Availability, which particularly emphasises the development of network coverage 
throughout a country
22
 so that residents can access universal services or use them on 
request if they find it affordable, is a typical focus of universal access policies.
23
 On the 
other hand, universal service policies that focus more on the availability of service for 
private use by every individual or household may emphasise improved affordability by 
supporting those who are otherwise unable to use services even if they are available.
24
 
Availability means that services are available to residents through public, shared or 
individual devices.
25
 Living in a high cost, rural or remote area ought not affect a 
person‘s ability to access communications services.26 Mobile service has reached a 
greater level of penetration than fixed networks in many developing countries.
27
 This 
change is now recognised as an opportunity for the much more rapid achievement of 
universal service policy than was thought possible even a decade ago.
28
  
Availability needs to be clearly distinguished from ‗use‘ in universal service policies.29 
While availability refers to the percentage of households with access to services, the 
term ―use‖ means the percentage of households that actually subscribe to the service.30 
This distinction, which can be blurred with regard to voice telephony, is very important 
for broadband service. The underlying reason is that there is normally a significant gap 
between the percentage of households with access to broadband service and the 
percentage of households actually using it.
31
 A significant number of residents at 
household level in rural areas may not be able to afford to use broadband services due to 
the requirement of expensive end-user equipment such as computers or smartphones.      
Affordability and accessibility mean that everyone can afford services and no one is 
disadvantaged either by their level of income or level of physical and mental ability in 
                                               
22 Intelecom Research and Consultancy Limited ―Universal Access and Service (UAS) and Broadband Development‖ 
(paper presented to the World Bank‘s Workshop, Washington, 23 November 2009), at 6.  
23 Arturo Muente-Kunigami and Juan Navas-Sabater Options to Increase Access to Telecommunications Sevices in 
Rural and Low-Income Areas (World Bank, Washington, 2010) at 1-2. 
24 InfoDev Programme of the World Bank, above n 8, at [1.1.1]. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Xavier, above n 4, at 10.  
27 InfoDev Programme of the World Bank, above n 8, at [1.2.1]. 
28 Ibid.  
29 Stanford Levin ―Universal Service and Targeted Support in a Competitive Telecommunications Environment‖ 
(2010) 34 (1-2) Telecommunications Policy 92 at 92. 
30 Ibid, at 93.   
31 Ibid.  
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terms of access to and use of telecommunications services, particularly vulnerable, 
disadvantaged consumers.
32
 Service take-up by low-income users often depends on the 
removal of price and non-price barriers.
33
 Residents in high-cost (such as rural and 
isolated) areas may not be able to afford these services without subsidies. Regulators and 
telecommunications operators, however, are aware that lower prices and few outgoing 
calls by residents in rural areas connected to essential services would increase 
commercial viability. In addition, their staying connected to services benefits other end-
users‘ communications and operators‘ business in other services. Thus, the majority of 
operators provide service access at a reasonable price so as to enable subscribers to stay 
connected even if they make few outgoing calls.
34
 
As a key goal of universal service policies is to provide telephone services at affordable 
rates, it can be important for regulators and policy-makers to determine what these rates 
are.
35
 Quantitative measurement of affordability involves estimating the percentage of 
income that households may be able or willing to spend on services, and hence the price 
of the service.
36
 According to the ITU, the ICT (Information and Communication 
Technology) Price Basket is a benchmarking tool for measuring the cost of services and 
an indication of affordable services between countries over periods of time.
37
  
While end-users in developed countries pay under 1% of the average national monthly 
income for broadband connections, in many developing countries even a slow broadband 
connection costs many times the average monthly income. For example, the 2009 ITU 
ICT basket showed that people in developed countries spent relatively less of their 
income (1.5%) on ICT services compared to people in developing countries (17.5%).
38
 
In 2010, the ICT Basket indicated that high-income earners in the top ten economies 
enjoyed the cheapest relative broadband prices, and paid less than 1% of their income 
(average monthly GNI per capita), compared with those in 19 other developing countries 
where comparable broadband services cost more than 100% of average income. In some 
countries (Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Guinea and Malawi), broadband prices are ten times the 
                                               
32 Xavier, above n 4, at 9. 
33 InfoDev Programme of the World Bank, above n 8, at [1.2.2].  
34 Ibid.  
35 Msimang, above ch 1, n 5, at 35. 
36 Ibid.  
37 International Telecommunications Union ―Measuring the Information Society 2012‖ (Geneva, 2012), at 65.  
38 Sundberg, above ch 1, n 14, at 8. 
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monthly average income.
39
 This illustrates that they remain unaffordable for many 
citizens, and are obviously more affordable in developed economies and less so in 
developing countries.
40
  
B Universal Service Rationales/Objectives 
Over the last two decades an increasing number of governments have established 
universal service policies.
41
 The reasons for pursuing these policies vary from country to 
country, as governments promote them in an attempt to achieve objectives that are often 
unique to each country.
42
 The principal objectives are: 
(1) The promotion of full participation in an information society; 
(2) The promotion of economic productivity and growth; 
(3) The promotion of economic, political and social cohesion;  
(4) The improvement of delivery of government services; and  
(5) The elimination of economic and social disparities. 43 
Each of these five factors is examined more fully below.   
1 The promotion of full participation in the information society and digital economy 
Access to telecommunications services has been increasingly viewed by policy-makers 
as a basic right of all citizens, and essential to full membership in society.
44
 Today, 
telecommunications and Internet access in particular are crucial for far more than 
personal and business communications. They have become essential for delivering all 
types of information, goods and services to the public.
45
 Broadband services have 
become more important as an ever larger proportion of the population depends more and 
                                               
39 International Telecommunications Union ―Measuring the Information Society 2011‖ (Geneva, 2011), at 71. 
40 International Telecommunications Union ―The World in 2013: ICT Facts and Figures‖ (press release, 27 February 
2013). 
41 Msimang, above ch 1, n 5, at 29.     
42 Ibid, at 30.  
43 See Msimang, above ch 1, n 5, at 30 and International Telecommunications Union ―Trends in Telecommunication 
Reform 2008: Six Degrees of Sharing: Summary‖ (2008), at 14. 
44 InfoDev Program of the World Bank, above ch 1, n 6, at [6.1.2]. 
45 Ibid. 
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more on them on a day-to-day basis.
46
 Broadband is recognised as an essential tool for 
business, education, health care and participation in the digital economy.
47
  
An enormous growth in social media networks, blog sites and online shared user-
generated content in the last few years also demonstrates the benefits and opportunities 
that broadband services bring to people on a daily basis.
48
 Thus, without access to 
telecommunications, citizens risk becoming increasingly marginalised members of 
modern society.
49
 There is a growing recognition throughout the world of the importance 
of broadband in the digital world.
50
 In addition, the need for deployment of broadband 
services to meet the growing demands of the information society and to ensure that 
citizens are not left out of the digital economy is a concern for many regulators 
worldwide.
51
 
2 The promotion of economic productivity and growth 
The relationship between economic growth and telecommunications development is 
complex. An increasing amount of research suggests that deployment of 
telecommunications services, especially broadband services, leads to GDP growth. The 
extent to which this is true varies in different studies, due to the use of different data sets 
and measurement models.
52
 In particular, Qiang concludes that every 10% increase in 
broadband penetration has brought an additional 1.21% or 1.38% points of GDP growth 
in high-income or low and middle income economies respectively.
53
 Other research in 
22 OECD countries for the period 2002-2007 indicates that more broadband penetration 
could contribute to greater GDP growth rates. An increase of 1% in adoption of 
broadband can generate 0.008%, 0.014% or 0.023% of GDP growth rates in countries 
with low (under 20%), medium (between 20 and 30%) or higher (more than 30%) 
                                               
46 Levin, above ch 1, n 9, at 4. 
47 International Telecommunications Union ―Trends in Telecommunication Reform 2008: Six Degrees of Sharing: 
Summary‖ (2008), at 14 <www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg/publications/Trends08_exec_A5-e.pdf>.  
48 Sundberg, above ch 1, n 14, at 8. 
49 InfoDev Programme of the World Bank, above ch 1, n 6, at [6.1.2]. 
50 Sundberg, above ch 1, n 14, at 18. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Raul Katz ―The Impact of Broadband on the Economy: Research to Date and Policy Issues‖ in Theresa Miedema 
(ed) Trends in Telecommunications Reform 2010/2011: Enabling Tomorrow‟s Digital World (International 
Telecommunications Union, Geneva, 2011) 23 at 30. 
53 Christine Qiang and Carlo Rossotto ―Economic Impacts of Broadband‖ in Mohsen Khalil, Phillipe Dongier, Velerie 
D‘Costa, Christine Qiang, Peter Smith, Randeep Sudan, Eric Swanson and Bjorn Wellius (eds)  Information and 
Communications for Development 2009: Extending Reach and Increasing Impact (World Bank, Washington, 2009) 
35 at 45.  
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broadband penetration rates respectively.
54
 Thus, a key objective of many governments 
is the use of broadband to promote economic productivity and growth.
55
  
3 The promotion of economic, political and social cohesion  
Access to telecommunications and Internet services ensures that citizens living in rural 
and remote communities or low-income people can participate in a nation‘s political, 
economic and social development regardless of their geographical limitations or 
isolation.
56
 The ITU considers that filling the information gap between rural and urban 
areas, and between lower-income and higher-income citizens through universal service 
programmes, contributes to social, political, economic and financial cohesion for 
residents in rural areas.
57
  
4 The elimination of economic and social disparities between the „information rich‟ and 
the „information poor‟ in access to telecommunications and Internet services 
The gap between people who have ready access to telecommunications and Internet 
services and those who do not can be measured in several ways. It can be a geographical 
disparity between rural and urban users, or an economic gap between lower-income and 
higher-income citizens. Narrowing or eliminating these gaps is often a core objective of 
universal service policies.
58
 In the least developed countries, more than 50% of the 
population is rural, but only 12% of the telecommunications infrastructure serves these 
areas.
59
  
5 The improvement of delivery of government services  
Access to telecommunications and Internet services enables government organisations to 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the delivery of services, such as health care 
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and education.
60
 The deployment of broadband networks also facilitates the evolution of 
new applications in providing various combinations of voice, data and multimedia 
services.
61
 In addition, broadband (fixed and wireless) networks allow customers to 
access Internet services at high-speed any time and anywhere, and with greater 
mobility.
62
 Accordingly, an ever larger proportion of the population depends on the 
Internet on a daily basis.
63
  
C Universal Broadband Access  
Throughout the 20
th
 century, telecommunications policies in most advanced economies 
promoted ―universal service‖ for fixed line telephony.64 In addition, services for disabled 
persons, or institutions (such as hospitals or schools), as well as directory enquiry or 
emergency services, and support services for Internet subscribers (such as help-lines, 
and training for educational institutions) are often included in universal service 
schemes.
65
   
The universal service definition, however, has never been static and has varied according 
to market conditions, public demand
66
 and changes in technology and services.
67
 Indeed, 
the definition needs to be expanded as voice calls can now be made through varied 
protocols, including mobile networks or wireless telephones, or VoIP calls via Internet.
68
 
The question of whether broadband services should be included in universal service 
schemes has become a highly controversial topic.
69
  
At the same time, competitive neutrality and non-discrimination between technology and 
services are important principles of universal service policies.
70
 An increase in 
communications facilities and technological innovation, and networks being built with 
new kinds of technology has resulted in a range of possible definitions of universal 
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service compared to the traditional fixed telephone scope and definition.
71
 Subsidies for 
universal service delivery should not rely on one service or technology only.
72
 In 
addition, the definition of universal service should be based on customer demand.
73
 The 
variety of services that consumers are able to choose from, rather than simply or solely 
‗voice‘, is the measure of universal service.74 Broadband access should be included in 
universal service because broadband has become more important and essential for 
people, and policy-makers are accordingly increasingly taking action to include 
broadband access as part of universal service policies.
75
  
In practice, there is still a wide disparity in access to broadband services between 
developed and developing countries, and between regions of the world, despite the 
increase in broadband penetration worldwide during the last few years.
76
 The situation 
also holds true in regard to the availability of mobile broadband services (See Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Broadband subscription per hundred inhabitants (2007-2012)
77
 
 Active mobile broadband subscription  
(per 100 inhabitants) 
Fixed (wired) broadband subscription  
(per 100 inhabitants) 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Developed  18.5 27.4 36.6 42.9 55.1 63.3 18.0 20.5 22.0 23.6 24.7 25.9 
Developing  0.8 1.6 3.0 4.4 8.2 13.3 2.3 2.9 3.5 4.2 4.9 5.5 
Worldwide  4.0 6.3 9.0 11.3 16.6 22.1 5.2 6.1 6.9 7.6 8.4 9.1 
The ITU Broadband Commission for Digital Development in its 2010 declaration 
emphasised to government leaders around the world that social and economic 
development depends on accessible and affordable broadband access as a civil right.
78
 It 
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challenged governments globally to ensure that ―more than half of the world‘s people 
have access to broadband networks by 2015‖.79 
A survey of customers in 26 countries, commissioned by the United Kingdom‘s BBC 
World
80
 in 2010, surveying 27,973 people (including 14,306 Internet users) showed that 
87% of respondents who use the Internet said they believe that Internet access should be 
considered a ‗fundamental right of all people‘. Moreover, 71 % of non-Internet users 
agreed with that statement.  
In 2012 the ITU Report recorded that more than 130 governments had adopted a national 
policy to promote broadband.
81
 Some developed countries have done so as part of their 
economic recovery plans while others have done so as part of their broader strategy to 
develop an information society and to extend universal access to telecommunications 
and Internet services.
82
 In 2012, over 40 countries had included broadband in their 
universal service or access definitions.
83
 
In summary, it can be seen that broadband services have become recognized as essential 
for every citizen and are present in most activities of individuals, organisations, 
businesses and government agencies. However, they remain unavailable or unaffordable 
for the majority of the world‘s population,84 especially those living in developing 
countries and in rural areas. Consequently, there is growing recognition at the highest 
government levels throughout the world of the importance of broadband.
85
 Many 
countries have begun to revise their policies on traditional universal service obligations
86
 
to include the deployment of accessible and affordable universal broadband technologies 
and services. 
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D Universal Service Funding Approaches 
There are five main mechanisms which are utilised to implement the funding of 
universal service policies: market-based reform, mandatory service obligations, cross-
subsidies, access deficit charges, and the establishment of universal service funds.
87
  
Traditionally, most countries use, or have used, more than one of these mechanisms to 
finance their universal service programmes. While internal cross-subsidies for universal 
service delivery provided by an incumbent are argued to be impractical and anti-
competitive,
88
 the mechanism of access deficit charges
89
 is also criticised for its 
inefficiency and potentially anti-competitive subsidies.
90
 An increasing number of 
countries adopted the universal service fund as the best option,
91
 except those countries 
(such as New Zealand) with a model of ex post reimbursement. Presently 66 countries 
have established or adopted plans for setting up universal service funds.
92
 These funds 
allow more flexibility than mandating a particular operator to use a specific prescribed 
technology. They are also seen by some countries as more transparent, and able to be 
designed to be competitively and technologically neutral.
93
  
Some countries prefer other financing mechanisms, such as public-private partnerships 
and non-government organisations.
94
 There are costs in administration of the funds and 
other possible problems. Given that Vietnam has a universal service fund, the following 
section will review sources of universal service funds and their administration with 
institutional arrangements, and subsidies.  
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1 Institutional arrangements for universal service funds  
In the majority of countries with universal service funds, the fund is managed directly by 
a regulator (either a government Ministry or a government-established regulator) or in 
some cases, by an advisory or management board specially created to represent the 
interests of rural stakeholders, the telecommunications industry and the regulator.
95
 
Some countries set up either separate banks or trusts to manage the funds (eg Nigeria 
and Peru), or create an independent agency or company (eg France and the United 
States).
96
 An Intelecom survey of 67 countries in 2011 showed that a majority (64%) of 
universal service funds are managed by a regulator, while another 23% are overseen by a 
government department or agency. Only 13% are entrusted to a private company or 
some other body.
97
 
Regardless of the institutional location of universal service fund administration, the 
entity in charge of managing the Fund and its operations should have clearly defined 
rules, principles and guidelines.
98
 Principles for good governance, among others,
99
 are 
the cornerstone of the success of universal service fund administration.
100
 Institutional 
arrangements for universal service fund administration should emphasise the importance 
of accountability, transparency and efficiency,
101
 and independence,
102
 which are 
fundamental for effective administration.  
Transparency requires active and substantial participation of telecommunications 
operators and end-users (public and stakeholder involvement) in the process of 
formulating and monitoring the outcomes of universal service policies in relation to 
policy objectives. This relates particularly to ensuring appropriate estimations of 
financial resources required for universal service delivery. In addition, performance 
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measurement and monitoring requires the generation, collection, analysis, reporting and 
utilisation of basic information about the performance of universal service administrators 
and programmes.  
Finally, determining the actual needs of citizens is essential for setting up appropriate 
universal service policies. Accordingly, their design should be one in which the 
government sets goals, and community representatives, telecommunications operators 
and citizens are actively involved in the implementation. This helps to align sufficient 
financial resources (including budget, human resources, political support and legal 
documents) with final goals (intended outputs and outcomes). The administration of 
universal service delivery should include a mechanism for coordinating, monitoring, 
evaluating and reporting that enables resources to be managed flexibly in terms of 
realistic outcomes.  
(a) Accountability 
Accountability for the management of universal service funds requires that the funds are 
accountable to all external stakeholders or interested parties for the way in which they 
conduct their operations over a given period.
103
 In order to ensure the accountability of 
universal service funds‘ administrators, certain key tools have emerged from both global 
experience and good practice.
104 
 
Firstly, a universal service fund must have separate accounting systems for its 
operations, including its own bank accounts and associated accounting procedures.
105 
This distinct system should be exclusively used for the purpose of universal service, and 
should not be mixed with any other regulatory activities where the regulator is the fund 
administrator, or linked in any way with other institutions which may manage the day-
to-day operations of the fund.
106
 Transparent accounting of fund administration enables 
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effective monitoring and tracking of all funding practices,
107
 and contributes to increased 
accountability of fund administrators.           
Secondly, all fund administration operating procedures must be transparent. A manual of 
operating procedures should be developed and published.
108
 It should include rules about 
operational issues such as procurement, project selection criteria, competitive tendering 
processes and procedures, subsidy procedures, and participation rules in the case of 
public-private partnership.
109
 
Thirdly, there must be a clear governance framework provided both in legislation and in 
the manual of operating procedures.
110
 The governance manual should include issues 
such as the general constitution, the role and function of the fund, the Board, Executive 
and staff, the management of finances, and reporting requirements.
111
 This enhances the 
performance accountability of the authorities involved in the administration and 
measurement of service delivery and avoids diffuse or overlapping responsibilities.   
Fourthly, well-crafted service agreements and contracts ensure increased accountability 
by shifting performance risk.
112
 This contributes not only to effective monitoring and 
evaluation through the alignment of subsidies to agreed outputs by the universal service 
providers, but also to the performance accountability of universal service fund 
administrators.   
Fifthly, annual reports should be published, accounting for monies spent and setting out 
details of activities, levies collected, subsidies and any other key issues that have 
affected the fund in the reporting year.
113
 This leads to the effective engagement of 
stakeholders and the public in monitoring the fund administration.  
Sixthly, periodic reports should be provided to the relevant stakeholders and also 
available publicly, which could enhance the effective monitoring and evaluation of 
                                               
107 Msimang, above n 92, at 102.  
108 InfoDev Programme of the World Bank, above n 8, at [4.3.2] and [5.3.2]. 
109 International Telecommunications Union, above n 98, at 29. 
110 Ibid. 
111 InfoDev Programme of the World Bank, above n 8, at [5.3.2]. 
112 Msimang, above n 92, at 102.  
113 International Telecommunications Union, above n 98, at 29.  
47 
 
programmes and projects undertaken.
114
 Regular reports ensure both performance 
accountability of fund administrators and community awareness.  
Finally, financial accounts must be independently audited annually, and the results made 
available publicly.
115
 Similarly, the recipient of universal service funding must regularly 
provide an audited report on its progress and performance of projects. 
In summary, all these factors contribute to ensuring the transparency and performance 
accountability of universal service fund administrators and associated authorities for the 
benefit of both external stakeholders and the public.     
(b) Efficiency 
Careful administration as well as effective estimation of subsidies, and market-driven 
distribution mechanisms could ensure minimum required levies and avoid wasteful 
distribution.
116
  
Inefficient administration of universal service funds is often seen in the slow 
implementation of projects, due to inappropriate, slow or expensive performance.
117
 
Stern and Townsend in their report on universal access in Latin American countries 
concluded that a major problem with most of these funds was their inability to 
effectively subsidise money collected to finance universal service projects, where all or 
large portions of the resources which had been collected remained unspent.
118
 In 2011 an 
Intelecom survey came to the same conclusion. The percentage subsidisation of 
universal service funds in non-OECD countries is about 33%, compared with 99% 
subsidisation in high-income OECD countries.
119
 This reflects the poor performance of 
funding mechanisms in developing countries, compared with developed countries.  
In addition, properly designed competitive tendering can generate incentives to contain 
costs, to innovate, and to reveal the true cost of delivering universal services, thus 
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minimising the subsidy required
120
 and the levies placed on telecommunications 
operators. This can be a significant advantage, since difficulties in estimating the net 
costs of providing universal services can make the designation of a universal service 
provider difficult.
121
 
(c) Transparency 
Transparency is an essential feature of accountability. Accordingly, the transparent 
administration of universal service funds is fundamental to the economic efficiency and 
effectiveness of universal service policies. Moreover, transparency is one of the key 
criteria for a pro-competitive universal service policy.
122
 In order to ensure transparency, 
along with those regulations included in the Manual of Operating Procedures, rules for 
recipients of financing, compliance, and reporting requirements are mandatory.
123
  
In addition, consultation processes and requests for input on major decisions such as 
auction design, request for proposals and contracts, and key policy issues (such as 
definition of under-served areas, eligible beneficiaries and eligible bidders) should be 
conducted publicly.
124
 Any redefinition of the scope, delivery and funding of universal 
service should be conducted on the basis of a transparent systematic review, to clarify 
objectives and targets pertinent to the country.
125
 
2 Sources of universal service fund 
Universal service funds collect revenue from a variety of sources. These include 
governments‘ general budget, industry levies, various other regulatory revenues such as 
licence fees and one-off contributions, loans or grants from donors.
126
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(a) Industry levies 
Most of the literature relating to universal service funds is concerned with whether they 
should be financed from levies on the telecommunications industry itself or general 
taxation revenues. Some theorists, for example Atkinson-Stiglitz, argue that the best way 
to redistribute income may be directly, such as through the taxation of income.
127
 These 
authors see indirect manipulation of the relative price of goods and services as 
inefficient. Laffont and Tirole (2000) argue that the logic behind the Atkinson-Stiglitz 
conclusion is too simple. While the government may want to redistribute assets and 
wealth from the rich to the poor, it should not decide what consumers want to 
consume.
128
 Crandall and Waverman, however, argue that if telecommunications 
services, especially universal services, are currently considered to be so socially 
important as to require a re-distribution of income from some sections of the population 
to others, then this should be achieved from the government purse and the general 
taxation system.
129
  
In practice, in a general tax system, governments allocate a fixed percentage of the 
national budget to cover the costs of public service delivery.
130
 This system is used to 
fund schemes to provide gas, electricity and water. While less frequent, a number of 
countries also rely on general taxation revenue to fund their universal service 
programmes. A universal service fund financed in part or wholly from general taxation 
revenues ensures a measure of security and consistency that permits long term planning 
for universal service programmes. It also guarantees that the burden of providing 
universal services is distributed across all sectors of the economy.  
                                               
127 Atkinson Anthony and Joseph Stiglitz ―The Design of Tax Structure: Direct versus Indirect Taxation‖ (1976) 6 
Journal of Public Economics 55 at 74. 
128 Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole Competition in Telecommunications (Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Press, Massachusetts, 2000) at 220-221. 
129 Robert Crandall and Leonard Waverman Who Pays for Universal Service? When Telephone Subsidies Become 
Transparent (Brookings Institute, Washington, 2000) at 21-22.   
130 Lisa Leidig ―An Assessment of Universal Service Funding in Canada‖ (2000) Ovum Ltd, at 20 
<www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/smt-gst.nsf/vwapj/ovum.pdf/$FILE/ovum.pdf>. 
50 
 
(b) Industry levies - how to determine levy levels   
Industry levies are the main source for universal service funding in most countries.
131
 
Therefore, determining the level of industry levies (universal service levies) plays a vital 
role in the implementation of universal service policies.  
After a country‘s universal service policy objectives and targets are designed, an 
estimated cost of meeting these goals can be determined.
132
 Total sector revenues are 
estimated from an analysis of operator revenues. The estimated cost of the universal 
service programme for the next year is estimated and then allocated to 
telecommunications operators as a percentage of annual gross or net revenue.
133
 By 
contrast, a market-driven approach employs a public consultation process, utilising 
surveys or assessment of operators‘ and other stakeholders‘ views, as well as 
international benchmarks, so as to determine what level of levy should be placed on 
telecommunications operators.
134
  
The determination of industry levies should be cost effective.
135
 This requires defining 
the net cost likely to be incurred for the delivery of universal services (inputs) and 
comparing it to outputs or even outcomes. Mandl indicates that there is no sense in 
measuring outputs or outcomes without the link with net costs being used for universal 
service delivery.
136
 An inappropriate determination of industry levies can result in either 
under- or over-collection. Moreover, over-collection imposes a cost on the industry, 
which is inevitably passed through to consumers in higher prices. 
The creation of so called ‗retrospective funds‘ is an option to ensure cost effectiveness 
and avoid the subsidy problem. In this model the percentage contribution is determined 
in advance, but payments only become due once the fund administrator has estimated 
them within a given year. This solution may be of help in solving concerns relating to 
the risk of unused collected revenues, the pace of commercial development and the over-
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collection problem.
137
 However, risks, such as operators not making the payments when 
required or funds being distributed to universal service projects too slowly, have to be 
managed.
138
  
(c) Regulatory sources 
In addition to levies on industry revenues, other potential sources of funding are: 
payments made on the award of a licence; annual licensing fees (either operating or 
spectrum licences); and amounts realised from the sale by government of interests in a 
service provider.
139
 For instance, in Australia, 5% of the proceeds from privatising the 
second tranche of Telstra‘s140 shares141 were allocated to improving conditions in rural 
areas.
142
 Other examples of licence auction proceeds being allocated to a universal 
service fund are: Ghana, with USD 50 million for the 6
th
 mobile licence and 3G in 2008, 
and Egypt, with USD 2.9 billion for the 3
rd
 GSM licence and 3G frequencies in 2006.
143
  
3 Allocating universal service levies  
Who should pay universal service levies and how to determine levels of universal 
service levies are controversial issues.
144
 A competitive environment and an equilibrium 
market structure challenges regulators to make the allocation and subsidies of universal 
service funds, and also share social benefits and costs.
145
 The determination should 
ensure technological and service neutrality and not discriminate between providers. In 
addition, universal service levies should be based on an economic analysis of a 
geographic area which takes into account the universal service requirements, and the 
number and nature of players in the market.
146
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(a) Who should pay universal service levies? 
Network operators, both fixed and mobile, are generally liable to pay universal service 
levies. Levies should be imposed on all telecommunications and Internet service 
providers (ISPs) (including VoIP service providers).
147
 Determination of which 
operators must pay levies should be neutral and non-discriminatory in terms of 
technology and services.    
In order to ensure affordability to pay universal service levies and minimise the impact 
on small providers, a minimum size limit (to be set at annual revenues or market shares 
of companies) can be set above which a service provider is required to pay.
148
 In Japan, 
telecommunications service providers who interconnect with universal service providers 
and earn over JPY 1 billion must contribute to the universal service obligation fund.
149
 
In New Zealand, the Telecommunications Amendment Act 2011 provides that the 
revenue threshold for becoming a person liable to pay universal service levies is NZD 10 
million
150
 (NZD 5 million for the period 2010-2011).
151
  
(b) Levels of universal service levies  
Most countries use the ‗eligible revenues‘ approach as the basis for the determination of 
universal service levies. In practice, the estimation of telecommunications service 
revenues has been difficult, due to rapid changes and development in services and 
technology that  affect the preferences and habits of customers using the services. The 
ITU recommends
152
 that revenue percentage contribution levels should not be set in law. 
Instead, levels of levies should be reviewed periodically so as to be aligned with policy 
objectives and market developments. In addition, allocation of levies should have a close 
link with the real costs for the delivery of universal services.  
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Recent research indicates that universal service levy rates of revenues range from 0.04% 
(Estonia) to 6% (Malaysia).
153
 According to Intelecom Research and Consultancy‘s 
survey in 2011, about 40% of countries imposed a rate of 1.5% or less, and another 28% 
imposed a rate of less than 1%.
154
 International experience also illustrates that no 
developing countries appear to have been able to subsidise more than 2% per year of 
sector revenues in their universal service programmes.
155
 Nearly 60% of total funds 
collected to date have not been paid.
156
 The average percentage of subsidised funds in 15 
developing countries (including Vietnam) was about 26%.
157
  
Although a considerable number of countries apply gross revenues for determining 
universal service levies,
158
 there are arguments in favour of collecting levies based on 
net (after-tax) revenues, or at least based on revenues minus required interconnection 
payments to other telecommunications operators.
159
 Regardless of whether levies are 
calculated before or after tax, they should be tax deductible.
160
 Deduction of some 
amounts from gross revenues avoids the potential for double levying of some operators 
and of imposing a heavy burden on new entrants, who are often levied more heavily than 
early-entry operators and typically face heavier net interconnection outflows than do 
well-established operators.
161
 
4 Administration of universal service funds  
Universal service fund subsidy plays an important part in the literature concerning 
universal service policies, and is a key focus of interest for many economists and policy-
makers.
162
 The general question of how subsidies from universal service fund are made 
covers a number of more specific questions. Target subsidies are the most effective 
means of financing universal access and service.
163
 The principal questions are: who 
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should get subsidies, what form should they take, and how should universal service 
providers be selected? 
(a) How service providers should be selected  
In the past, supply-driven approaches, which were measured by infrastructure 
deployment on a national level, were typically adopted for large universal service 
projects. A single provider, usually the incumbent, was selected to provide universal 
services over a wide geographical area with a narrow set of technologies.
164
 Lie argues 
that while top-down (supply-driven) approaches could still be used in some cases, where 
large-scale projects are undertaken, competitive methods of selecting universal service 
providers should be considered.
165
  
Contestable bidding has been identified as one possible method to identify the most 
efficient universal service provider and minimise subsidies. Contestable bidding for 
universal service often takes the benefits of in-market competition for granted.
166
 This 
can mitigate the duplicate investments in telecommunications infrastructure in high-cost 
(rural and isolated) areas. It can also help to avoid overestimated requirements for 
subsidies by the bidders or escape the price constraint by lowering quality.
167
 In 
addition, contestable bidding is a solution for dealing with asymmetric information 
factors between regulators and telecommunications operators in determining the net cost 
for the delivery of universal services. Accordingly, contestable bidding is probably the 
best way to arrive at the least actual subsidy for universal service delivery.
168
   
Some studies focus on the ‗reverse auction‘ for universal service. Milgrom proposed the 
idea of ‗reverse auctions‘ for universal service obligations more than a decade ago169 and 
since then, Weller has developed a more specific proposal.
170
 A reverse auction
171
 is a 
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possible option for achieving lower universal service fund subsidies.
172
 It is one in which 
companies bid for subsidies, and the firm which proposes the lowest subsidy to provide 
universal service wins.
173
  
Some countries
174
 have used this type of auction with some success. Experience from 
these countries demonstrates that this auction system can bring subsidies down 
substantially, and that expenditure is no greater than it would be without an auction. For 
instance,
175
 in Chile between 1995 and 1999, the average winning subsidy was about 
half the maximum subsidy offered for projects. Similarly, in Peru, in 1999-2000, the 
average winning subsidy was just 25 percent of the subsidy ceiling. These results show 
that this method of distributing funds for the delivery of universal services is both 
feasible and effective.
176
  
(b) Type of the subsidies 
Appropriate mechanisms for universal service subsidies, including types and levels, help 
in using fund resources efficiently and enhance technological development to benefit 
under-served and unserved residents, especially in rural areas.
177
  
Policies which focus on universal access target the availability of access to 
telecommunications and Internet services by providing subsidies for the development of 
telecommunications and Internet infrastructures in rural and isolated areas, and for the 
development of shared and communal access such as public service centres.
178
 These 
subsidies can be either by non-refundable subsidies or loans with favourable conditions, 
or through minimum subsidy auctions for projects which enhance public service access 
in rural areas.  
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On the other hand, a universal service policy whose target is universal service normally 
provides subsidies for enhancing the affordability of services for residents in rural and 
isolated areas. Types of subsidies for this policy include subsidies for end-user 
equipment, and monthly subscription fees or a fixed per minute calling cost.  
An increasing number of countries have included both universal access and universal 
service targets within their universal service policies.
179
 The key criteria for determining 
types and levels of subsidies from universal service funds should be cost-based and one-
off subsidies for universal access, to encourage cost-effective delivery of universal 
service in non-viable economic areas, linked to optimal outputs/outcomes.
180
 One-off 
subsidies would avoid too much dependence of operators on subsidies without a 
willingness to reduce costs. Various means of improving the cost-effective subsidies, for 
example competitive auctions, have been explored.
181
 One-off subsidy is a good option 
not only for selecting the most economically efficient universal service provider,
182
 but 
also for projects that develop telecommunications and Internet infrastructures and public 
service access centres in rural and isolated areas.
183
     
(c) Who should be subsidised  
Universal service policies, whether with regard to availability or use, are targeted at un-
served geographic areas and towards customers who cannot obtain a competitively 
provided service. Appropriate determination of priority target groups (beneficiaries) and 
geographical locations (universal service-qualified areas) enable governments to 
enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of universal service funds.
184
 In addition, 
determining what should be subsidised from these funds also helps to determine exactly 
which funds are needed, and to allocate universal service levies. Clear and appropriate 
statements by target groups help to mitigate unnecessary burdens levied on 
telecommunications operators while meeting public demand and contributing to the 
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sustainable outcomes of universal service delivery. Interventions and distortions in 
otherwise competitive markets, thus, could be limited accordingly.
185
  
There are a number of approaches to defining target areas and target population 
groups.
186
 Priority target groups and geographical locations (universal service-qualified 
areas) are those where it is uneconomic for private providers to offer services.
187
 
Telecommunications indicators, performance costs and demand estimates should be used 
in a comprehensive analysis of socio-economic conditions and demographic locations in 
order to determine universal service targeted groups and areas.
188
 Residents in the most 
remote, rural or isolated geographic areas should receive priority. Infrastructure and 
geographical service gaps could be used in defining the most precise target areas.
189
 This 
approach is adapted to the situation of NGNs (Next Generation Networks), whose 
deployment in many countries is still at an early stage.
190
  
In summary, there are a number of key requirements for efficient and effective 
performance of universal service delivery. They centre on two main concerns in public 
administration: institutional arrangements and funding administration. In order to ensure 
efficient and effective institutional arrangements, governments should ensure 
performance accountability and transparency. At the same time, funding administration 
should aim to achieve economic efficiency rather than create unnecessary financial 
burdens on operators, and to ensure competitive and technological neutrality, and non-
discrimination between operators.  
Part III of Chapter Two will review certain basic concepts of public administration that 
could serve as key factors for understanding and proposing the best possible practices of 
universal service institutional arrangements and funding administration.     
III Basic Concepts of Public Administration Related to Universal Service     
When universal service delivery is provided by a public monopoly or a regulated 
operator, governments have greater control over the activities and processes of the 
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provider. In a competitive universal service delivery market, where there can be a range 
of providers, governments as far as is possible need to ensure the best performance 
management practice.  
This section examines three fundamental issues - accountability, transparency, and 
efficiency and effectiveness - in some detail because universal service policies (as public 
policies) are increasingly dependent on best management practices in both the public and 
corporate sectors. This section focuses on performance accountability and transparency 
in the public sector. Accountability and transparency are widely accepted as 
foundational principles of performance management in public administration.
191
 In this 
thesis, they are also key factors that underpin proposals about reform in the provision of 
telecommunications universal service in Vietnam.  
A Performance Accountability  
Accountability is a key principle underlying the processes whereby public sector 
organisations carry out their functions and are accountable for their decisions or 
actions.
192
 Without accountability, governments and bureaucracies face many issues, 
high amongst them being potential corruption.
193
  
1 Concept of accountability  
Accountability can be defined in many ways. A common definition is the ‗obligation or 
responsibility
194
 of persons or institutions to ‗explain, answer, justify‘195 and ‗defend‘196 
‗their actions or what they have done and how well it has been done‘.197 They are 
required to ‗explain, answer (and) justify‘ to another party who will ‗observe, evaluate, 
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and scrutinise‘198 their performance and can give feedback, including reward and 
penalties.
199
  
A formal performance accountability relationship consists of four key components: 
control, answerability, responsibility, and responsiveness. 
Control: accountability aims to ensure that agents and subordinates respond in 
accordance with the expectations or directions of their superiors. Mulgan notes that the 
accountability of public officials and their superiors is based on essentially unequal 
relationships; officials take directions from their superiors and accept sanctions for 
unsatisfactory performance.
200
 Identifying who is responsible for political outcomes 
when different officials contribute to the decision and policy-making processes is a 
considerable challenge.
201
  
Answerability: involves both answering questions and apportioning blame.
202
 Public 
organisations have obligations to provide reasons for their actions, and why they fail to 
meet performance objectives.
203
 
Responsibility: accountability and responsibility are not exactly the same.
204
 
Responsibility involves an obligation and a possibility of being called to account, while 
accountability implies a compulsory requirement to account for an obligation.
205
  
Responsiveness:
206
 accountability places emphasis on governments meeting the 
preferences, and needs of people,
207
 or of key stakeholders.
208
 Responsiveness focuses 
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on making a government meet popular demands.
209
 Public agencies are expected to be 
responsive to other actors within the political system.
210
  
2 Types of accountability 
Accountability is classified in many different ways. These include political, public, 
managerial, professional, personal and organisational accountability, and financial, 
fairness and performance.
211
 The section provides a brief review of the six main kinds of 
accountability. 
(a) Hierarchical (also referred to as organisational) accountability relationships 
form what is traditionally known as accountability.
212
  
(b) Legal accountability relationships are consistent with hierarchical 
accountability relationships. They refer to the relationship between two 
autonomous agencies, and involve detailed external oversight of performance in 
accordance with performance obligations.
213
  
(c) Political accountability relationships enable managers to make choices in 
dealing with the concerns of key stakeholders and the general public.
214
  
(d) Financial accountability is based on law, regulation and agreement. Any public 
organisation is obliged to use public funds appropriately.
215
 
(e) Accountability for fairness requires public servants/organisations having 
responsibilities to treat all citizens fairly.
216
 Fairness accountability also involves 
protection from abuse of power.
217
 
                                               
209 Mulgan, above n 200, at 566.   
210 Hector Arambula ―Toward a Theoretical Framework of Accountability for Performance in Public Organisations: A 
Review and Research Agenda‖ (paper presented to the EGPA Conference, Rotterdam, 1-2 September, 2008), at 4.  
211 Behn, above n 197, at 6. 
212 Barbara Romzek ―Dynamics of Public Sector Accountability in an Era of Reform‖ (2000) 66 (1) International 
Review of Administrative Sciences 21 at 24.   
213 Ibid, at 25.  
214 Barbara Romzek ―Where the Buck Stops: Accountability in Reformed Public Organisations‖ in Patricia Ingraham, 
James Thompson and Ronald Sanders (ed) Transforming Government: Lessons from the Reinvention Laboratories 
(San Francisco, 1998) 197 at 198. 
215 Behn, above n 197, at 8. 
216 Ibid.  
217 Hughes, above n 192, at 246. 
61 
 
(f) Performance accountability involves fulfilling expectations of citizens in a 
satisfactory manner and being accountable to all citizens. In order to hold a public 
agency accountable, a clear benchmarking of performance (such as objectives or 
targets) must be established for the outcomes the agency will achieve, the 
consequences it will create, and how well it has done compared with the 
expectations that have been set for it.
218
  
3 Accountability: the shift to improved performance accountability 
The traditional public administration paradigm focuses mainly on efficiency, 
hierarchical authority (through law), procedure, process and professional accountability 
in both financial and legal senses.
219
 Certain problems arise in this model. One is related 
to the relationship between politics and administration. The politician can ―be 
accountable in the system, whereas the administrator is neutral and anonymous and not 
associated with particular policies‖.220 This means that administrators can avoid 
accountability if policy and implementation plans go wrong or fail. Their excuse can be 
that political leaders ordered them to implement such a policy or plan.
221
 Accountability, 
therefore, is always potentially problematic in the traditional model because of the 
political and bureaucratic interface.
222
  
The improvement of performance accountability is crucial for better public 
administration. It is essential to have an effective separation between politics and 
administration.
223
 Public organisations should also make roles, responsibilities, 
objectives, and citizens‘ requirements absolutely clear.224 This includes the delegation of 
responsibility to lower public levels
225
 and the encouragement of public involvement in 
policy, planning and designing, and implementation.
226
 Policy makers and administrators 
should ideally be open to examination, and to public comments and critique.
227
 Public 
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organisations should produce documents such as statements of functions and 
responsibility, organisational strategies, and codes of conduct. Plans are also important 
for accountability. Public agencies should also provide their performance information on 
outputs/outcomes through reports to external, independent organisations, and to the 
public.
228
  
However, there are still some accountability concerns in the new public management 
paradigm. Firstly, changes often occur in setting performance standards for individuals 
and agencies in the context of public sector reform.
229
 Therefore, to make public 
agencies accountable for performance, it is essential to establish ―expectations for the 
outcomes that agencies will achieve, the consequences that they will create, and the 
impact that they will have‖.230 Secondly, because it is challenging to identify 
organisational objectives and long-term outcomes, as well as citizens‘ demands, the new 
model is structured so as to improve relationships with citizens. Agencies are expected 
to improve the quality of public goods and services through disclosing details of 
administration to the public, and encouraging public participation in decision-making.
231
 
Public organisations must be accountable for financial expenditure and financial 
performance.
232
 Thirdly, as the focus of individual organisations is directly on their own 
objectives, priorities and budget management, their accountability to government policy 
and objectives can often be ignored.
233
  
A system of accountability helps clarify the key relationship between the administration 
of government and political systems.
234
 The overlap of public organisations‘ 
responsibilities and incomplete or unclear legal specifications are common issues for 
governments. These include the obligation of public organisations to be suitably 
responsive to the public in terms of provision of performance information and to 
encourage the public to be more involved in designing and monitoring policies.  
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The accountability methods of the New Public Management
235
 eliminate the 
politics/administration dichotomy and other issues of the old model. Public servants 
have adequate power and resources to conduct their mission. They are accountable for 
managing outputs and outcomes. However, there are still considerable gaps in the 
measurement of managerial accountability and performance. Furthermore, the 
requirement of effective accountability for ‗managing for outcomes‘ is different from 
that based on outputs and outcomes.  
B Transparency   
Transparency is an important feature of performance accountability.
236
 It helps assess the 
efficiency and effectiveness of government policies and programmes, and public 
organisations.
237
 Transparency, and openness and access to government-held 
information are broadly considered as remedies for the potential shortcomings in the 
operations of government in a democracy.
238  
1 The concept of transparency  
Transparency can be understood as ―the availability and accessibility of reliable, relevant 
and timely performance information‖.239 It is also a measure of the freedom of both 
internal and external parties to examine, evaluate,
240
 and give feedback or comment
241
 
on ―government‘s rules, regulation and decisions‖,242 and on ―policy intention, 
formulation and implementation‖.243 
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A public organisation‘s transparency can be assessed by the extent of accessibility to 
performance information about its processes which it makes available,
244
 and its 
willingness not only to respond to citizens,
245
 but also to encourage them to participate 
in and monitor its policy-making and performance.
246
  
The production of performance information has received considerable attention in public 
sector performance measurement and management. It contributes to systematic and in-
depth evaluation of public policies and programmes.
247
 Performance information and 
reporting of public programmes and how taxpayers‘ money is spent helps to demonstrate 
the performance accountability of government officers to the public, and builds public 
trust in government institutions.
248
 Performance information is significantly neglected by 
some governments. However, there is increasing evidence that using performance 
information leads to greater effectiveness.
249
  
Transparency can also enhance public support by creating more opportunities for public 
involvement, and encouraging public trust in the legitimacy of government actions.
250
 In 
the long term, it makes policy-making and implementation processes more equitable, 
efficient and effective,
251
 and reduces the need for duplication. Transparency helps lower 
the risk of both financial crisis
252
 and corruption. It calls both individuals and public 
organisations to a greater degree of performance accountability.
253
 The establishment of 
independent (auditing) agencies is one method of sponsoring greater answerability and 
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transparency.
254
 Independent agencies are free to scrutinise information and analyse 
financial issues, and thus can make crucial contributions to transparency.
255
 Democratic 
structures which private-public partnerships demand are also considered as successful 
transparency strategies.
256
 Democratic cultures and societies by their very nature 
improve transparency.
257
  
In order to obtain reliable, relevant and timely information about the performance of 
public organisations, it is essential to establish suitable measurements for their 
performance. These measurements should not simply be about accounting for finance or 
answering for performance, but also the quality of effective decision-making.
258
 This 
leads to the need for a system for acquiring different types of performance information, 
such as annual reports.
259
  
Performance information allows public managers to create logical flow and to link 
performance monitoring, performance evaluation and performance management.
260
 This 
helps performance information to be used effectively, such as for guiding programme 
planning and improving future performance.
261
  
As public organisations use public resources, they should be ready to explain where and 
how public money has been used. They should provide all essential financial 
documentation.
262
 This includes financial reports such as: financial statements and 
auditor‘s reports, statement of the aims and objectives of their organisation, a statement 
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on how the board or committee is appointed, its term of appointment and remuneration, 
performance standards, and any other commitments and liabilities.
263
 
2 Transparency: its problems in traditional and managerial models 
Insufficient transparency in public organisations is a problem in both traditional and new 
managerial models. The traditional management model is based mainly on hierarchical 
relationships.
264
 This is its main drawback.   
By contrast, in new managerial models, there is sometimes too much concentration on 
transparency which can negatively affect the performance of an organisation. An over-
concentration on transparency can create a reduction of decision making and promote 
rule-obsession in public organisations.
265
  
In the traditional management model there was a clear lack of transparency. This 
involved many factors: inappropriate law and regulation on information availability, lack 
of accessibility to performance information, and inadequate systems or methods for 
collecting evidence, monitoring, evaluating, forecasting and reviewing.  
By contrast, the New Public Management model, with support from politicians, has 
promoted decentralisation and deregulation, and has devolved much better budget 
management. However, it has not always succeeded in establishing perfect 
collaboration, nor coordination of systems and measurement techniques for strategic 
implementation. This has led to difficulties in collecting data needed to achieve the 
overall goals and outcomes.  
C Performance Budgeting: Efficiency and Effectiveness  
The third principal issue to be examined is financial efficiency and effectiveness 
(performance budgeting). Performance budgeting aims at enhancing expenditure by 
                                               
263 International Federation of Accounts ―Governance in the Public Sector: A Governing Body Perspective‖ (2001) 
International Federation of Accounts, at [298] <www.ifac.org/sites/default/files/publications/files/study-13-
governance-in-th.pdf>. 
264 Hughes, above n 192, at 241. 
265 Mark Bovens ―Public Accountability‖ in Ewan Ferlie, Laurence Lynn and Christopher Pollitt (ed) The Oxford 
Handbook of Public Management (Oxford University Press, New York, 2007) 182 at 194. 
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linking funding to the results of public policies and programmes.
266
 Performance 
budgeting focuses directly on the objectives of appropriate prioritisation of expenditures, 
and service efficiency and effectiveness.
267
 Appropriate prioritisation of expenditure 
refers to the allocation of funds to public programmes or policies which are most 
effective in meeting social needs.
268
 Efficiency refers to the delivery of services at the 
lowest possible cost without sacrificing quality.
269
 By contrast, effectiveness refers to the 
extent to which services deliver the benefits which it is supposed to deliver to society,
270
 
and whether stated objectives/targets are achieved.
271
 This indicates the relationships 
between the intended and actual effect of an activity.
272
 It requires both clear 
organisational objectives and measurement results, including long-term outcomes.
273
  
Effectiveness and efficiency concern the relationship between basic concepts of inputs, 
outputs and outcomes in the public funding/budgeting process.
274
 Efficiency is widely 
accepted by scholars as the output-input ratio.
275
 Effectiveness, on the other hand, relates 
to inputs or outputs with regard to the desired final objectives (eg public policies).
276
  
1 Basic concept  
Input is the first requirement for the measurement of efficiency and effectiveness. It is 
generally defined as all resources to be deployed in the production of an output and the 
eventual achievement of outcomes.
277
 This may include either monetary or non-
monetary resources.
278
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Output is assumed to be less influenced by external variables and more under the control 
of the performing organisation or institution.
279
 The lower the input for a given output or 
the greater the output for a given input, the more economically efficient the performance 
is.
280
 
Outcome, the last core concept, which is often blurred with output and sometimes used 
interchangeably,
281
 is defined as the achievement of the underlying objectives of (public) 
policies.
282
 Although similar to output, outcome may be influenced by multiple external 
factors, including regulatory frameworks, institutional arrangements, socio-economic 
background/situation, and country-specific features.
283
     
2 Measurement and improvement of efficiency and effectiveness 
Measurement and improvement of efficiency and effectiveness in public sector 
performance plays a key role in the political agenda of most countries.
284
 Assessments of 
efficiency involve measuring observed outputs over and against the utilised inputs in 
terms of maximum gains.
285
 The related information reflects efficiency by combining 
inputs and outputs, while the information collected, by comparing outputs and results, 
indicates gains. If the relevant component factors cannot be compared, neither inputs, 
outputs or results can provide true indicators of efficiency and effectiveness.
286
 Different 
methods have been developed to assess them,
287
 including the evaluation of indexes or 
performance indicators and efficiency frontiers.  
One way of evaluating efficiency and effectiveness is by using indexes and performance 
indicators of other or similar countries, such as public sector performance indexes and 
public sector efficiency indicators.
288
 This method is often criticised as being incapable 
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282 Mandl, Dierx and Ilzkovitz, above n 136, at 7.  
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of including information on the maximum possible achievements.
289
 Inter-country 
evaluations are regarded as a very useful way to compare a country‘s public 
performance with that of others, although they can give false readings about the 
functioning of a country‘s own economy.290 
An alternative method, reflected in much of the literature, is based on the concept of 
efficiency frontiers.
291
 This option demonstrates that efficiency can be improved either 
by increasing the level of output while keeping the input unchanged (output efficiency), 
or by maintaining a fixed level of output but reducing the amount of input incurred 
(input efficiency).
292
  
In summary, the evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness levels of public policies is 
vital for policy makers. It should be noted that no one approach is strictly preferable to 
any other regardless of the selection of performance indicators or efficiency frontiers - 
parametric or non-parametric methods, or a combination of these methods - to measure 
efficiency and effectiveness levels. In the final analysis the method chosen depends on 
the preference of policy-makers. With regard to the performance and measurement of 
universal service delivery, the evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness mostly 
involves funding arrangements, including allocation of levies and subsidies. Universal 
service levies should be kept to a minimum and subsidies should not be squandered.
293
 
In particular, allocation of levies should have a clear link with the actual costs of service 
delivery and should mitigate financial burdens on operators. On the other hand, subsidies 
should be cost-based effective and use the principles of Output-Based Aid (OBA)
294
 so 
as to ensure well-spent money, best benefits to appropriately identified beneficiaries and 
to link subsidies to the delivery of specific services, outcomes or outputs.
295
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IV A Possible Best Practice Model for Universal Service Policy 
The previous parts of this chapter have provided an overview of basic concepts relating 
to public administration and performance management, including foundational 
principles and approaches, which are parts of the core theoretical foundation for an 
analysis of universal service policies, and the management and funding mechanisms of 
universal service funds. These include major principles such as accountability, 
transparency and performance budgeting, which are key factors and vital requirements in 
ensuring and enhancing the success of public policies in terms of effectiveness and 
economic efficiency, while at the same time pursuing and balancing social policy 
objectives.      
An optimum universal service policy should include: (1) precise definition of the scope 
of these services in line with technological advancements and the needs of customers; 
and (2) models of universal service funding, revenue sources and governance structure 
of universal service funds.  
All these structures would need to have the following significant characteristics: (a) 
constant improvement of economic efficiency and effectiveness, (b) a focus on outcomes 
and outputs of universal service policies, (c) clear pursuit of social policy objectives, and 
(d) a focus on ensuring principles of accountability and transparency as precursory 
requirements of institutional arrangements for universal service fund administration. 
Finding the best blend of structures, regulatory frameworks, and funding models is an 
on-going process for most countries, although a best practice model must contain the key 
characteristics described above.  
These characteristics will be used in Chapter Five to analyse the universal service policy 
in Vietnam so as to propose an improvement of the universal service legal framework 
and institutional arrangements in that country, and a practical implementation in line 
with the optimum model of economic efficiency and effectiveness.  
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Below is a schematic outline of the key elements and processes which constitute the 
basis of universal service policies in a potential best practice or most economically 
efficient and effective model:
296
 
A Scope of Universal Services   
1) Traditional voice (fixed) telephone should continue to be included in universal service 
policies. However, policies should also take into account alternative voice services, 
either wired or wireless, dependent on specific geographical conditions, the needs of 
citizens, and costs.  
2) Broadband services should be included in universal service policies. However the 
definition should be specified according to the needs of customers in terms of required 
minimum speeds and applications of multiple/convergent services. 
B Institutional Arrangements for Universal Service Fund Administration  
1) The administrator of the universal service fund should be an independent 
agent/agency with a full-time administrator/CEO and a Board of Trustees or Board of 
Directors, which should consist of public sector representatives and external 
stakeholders (eg representing regulator and industry). 
2) The administrator should have separate accounting structures and systems for the 
operation of the universal service policies, and not be involved with any other regulatory 
activities, nor be linked with other institutions that may manage the daily operation of 
universal service funds. The accounts of universal service funds should be independently 
audited on an annual basis and the results made public. 
3) There should be specific and feasible rules for procurement, accounting standards, 
criteria for selection of universal service projects, competitive bidding processes and 
procedures, specified subsidy procedures, and rules about participation in cases of 
public-private partnership.  
4) There should be a clear governance framework for universal service funds provided in 
                                               
296 See general International Telecommunications Union, above n 98; InfoDev Programme of the World Bank, above 
n 8; InfoDev Programme of the World Bank, above ch 1, n 6; International Telecommunications Union, above n 146.  
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a legal framework and guidelines, including a description of the role of the Board, the 
roles of the executive and staff, and financial management and reporting mechanisms. 
5) There should be public periodic reports on the collection and subsidy of levies and 
other inflows, and on other key issues affecting the fund in a given year. 
6) Audited reports on the progress and performance of universal service projects should 
be provided regularly to responsible authorities, and made available to the public and 
stakeholders. 
7) All information related to the implementation of universal service policies should be 
available to stakeholders and to the public. 
8) Minimum administrative costs should be established or a ceiling set for the 
percentage of administrative costs in comparison to the resources of the universal service 
fund.  
C Sources of Universal Service Fund   
1) The determination of universal service fund revenue sources should follow principles 
of economic efficiency and avoidance of market distortion. 
2) There should be competitive neutrality and non-discrimination in determining 
telecommunications operators to contribute to universal service funds. 
3) Technology neutrality - there should be no discrimination by technology or by 
service. 
4) Transparency - there should be the opportunity for all stakeholders/interested parties 
to have access to information, to the maximum extent possible.  
5) The determination of universal service fund levies must ensure specific, predictable 
and sustainable arrangements, have a clear link with the costs of universal service 
delivery and be evidence-based.  
6) Determination of levy contributions should be arrived at by consultation with all 
stakeholders, and by a public process. Publication of final decisions, and any binding 
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regulations or rules should be available publicly.  
7) The actual percentage contribution should not be fixed in law so as to avoid the risk 
of under-collection or over-collection of levies.   
8) Levels of industry levies should be reviewed periodically (annually) to ensure 
alignment with policy objectives and market developments. 
9) Collection of industry levies should be delayed until projects or subsidies are clearly 
defined so as to avoid the risk of unused collected funds. 
10) Cost-based effectiveness should be used for determining the source and level of 
contributions from telecommunications operators. 
11) Industry levies should be allocated on the basis of net rather than gross revenues of 
telecommunications operators.        
D  Expenditure   
1) Determination of subsidy levels for universal service policies should follow cost-
based effectiveness or competitive bidding (reverse auction) processes depending on 
specific conditions. 
2) Target groups should be determined on the basis of appropriate geographical areas.  
3) Determination of targeted geographical areas: countries should be divided into 
different geographic target areas based on the existing broadband infrastructure which 
becomes the determinant of eligibility for subsidies (eg white areas for those without 
broadband infrastructure, grey areas for those with only one broadband provider and 
black areas where at least two or more broadband providers and broadband services are 
provided under competitive conditions). 
4) There should be use of reverse auctions as a means of determining subsidy from 
universal service funds with the lowest cost subsidy. Some key criteria need to be 
designed for reverse auctions: the process must be transparent, competitively and 
technologically neutral, reduce the reliance on detailed cost information, encourage cost 
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savings and market growth, and be used only to supplement the results of a subsidy.  
V Conclusion 
This Chapter has provided a framework of basic concepts concerning universal service 
policies and relevant approaches of public administration. It has shown that efficiency 
and effectiveness of public policies, including telecommunications universal services, 
involve improvement of institutional structures and the legal framework for budgeting 
arrangements.        
(1) Significant reforms in the telecommunications sector, particularly liberalisation and 
privatisation with the advent of multiple services through different technologies, have 
necessitated improvements for efficient and effective universal service delivery. These 
improvements have included the definition of services (universal broadband access) and 
funding arrangements (establishment of universal service funds and industry levies).   
(2) Customer demands for voice services have varied with different technologies. In 
addition, broadband access, which has become essential for people on a daily basis, 
should be included in the universal service definition. This requires an extension of the 
universal service definition, which in turn impacts on amendments to funding 
arrangements and administration.     
(3) The situation where a public monopoly operator for universal service delivery and an 
asymmetric obligation placed on a dominant service provider in a competitive market 
with internal cross-subsidised costs, presents significant obstacles to efficiency and 
effectiveness. The legal framework for institutional and funding arrangements needs to 
be improved in increasingly competitive markets.  
(4) The basic concepts of performance-based administration/management (management 
for outputs or outcomes), which particularly concern improvement of universal service 
institutional and funding arrangements, are performance accountability, transparency, 
performance information and public involvement, and performance budgeting.    
(5) Obstacles to institutional arrangements mostly concern the centralised model for 
public service delivery, including universal service policy. Too much power is retained 
at the centre instead of being delegated to lower levels of government organisations. The 
75 
 
centralised model also involves unclear and overlapping responsibilities among public 
administrators and organisations, insufficient accountability and lack of transparency 
without sufficient involvement of the stakeholder/public, and a general ineffectiveness 
and inefficiency of public policies, including universal service policy and 
implementation.   
 (6) Performance accountability and transparency help focus a public organisation‘s 
strategic management, and deal with complex issues of efficiency and effectiveness of 
public policies. Foremost amongst these are the establishment of appropriate regulations 
and procedures for performance, evaluation and monitoring. In addition, there is a need 
for appropriate performance information and a reporting system for measuring results 
and managing outcomes. Other matters include providing adequate guidance, incentives 
and penalties, and promoting appropriate communication and a collaborative culture. 
Nevertheless, all this can, at times lead to conflict, unclear vision, unrealistic proposed 
outcomes, and onerous demands on public organisations. 
(7) Modern performance budgeting focuses on funding arrangements and processes that 
strengthen the link between funding and results (outputs and outcomes) through the 
systematic use of performance information with the objective of improving efficient 
public programmes.
297
 Funding arrangements for universal service delivery, including 
allocation of levies and subsidies, should also emphasise cost-effectiveness and have a 
clear link with the real costs of service delivery (cost-based funding arrangements). 
Contestable bidding should be used as the best option for mitigating expenditures.          
 (8) Amendments to funding arrangements with the establishment of universal service 
funds and financial resources, mostly from industry levies paid by telecommunications 
operators, relate to allocation of levies and subsidies. These arrangements should ensure 
not only general principles of performance-based public budgeting but also competitive 
neutrality, non-discrimination and mitigation of levies without unnecessary financial 
burdens on telecommunications operators.  
The fundamental elements of a possible best practice model for universal service 
delivery and administration, which were outlined from international experience, will be 
                                               
297 Mark Robinson (ed) Performance Budgeting: Linking Funding and Results (Palgrave Macmillan, Washington, 
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used for reviewing the universal service model in New Zealand so as to identify the best 
practical features (Chapter Three). These characteristics and elements will be used to 
examine the model in Vietnam (Chapter Four) so as to propose a set of 
recommendations to institutional structures and the legal framework for funding 
arrangements (Chapter Five). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNIVERSAL SERVICE 
IN NEW ZEALAND 
  
I Introduction  
This chapter will review the development of universal service delivery in New Zealand 
during three principal periods: (1) the State monopoly period before 1987; (2) the period 
of light-handed regulation between 1987 and 2000; and (3) the industry-specific 
regulation period since 2001. The Chapter examines the legal framework and 
institutional arrangements for the New Zealand universal service model. The main focus 
is on the establishment of key institutional arrangements, and the funding mechanisms 
for universal service delivery with particular regard to:  
(1) transparent performance information and reporting systems;  
(2) effective performance accountability;  
(3) public and stakeholder engagement in the performance of universal service delivery; 
and  
(4) cost-effectiveness, competitive and technological neutrality in funding arrangements.  
The key features in the political context which favour or work against a best practice 
model theory are also reviewed. The current New Zealand universal service model has 
features close to the key best practice: transparency, effective monitoring with public 
and stakeholder involvement, performance accountability and publicly available 
performance information, and the on-going adjudication of commercial interests and 
funding arrangements by an independent judicial system. In addition, universal service 
funding arrangements (including the determination of universal service net cost and the 
allocation of universal service levies) reflect clear principles of cost-based effectiveness 
and competitive neutrality. The New Zealand model is still criticised for some issues 
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such as political interference or influence on the independence of the industry regulator
1
 
and inconsistent principles of broadband access regulation.
2
 This chapter concentrates 
mainly on identifying positive features in the New Zealand model, which could 
contribute to improvement in Vietnam, rather than emphasising or criticising the 
shortcomings of its institutional and regulatory arrangements.         
II New Zealand Profile 
A Socio-Political Profile 
New Zealand is an independent country and governed by an executive system, a one 
chamber parliament passes laws, with elections every three years.
3
 An independent 
judiciary is organised in a tiered court system. At the top is the Supreme Court. Below it, 
in descending order, are the Court of Appeal, the High Court and the District Courts. 
New Zealand has a diverse multicultural population of about 4.4 million people.
4
 The 
rural population decreased slightly between 2002 and 2010, and currently is about 
576,000, approximately 13.2% of the total population.
5
 Population density (people per 
square kilometre) ranges from less than five in remote areas to over 500 in main urban 
areas.
6
 
B Economic Background  
New Zealand has a free-market economy based largely on tourist and primary industries 
such as agricultural and related manufacturing industries. The economy depends heavily 
on international trade, mainly with Australia, China, the United States, and Japan.
7
 
Economic free-market reforms in the country since the 1980s have removed many 
barriers to foreign investment. 
                                               
1 Ross Pattesson ―Government interference doomed‖ Stuff (New Zealand, 10 December 2012).   
2 Bronwyn Howell ―Fit for Purpose? Examining the Current State of Broadband Regulation in New Zealand‖ (paper 
presented to the New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation‘s Seminar, Wellington, 6 March 
2013), at 24.   
3 Technically elections must be held within three years. They can be held earlier. 
4 Statistics New Zealand <www.tradingeconomics.com/new-zealand/gdp-growth-annual>. 
5 Statistics New Zealand <www.tradingeconomics.com/new-zealand/rural-population-percent-of-total-population-wb-
data.html>.  
6 Ibid. 
7 Statistics New Zealand ―New Zealand in Profile 2012‖ <www.stats.govt.nz>. 
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III TSO Legal Framework and Institutional Arrangements in New Zealand  
A State Monopoly Period before 1987  
The first communication system set up in New Zealand (1840) was postal one, which 
ensured the movement by sea or land of hand-written communications.
8
 
Communications services were formalised in the passage of the New Zealand Post 
Office Act in 1858. In 1862, New Zealand witnessed the construction of the first 
telegraph line in South Island.
9
 In 1865 the Government placed the country's growing 
telegraph networks under centralised control
10
 by setting up the Electric Telegraph 
Department.
11
 In 1881, the Government merged the Electric Telegraph Department into 
the National Post Office, creating the New Zealand Post and Telegraph Department, 
which became the New Zealand Post Office. The New Zealand Post Office extended its 
network throughout the country, and opened a series of bureau stations which from 1881 
combined telegraphic services with public telephones.
12
  
During the 20
th
 century (until 1987), telecommunications in New Zealand was a state 
monopoly (New Zealand Post Office). The New Zealand Post Office provided a wide 
range of public services and had a distinct social role.
13
 The Telecommunications Act 
1912 enabled people in rural areas to build their own telephone networks and link into 
the public network.
14
 The legal framework for telecommunications during this period 
was regularly revised and amended, including the Post and Telegraph Act 1908, the Post 
and Telegraph Act 1928 and the Post Office Act 1959.
15
 The latter Act, which was 
enacted during the period of economic expansion and general well-being from the end of 
                                               
8 Wilson A C Wire & Wireless: A History of Telecommunications in New Zealand 1890 – 1987 (Dunmore Press 
Limited, Palmerston North, 1994) at 20. 
9 The first official trial of a telephone link took place in 1877 in Blenheim. See Eli Noam, Seisuke Komatsuzaki and 
Duglas Conn Telecommunications in the Pacific Basin: An Evolutionary Approach (Oxford University Press, New 
York, 1994) at 395. 
10 Wilson, above n 8, at 28.   
11 Electric Telegraph Act 1865 s IV.   
12 Wilson, above n 8, at 28.    
13 Herbert Dordick ―New Zealand: Testing the Limits of Nonregulation‖ in Eli Noam, Seisuke Komatsuzaki and 
Duglas Conn (ed) Telecommunications in the Pacific Basin: An Evolutionary Approach (Oxford University Press, 
New York, 1994) 420 at 420.  
14 The Country Telephones-lines Act 1912 s 2.   
15 Patrick Mccabe ―New Zealand: The Unique Experiment in Deregulation‖ in Eli Noam, Seisuke Komatsuzaki and 
Duglas Conn (ed) Telecommunications in the Pacific Basin: An Evolutionary Approach (Oxford University Press, 
New York, 1994) 393 at 396.  
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World War II to the early 1970s,
16
 provided the legislative basis for the monopoly in 
public switched telecommunications services enjoyed by the Post Office until mid-
1987.
17
 This period is regarded as having had ‗a dominant influence on social attitudes 
and on politics alike‘.18 The country became a ‗welfare state‘ with a wide range of 
welfare benefits provided by the Government.
19
   
There followed a period of economic decline from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s
20
 
with poor productivity and growth performance in New Zealand.
21
 The economic 
situation of the country was relatively stagnant due to an increasingly ad hoc and 
restrictive set of regulatory interventions by government.
22
 The Labour Government, 
which came to power in 1972, aimed to move New Zealand towards becoming a social, 
democratic, egalitarian nation.
23
 The Government was focused on consumer interests, 
along with developing the efficiency of the economy.
24
 There was ample evidence that 
the performance of government trading activities was far from satisfactory in a wide 
range of ways - in fact so unsatisfactory as to make it worthwhile for the government to 
examine other options about its ownership role,
25
 which was argued as a mistake and 
unsuccessful.
26
 The National Government elected in 1975 was unable to reduce trade 
deficits, inflation or unemployment in the country over the next nine years. Economic 
reforms commenced more vigorously with the re-election of the Labour Party in 1984.
27
  
With regards to telecommunications, an approach close to the universal service in New 
Zealand had its historical origins in 1856 when there was the establishment of regulated 
                                               
16 Schechter P B ―Telecommunications in New Zealand: Competition, Contestability and Interconnection‖ (1995) 
University of Colorado, at 2 <pb.freeshell.org/nz.pdf>.  
17 Mccabe, above n 15, at 396.  
18 Keith Sinclair A History of New Zealand (Penguin Book, Harmondsworth, 1959) at 288.   
19 Dordick, above n 13, at 425. 
20 Schechter, above n 16, at 3.  
21 Ian Duncan and Alan Bollard Corporatisation and Privatisation: Lessons from New Zealand (Oxford University 
Press, London, 1992) at 5. 
22 Ibid.  
23 Dordick, above n 13, at 425. 
24 The Commerce Act 1975 s 2 provided that:  
 
―An Act to promote the interest of consumers and the effective and efficient development of industry and 
commerce through the encouragement of competition…‖ 
 
25 Duncan and Bollard, above n 21, at 9.  
26 Jack Nagel "Social Choice in a Pluralitarian Democracy: The Politics of Market Liberalisation in New Zealand" 
(1998) 28 (2) British Journal of Political Science 223 at 230.  
27 Schechter, above n 16, at 4.  
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postal tariffs at a single and uniform national rate in New Zealand.
28
 This was then 
applied to telegraph services in 1864. The social policy objective of this approach was to 
facilitate the provision of telegraph services to a rapidly increasing population 
nationwide with the development of an export-orientated, agriculture-based, ex-colonial 
economy.
29
 During this period, the Government had the monopoly of provision of all 
telephone services in the country.
30
 ―Free local calling‖ was introduced in New Zealand 
in 1880 so as to avoid charging for calls between telephone end-users connected to the 
same exchange. This approach referred to the practice of charging customers a fixed 
monthly rental, with free unlimited calls within a specified local region.
31
 The Post 
Office retained this ‗free local calling‘ service for telephone end-users. It was funded by 
internal cross-subsidies set up under the Post Office‘s tariff structure. These subsidies 
were part of the government social and political objectives.
32
 The internal cross-
subsidies regime remained largely unchanged during the monopoly period, and 
continued through the light-handed regulation period. 
B The Light-Handed Regulation Period between 1987 and 2000  
1 Overview 
There was a government monopoly in the telecommunications sector in New Zealand 
until the late 1980s.
33
 In 1988 Touche Ross Report
34
 demonstrated that the performance 
of the telecommunications system during the state monopolistic period was costly and 
highly inefficient by international standards.
35
 The telecommunications sector was not 
market driven and its management was not markedly efficient.
36
 The absence of asset 
data for a comprehensive fixed asset register reflected a very low emphasis on good 
management and financial and marketing skills.
37
 Bollard refers to a Treasury report 
                                               
28 Wilson, above n 8, at 22.  
29 Ibid. 
30 The Electric Telegraph Act 1865, at [II].  
31 Graham Wagner ―The Deregulation and Privatisation of New Zealand Telecommunications: An Economic, Political 
and Ideological Analysis‖ (PhD, University Microfilms International, 1992), at 91. 
32 Ducan and Bollard, above n 21, at 154. 
33 Ministry of Economic Development ―New Zealand Telecommunications 1987-2001‖ (2001), at 3. 
34 Touche Ross Management Consultants was hired by the Government (1987) to study Telecom and the desirability 
of competition in telecommunications markets.  
35 Touche Ross Management Consultants Competition in Telecommunications Networks (Department of Trade and 
Industry, Wellington, 1988) at 115.   
36 Schechter, above n 16, at 8.  
37 Duncan and Bollard, above n 21, at 149-150. 
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which noted how the telecommunications sector demonstrated a lack of harmony in its 
various commercial and social objectives, was subject to political interference, and 
lacked a competitive environment.
38
   
By the mid-1980s, the New Zealand growth rates were lower than the OECD average.
39
 
Treasury reports found that annual economic growth rates in New Zealand were low 
with high inflation, compared with the average situation of OECD countries for the 
decade.
40
 GDP per capita dropped to 27% below the OECD average in the mid-1980s.
41
 
In the telecommunications sector, state monopolies and under-pricing of state-supplied 
services were poorly performing policy interventions.
42
 In view of all this, a light-
handed regulatory regime was introduced which, it was hoped, would lead to a much 
more vigorously competitive telecommunications market. It was seen as an effective 
means of achieving consumer benefits and efficient economic outcomes.
43
 
In 1987, New Zealand was one of four
44
 countries at the forefront of innovative 
telecommunications deregulation in the world,
45
 and adopted ‗light-handed‘ 
telecommunications regulation.
46
 This government policy was in pursuit of economic 
efficiency
47
 and aimed at ―a competitive environment in which markets can operate 
relatively free from subsequent government involvement‖.48 The ‗light-handed‘ 
telecommunications regulation in New Zealand did not create an industry-specific 
                                               
38 Alan Bollard ―Utility Regulation in New Zealand‖ (speech to ACCC/PURC Training Programme on Utility 
Regulation, Melbourne Business School, Melbourne, 10-14 November 1997), at 3.    
39 State Service Commission ―New Zealand‘s State Sector Reform: A Decade of Change‖ (1998) 
<www.ssc.govt.nz/decade-of-change>.  
40 Mccabe, above n 15, at 398. 
41 Bollard A and Pickford M ―New Zealand‘s Light-Handed Approach to Utility Regulation‖ (1995) 2 (4) Agenda 
411-422.     
42 Mccabe, above n 15, at 398. 
43 Ministry of Finance ―New Zealand Telecommunications 1987-1998 (1998), at 5.  
44 Three other countries are Australia, Chile and Guatemala. See Pablo Spiller and Carlo Cardilli ―The Frontier of 
Telecommunications Deregulation: Small Countries Leading the Pack‖ in Tom Bell and Solveig Singleton (eds) 
Regulators‟ Revenge: The Future of Telecommunications Deregulation (Cato Institute, Washington, 1998). 
45 Pablo Spiller and Carlo Cardilli ―The Frontier of Telecommunications Deregulation: Small Countries Leading the 
Pack‖ in Tom Bell and Solveig Singleton (eds) Regulators‟ Revenge: The Future of Telecommunications 
Deregulation (Cato Institute, Washington, 1998) 39 at 39.  
46 Bronwyn Howell ―From Competition to Regulation: New Zealand Telecommunications Sector Performance 1987-
2007‖ (paper presented to the International Telecommunications Society European Region Conference, Rome, 2008), 
at 3. 
47 Bronwyn Howell ―The End of the Means? The Pursuit of Competition in Regulated Telecommunications Markets‖ 
(paper presented to the International Telecommunications Society, Montreal, June 2008), at 10. 
48 Lewis Evans, Arthur Grimes, Bryce Wilkinson and David Teece ―Economic Reforms in New Zealand 1984-1995: 
the pursuit of efficiency‖ (1996) 34 Journal of Economic Literature 1856 at 1863.  
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regulatory authority or enact comprehensive legislation to regulate competition within 
telecommunications market.
49
 Key elements of the light-handed framework were:
50
 
(a) The Commerce Act 1986 - generic competition legislation in New Zealand;  
(b) The Telecommunications (Disclosure) Regulations 1990 - imposing certain 
information disclosure obligations on the dominant telecommunications provider;  
(c) Private litigation: The Commerce Commission encouraged Telecom‘s 
competitors to take court actions against Telecom; and  
(d) Threat of Government intervention – the Government would introduce heavier 
regulation if the light-handed regulation was perceived as unsuccessful.  
The light-handed regulatory environment began with the privatisation of the incumbent 
provider (Telecom) and the entry of competition in the telecommunications industry. 
The aim of these reforms was to improve the economic performance and increase 
consumer benefits through a competitive and open entry telecommunications market, 
supported by generic competition law.
51
 
The competitive practices of the telecommunications industry were subjected to the 
Commerce Act 1986.
52
 In the following year, the Telecommunications Act 1987 ended a 
hundred years of state sector ownership and political control of telecommunications in 
the country.
53
 These reforms resulted in the removal of regulatory restrictions on the 
supply of telecommunications equipment, the removal of statutory monopoly provisions, 
along with the creation of a stand-alone telecommunications state-owned enterprise, the 
                                               
49 Malcolm Webb and Martyn Taylor ―Light-handed Regulation of Telecommunications in New Zealand: Is Generic 
Competition Law Sufficient?‖ (1999) 2 International Journal of Communications Law and Policy 1 at 2. 
50 See Ross Patterson ―Light Handed Regulation in New Zealand Ten Years On‖ (1998) 6 Competition and Consumer 
Law Journal 134 at 139; Alan Bollard ―Utility Regulation in New Zealand‖ (speech to ACCC/PURC Training 
Programme on Utility Regulation, Melbourne, 10-14 November 1997), at 3; Malcolm Webb and Martyn Taylor 
―Light-handed Regulation of Telecommunications in New Zealand: Is Generic Competition Law Sufficient?‖ (1999) 2 
International Journal of Communications Law and Policy 1 at 2-3; Tristan Gilbertson ―Beginning of the End of ―Light 
Handed‖ Telecommunications Regulation in New Zealand‖ (2001) 7(1) Computer and Telecommunications Law 
Review, at 5.  
51 Ministry of Economic Development, above n 33, at 3. 
52 Commerce Act 1986.   
53 Bronwyn Howell ―Strategic Interaction under Asymmetric Regulation: the ‗Kiwi Share‘ in New Zealand 
Telecommunications‖ (paper presented to the International Telecommunications Society European Region 
Conference, Rome, September 2008), at 29.  
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Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Limited.
54
 There followed the opening up of a 
limited competitive market and the establishment of the ‗Kiwi Share‘ Obligations (the 
‗Kiwi Share‘), a special ‗golden‘ share in Telecom held by the Government. The ‗Kiwi 
Share‘ imposed on Telecom certain social obligations in relation to domestic telephone 
services.
55
 All these changes can be summarised into the following three stages. 
2 1987-1991: Corporatisation of the incumbent operator   
During the 1980s and early 1990s, New Zealand underwent fundamental economic 
changes, which determined shifts in almost all aspects of economic policy.
56
 There were 
a number of factors contributing to the decision to implement these structural economic 
reforms, such as low productivity, poor growth and economic performance, and 
restrictive government regulations.
57
 
In the telecommunications sector, the administration of telecommunications and its 
operation moved from being a government department to a state-owned enterprise, then 
to an unlisted company, and eventually to being a publicly listed company.
58
 The Post 
Office Review in 1986
59
 suggested the inadequacies of this state-owned organisational 
entity and recommended that it should be re-organised into specific business units.
60
  
The Government started the deregulation of the telecommunications sector with the 
passage of the Telecommunications Act 1987
61
 with the premise that economic 
efficiency was an essential aim to reform the sector.
62
 The Post Office was restructured 
into three autonomous state corporations.
63
 The telecommunications section was first 
spun off and incorporated as a separate limited liability company (Telecom Corporation 
of New Zealand), pursuant to the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986.
64
 It was given the 
                                               
54 Louise Hill ―Litigation Versus Regulation: How Successful is Light-Handed Regulation‖ (1996) 8 Auckland 
University Law Review 1119 at 1126.   
55 Webb and Taylor, above n 49, at 3.  
56 Duncan and Bollard, above n 21, at 3. 
57 Ibid, at 5. 
58 Duncan and Bollard, above n 21, at 147. 
59 Mason N and Morris S Post Office Review (Government Printer, Wellington, 1986).   
60 Ministry of Economic Development, above n 33, at 4. 
61 Carl Blanchard ―Telecommunications Regulation in New Zealand: How Effective is ‗Light-Handed‘ Regulation?‖ 
(1994) 18(2) Telecommunications Policy 154 at 154. 
62 Hill, above n 54, at 1126. 
63 Duncan and Bollard, above n 21, at 145. 
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status of a ‗state-owned enterprise‘ (SOE).65 Telecom then began the next stage of its 
transition, that of becoming a fully privatised company in 1989.  
Some main themes of the Telecommunications Act 1987 expressed the government‘s 
aims of removing restrictions on the supply of all telecommunications equipment by 
mid-1988
66
 and maintaining an efficient telecommunications industry.
67
 The final 
statutory barriers to market entry were removed,
68
 including network service in April 
1989, as provided in the Telecommunications Amendment Act 1989.
69
  
 The Telecommunications Amendment Act 1989 removed the monopoly protection 
clauses in the Telecommunications Act 1987.
70
 The first competitor of Telecom, which 
set up business in New Zealand in 1990 to compete in the long-distance and later local 
calling markets, was   Alternative Telephone Company.
71
 There were other investments 
in the telecommunications market by Global One, Team Talk, Telstra NZ and Vodafone 
(formerly BellSouth NZ).
72
 The deregulation and opening of the market to competition 
resulted in substantial price reductions, improvement of service availability, and sizeable 
investment from other telecommunications operators and development of competition in 
a wide range of telecommunications services.
73
    
                                               
65 The State Owned Enterprises Act 1986 s 4(1) provides that:  
 
(1) … every State enterprise shall be to operate as a successful business and… be - 
(a) As profitable and efficient as comparable businesses that are not owned by the Crown; and… 
(c) An organisation that exhibits a sense of social responsibility by having regard to the interests 
of the community in which it operates and by endeavouring to accommodate or encourage these 
when able to do so.  
 
66 Lewis Evans and David Boles de Boer ―The Economic Efficiency of Telecommunications in a Deregulated Market: 
the Case of New Zealand‖ (working paper 8/95, Victoria University of Wellington, 1995), at 7. 
67 Hill, above n 54, at 1120. 
68 Ibid.  
69 Max Saunders ―Telecommunications Regulation in New Zealand‖ (1994) 18(6) Telecommunications Policy 495 at 
496.   
70 Carl Blanchard ―Telecommunications regulation in New Zealand: light-handed regulation and the Privy Council‘s 
Judgment‖ (1995) 19 (6) Telecommunications Policy 465 at 465. 
71 Alternative Telephone Company later became Clear Communications. 
72 Bell South began to provide mobile services, but later sold its New Zealand assets to Vodafone. 
73 Ministry of Economic Development, above n 33, at 3. 
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3 Stage 1991-1997: The competitive era, litigation and the introduction of KSO  
The telecommunications market entered on a further stage of development in the 1990s 
marked by the opening of a highly competitive era
74
 and the privatisation of Telecom. 
The period 1991-1994 witnessed competition in fixed-line infrastructure and service 
markets, and the establishment and growth of the mobile market competition.
75
 This 
period also witnessed the establishment of ‗Kiwi Share‘ Obligations (KSO) with three 
explicit obligations laid on the newly-privatised incumbent telecommunications provider 
(Telecom).
76
  
An agreement
77
 between Telecom and the Government was entered into on 12 
September, 1990. Telecom was recognised as having a dominant position in the 
telecommunications market in New Zealand.
78
 The KSO was recorded in Telecom‘s 
Articles of Association with the following main requirements:
79
  
(1) To maintain a local free-calling option for local residential telephone service for all 
residential customers; 
(2) To ensure the rate of increase in the residential telephone line rental, which includes 
the cost of all local calls, does not result in the rental increasing in real terms above rate of 
NZD 27.80 per month (excluding GST as of November 1, 1989), unless this unreasonably 
impaired Telecom's profits; 
                                               
74 The first competitor to Telecom entered into the New Zealand telecommunications market in November 1990 - 
Clear Communications Limited. There followed other investments in the market, from Global One, Team Talk, 
Telstra NZ and Vodafone (formerly BellSouth NZ). See Ian Duncan and Alan Bollard Corporatisation and 
Privatisation: Lessons from New Zealand (Oxford University Press, 1992), and Ministry of Economic Development 
(New Zealand Telecommunications 1987-2001 (2001). 
75 Ministry of Economic Development, above n 33, at 6. 
76 See Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Limited ―Articles of Association of Telecom Corporation of New 
Zealand Limited‖ (1990). 
77 The State Owned Enterprises Act 1986 s4(1) provided that ―…every State enterprise shall operate as a successful 
business and also exhibits a sense of social responsibility by having regard to the interests of the community in which 
it operates and by endeavouring to accommodate or encourage these when able to do so‖.  With regard to non-
commercial activities, s7 notes ‗where the Crown wishes a State enterprise to provide goods or services to any 
persons, the Crown and the State enterprise shall enter into an agreement under which the State enterprise will provide 
the goods or services in return for the payment by the Crown of the whole or part of the price thereof. It should be 
noted that the State-owned Telecom was privatised in September 1990. The State Owned Enterprise Act ceased to 
apply to Telecom once it was privatised.  
78 As of September 2000, Telecom‘s public switched telephone network lines were 1,800,000 while those of two other 
telecommunications companies in the market, Clear and Telstra Saturn, were 10,000 and 22,500 respectively. See 
Ministry of Economic Development ―Ministerial Inquiry into Telecommunications‖ (2000), at 60.  
79 Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Limited, above n 76, at [11.4.2].   
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(3) To ensure that the line rental for residential users in rural areas is no higher than the 
standard residential line rental and make ordinary residential telephone services as widely 
available as it is at 11 September 1990.  
The introduction of KSO
80
 in the 1990s had included three obligations of ‗universal 
service‘, ‗free local calling‘ and a ‗price cap‘.81 KSO remained relevant as long as 
Telecom remained the sole provider of residential telephone service in many areas. In a 
competitive market, this became increasingly incongruous as it was an asymmetric 
allocation of a universal service obligation on the prices of only one telecommunications 
provider.
82
  
With regard to the funding mechanism during this period, Telecom, as the dominant 
player, took the responsibility of providing KSO service and implementing the recovery 
of its costs through ‗internal cross-subsidies‘ within its retail pricing,83 a cross-subsidy 
from urban, business and tolls to rural users, and at the same time a premium on the 
price Telecom charged its competitors to interconnect with its network.
84
  
The entry of other telecommunications companies
85
 with the introduction of new 
services and alternative access technologies in the following years demonstrated that 
Telecom was no longer the sole significant player in the New Zealand 
telecommunications industry.
86
 There arose questions as to who should contribute to the 
costs of the KSO
87
 and whether Telecom or any other provider should be compensated 
by other telecommunications companies for the costs of providing KSO.
88
  
                                               
80 Before privatisation, tariff equalisation and free local calling was a government policy. However, once Telecom 
ceased to be state-owned, it was necessary to create explicit obligations that could be enforced, if need be. At the time 
of privatisation, therefore, the policy was entrenched through the Kiwi Share mechanism. 
81 Howell, above n 53, at [1.1] and [1.3]. 
82 Joseph Farrel ―Creating Local Competition‖ (1996) 49 (1) Federal Communications Law Journal 201 at 214.  
83 Clear Communications Limited ―Submission to the Commerce Select Committee on the Telecommunications Bill 
2001‖ at 60. 
84 Ministry of Economic Development ―Submission to the Commerce Select Committee on the Telecommunication 
Bill 2001‖ at [11]. 
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86 Telecom New Zealand Limited ―Submission to the Commerce Select Committee on the Telecommunications Bill 
2001‖ at [105]. 
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These concerns became much more significant after three judicial decisions with regard 
to disputes between Clear and Telecom in 1991-1994.
89
 Clear initiated proceedings 
under the Commerce Act in 1991, after failing to negotiate terms and conditions for 
access to Telecom‘s local loop.90 Although Clear had succeeded in capturing 
approximately 20% of the long-distance call market
91
 after a year in the 
telecommunications market, the company‘s entry to the local call market was more 
complicated
92
 because Clear and Telecom could not agree on interconnection terms.
93
  
After the removal of legal restrictions on entry into the telecommunications market, all 
other providers of fixed or mobile telecommunications services had demanded access to 
the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) of Telecom,
94
 via interconnection 
agreements (ICA). An important issue in the ICA was the payment of termination 
charges: when a customer of one service provider made a call to another provider‘s 
network, the network of origin had to pay a per-minute-charge to the other network on 
which the call ‗terminated‘. However, the per-minute-charge payable by Clear to 
Telecom would be higher than that payable by Telecom to Clear.
95
   
The central issue of the dispute was the interconnection price, and whether Telecom 
could lawfully charge a price based on the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR).
96
 
The ECPR allows the telecommunications dominant incumbent to charge new entrants 
access prices equal to the opportunity costs on the competitive segment,
97
 together with 
a contribution to common costs and profits, including any monopoly profit of the 
dominant incumbent from any business lost to the new entrants.
98
 Telecom used the 
ECPR in its local calling ICA to set inter-connection prices with Clear so as to recover 
costs, thereby enabling continuing cross-subsidy of unprofitable residential services that 
                                               
89 Clear Communications v Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Limited [1992] 5 TCLR 166 (HC), [1992] 3 NZLR 
249 (HC), [1993] 5 NZLR 25/93 (CA), [1993] 5 TCLR 166 (HC), [1993] 4 NZBLC 99-321 (CA), [1993] 5 TCLR 413 
(CA), 6 TCLR 682 (CA), [1995] 1 NZLR 385. 
90 Ibid, at 386.  
91 Michael Carter and Julian Wright ―Bargaining over Interconnection: The Clear-Telecom Dispute‖ (1998) Social 
Science Research Network, at 1 <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=41223>. 
92 Entry was not possible until there was an interconnection agreement. Notwithstanding lengthy negotiations, the 
parties were unable to agree on interconnection pricing, in large part because of the access deficit issue. 
93 Annemieke Karel ―The Development and Implications of free ISPs in New Zealand‖ (2003) New Zealand Institute 
for the Study of Competition and Regulation, at 10 <www.iscr.org.nz/f209,4313/Free_ISPs_220903.pdf>. 
94 Ministry of Economic Development ―Ministerial Inquiry into Telecommunications‖ (2000), at 60. 
95 Clear Communications v Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Limited, above n 89, at 386. 
96 Ibid, at 385.  
97 Laffont and Tirole, above ch 2, n 128, at 166. 
98 Ibid, at 23. 
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it was obliged to provide under the KSO.
99
 Clear claimed that Telecom alone should 
bear the KSO costs and any charge levied by Telecom above its service delivery cost 
(excluding any component to recover KSO costs) constituted an exercise of market 
power, and was illegal under s 36 of the Commerce Act.
100
    
When starting legal proceeding against Telecom in 1991, Clear argued that the ECPR 
constituted ‗use‘ of a ‗dominant position‘ for the purposes of restricting or preventing 
competition in the telecommunications market.
101
 The High Court found that Telecom 
was dominant in the retail but not in the wholesale market.
102
 The Court also noted the 
existence of an element of cross-subsidy of residential calls by Telecom‘s other services 
as a result of the KSO. However, the Court accepted that Clear had to contribute to the 
common cost of Telecom‘s network in which any cross-subsidy would be included in 
the common cost.
103
 The ECPR was also found not to be in violation of Section 36.
104
 
This indicated that monopoly pricing to recover KSO costs did not itself constitute the 
restriction, prevention or elimination of competition.
105
  
Clear then appealed against the finding of the High Court arguing that the ECPR was a 
breach of s 36 of the Commerce Act 1986, in that it constituted a use of a dominant 
position in order to constrain competition. The Court of Appeal concluded that the 
incorporation of a monopoly profit component in an interconnection charge was anti-
competitive as a contribution to the cross-subsidy of Telecom‘s revenue from residential 
services.
106
 While Telecom could impose a charge reflecting the direct benefits of 
interconnection with residential subscribers, any access levy beyond that specifically to 
cross-subsidise Telecom‘s revenue from its residential business would be in breach of 
section 36.
107
  
                                               
99 Bronwyn Howell ―A Pendulous Progression: New Zealand‘s Telecommunications Regulation 1987-2007‖ (2007) 
New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation, at 18 <www.iscr.org.nz/n378.html>. 
100 Clear Communications v Telecom Corporation [1993] 5 TCLR 25/93 (CA), at 42-43. 
101 Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Limited v Clear Communications [1992] 3 NZLR 247 at 249. 
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Telecom appealed to the Privy Council.
108
 The Privy Council concluded that Telecom 
had set its interconnection prices for Clear on the basis of opportunity cost, and it was 
behaving exactly as would any firm in a competitive market.
109
 The Privy Council also 
found that Clear had not demonstrated that Telecom‘s prices included monopoly rents 
above that necessary to meet the costs of the KSO.
110
  
Clear and Telecom subsequently negotiated an interconnection arrangement (ICA) that 
recognised the KSO and a contribution towards the fixed and common costs of the 
Telecom local network through the interconnection charge. The Government in turn 
reaffirmed its expectation that interconnection would be provided based on terms that 
would promote efficiency and deliver the benefits of competition to consumers.
111
 This 
assumed that there would be no changes to the arrangements existing at that point.
112
  
The ‗1995 Review‘ of telecommunications interconnection negotiations in New Zealand 
indicated that the Government would ―continue, for the time being, with the present 
regulatory regime based upon the Commerce Act‖,113 particularly through s 27114 and s 
36.
115
 The Government‘s endorsement of the continuation of a light-handed regime, plus 
the greater certainty following the interconnection agreement between Clear and 
Telecom in March 1996 brought an increasing number of new entrants into the 
                                               
108 Privy Council, a judicial body based in London, was the former final court of appeal for New Zealand. Since 2003 
the Supreme Court is the final court of appeal for New Zealand, similar to the Supreme Court in Vietnam. 
109 Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Clear Communication Ltd [1995] 1 NZLR 385 (PC), at [406]. 
110 Ibid, at [407]. 
111 Damien Géradin, Michel Kerf Controlling Market Power in Telecommunications: Antitrust Vs. Sector-specific 
Regulation (Oxford Univbersity Press, Oxford, 2003) at 123.   
112 Howell, above n 99, at 23. 
113 Bollard, above n 38, at 11. 
114 The Commerce Act 1986 s 27 (1) states:  
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115 The Commerce Act 1986 s 36 (1) states:  
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(a) restricting the entry of a person into that or any other market; or 
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market; or 
(c) eliminating a person from that or any other market. 
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telecommunications market.
116
 By the end of 1997, there were seven registered network 
operators and fourteen international service operators.
117
  
Following the 1995 Review, Clear rejected an offer by Telecom, which included a 
separately-identified contribution to KSO costs, which would have enabled cost-based 
pricing of interconnection.
118
 Clear claimed that pricing of interconnection did not 
recognise network reciprocity nor take differences in call volumes into account. It 
counter-offered with a proposal equalising the per minute charge between the 
networks.
119
 However, a settlement agreement, with the express intention of settling all 
disputes, claims, arbitration and litigation between Clear and Telecom was finally signed 
in March 1996.
120
 This agreement recognised the KSO, and a contribution from Clear 
and any other providers towards the fixed and common costs of the Telecom local 
network.
121
 There followed agreements between Telecom and Telstra (1996), Saturn 
(1997) and Compass (1998).
122
  
Shortly after signing the ICA, Clear requested changes in the capped-price provisions 
because of the structure of Telecom‘s capped-price retail long distance calls. However, 
Telecom declined this request on the basis that these capped-price offers, which were 
becoming common in the market, offering unlimited national calls for a fixed price in a 
given time,
123
 had been trialled by Telecom before the ICA. Moreover, it claimed that 
Clear should have known about the use of capped-price calls before signing the ICA
124
 
and have been aware of both industry trends and the risks associated with the contract.
125
   
Despite Telecom‘s refusal, Clear tested the limits of its contractual obligations by 
withholding a proportion (approximately 15%) of interconnection revenues owed to 
Telecom.
126
 Telecom then started legal proceedings to recover the debt. Clear‘s response 
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was that Telecom‘s retail long-distance call offers were in breach of s 27 and s 36 of the 
Commerce Act 1986. Both the High Court
127
 and the Court of Appeal
128
 found that 
Clear could legally withhold payments of interconnection charges until judgment was 
delivered. These 1997 court decisions injected a degree of uncertainty into the 
telecommunications market. This impacted on Telecom‘s incentives to invest in new 
infrastructures and services, and threatened the pursuit of monopoly profits.
129
   
4 1997-2000: „free local calling‟ obligation in KSO and consequences of ICA 
The period between 1997 and 2000 witnessed an increasing number of new 
telecommunications service providers: 11 registered network operators and 26 registered 
international operators by the end of 2000.
130
 This period also witnessed the early 
emergence and rapid growth in uptake of ‗dial-up‘ Internet service in New Zealand131 
with more than 30 ISPs in the market as of 1996.
132
 This development was greatly 
facilitated by the residential ‗free-local calling‘ obligation in the Kiwi Share and a flat-
rate regime in the telecommunication sector.
133
  
The emergence of the Internet dramatically changed calling patterns.
134
 The traffic 
generated on Telecom‘s PSTN grew exponentially as a result of the free local calling 
obligation under the KSO. Moreover, the majority of this traffic originated from 
Telecom‘s network because the majority of Internet users were Telecom‘s fixed line 
customers. This resulted in a financial burden on Telecom
135
 due to the free local calling 
obligation that prevented Telecom from charging its customers for data traffic carried by 
the local access network.
136
  
In February 2000, Compass Communications introduced a ‗free-internet-access‘ retail 
offering. This service was provided at no joining fee, a package of 10 free hours per 
                                               
127 Telecom New Zealand Limited v Clear Communications Limited, above n 101, at 256. 
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month and charged at NZD 1.50 per hour after those 10 free hours, or at a flat-rate of 
NZD 19.95 for 300 hours per month. This offer brought Compass about 10,000 new 
customers who signed up in the first four weeks.
137
 Another free Internet access service, 
utilising Clear‘s network i4free, was launched in April 2000. It offered ‗unlimited free 
internet access‘ and very soon there were about 33,000 customers using this service.138  
Business commentators noted that one customer of this service, if online continuously 
for more than 700 hours in a month, would cost Telecom more than NZD 840 in 
interconnection charges per line.
139
 While the market share of ISPs signed up to 
Telecom‘s competitors grew to slightly over 50%,140 more than 50% of the Internet 
traffic was terminated on Telecom‘s competitors‘ networks.141 As noted above, this was 
due to Telecom‘s obligation to provide the local component of dial-up Internet calls at 
no charge. Thus, Internet calls quickly came to exceed voice calls on the network.
142
  
The net result was to tilt the balance of financial advantage under the interconnection 
agreement from Telecom to Clear.
143
 ISPs on Clear‘s network could keep their retail 
charges low or even free because Clear and the ISPs agreed to share the termination 
charges paid by Telecom.
144
 This made Telecom‘s situation disadvantageous because 
some customers were encouraged to stay on the Internet longer.
145
 Another problem for 
Telecom was that, under the KSO, the company was required to provide residential 
subscribers with free and unlimited local calls for a fixed monthly fee, which could not 
be increased by more than the rate of the Consumer Price Index.
146
    
Telecom responded with two initiatives - the one commercial and the other political. The 
commercial response was the introduction of a technological bypass of the dial-up PSTN 
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with a new, unregulated Asymmetrical Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL)
147
 broadband 
service.
148
 Wider availability of high speed ADSL and lower prices were targeted, in 
order to induce rapid substitution by the heavy users from costly, un-chargeable dial-up 
Internet access to relatively less costly, chargeable and unregulated ADSL.
149
 However, 
there was no sudden customer change-over due to the high value of the ‗connection gift‘ 
which bundled dial-up Internet access with voice telephony and the comparatively low 
valuation of the Internet usage of most consumers.
150
  
Due to its inability to significantly increase revenue through these technological means, 
Telecom sought to re-negotiate the terms of the ‗Kiwi Share‘ so as to be able to recover 
the costs imposed by escalating Internet use and strategic arbitrage on the ICA.
151
 The 
company proposed a revision of the prices charged under the ‗Kiwi Share‘ agreement,152 
thereby charging residential consumers 2 cents per minute for calls in excess of 10 hours 
per month per account made to ISPs not connected to a separate Telecom dial-up 
Internet PSTN network.
153
 
This Telecom solution, referred as the ‗0867‘ package, was proposed from the point of 
view that use of the ‗0867‘ prefix enabled separation of Internet traffic from voice 
traffic. As a result, it enabled the company to maintain voice service quality levels as 
agreed under the ‗Kiwi Share‘ terms.154 Telecom argued that 0867 calls were outside the 
KSO and ICAs, thus not incurring termination charges. This package aimed at 
encouraging residential end-users and ISPs based on Clear‘s network to terminate to 
Telecom and encourage Clear to adopt the 0867 prefix for ISPs on its network.
155
 As a 
result, the termination costs payable by Telecom could be reduced.
156
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In September 1999, the Government announced that as of 1 November 1999, Telecom 
would be permitted to introduce a 2c a minute charge for dial-up Internet access for 
residential customers after 10 hours of free use each month.
157
 By contrast, the 
Commerce Commission processed litigation against Telecom under s 36 (1) (b) of the 
Commerce Act 1986, alleging that, by the introduction of the ‗0867‘ package, Telecom 
attempted to prevent competitive conduct by other telecommunications network 
operators and ISPs.
158
 The Commerce Commission‘s contention was rejected first by the 
High Court in 2008
159
 and then by the Court of Appeal in 2009.
160
 In September 2010, 
the Commerce Commission‘s appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed because it 
could not prove that Telecom used its dominant position in the relevant markets when 
introducing the 0867 code in 1999.
161
 The case was finally ended after a decade of 
arguments.  
In summary, free local calling for fixed lined telephone services in the KSO scheme was 
onerous to the universal service provider (Telecom) due to asymmetrical obligations and 
the need for internal cross-subsidies. Solutions to recover costs of providing universal 
services (fixed line telephone services) in the form of the ‗0867‘ package led to litigation 
between Telecom and other operators. The courts came to the conclusion that Telecom, 
through the 0867 dial-up Internet package, did not contravene s 36 or use its dominance 
to limit competition.
162
 Thus, the Telecom 0867 dial-up Internet package was 
inconsistent with competitive neutrality between operators. At the same time, the 
calculation of universal service costs would become more complicated with the 
determination of separate components between local residential voice telephones and 
dial-up Internet access through the same residential line so as to avoid double-dipping 
compensation.             
5 Summary  
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The period 1987-2000 was characterised by privatisation of the dominant 
telecommunications operator, and regulated by generic competition law.
163
 There were 
no fundamental changes in the telecommunications legal framework and the 
Government continued to pursue the public policy of universal service through the KSO.   
C Legal Framework and Institutional Arrangements for TSO Delivery from 2001 
The light-handed regulatory period in telecommunications was replaced by industry-
specific regulation with the passage of the 2001 Telecommunications Act.
164
 This was 
partly a response to entrants‘ dissatisfaction with the three judicial decisions of 1991-
1994.
165
 It was also an outcome of the general reaction to the failure of the previous 
light-handed regulatory structures which had resulted in only limited reductions in 
Telecom‘s market share and degree of market dominance. The Government, with the 
purpose of tightening controls on companies with a dominant position, stated its 
objective of ensuring that the regulatory environment for cost-efficient, timely and 
innovative telecommunications service on an on-going, fair and equitable basis to all 
existing and potential users.
166
  
A distinct shift was made in the report of the Ministerial Inquiry on Telecommunications 
released in 2000. The report focused on processes within the industry and the nature of 
the interaction between industry participants. It also focused on the Government‘s 
objectives, rather than on an assessment of the light-handed regime‘s performance 
against its original policy objectives. It considered alternative means of establishing 
interconnection terms and conditions, and the pricing principles and processes applying 
to interconnection negotiations and Kiwi Share Obligations.
167
 As a result of the report, 
the Telecommunications Act 2001 was enacted, providing for the establishment of an 
industry-specific regulator in the telecommunications sector, the removal of the cost 
burden of the Kiwi Share Obligation from Telecom alone, and the replacement of the 
KSO with a telecommunications service obligation (TSO).
168
 In addition, a mechanism 
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for funding the TSO was provided in Part 3 of the Act, which aimed to facilitate the 
supply of certain telecommunications services to end-users to whom those services 
might not be otherwise supplied on a commercial basis at a price affordable to those 
end-users.
169
  
1 Ministerial Inquiry into Telecommunications 2000  
One of the main concerns of the Ministerial Inquiry into Telecommunications was the 
tension between efficiency and equity. ‗Cost-efficient‘ within the new approach implied 
that services would be provided at the lowest cost and delivered to consumers at the 
lowest sustainable price.
170
 Moreover, the efficiency should be ‗dynamic‘,171 without 
any impediment to the implementation and uptake of innovative services. On the other 
hand, equity-based approaches aim at ensuring that every existing and potential user has 
affordable access to a minimum level and standard of services.
172
 However, statistical 
surveys of telecommunications use in rural areas suggested that some residential 
customers were not receiving from Telecom even standard ‗ordinary residential 
telephone service‘.173  
Tendering out the universal service delivery obligations so as to seek low-cost options 
was another recommendation in the Inquiry report. The proposal of a tendering process 
was aimed at supporting a more competitive environment in the sector. However, the 
report also referred to some potential problems related to this tendering option, such as 
no acceptable bids being forthcoming at the expiry of a contract with a new provider, 
what guarantees Telecom should be obliged to give about resuming the service, or 
customers being reluctant to switch to a new provider that did not have an established, 
long-standing service delivery record. The report did note that the tendering option could 
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be proposed in co-operation with Telecom and with regard to providing services beyond 
the KSO.
174
  
With regard to the cost of KSO performance, the report recommended that the 
interconnection prices of Telecom should not include a contribution to any losses arising 
from the KSO. Moreover, Telecom should continue to bear the cost of the Kiwi Share 
uncompensated until such time as it could demonstrate financial impairment
175
 sufficient 
to require it to apply to the government to increase its prices, as well as being prevented 
from charging ISPs for calls made using the 0867 numbers.  
The Inquiry recommended that an industry-specific regulator, with the power to regulate 
prices using a cost-based methodology for a range of Telecom services, should be set up, 
and that Telecom should bear the costs of the KSO.
176
 However, these ‗Kiwi Share‘ 
recommendations were not included in the Telecommunications Act 2001. 
According to some statistics, in 2001 New Zealand‘s residential line rental was among 
the highest
177
 and ranked the 2
nd
 most costly in the OECD.
178
 Residential line rental also 
more than doubled between 1982 and 1990 before the privatisation of Telecom.
179
 The 
price cap applied under the Kiwi Share was less efficient than that of many other price 
capping regimes under which incumbent carriers had to reduce their local service 
charges by an amount less than inflation.
180
  
2 The Telecommunications Act 2001: TSO legal framework and institutional 
arrangements 
Although there had been significant reforms in the economy since the 1990s, outcomes 
in the telecommunications market and particularly the universal service arrangements 
remained limited. The Telecommunications Act 2001 was enacted in response to a 
‗significant gap‘ in pricing performance between New Zealand and countries in the top 
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half of the OECD.
181
 The Act set up industry-specific regulation in the 
telecommunications sector,
182
 and reformed the telecommunications regulatory 
environment in New Zealand so as to deliver a better deal for consumers.
183
 The key 
objective of the Telecommunications Act 2001 was to promote competition in the 
telecommunications markets for the long term benefit of service users in New Zealand 
by regulating the supply of services between service providers.
184
 The following specific 
components in the Act illustrate the shift:
185
 
(a) The establishment of a Telecommunications Commissioner with responsibility 
to regulate the telecommunications industry (Subpart 2). 
(b) Access systems for interconnection and wholesale to enable competitors to 
access Telecom‘s network and retail services, with some standard access 
principles, such as timely supply consistent with international best practice and 
applying the same terms and conditions of supply to competitors as to Telecom 
itself (Part 2). 
(c) A new approach to universal service schemes to establish a regime for 
monitoring and enforcing TSO instruments (Part 3). 
(d) General network regulation - to deal with rules relating to the operation of the 
physical telecommunications infrastructure (Part 4).  
(e) A system of self-regulation - to enable industry fora to prepare 
telecommunications access codes in relation to designated and specified services 
(Schedule 2).   
With regard to the TSO, the Act provided a mechanism whereby the Government‘s 
social objectives for the telecommunications sector could be achieved (for example, the 
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deaf relay service and the Kiwi Share)
186
 and paid for by telecommunications service 
providers.
187
 The Act set up a new approach to telecommunications service obligations 
(TSO) and a process to declare TSO instruments,
188
 provided for the determination of 
the cost of a TSO instrument levied on liable persons, and allocated the TSO cost to be 
paid by each liable person
189
 based on market share and revenue.
190
 Telecommunications 
service providers who did not supply telecommunications services under a TSO 
instrument would contribute towards the net cost of the supply of the 
telecommunications services as determined by the Commerce Commission.
191
 
(a) Institutional arrangements for TSO delivery in New Zealand  
The Commerce Commission is a functionally and operationally independent Crown 
entity,
192
 and a regulatory and investigatory body with the responsibility of enforcing 
competition, fair trading and consumer credit contract laws.
193
 The Commerce 
Commission is also the telecommunications industry regulator and has general 
responsibility for monitoring and information dissemination in the telecommunications 
sector, and overseeing the achievement of long-term benefits for end-users.
194
 The 
general universal service obligation (the TSO) was imposed on Telecom and it was left 
to Telecom to decide how to achieve the outcomes and what amounts to spend. The 
Commission was only involved after the event in deciding whether the service standards 
for the TSO had been met, calculating the cost of providing the TSO service, and 
allocating that cost through levies on all operators. 
(i) Performance measurement of public agencies 
A core character of public management in New Zealand has been a strong focus on 
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performance measurement, and the performance accountability of public agencies for 
the delivery of public services.
195
 Any public agency with a policy, delivery, and 
regulating or monitoring sector role should have a robust performance measurement 
framework.
196
 Performance measurement requires agencies acting within and according 
to the law, and being accountable for outputs and outcomes.
197
 The overall emphasis in 
New Zealand has been on the broader and joint responsibilities of related agencies.
198
 
The Public Finance Act 1989 and the Crown Entities Act 2004 require compliance with 
robust performance measurement and reporting systems for all public sector agencies.
199
 
The focus on inputs and outputs, and the reporting requirements for departments and the 
whole of government were spelled out in the Public Finance Act 1989.
200
 As demand for 
an increased focus on outcomes in the public sector became more significant,
201
 
performance management has put more emphasis on the alignment of outputs with 
outcomes.
202
  
Public sector performance in New Zealand is currently assessed and measured at three 
levels: (1) outcomes; (2) intermediate outcomes or impacts, and (3) outputs.
203
 Any 
evaluation of outcomes and outputs for public sector performance must link with the real 
cost for the delivery of services by which the public and stakeholders (internal or 
external) can assess value-for-money.
204
 In addition, public sector agencies have been 
required to inform the public and stakeholders about progress being made towards 
outcomes, build more robust evidence-based data upon which decisions are made, and 
report performance results in a verifiable, comprehensive and simple way.
205
 Enhanced 
performance measurements are required to ensure a greater integration between internal 
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management information systems, management reporting system, and performance 
budget and accountability documents.
206
  
Outputs (and outcomes more recently) are key performance measures to enhance 
performance accountability and also to improve efficiency of the public sector.
207
 An 
output agreement is produced annually as a composite accountability document between 
the responsible Ministers and agencies such as the Commerce Commission.
208
 Output 
agreements establish expectations by the Commission of performance outputs. The 
Commerce Commission itself is accountable to the Minister of Commerce and, in 
respect of telecommunications, the Minister of Communications and Information 
Technology, for its performance.
209
 These output agreements enable the respective 
Ministers to monitor and hold the Commerce Commission to account for its outputs 
delivery and performance.
210
 The Commission delivers outputs under an Output 
Agreement with both ministers. Its performance is measured against a detailed set of 
Output Measures, which are agreed with an external monitoring agency, the Ministry of 
Economic Development.
211
 Statements of Intent are produced annually to set future 
work programmes; there is also quarterly reporting to the Ministry, and annual reporting 
to the Government, and also to taxpayers via the Commission Annual Report.
212
 
Public and stakeholder involvement in performance measurement has been an important 
part of performance management in New Zealand. This not only drives the performance 
measurement of public sector agencies themselves but also underpins the process of 
delivering performance information needed by internal and external stakeholders.
213
 
Policy-making processes in New Zealand are open to public review. The Commerce 
Commission‘s governance and regulatory decision-making processes, for example, are 
open and transparent, and stakeholders are able to provide input before a final decision is 
made. The Commerce Commission undertakes stakeholder analysis during the processes 
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of strategic design and implementation so as to better understand stakeholders‘ interests 
before determining strategic directions. In addition, cross-submission
214
 is evidence of 
the two-way transparent engagement in decision-making processes of the Commerce 
Commission and between stakeholders. Public and stakeholder involvement in 
Commerce Commission processes reflects symmetric rights of cross-submission rather 
than simply a process of consultation.
215
 
(ii) Institutional arrangements for TSO delivery: the establishment of the specific 
industry regulator for telecommunications sector  
 The Commerce Commission is responsible for competition enforcement and regulatory 
control over a number of specific industries, including the telecommunications sector.
216
 
Its primary purpose is to promote market efficiency by enhancing ―healthy competition 
amongst businesses, informed choice by consumers and sound economic regulation‖.217 
It has considerable scope to make judgments on how policy can be most efficiently 
implemented. 
With regard to the telecommunications sector, the Commerce Commission has 
responsibility for monitoring and information dissemination, and for overseeing the final 
outcomes of long-term benefits for end-users of telecommunications service.
218
 Related 
particularly to TSO delivery, as provided in Part 3 of the Act, the Commerce 
Commission has the key statutory function of TSO administration. In addition, it has the 
function of enforcement of TSO conditions. These functions are carried out annually 
through monitoring compliance of TSO delivery with TSO instruments, determining the 
TSO net costs, determining TSO contributors (liable persons) and allocating this TSO 
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net cost among these liable persons (TSO levies).
219
 It releases TSO costs allocation 
determinations annually for each fiscal year.
220
 
 The monitoring function of the Commission is undertaken on a regular basis, releasing 
information through quarterly reports and through an annual comprehensive set of 
statistics, along with commentary and analysis of the telecommunications market. The 
Commission also carries out a specific evaluation of compliance with the service quality 
standards for TSO service delivery.  
All these reports and information are available to the public and ensure sufficient 
evidence-based analysis for decision-making related to TSO delivery. The monitoring 
function of TSO delivery is also ensured through the assessment of compliance with 
TSO instruments. This assessment must be completed within a determined period (60 
working days) after the end of each financial year.
221
 The Commission must make 
reasonable efforts to assess the annual TSO cost not later than 40 working days after the 
closing date for submissions.
222
  
Accountability arrangements for the TSO objectives and outcomes in New Zealand are 
clearly identified in order to improve the performance of TSO delivery. The 
Commission is accountable to the Minister for Communications and Information 
Technology for the performance of the efficient and effective delivery of its functions in 
regulating the telecommunications sector.
223
  
In practice, an output agreement will be reached annually
224
 between the Responsible 
Minister(s) and the Commerce Commission in a composite accountability document.
225
 
This determines the outputs to be provided by the Commission and also establishes 
expectations of the Commission‘s performance.226 These outputs involve the preparation 
and provision of reports on any specified matters to the respective ministers, such as the 
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Minister for Communications under the Telecommunications Act.
227
 It also included 
determinations of TSO cost to TSO providers complying with the TSO, and the 
allocations of these costs across the telecommunications industry.
228
 These annual output 
agreements enable the respective Ministers to monitor the Commission and hold it to 
account for its outputs delivery and performance.
229
 Accordingly, the Commission is 
required to maintain systematic measurement and verification of performance against the 
specified standards, and deliver the outputs in accordance with the specified 
performance undertaking.
230
 The Commission also has to provide information consistent 
with its role and responsibilities in response to official requests for information related to 
ministerial correspondence and speeches, Parliamentary questions, and Select 
Committee examinations and investigations.
231
 These activities of the Commission‘s 
enforcement and regulatory control are funded through appropriations of public money 
by Parliament and allocated to each of specific functions,
232
 including money for 
performance in telecommunications industry and TSO delivery particularly.
233
  
The Commission produces a Statement of Intent annually setting out its future work 
programme. The outputs are linked with outcomes in order to ensure effective 
governmental policy. Inputs-outputs analysis is undertaken to arrive at a better 
understanding of desired policy outcomes and how strategy actions can be best 
achieved.
234
 Ultimately, this clear role and structure helps to achieve genuine 
accountability. 
In addition, because of focus on residents, the system of accountability is improved. 
Public managers pay attention to managing the relationship with clients (citizens) in 
order to be accountable to the public. The public is better able to contribute to the 
policy-making process while administrators gain greater understanding of public needs. 
This could lead to more satisfaction for the public through greater participation in 
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policy-making.
235
 Along with investigation and litigation, the provision of information to 
the public plays an important role in the Commission‘s enforcement activities.236  
In summary, the institutional arrangements for the management of TSO delivery in New 
Zealand reflect key features close to the best practice. An appropriate monitoring and 
evaluating mechanism by an independent specific-industry regulator with sufficient 
performance information systems and involvement by the public and stakeholders results 
in the effective management and economically efficient delivery of TSO services. In 
addition, other core features of the management for outcomes in the public sector in 
New Zealand, such as performance accountability and transparency, have important 
roles in enhancing the effective performance of TSO delivery. 
(b) Definition of TSO and declaration of TSO instrument 
The Telecommunications Act 2001 for the first time formalised the definition of the 
original KSO as the obligations that were set out in clause 5 of the First Schedule of 
Telecom‘s Memorandum of Association. These provisions237 required Telecom and 
those of its subsidiaries that provided a local residential telephone service to offer free 
local calling and capped monthly access charges.
238
 Free local-calling and capped 
monthly fixed charges should observe principles relating to the supply of that service.      
In addition, s 5 created the concept of a TSO instrument, which incorporated the KSO 
and any instrument declared by Order in Council to be a TSO instrument. The purpose 
of these provisions was to ―facilitate the supply of certain telecommunications services 
to groups of end-users within New Zealand to whom those telecommunications services 
may not otherwise be supplied on a commercial basis or at a price that is considered by 
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the Minister to be affordable to those groups of end-users‖.239 The criteria required to be 
met for an agreement to be declared as a TSO instrument were that it must:
240
    
(a) Record a contract or arrangement or understanding between the Crown and a service 
provider for the supply of a particular telecommunications service or range of 
telecommunications services; 
(b) Identify the group of end-users to whom the service must be supplied; 
(c) Define the geographical area within which the service must be supplied;  
(d) Specify the retail price at, or below which, the service must be supplied; and 
(e) Specify the criteria that must be met for the standard of the service to be supplied.  
Currently there are two TSOs in New Zealand: one for Local Residential Telephone 
Services (Local Service TSO) Deeds,
241
 and the other for the Telecommunications Relay 
Service (TRS)
242
 for meeting the telephone communication needs of deaf, hearing 
impaired and speech impaired people in New Zealand. This study is focused on the TSO 
for local residential telephone service only.  
(c) Determining the net cost of a TSO instrument 
One of the most important changes in the Telecommunications Act was the removal of 
the cost burden of the TSO from Telecom alone and the confirmation of 
telecommunications operators‘ responsibility to share the TSO cost. In particular, Part 3 
subpart 2 created an annual procedure for determining the costs of TSO instruments and 
the amounts payable by service providers (liable persons) in the telecommunications 
industry to the TSO service provider.
243
 Allocating TSO costs to telecommunications 
operators in New Zealand prior to the Telecommunications Amendment Act 2011 was 
based on the cost of TSO services provided by the TSO service provider (Telecom) as 
                                               
239 Telecommunications Act 2001, s 70 (1). 
240 Ibid, s 70(2) and (4).  
241 Telecommunications Service Obligations (TSO) Deed for Local Residential Telephone Service (November 2011) 
between the Crown and Telecom, and the TSO Deed for TSO Network Services between the Crown and Chorus 
Limited. 
242 Telecommunications Service Obligations (TSO) Deed for Telecommunications Relay Services (TRS) (September 
2004). 
243 Telecommunications Act 2001 s 5 provided that ―TSP or telecommunications service provider means a provider of 
a telecommunications service under a TSO instrument‖. 
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identified annually by a cost-based model developed by the Commission. In order to 
ensure cost-effectiveness, the net cost of the TSO was defined as the ―unavoidable net 
incremental cost to an efficient service provider of providing services required by the 
TSO instrument to commercially non-viable customers‖.244  
(i) Unavoidable incremental cost 
The concept of incremental cost is well established in economic theory and referred to as 
an additional cost a company would incur if it chooses to serve an extra group of 
customers or provide an extra unit of output.
245
  
The incremental cost of an obligation to provide services to commercially non-viable 
customers is equal to the difference in the TSO service provider‘s total cost between the 
circumstances where it supplies those customers in conjunction with all its other 
customers, and where it does not.
246
 This incremental cost is the long-run incremental 
cost (LRIC), including the costs of all the inputs used to provide the service.
247
 
Accordingly, unavoidable incremental costs are the difference between the long-run 
costs an efficient service provider would incur with and without the obligations imposed 
by the TSO instrument.
248
  
The Commission is required to take the following matters into account in calculating the 
net cost:
249
  
(a) Direct and indirect revenues and associated benefits derived from providing 
telecommunications services to commercially non-viable customers, less the costs of 
providing those telecommunications services to those customers.  
(b) The provision of a reasonable return on the incremental capital employed in 
providing the services to those customers. 
                                               
244 Telecommunications Act 2001 s 5. 
245 William Baumol and Gregory Sidak Toward Competition in Local Telephony (Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology Press, Cambridge, 1994) at 57. 
246 Commerce Commission ―Determination for TSO Instrument for Local Residential Service for Period between 20 
December 2001 and 30 June 2002‖ (2003), at [32].  
247 Ibid, at [36].  
248 Ibid, at [34].  
249 Telecommunications Act 2001, s 84. 
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(c) Include or exclude profits from any new telecommunications services that involve 
significant capital investment and that offer capabilities not available from established 
telecommunications services; 
(d) Exclude any losses from telecommunications services other than services that the 
TSO instrument requires the TSP to provide; 
(e) Consider the purpose set out in section 18.250   
(ii) Efficient service provider 
The existence of the TSO would impact on all telecommunications service providers and 
consequently on all users. However, the term ‗efficient service provider‘ was not defined 
in the Act and s 5 only referred to ―…an efficient service provider as providing the 
service required by the TSO instrument…‖251 in calculating the net cost of the TSO 
instrument.  
The Commerce Commission annually has modelled the costs of an efficient service 
provider in delivering the TSO service
252
 and used its own cost models to calculate the 
net cost to the TSO provider using a ‗bottom-up‘ approach253 to design the network of an 
efficient operator providing the TSO service.
254
  
Generally, an efficient service provider could be defined as one producing a given 
quantity and quality of service at the lowest possible cost.
255
 Accordingly, the relevant 
benchmark for the level of costs associated with the concept of ‗efficient service 
provider‘ was that of a competitive market,256 where incentives operate to ensure that 
                                               
250 Telecommunications Act 2001 s 18(1) provides that:  
 
(1) The purpose of this Part and Schedule 1 to 3 is to promote competition in telecommunication in 
telecommunications markets for the long-term benefit of end-users of telecommunications services within 
New Zealand… 
251 Telecommunications Act 2001 s 5. 
252 Commerce Commission ―Determination for TSO Instrument for Local Residential Service for Period between 1 
July 2007 and 30 June 2008‖ (2008), at 6.  
253 A modelling approach progressing from small units to a larger or more important unit. See Final Determination for 
TSO Instrument for Local Residential Service for Period Between 1 July 2004 and 30 June 2005 (2008).  
254 Commerce Commission ―Final Determination for TSO Instrument for Local Residential Service for Period 
between 1 July 2004 and 30 June 2005‖ (2008), at [12].  
255 Commerce Commission, above n 246, at [39]. 
256 Ibid, at [45]. 
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costs are minimised.
257
 Therefore, s 84 (2) (c) required the Commission to consider the 
legislative purpose in s 18 of the promotion of competition in telecommunications 
markets in determining the TSO net cost.
258
  
(iii) Commercially non-viable customers 
The concept of ‗commercially non-viable customers‘ (CNVCs) played an important role 
in determining the TSO net cost.
259
 However, the Act did not define CNVCs. The 
Commission decided that CNVCs could be identified by determining which groups of 
customers in the absence of the TSO would neither be supplied on a commercial basis 
nor be supplied at an affordable price.
260
  
In order to identify CNVCs, the Commission considered which ‗clusters of customers‘ 
would incur costs for TSO services exceeding the standard residential line rental plus 
expected supplementary revenue, and by how much that cost would exceed that 
revenue.
261
 The smallest logical group of customers served by the access network to 
which costs ought to be attributed was a ‗cluster‘, as an efficient network provider was 
unlikely to roll out its network on a customer-by-customer basis.
262
 Each cluster would 
be identified as either ‗viable‘ or ‗non-viable‘ and the summation of the net costs of all 
the non-viable clusters would determine the total TSO net cost.
263
  
(iv) Determination of the TSO net cost 
Litigation arose between Vodafone and Telecom concerning the method used by the 
Commerce Commission to determine the TSO net cost for periods 2004-2005 and 2005-
2006. Vodafone claimed that the Commission made errors when it determined the TSO 
net cost that liable persons must pay Telecom to subsidise the cost of serving its non-
viable rural customers.
264
 Vodafone argued that the TSO should be based on the most 
                                               
257 Commerce Commission, above n 254, at [44]. 
258 Telecommunications Act 2001 s 84(2)(c).  
259 Commerce Commission, above n 246, at [43]. 
260 Commerce Commission ―Determination for TSO Instrument for Local Residential Service for Period between 1 
July 2002 and 30 June 2003‖ (2005), at [29]. 
261 Commerce Commission, above n 246, at [46]. 
262 Ibid, at [49]. 
263 Ibid, at [50]. 
264 Vodafone New Zealand Limited v Telecom New Zealand Limited [2008] CIV-2008-485-002194, [2008] CIV-2008-
485-002195, [2008] CIV-2008-485-002341, [2010] HC WN CIV 2008-485-2194, [2010] SC 44/2010, [2010] SC 
45/2010, [2010] SC 46/2010, [2011] NZSC 138, at [3]. 
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efficient technology and the Commission should consider both wireless and mobile 
technologies when determining Telecom‘s net cost in providing the TSO service.265 This 
was again proposed in Vodafone‘s submission to the TSO Review in 2007.266          
The company argued that the charging system adopted by the Commission precluded 
competition from new alternative technologies, as the network model was based entirely 
on Telecom‘s fixed network nodes, and the Commission had decided not to include 
alternative technologies in its cost modelling.
267
 Vodafone claimed that the Commission 
excluded new technologies from its calculation of net cost. Instead Vodafone contended 
that the Commission was using a method of calculation, which was likely to have 
significantly overstated the TSO net cost
268
 and consequently overstated the amount that 
liable persons must pay to Telecom.
269
  
During the submission process for determining the TSO net cost, Vodafone had argued 
that the cost should be calculated on the basis of a model utilising existing mobile sites 
and efficiently located new sites. The Commission rejected this argument.
270
 Costs for 
delivery of universal services to CNVCs in some areas with certain geographical 
conditions and population areas, such as mountainous areas with discrete populations, 
were lower for using wireless and mobile technologies instead of fixed line telephones. 
Hence, considering costs of wireless and mobile technologies in calculating TSO costs 
in these areas would reduce universal service levies on other operators. 
In 2010, the High Court found in favour of Vodafone and concluded that an error of law 
had occurred in the course of the determination by failing to introduce new technology 
into the modelled network.
271
 Accordingly, the Commission had failed to determine the 
unavoidable costs of an efficient service provider and thus set the net cost at a level 
higher than Telecom‘s actual costs.272 The High Court referred the determination back to 
                                               
265 Ibid, at [4]. 
266 Vodafone New Zealand Limited Submission on the TSO Reform and Funding Telecommunications Development 
(2009).  
267 Ibid, at 6.  
268 Vodafone New Zealand Limited v Telecom New Zealand Limited, above n 264, at [5]. 
269 Ibid, at [7]. 
270 Vodafone New Zealand Limited v Telecom New Zealand Limited, above n 264, at [33]. 
271 Vodafone New Zealand Limited v Telecom New Zealand Limited [2008] CIV-2008-485-002194, [2008] CIV-2008-
485-002195, [2008] CIV-2008-485-002341, [2010] HC WN CIV 2008-485-2194, at [75]. 
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the Commission for further consideration,
273
 raising the possibility that the Commission 
would have to review its approach to cost modelling not only for these determinations 
but potentially for all of the other TSO determinations.
274
 
In summary, the calculation of the net costs of providing universal services to be used 
for allocating levies has been contentious and complex. There is continuing litigation 
with regard to the net cost determination for the 2004/2005 and 2005/2006 years and the 
Commerce Commission has been reviewing its approach, after the Court‘s judgment.275     
(d) Allocation of TSO costs charged by each liable person and TSP  
An essential part of the TSO determination is to allocate the net cost of the TSO amongst 
telecommunications operators serving end-users in New Zealand.
276
 Allocating TSO 
costs (TSO levies) in New Zealand prior to the Telecommunications Amendment Act 
2011 was based on the cost of TSO services provided by the TSO provider. The 
allocation of such TSO costs was carried out only after the TSO provider had provided 
services, and was linked with outputs (such as the number of commercially non-viable 
customers). This helped to avoid overcharging or unused collected TSO levies.  
Other important matters taken into account in allocating the net costs of the TSO 
included the definition of liable person, liable revenue, weighted revenue, and the TSO 
component of interconnection charges.   
(i) Determination of liable person 
The determination of telecommunications operators‘ liability for TSO levies (liable 
person for TSO levies) in New Zealand is based on interconnection between networks. 
The Telecommunications Act defines ‗liable person‘ as follows:277   
Liable person, in relation to a TSO instrument, means (except when they are the TSP),  
                                               
273 Ibid, at [99]. 
274 Jenny Keown ―Vodafone wins TSO Appeal‖ (New Zealand, 8 April 2010) <www.stuff.co.nz\timaru-
herald\business\3561080\Vodafone-wins-TSO-appeal>.   
275 See Vodafone New Zealand Limited v Telecom New Zealand Limited [2010] SC 4/2010, [2010] SC 44/2010, 
[2010] SC 45/2010, [2010] SC 46/2010, [2011] NZSC 138.  
276 Vodafone New Zealand Limited v Telecom New Zealand Limited, above n 264, at [104]. 
277 Telecommunications Act 2001, s 5.  
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(a) Telecom; and 
(b) A person- 
(i) whose network is interconnected with a fixed PSTN operated by 
Telecom; and  
(ii) who provides a telecommunications service in New Zealand to  
end-users by means of some component of a PSTN that is 
operated by the person.  
In order to identify which telecommunications operators were eligible to be defined as a 
‗liable persons‘, the Commission concluded that these operators needed to (1) own a 
network that interconnected to Telecom‘s fixed telephone network and (2) provide 
telecommunications services to end-users in New Zealand by operating a component of 
a PSTN located in New Zealand.
278
  
As there was no definition of the term ‗interconnected‘ in the Act, the Commission 
considered several possible interpretations, before concluding that networks were 
‗interconnected with a fixed PSTN operated by Telecom‘ when there is a direct physical 
linkage between the originating and terminating networks.
279
  
With regard to the criterion of the ‗provision of telecommunications services to end-
users in New Zealand by operating a component of a telephone network‘, the 
Commission noted that determining the criterion of ‗provision of telecommunications 
services to end-users‘ was not complicated, but the criterion of ‗component of a PSTN‘ 
was more difficult:
280
 for example, in the case of an internet service provider (ISP), 
which operated a component of a PSTN and terminated telephone calls from the PSTN 
for the purpose of providing access to the Internet.
281
  
‗PSTN‘ was defined by the Act as a ―dial-up telephone network used, or intended for 
use, in whole or in part, by the public for the purpose of providing telecommunication 
                                               
278 Commerce Commission, above n 246, at [477]. 
279 Commerce Commission, above n 260, at [420]. 
280 Commerce Commission, above n 246, at [484]. 
281 Ibid, at [485]. 
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between telephone devices‖.282 While ISPs might operate telephone devices so as to 
terminate calls which were provided on a PSTN infrastructure, calls terminated by an 
ISP were not passed across any components of a PSTN operated by the ISP specifically 
for connection with another telephone device. Thus, ISPs were not to be accounted as 
liable persons.
283
 However, an ISP that was interconnected with Telecom‘s fixed PSTN 
for the purpose of providing voice services to end-users in New Zealand by means of a 
component of a PSTN operated by the ISP would be a liable person.
284
  
The Commission noted that it received no evidence that there were any ISPs who met 
both criteria of the definition of liable person.
285
 When allocating the TSO net cost, the 
Commission determined that liable persons were those firms with an interconnection 
agreement with Telecom during the TSP‘s financial year.286  
In summary, there was competitive neutrality and no discrimination between technology 
and services in determining telecommunications operators‘ liability for universal service 
levies in New Zealand. Instead, any operators interconnected with Telecom‘s fixed 
PSTN were responsible for paying universal service levies. However, some service 
providers who benefited by using some components of Telecom‘s fixed PSTN, such as 
ISPs and content service providers, were not liable to pay levies.      
(ii) Determination of liable revenues 
With regard to the approach of ‗liable revenue‘, there was no definition provided in the 
Act of ‗revenue‘ for the amount of revenue that was used to calculate the TSO liability 
of liable persons and the TSP.
287
 The Telecommunications Act 2001 ss 92(b)(i) and 
92(a)(ii) provided that the amount of revenue received during the financial year by that 
liable person or the TSP (in relation to the TSO instrument from providing a 
telecommunications service either by means of its PSTN or by means that relied 
primarily on Telecom‘s PSTN) was to be counted as liable revenue.288  
                                               
282 Telecommunications Act 2001 s 5.  
283 Commerce Commission, above n 246, at [486]. 
284 Ibid, at [487]. 
285 Ibid, at [488]. 
286 Ibid, at [488-489]. 
287 Ibid, at [490]. 
288 Telecommunications Act 2001 s 92(a)(ii) and 92(b)(i).  
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The amount of revenue received from providing telecommunications services could be 
interpreted ordinarily as amounts received in the nature of income for providing 
telecommunications services.
289
 According to the Commission, it was normally a gross 
amount and expenses were unable to be deducted from the amount submitted by liable 
persons.
290
 This included all revenues received by the TSP and each liable person for the 
provision of telecommunication services, regardless of whether those services were 
provided to end users or to other carriers, and without deduction of expenses incurred 
either for intermediate inputs or services that were resold.
291
  
The Act provided that the Commission, in determining the net cost of the TSO, must 
consider the purpose set out in s 18, ―to promote competition in the telecommunications 
market for the long-term benefit of end-users of telecommunications services within 
New Zealand‖.292 Thus, the Commission considered that the interpretation of liable 
revenue should have the following requirements:
 293
  
(1) To avoid distorting end-user choices of the same services provided by different 
operators;  
(2) To exclude any capital-nature item so as to avoid distorting welfare-enhancing 
investments by operators;  
(3) To avoid distorting the relative costs of different supply arrangements for providing 
the same service; and  
(4) To minimise the level of competitive advantage arising from the impact of the TSO 
charge enjoyed by non-liable persons providing the same services as liable persons.  
The Commission considered whether alternative approaches, including two possible 
approaches: ‗retail revenue‘ or ‗net revenue‘, would lead to an outcome consistent with 
the purposes of the Act. Retail revenue, determined as earnings by the TSP and liable 
persons from providing telecommunications services directly to end-users,
294
 would be 
ineffective in removing market distortions that would be disadvantageous to the long-
                                               
289 Commerce Commission, above n 246, at [493].  
290 Ibid, at [494].  
291 Ibid, at [495].   
292 Telecommunications Act 2001 s 84(2).  
293 Commerce Commission, above n 246, at [498].  
294 Ibid, at [504]. 
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term interests of end-users
295
 and might result in the distortion of customer choice 
between different suppliers of the same service.
 296
  
Net revenue - earned revenue after eliminating intra-industry sales of 
telecommunications services, by deducting from gross revenue any amounts payable to 
other carriers for the provision of telecommunications services
297
 - would be a better 
option. The Commission argued that this option could significantly lessen the distortion 
of the TSO charge on liable persons and the TSO provider.
298
 The revenues eligible for 
determining TSO levies were then interpreted as the net revenue excluding intra-industry 
payments.
299
  
In summary, allocating universal service levies to telecommunications operators in New 
Zealand illustrated the key features of competitive and technological neutrality. In 
addition, it was also aligned with the cost-effective principle when the allocation was 
based on the net (actual) costs of providing services through using cost modelling and 
specific criteria for an efficient service provider.
300
 Calculating liable revenues for 
paying universal service levies in New Zealand reflected a significant aim at mitigating 
levies placed on telecommunications operators by deducting revenues receivable from 
providing universal services. In addition, revenues from intra-industry payments were 
also subtracted from liable revenues for paying levies. However, the determination of 
gross (before-tax) revenue as liable revenues and the absence of a minimum threshold of 
liable revenues of operators for paying levies could place financial burdens on small and 
new service providers.     
(e) Subsidies to TSO service providers 
The Telecommunications Act 2001 had several significant features in regard to the TSO 
service provider:  
(i) The TSO net cost was calculated retrospectively following the completion of 
each financial year of the TSP; 
                                               
295 Ibid, at [508]. 
296 Ibid, at [506]. 
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300 See Chapter Three III.C.3(c). 
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(ii) Levels of subsidy were linked to the net cost of providing TSO services; 
(iii) The process for the TSO net cost determination was to be based on a detailed 
and transparent process, with performance information and stakeholder 
involvement/submission. The determination of the net cost was based in part on 
performance information provided by the TSO service provider and calculated by the 
regulator with appropriate cost modelling updated annually;
301
  
(iv) The determination of net cost was aimed at cost-effectiveness and producing 
given outputs at the lowest possible cost so as to mitigate TSO costs levied on 
telecommunications operators.
302
  
(v) The subsidies to the TSO service provider were made by levy payers to the 
TSP only after the Commission had calculated the net cost and allocated it to liable 
persons.  
In order to mitigate the financial burden of TSO service provision due to the 
retrospective funding model and delayed subsidies, the Act fixed a period for the 
completion of the TSO net cost allocation determination, an applicable extra charge for 
‗loss of use of money‘ in TSO levies, a fixed period after the date of the determination 
for payment of TSO levies and payment of interest on any outstanding TSO levies.    
In addition to the actual amount of TSO net cost levied on liable persons and paid to 
TSO service providers by liable persons, an extra payment for ‗loss of use of money‘ is 
added for the period from the last day of the fiscal year to the date of the final allocation 
determination of TSO costs.  
The Act provided that any delay or unpaid payment of TSO levies to TSO providers in 
relation to a TSO instrument would incur interest. Any service provider liable to pay a 
levy, who fails to pay the whole amount of that levy by the date specified, must pay 
interest on the unpaid amount at the rate of 1.5% per month calculated from the due date 
for payment.
303
  
                                               
301 See Chapter Three III.C.3.(c). 
302 See Chapter Three III.C.3.(c).  
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In addition, any liable person in relation to a TSO instrument must pay to the TSO 
provider the amounts set out in the determination not later than 20 working days after 
the date of the determination. In cases where they have not paid the whole amount 
before the expiration of the 20-working day period they must pay to the TSO provider 
interest on the unpaid amount at the 90-day bank bill rate, plus 5% for the period 
commencing on that working day to the date of payment of the whole amount.
304
  
These measures help to avoid any losses incurred by TSO providers due to delays in the 
determination of the TSO net cost and subsidies to TSO service providers.  
4 The Telecommunications Amendment Act 2006  
(a) Situation of the telecommunications industry 
The 21
st
 century has witnessed rapid increases in the use of computers, Internet, mobile 
and digital technology. This caused more social and economic change than any other 
aspect of information and communications technologies.
305
 In 2005 New Zealand had 
good broadband access availability (over 95% of households)
306
 and business 
penetration of broadband technology was comparatively high, compared with other 
OECD countries.
307
  
However, there was a significant gap in pricing performance between New Zealand and 
some OECD countries.
308
 The average price of residential fixed to mobile calling was 
significantly higher in New Zealand and needed to be reduced by 50% to rank in the top 
half of the OECD.
309
 In addition, New Zealand had substantially higher residential local 
call usage than the standard OECD comparison basket. The free-local-calling option and 
the extensive use of this option for dial-up Internet access were the principal causes of 
this.
310
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There was also no infrastructure-based alternative supplier of residential telephone 
service with a national reach, except a limited infrastructure-based competitive provision 
by TelstraClear in some areas of the country.
311
 Further, New Zealand‘s mobile service 
pricing performance ranked in the bottom half of the OECD; mobile calling usage was 
among the lowest in the OECD, but there was high text usage compared to other 
countries.
312
  
Broadband Internet access uptake in New Zealand as at December 2004 was low at 4.7 
lines per 100 residents (10.9% of households), compared with 10.34 lines per hundred 
residents (21.2% of households) for the OECD.
313
 In addition, broadband access pricing 
was high relative to most other OECD countries,
314
 especially with advanced broadband 
services requiring upstream speeds significantly higher than 128 kbps.
315
  
In December 2006, the Telecommunications Amendment Act 2006 was enacted. This 
was a vital part of the Government‘s aim to transform the economy and improve 
broadband performance in the country relative to other OECD countries. The 
Amendment Act made major changes to the Commission‘s regulatory functions for 
monitoring competition in the telecommunications market, and the overall performance 
of telecommunications markets.
316
 These amendments included the introduction of new 
regulated services (such as unbundled copper local loop - UCLL and unbundled bit-
stream access backhaul),
317
 the introduction of a standard terms determination regime,
318
 
and provisions for the operational and accounting separation of Telecom so as to 
enhance competition for the long-term benefit of telecommunications service end-users 
with transparency, non-discrimination and equivalence of supply.
319
  
Another significant change was a requirement for the Commission to monitor 
competition, the performance and development of telecommunications markets, and to 
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make public relevant outputs of its monitoring activities.
320
   
(b) Amendments related to TSO  
The framework for TSO cost determinations under Part 3 of the 2001 Act was modified 
by providing more details on the process of determining TSO net cost, and amending the 
formula to be used in calculating the amount payable by a liable person.
321
 The 
definition of net cost and the substance of the relevant considerations applied in 
determining the net cost to the TSO provider
322
 however remained the same.
323
 
A cost formula for calculating the amount of TSO levies payable by each liable person 
was added, so that a TSO levy payable by a liable person was to be calculated by:
324
 
a. Multiplying the TSO qualified-revenue of that liable person with a 
deficiency between the TSO net cost of TSO provider and any amount 
receivable from all liable persons in relation to the TSO instrument; and  
b. Dividing the sum of the TSO provider‘s qualified-revenue and the TSO 
qualified-revenue of such a liable person. 
Sections 100B and 100C require the Commission to disclose information for 
disaggregated geographical areas for the purpose of calculating the TSO net cost to the 
TSO provider in both the draft and final TSO cost calculation determinations. Those 
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    f  is the net cost referred to in section 93E(a)     
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geographical areas must correspond to the areas that the Commission has identified in 
assessing the commercial viability of supplying the TSO service to customers.
325
  
The key parts of the new reporting requirement are:
326
  
(a) the name, location, and limits of each geographical area within which the TSO 
provider supplies the service under the deemed TSO instrument; and 
(b) the number of subscriber lines for that service in each geographical area; and 
(c) the number of those subscriber lines for which— 
(i) the revenue attributed by the Commission is greater than, or equal to, the 
respective cost attributed; and 
(ii) the revenue attributed by the Commission is less than the respective cost 
attributed; and 
(d) the net cost of the deemed TSO instrument in each geographical area; and 
(e) any related information that is necessary to assist in understanding the information 
specified in paragraphs (a) to (d). 
This imposition of the public disclosure requirement was a response to concerns that the 
Commission had not previously released details of non-viable customer groupings in 
documents of determination of TSO net cost and allocation.
327
 Draft and final 
determinations of TSO net cost included the total number of CNVCs only.
328
 The reason 
for excluding information of the location and number of CNVCs was that it could 
damage Telecom‘s commercial interests.329 However, providing adequate information 
about location and number of CNVCs within each of commercially non-viable customer 
clusters would make it possible for competitors to provide services where it was less 
costly to do so than compensating Telecom.
330
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329 See Submissions of 2Degrees, TeamTalk, Woosh, WorldxChange, TUANZ, Northpower Limited, New Zealand 
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5 The Telecommunication Amendment Act 2011 - TSO and Broadband  
(a) TSO reviews and rural broadband in New Zealand  
Several reviews of the TSO regime were carried out so as to ‗future-proof‘ the 
regulatory regime in terms of market developments and technological changes. The first 
TSO review was in 2006 (the Government‘s Telecommunications Stocktake) and there 
were further TSO reviews in 2007 and 2009. The fundamental areas to be addressed 
were: (1) how to arrive at suitable compensation for the TSO provider (Telecom) for 
supplying TSO local residential telephone service in commercially non-viable areas; and 
(2) whether there should be TSO requirements for rural broadband services.  
With regard to TSO local residential telephone service, Telecom‘s competitors argued 
that the compensation Telecom received for supplying TSO local residential telephone 
service did not reflect economic efficiency.
331
 Vodafone argued that the TSO scheme 
had given rise to consequences which were both ‗inefficient‘ and ‗unfair‟.332  
The TSO net cost for local residential telephone service steadily increased from 2002 to 
2009. It was NZD 56.8 million for the fiscal year 2002-2003, but this increased sharply 
to NZD 69.72 million in 2008-2009 although the number of CNVCs decreased from 
65,679 to 59,301 (See Figure 2).
333
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
331 Ministry of Economic Development ―Telecommunications Service Obligations Regulatory Framework‖ (2007), at 
9. 
332 Vodafone New Zealand Limited ―Submission to the Ministry of Economic Development on Telecommunications 
Service Obligation Discussion Document‖ (2007), at 2.  
333 See Commerce Commission, Final determination for TSO Instrument for Local Residential Telephone Service for 
periods 2001-2002 (2003) and 2006-2007 (2008).  
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Figure 2: TSO Net Cost and Residential CNVCs of Telecom from 2001 to 2009
334
 
Financial year TSO Net cost 
(NZD million) 
Residential CNVCs 
(Subscribers) 
Cost per CNVC 
(NZD/subscriber) 
2001 - 2002
335
 34.72 68,689 505.5 
2002 - 2003 56.8 65,679 864.8 
2003 - 2004 63.8 60,960 1,046.6 
2004 - 2005 52.0 42,930 1,211.3 
2005 - 2006 58.24 48,291 1,206.07 
2006 - 2007 61.36 50,801 1,207.92 
2007 - 2008 72.07 59,240 1,216.66 
2008 - 2009 69.72 59,301 1,175.76 
In addition, there were an increasing variety of ways in which end-users in New Zealand 
could access telephone service, and a wide range of alternative voice services, such as 
voice over Internet protocol (VoIP), wireless access services, and home phone service 
via the mobile network.
336
 Thus, some providers proposed the creation of a ‗contestable 
Local Service TSO‘.337 
One potential way to achieve these goals of TSO reform was to establish a competitive 
process to select the providers, who would then guarantee a minimum level of basic 
services to the relevant households. Other firms would be given incentives to compete in 
TSO areas by being offered a subsidy proportional to each commercially unviable 
household. This would make them able to compete for TSO funding on a per-customer-
basis, by which operators were able to win the customers‘ revenue as well as the TSO 
subsidy.
338
 A subsidy for TSO provision would only be considered for a network 
                                               
334 Commerce Commission <www.comcom.govt.nz/telecommunications-service-obligations>  
335 Commerce Commission, above n 246.  
336 Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Limited ―Telecom‘s Comments on telecommunications Service Obligations 
Regulatory Framework Discussion Document‖ (2007), at 3. 
337 Some others also expressed their support of contestable feasibility among qualifying entrants for providing relevant 
telecommunications services to groups of customers that are deemed uneconomic by incumbent TSO provider.   See 
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NZCL‘s Response to the Ministry of Economic Development: Discussion Paper on telecommunications Service 
Obligations regulatory Framework (2007), at 6-7. 
338 Woosh ―Submissions to the Ministry of Economic Development on Telecommunications Service Obligation 
Discussion Document‖ (2007), at 3. 
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provider in those areas where only one network operator was able to provide 
connectivity.
339
 
In 2009, TSO delivery structures still hampered competition in supplying local telephone 
services to most rural areas in New Zealand. The TSO provider (Telecom) was seen by 
most industry participants as being over-compensated for meeting its TSO 
obligations.
340
 The Government decided to investigate TSO arrangements to ensure that 
they were efficiently and effectively focused on long-term benefits to end-users, and to 
re-consider the TSO provisions.
341
 
With regard to rural broadband, the Government‘s Telecommunications Stocktake in 
2006 identified that accessibility of broadband services for residents in rural areas was 
adversely impacted by the regulatory reforms.
342
 The TSO Review in 2007 proposed a 
possible universal broadband access TSO.
343
 It was argued that the availability of 
advanced and affordable broadband services was essential to economic growth in New 
Zealand, and the benefits of broadband to rural New Zealand were very significant.
344
 
Concerns about rural broadband were also raised by the Government.
345
 Establishing a 
broadband TSO was one of several possible mechanisms for improving the availability 
of broadband access services in rural areas.
346
 In addition, concerns had arisen around 
issues of TSO funding,
347
 including a Supreme Court review
348
 of past TSO payments to 
Telecom.
349
  
Rural broadband policy has gained an increasing profile in New Zealand,
350
 due to the 
economic importance of rural New Zealand and the issue of inefficient 
telecommunications in many rural areas. In international terms, the New Zealand 
                                               
339 Smartlinx 3 Limited Comment on Telecommunications Service Obligations Regulation Framework Discussion 
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broadband situation in 2007 was ranked lower than the Government considered 
desirable, although it had advanced from 21st to 19th place in OECD rankings.
351
  
Rural areas in New Zealand and rural industries play an important role in the country‘s 
economy. There is now an increasing emphasis on the development of rural 
telecommunications.
352
 In 2008 the Government announced a doubling of the 
government funding available from NZD 24 million to NZD 48 million, with the focus 
on accelerating ―high‐speed broadband roll‐out to rural and remote areas‖.353 The Rural 
Broadband Initiative was then announced in 2009 with an estimated cost of NZD 300 
million, emphasising the integral role of rural communities in the national economy.
354
 
Although only 13.2% of New Zealand‘s population lives in remote rural areas - 
constituting approximately 86 percent of the land area
355
 - these rural regions contribute 
significantly to the New Zealand economy - approximately 64% of total exports in 
2009.
356
  
While the benefits of broadband to rural New Zealand are clearly significant, the 
availability of broadband services to users in rural areas is still far below the availability 
to most households in urban areas.
357
 In addition, there is some evidence that re-
investment levels in key telecommunications access and backhaul infrastructure, 
particularly in rural areas, may still be low.
358
   
In spite of the economic success in rural and remote regions, the availability and quality 
of telecommunications services in these areas remains relatively poor. Although the 
country had virtually 100 percent broadband coverage through satellite technology, the 
telecommunications sector has been slow to bring higher quality services to many 
regional areas.
359
  
                                               
351 OECD Broadband Penetration <www.oecd.org/statistics/>. 
352 Mosby and Purre, above n 163, at [11.2.1]. 
353 New Zealand National Party‘s Government ―Step Change - Better Broadband for New Zealand‖ (press release, 22 
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According to the Government,
360
 while 87 percent of rural fixed copper access lines 
could potentially support DSL‐based broadband speeds, only 30 percent of these lines 
have been DSL-enabled. The low percentage of lines upgraded for DSL broadband is 
due to several factors:
361
 copper local loops in rural areas are longer than loops in urban 
areas, backhaul in rural areas is often via copper or radio rather than optical fibre, and 
DSL technology which is most effective at short distances, is often ineffective at 
distances beyond seven kilometres.    
(b) The Telecommunications Amendment Act 2011: Telecommunications 
Development Levy (TDL) and rural broadband  
(i) Overview 
During the period 2009-2010, the Government decided to drive the deployment of ultra-
fast broadband
362
 and commenced a series of major telecommunications policy 
initiatives to improve the quality of telecommunications services in rural areas.
363
 These 
included the Ultra-Fast Broadband (UFB) Initiative with the goal of achieving ultra-fast 
broadband for the majority of New Zealanders
364
 and the Rural Broadband Initiative 
(RBI) with the objective of ensuring broadband services to rural schools and 
communities.
365
 In addition, the Telecommunications Amendment Act 2011 replaced the 
TSO regime with a new and different regime.
366
 There were some key amendments 
related to TSO delivery:   
(1) The TSO liability allocation determination process with TSO levies for the 
period 2001-2010 was replaced by the Telecommunications Development Levy 
(TDL), which streamlined the process for industry contributions, and was aimed at 
                                               
360 Ministry of Economic Development ―Proposal for Comment: Rural Broadband Initiative‖ (2009).  
361 Mosby and Purre, above n 163, at [11.2.2]. 
362 Ibid, at 11. 
363 Ministry of Economic Development, above n 360, at 6-8.  
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assisting the Government in its funding of improvements to New Zealand‘s 
telecommunications rural broadband infrastructures
367
 and paying TSO charges.
368
   
(2) The process of TDL Liability Allocation Determination was focused on 
ensuring the following key outcomes:
369
 (a) economic efficiency; (b) technology 
independence; (c) competitive independence; and (d) enforceability, simplicity, 
transparency and certainty.  
(3) The TDL liability allocation determination for each financial year was based 
on new definitions of ‗liable persons‘ and ‗qualified revenue‘ (a minimum 
telecommunications revenue threshold for liability to contribute to the TDL).
370
 
Apart from a grant of NZD 48 million distributed by the Government, a TDL of up 
to NZD 252 million was to be allocated to liable persons within 5 years.
371
 TDL is 
currently scheduled to be NZD 50 million per year until 2015-2016, and NZD 10 
million in 2016-2017, and subsequent to 2016-2017 will be calculated as in an 
inflation adjusted figure.
372
 However, the process for TDL liability allocation 
determination, which mostly remains the same as the process for the TSO levy 
allocation determination during 2001-2010, has some specific amendments in 
identifying those liable for paying TDL, qualified revenues with a minimum 
threshold of revenues for paying TDL, and subsidies to universal service providers 
and projects.     
(ii) Identifying potentially ‗liable persons‘ for the purpose of the TDL  
Determining potentially liable persons to pay the TDL has a primary and important role 
in allocating the TDL. The Amendment Act 2011 defined a liable person as ―a person 
who provides a telecommunications service in New Zealand by means of some 
components of a PTN that is operated by that person‖.373 PTN was defined as being a 
network used, in whole or in part, by the public for the purpose of telecommunications, 
                                               
367 Commerce Commission ―Notification of Potential Liability for the Telecommunications Development Levy 2012‖ 
(2012), at [6]. 
368 Ibid, at [4]. 
369 Ministry of Economic Development, above n 327, at [51]. 
370 Commerce Commission, above n 367, at [4]. 
371 Ministry of Economic Development, above n 365, at 1.  
372 Commerce Commissionm, above n 367, at [7]. 
373 Telecommunications Amendment Act 2011 s 5. 
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including a PSTN and a public data network (PDN).
374
 This amendment aimed to 
capture a wider range of technologies in determining the service providers liable to pay 
TDL levies, so as to ensure technological neutrality.   
Determining service providers who are potentially ‗liable persons‘ for the purpose of 
TDL was described by the Regulatory Impact Statement (RIS) as starting out from the 
status quo of the previous TSO liability allocation process; this was updated to include 
Internet protocol interconnection revenue.
375
 The Commerce Commission, in harmony 
with the Ministry of Economic Development‘s interpretation, defined potentially liable 
persons as all service providers that do all of the following:
376
  
(1) Provide a telecommunications service, which may include the transmission of voice, 
data, SMS, or any other content, but not including broadcasting (the transmission of 
programmes for reception by the public); 
(2) Provide a telecommunications service in New Zealand; 
(3) Operate a component of the public telecommunications network (PTN) over which 
telecommunications service is provided; 
(4) Operate a component of a PTN that falls on the public side of the network demarcation 
point; 
(5) Provide a telecommunications service that is publicly available, not just limited to a 
private use. 
Based on these criteria, in addition to retail voice and broadband service providers, and 
mobile voice operators as liable person paying for TSO levies for the period 2001-2010, 
since 2011 ISPs were counted as liable persons to contribute to the TDL. These groups 
include those previously captured by the TSO, plus VoIP operators and ISPs - and 
wholesale service providers such as local access network and backhaul service 
providers.
377
 This determination of potential liable persons reflects better competitive 
                                               
374 Telecommunications Amendment Act 2011 s 5. 
375 Ministry of Economic Development, above n 327, at [220]. 
376 Commerce Commission, above n 365, at 9-10. 
377 Ibid, at 10. 
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neutrality and non-discrimination between operators with regard to different technology 
and services.   
(iii) Qualified revenues  
Another part of the TDL liability determination was to determine qualified revenue 
which is used to calculate a liable person‘s percentage of the TDL liability.378 The 
Amendment Act defined ‗qualified revenues‘ as:379 
 … the revenue (as determined in accordance with any specifications set by the 
Commission) that a liable person receives during a financial year for supplying either or 
both of the following (excluding any amount paid to the liable person by the Crown as 
compensation for the cost of complying with a TSO instrument that contains a specified 
amount):  
 (a) telecommunications services by means of its PTN; 
 (b) telecommunications services by means that rely primarily on the existence of its 
 PTN or any other PTN.  
This determination of qualified revenues covers revenue received from supplying 
telecommunications services.  
The net revenue approach
380
 will be used by the Commerce Commission
381
 as the most 
appropriate revenue assessment method.
382
 This net revenue approach would eliminate 
revenue that is neither covered by the statutory definition of qualified revenue nor 
captured in the revenue of other liable persons.
383
 In addition, the net revenue approach 
could minimise the risk of deterring the resale of retail services. It is seen as superior to a 
‗gross revenue‘ approach, which captures all revenue, regardless of whether those 
                                               
378 Commerce Commission, above n 360, at [45].  
379 Telecommunications Amendment Act 2011 s 5. 
380 From 2001-2011 the revenue base relied on use of a component of a PSTN. The Telecommunications Amendment 
Act 2011 expanded the revenue base to include revenue derived from services that rely on either a telephone network 
or a data network. This change meant that service providers providing voice, data, SMS or other content services may 
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381 Telecommunications Amendment Act 2011 s 85(2). 
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services are provided to end-users or other carriers, and without deduction of purchases 
from other liable persons (through intra-industry sales).
384
  
The net revenue approach is seen as most likely to promote competition in 
telecommunications markets for the long-term benefit of end-users within New 
Zealand.
385
 This determination of qualified-revenues reflected competitive neutrality and 
non-discrimination between operators, regarding technology they use or service they 
provide. In addition, the deduction of revenues generated from intra-industry sales such 
as amounts payable to other liable persons for telecommunications services and amounts 
receivable from providing universal services
386
 could be helpful in avoiding double-dip 
levies on some revenues of operators.    
(iv) Minimum telecommunications revenue  
The Amendment Act introduced a minimum telecommunications revenue threshold in 
determining service providers who are liable to contribute to the TDL.
387
 This new rule 
will exclude some small operators. Service providers are liable to contribute to the TDL 
if they traded in the preceding financial year and earned more than the minimum 
telecommunications revenue of NZD 10 million in that preceding year.
388
  
In order to identify who qualifies as liable persons to contribute the TDL, only those 
potentially liable persons that meet the minimum telecommunications revenue threshold 
are required to provide financial information on the year being assessed for the purpose 
of the TDL.
389
 All information requested for determining the TDL allocation must be 
accompanied by an audited report that details the extent to which this information is 
‗correct and complete‘.390 This enhances the transparent and fair process for calculating 
and allocating the TDL among telecommunications operators.   
(v) TDL subsidies to TSO service provider  
                                               
384 Ibid, at [51]. 
385 Ibid. 
386 Commerce Commission, above n 382, at [5.2]. 
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The Amendment Act reflected some significant changes in TDL subsidies. In particular, 
the TDL is to cover subsidies for:
391
  
(1) TSO charges, including TSO local residential telephone and relay service for the 
hearing impaired,  
(2) deployment of rural broadband infrastructure, and  
(3) upgrades to the 111 emergency calling system.  
Subsidies for providing TSO services under a TSO instrument are not determined 
without a written notification from TSO providers within 90 working days after the end 
of the financial year requesting a TSO cost calculation determination.
392
 However, the 
determination of TSO net cost must be calculated within the provision of the TSO 
service throughout the country.  
The Amendment Act provides that the range of direct and indirect revenues and 
associated benefits derived from the provision of telecommunications services to all 
residential end-users, less the cost of providing these services to these end-users, must be 
taken into account.
393
 At the same time, the net cost must not include any losses from 
telecommunications services other than those the TSO instrument requires the TSO 
provider to provide.
394
 If the Commission finds the TSO charges for the instrument to be 
zero, a TSO service provider must pay the costs for this process of TSO cost calculation 
determination.
395
  
In addition, the Amendment Act defined the fixed period of time the Government has to 
pay the total amount to the TSO provider as 30 working days after the date that the final 
TSO cost calculation determination is publicly notified.
396
 Otherwise the Government 
must pay interest on the unpaid amount at the 90-day bank bill rate (as at 31 working 
days after the date on which the final cost calculation determination is publicly notified) 
plus 5% for the period from the time the amount was due until the time at which it is 
                                               
391 Ministry of Economic Development, above n 327, at 9. 
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393 Ibid, s 94E(1)(b). 
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paid.
397
 This helps to mitigate financial burdens on TSO providers due to the 
retrospective funding model and delayed subsidies.  
(c) Rural Broadband Initiative: broadband universal access and competitive 
bidding process 
(i) Overview 
The Rural Broadband Initiative (RBI), which was launched by the Government in 
September 2010, aims at investing directly in rural communities to provide fast 
broadband to rural users and improve the effectiveness of the local service TSO.
398
 The 
RBI was as a complement to the Government‘s NZD 1.5 billion UFB Initiative (2009) 
which sought to accelerate the roll-out of ultra-fast broadband to 75% of New 
Zealanders in urban areas.
399
 The RBI, a NZD 300 million grant funding initiative, 
targeted the 25% of New Zealanders in rural areas and aimed particularly to support the 
roll-out of faster broadband to rural communities, and subsidise the connection of rural 
schools to ultra‐fast broadband networks.400 The RBI, with its emphasis on the integral 
role of rural communities in the national economy, was to be implemented through a 
competitive commercial bidding process.
401
  
(ii) RBI overall objectives 
The Government‘s overall objectives for the RBI were confirmed as follows:402  
(1) To improve coverage of fast broadband services so that 97 percent of New Zealand 
households and enterprises are able to access broadband services of 5 Mbps or better, 
with the remaining 3 percent to achieve speeds of at least 1 Mbps (‗the rural 
community objective‘); and 
(2) To connect 97 percent of schools to fibre, enabling speeds of at least 100 Mbps, 
with the remaining 3 percent to achieve speeds of at least 10 Mbps (‗the rural schools 
objective‘).  
                                               
397 Ibid, s 94L(2). 
398 Ministry of Economic Development ―Rural Broadband Initiative Final Proposal‖ (2011), at 1. 
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Health-care sites in rural areas would also be considered for connection to fibre subject 
to some conditions, such as the incurred additional cost, local needs, and significant 
benefits to the local rural communities from a fibre connection.
403
  
With regard to the 3 percent of remote rural schools, which would not be connected to 
fibre, the Government is concurrently considering a Remote Schools Broadband 
Initiative (RSBI) to provide faster broadband. Accordingly, technical tests are being 
undertaken to determine the suitability of satellite technology for the provision of high 
speed services to these schools.
404
 
(iii) RBI funding 
The Government stated that up to NZD 300 million would be made available over six 
years to fund RBI projects.
405
 This funding will include a Government grant of up to 
NZD 48 million, plus a Telecommunications Development Levy (TDL) of up to NZD 
252 million.
406
 Although broadband service was not included in the Local Service TSO 
requirements,
407
 TDL, as the consolidated industry levy, would pay for all TSO charges 
and be collected from telecommunications operators on the same basis as the current 
TSO levies.
408
  
As in the submissions to the TSO Reviews in 2009 (also in 2007), there were concerns 
that the Government would use public funding to fund the public policy objective of 
RBI, rather than impose costs on private industry or its customers. Rural businesses 
(tourist operators, ski resorts, farmers and others who stand to gain most from the 
availability of such rural broadband service) would be expected to contribute to this 
cost.
409
  
Vodafone suggested that the TDL be capped at a level below the current TSO levy 
costs.
410
 In contrast, Federated Farmers of New Zealand argued that the amount 
proposed for the TDL should be increased from NZD 50 million per year to at least what 
                                               
403 Ministry of Economic Development, above n 398, at 2. 
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is raised by the current TSO Levy (about NZD 70 million per year).
411
 The TDL was 
finally determined to include NZD 252 million from the telecommunications industry 
within six years, lower than the current TSO net cost
412
 at approximately NZD 70 
million per annum, to compensate for supplying local service to rural customers by 
Telecom.
413
    
(iv) RBI target funding 
In accordance with the Government‘s objectives to connect rural communities with high 
quality broadband infrastructure, the RBI scope is focused on funding for:
414
 
(1) Upgrading existing fibre backhaul routes where required to meet the Government‘s 
RBI objectives; 
(2) Providing new fibre connections to rural areas without existing fibre connections for 
services of either fixed line broadband networks, mobile phone networks or rural wireless 
operators; 
(3) Providing fibre connections to schools in the RBI coverage areas; and 
(4) Providing alternative connections (satellite or terrestrial wireless) to rural areas and 
schools for which the development of fibre‐based networks would not be economically 
effective. 
Thus, due to lower population densities in rural areas, alternative options (mobile, 
wireless and satellite services) were suggested to be more economically efficient than 
constructing a fibre network to all premises in remote areas.
415
 The proposal was 
finalised by the Government in the Rural Broadband Initiative Final Proposal (2011).
416
  
(v) Minimum requirements to ensure a pro-competitive, future-proof outcome, 
open access and non-discrimination 
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According to the Government, all projects funded under the RBI must meet a number of 
minimum requirements in order to ensure a pro-competitive, future-proof outcome,
417
 
including open access and non-discrimination requirements. Open access is an important 
requirement of public policy for rural infrastructure subsidised through the RBI. The 
requirement would enable full retail competition with improved choices becoming 
available to rural consumers.
418
 The Government provided guiding principles of open 
access that a respondent to the RBI Request for Proposals must comply with, namely:
419
 
(1) Any-to-any connectivity: allowing different networks to inter-operate and interconnect 
over each service layer and between the service layers; 
(2) Any network technology: technology choices are market driven and the open access 
framework should be designed to outlive the technology choices; 
(3) Low cost to change providers: end-users are entitled to competition among suppliers 
and other network providers, application and service providers, and content providers and 
are easily able to switch between providers, subject to the commercial terms such end-
users have with their existing network providers; and 
(4) Non-discrimination: services provided by the preferred supplier(s) should be offered to 
all access seekers on the same terms and conditions except where variations can be 
objectively justified, even if the access seeker is a competitor or a downstream arm of a 
network competitor. 
In terms of the non-discrimination requirement, the Respondent was required to abide by 
the non-discrimination requirements set out in Appendix 3 of the RBI.
420
 Non-
discrimination is a measure intended to ensure that the supplier does not give itself an 
unfair advantage when both the supplier and its access seeker customers compete in the 
marketplace for the provision of Layer 2 services.
421
 It is also a means of ensuring that 
supply of Layer 2 services does not favour the supplier‘s downstream retail arm.422  
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In addition, non-discrimination ensures that like access seekers are treated in a like 
manner, and that any differences are objectively justifiable, reasonable and 
transparent.
423
 The supplier must provide the following services on non-discriminatory 
terms to all access seekers: (1) Layer 1 and 2 backhaul services; (2) Layer 1 and 2 
connections to schools and priority users; and (3) Layer 2 broadband services to end-
users.
424
 
(vi) Competitive bidding process 
With regard to the RBI supplier selection process, the allocation of funding to successful 
telecommunications operators is conducted through a competitive commercial tender 
process.
425
 The Government decided to split the RBI tender process into two stages: 
Expression of Interest (EOI), and Request for Proposals (RFP). This two-stage tender 
process would enable the Government to gather more information as to the interest, 
intent and initial ball park estimates of potential bidders so that it can make more 
informed decisions when finalising the RFP.  
In addition, this two-stage process would give bidders more time to prepare detailed 
proposals, provide greater flexibility to take into account developments with the UFB 
Initiative, and is expected to enable a larger number of potential bidders to express 
interest in participating at relatively low cost.
426
  
The process of the RBI supplier selection and the allocation of funding to successful 
telecommunications operators were divided into two phases: (1) phase 1 for deployment 
of broadband infrastructure in Zone 4 areas;
427
 and (2) phase 2 for Non-Zone 4 and Non-
UFB areas, and remote schools broadband.  
After releasing the RBI Phase 1 Request for EOI on 22 April 2010, the Government 
received 39 EOIs, including nine for national implementations of the RBI.
428
 A request 
                                               
423 Ibid, at [2.3]. 
424 Ibid, at [2.1]. 
425 Mosby and Purre, above n 163, at 43.  
426 Ministry of Economic Development, above n 360, at 3. 
427 Zone 4 areas or rural areas (except the Chatham Islands) that are not in Telecom‘s Zone 1, 2 and 3, which are 
known as urban areas served by telephone exchanges with a total line count of greater than 500 lines and which at 30 
June 2008 together include not less than 80% of total existing PSTN lines. See Rural Broadband Agreement between 
the Government and Telecom (2011), at [1.1].  
428 Mosby and Purre, above n 163, at [11.5.1]. 
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for proposals (RFP) was released on 25 August 2010 to invite potential suppliers to 
provide detailed proposals for the provision of appropriate broadband infrastructure for 
Zone 4 areas.
429
  
Traditional rivals Telecom and Vodafone made a joint bid for the Government's RBI 
project.
430
 The joint bid from the full telecommunications service provider (Telecom) 
and the largest mobile company by subscribers (Vodafone) was seen as an effort to beat 
off rival bids from four other consortiums.
431
  
It was argued that this situation would be a ‗tragedy for rural New Zealand‘432 and 
awarding Telecom and Vodafone the task of building the rural broadband network could 
stifle competition.
433
 The Labor Party called on the Government to re-tender the RBI 
because they argued that the preferential bidders (Telecom and Vodafone) could carve 
up rural areas and offer whatever prices they wanted. This would mean less competition 
and less choice for New Zealand consumers.
434
 However, the Government entered into 
commercial negotiations and reached agreements with Telecom and Vodafone on 20 
April 2011
435
 to roll out more and faster broadband to much of New Zealand rural areas 
until 2016.
436
 
In summary, the Rural Broadband Initiative in New Zealand illustrates some features 
close to the best practice model.  
Firstly, the scope of universal broadband access in New Zealand was extended to cover 
rural institutions, such as health-care sites and rural schools. Thus, the universal service 
arrangements in New Zealand aligned with international experience and the ITU‘s 
recommendations.
437
  
                                               
429 Ministry of Economic Development, above n 365, at [2.2 (a)]. 
430 ―Telecom, Vodafone bid one of five‖ Stuff.co.nz (New Zealand, 12 November 2010).  
431 ―RBI tender awarded to Telecom and Vodafone; Kordia calls decision a ‗tragedy for rural New Zealand‘ Tele -
geography (7 February 2011).  
432 Ibid. 
433 Hamish Fletcher ―Rural Broadband Build ‗Will be Open‘‖ nzherald.co.nz (New Zealand, 8 February 2011). 
434 Clare Curren ―Labour calls on the Government to re-tender rural broadband scheme‖ (1 April 2011).  
435 Telecom was allocated a grant of NZD 225 million to complement its investment for Zone 4 backhaul, schools and 
hospitals while Vodafone‘s grant was NZD 60 million to complement its investment for Zone 4 community coverage.  
436 Rural Broadband Agreement between the Government and Telecom (2011).    
437 See Chapter Two II.C. 
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Secondly, the Initiative reflected the main objective of universal broadband access 
through a focus on the deployment of broadband infrastructure in rural areas. The 
enhanced development of infrastructure for providing broadband services in rural areas 
would be pro-competitive with minimum guiding requirements of open access, ensuring 
sustainable outcomes and non-discrimination between service providers.  
Thirdly, funding arrangements for rural universal broadband access were improved with 
a kick-off contribution from the Government budget, in addition to the industry levies. 
This illustrated the higher awareness of the Government and its shared financial 
resources for a public policy of universal broadband.  
Finally, a contestable bidding process was used to select the most efficient operator to 
deploy the broadband infrastructure. This could mitigate the net costs for broadband 
infrastructures but avoid complicated arrangements for calculating actual costs and 
potential litigation proceedings, which happened with calculation for actual costs of 
fixed residential telephone services.    
IV Some Important Elements in the New Zealand TSO Experience 
This examination of the development of telecommunications universal service in New 
Zealand is informative in that it mirrors many of the elements of a best practice 
model.
438
 It is also instructive for universal service structures in Vietnam, in that it 
demonstrates: 
(1) The steady progression from complete government monopoly to a situation where 
the government has removed itself completely from the delivery of telecommunications 
services; 
(2) The movement from a sole incumbent (Telecom) to a multi-provider competitive 
market, and the creation of regulations in that market which protect the basic social aims 
of universal service, especially the competitive and technological neutrality of liability 
for contributing to universal service levies, and the contestable bidding process for 
deployment of universal rural broadband infrastructures.  
                                               
438 See Chapter Two. 
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(3) The establishment of key institutional arrangements such as independent external 
monitoring for the performance measurement of TSO delivery (Ministry of Economic 
Development, Commerce Commission and Telecommunications Commissioner); 
(4) The transition from a largely laissez faire management model where there was only 
basic interest in the good performance management of commercial aspects of public 
service provision, to a highly competitive market where good performance management 
(public and corporate) is of high importance; 
(5) The on-going adjudication of commercial interests and funding arrangements by an 
independent judiciary, which is an additional way of enhancing performance 
accountability of agencies involved in TSO delivery;   
(6) The persistent upholding and protection of the fundamental social (and political) 
policies and aims in universal service telecommunications provision, namely 
accessibility, affordability, and particular needs of residents/citizens in a rural society; 
(7) The continued involvement of stakeholders and the general public in the performance 
of universal service policy, particularly through the transparent performance information 
and reporting systems, cross-submissions, and public access to information (Official 
Information Act); 
(8) The establishment of persistent protection for economic cost-effectiveness, 
particularly through the continuous updating of the cost model for TSO net cost 
determination, along with deduction of revenue generated from intra-industry sales, and 
the calculation of TSO net cost within the provision of the TSO service throughout the 
country;  
(9) The use of contestable bidding processes for universal rural broadband to mitigate 
the TSO net cost;  
(10) The prospective and virtual TSO funding model does not require highly-
complicated institutional arrangements, nor create unnecessary burdens on 
telecommunications operators; it avoids either under- or over-collections of levies and 
ensures the benefits to TSO providers by including an additional amount for loss of use 
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of money, interest for the period between the end date of financial years and determined 
TSO levy allocation dates, and payment of interest for any delayed payment of TSO levies 
so as to mitigate financial burdens on TSO providers.   
(11) The persistent support for a competitive market through the establishment of a 
minimum telecommunications revenue as the threshold for determining liable persons 
qualified for paying TSO levies; this facilitates the access of new and small service 
operators into the competitive market. 
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CHAPTER FOUR  
TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNIVERSAL SERVICE LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN VIETNAM  
 
I Introduction            
Since the beginning of economic reforms 25 years ago, Vietnam has progressed rapidly 
from being a poor country to one experiencing an improvement in middle-class incomes 
and high rates of growth. It has actively reformed its laws, institutions, policies, and 
administrative systems. All this has been aimed at making Vietnam better integrated into 
the international economy.  
The telecommunications sector has played an important role in Vietnam‘s social and 
economic growth, and has witnessed considerable progress in establishing policies on 
universal service delivery. However, in recent years some concerns relating to the 
effectiveness and efficiency of this universal service policy have emerged, most notably 
inadequate performance management and inefficient funding structures.  
This chapter will review the evolution of the legal framework and institutional 
arrangements for the delivery of universal services in Vietnam. Universal service 
delivery will be examined over three distinct periods: (1) the monopoly period (1976-
1995); (2) the period of market liberalisation (1995-2001); and (3) the period of 
telecommunications regulatory reforms (since 2002). The chapter also identifies the key 
obstacles to the effective and efficient delivery of universal services, and describes 
significant defects or problems in the universal service legal framework and institutional 
arrangements. The latter part of this chapter identifies key issues and problems.  
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II Institutional and Regulatory Structure for the Telecommunications 
Industry 
A Vietnam Profile 
1 Overview 
Vietnam, situated in Southeast Asia, has a population of 87 million people.
1
 The 
population consists of 54 different ethnic groups, living in a land area of 331,698 square 
kilometres, which has more than 3,000 km of coastline. About 70% of the population 
lives in rural areas. The predominantly rural density and dispersal of the population has 
implications for universal service implementation.  
Vietnam has 63 provinces and centrally governed cities,
2
 and 9,084 communes
3
 (See 
Figure 3).
4
 Hanoi in the north serves as the capital; Ho Chi Minh City in the south is the 
largest urban area, with a population estimated at 7.39 million.
5
 
Figure 3: Vietnamese regions: administrative units and population by rural and urban at 
31 December 2010
6
 
 Red river 
delta 
Northern 
midlands  
North 
Central 
Central 
Highlands 
South 
East 
Mekong 
River Delta 
Total 
Number of provinces 11 14 14 5 6 13 63 
Number of communes 1,944 2,274 2,474 598 490 1,304 9,084 
Rural population 
(million)  
13.78 9.33 14.17 3.72 6.21 13.18 60.41  
Urban population 
(million)  
6.02 1.84 4.76 1.48 8.33 4.06 26.51 
                                               
1 General Statistics Office ―Population and population density in 2010 by province‖ (2011) 
<www.gso.gov.vn/default_en.aspx?tabid=467&idmid=3&ItemID=11728>.   
2 Centrally governed city is an administrative unit equivalent to a province in Vietnam. Centrally governed cities are 
under the management of the Central Government, different from cities under the management of provinces, which 
are equivalent to districts. There are 5 centrally governed cities in Vietnam: Can Tho, Da Nang, Hai Phong, Hanoi and 
Ho Chi Minh City. 
3 Commune, the smallest administrative unit of population (including commune, precincts and towns under districts) 
in Vietnam, includes 11,111 communes nationwide as of 1 June 2010. See Ministry of Information and 
Communication ―Report on the national survey of telecommunications, Internet and broadcasting situation in Vietnam 
in 2010‖ (Ministry of Information and Communication‘s Publishing House, Hanoi, 2011) at 33. 
4 General Statistics Office ―Administrative Units at 31 December 2010‖ (2011) <www.gso.gov.vn>.  
5 General Statistics Office ―Population and population density in 2010 by province‖ (2011) <www.gso.gov.vn>. 
6 General Statistics Office <www.gso.gov.vn/default_en.aspx?tabid=466&idmid=3&ItemID=11653>. 
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2 Economic background 
After the unification of the country in 1975, a centralised government was established.  
The State and collective
7
 sectors, highly subsidised by the State budget, became the 
foundation of the economy. This model proved to be both inefficient and costly, and 
resulted in budget deficits and increasing foreign debt.  
Economic reforms put in place in the period 1980-1986 focused on policies aimed at 
encouraging economic efficiency and loosening central management control. However, 
the economy continued to suffer from inefficient centralised bureaucratic management 
and over-use of state subsidies. The economy remained underdeveloped: annual inflation 
was over 700% and exports were less than 50% of imports.
8
 Further economic reforms 
(called Doi Moi) were embarked upon in 1986 and involved the replacement of a 
centrally planned economy by a socialist-oriented market economy, widespread national 
industrialisation and modernisation, together with diversification of external economic 
relations.
9
 The Doi Moi has had a direct effect on Vietnam‘s economic development, 
especially its economic growth.
10
 
B The Legal System 
The Vietnamese legal system and the institutional structures are based on the role of the 
Vietnamese Communist Party (CPV) and on a system of legal documents which serve as 
sources of law in Vietnam.  
                                               
7 Law on Collective Economic Entities 18/2003/QH11 (2003) art 1 provided:  
Collective economic entities are formed by individuals, households, legal entities (hereinafter referred to as 
member of collective economic entities), who have mutual demand and benefit, voluntarily invest capital and 
contribute their manual work in accordance with applicable regulations so as to enhance the collective strength 
of each member…  
Collective economic entities operate as one kind of business entity, have their own legal entities, self-
management and take all responsibility with their registered capital, accumulative capital and other resources in 
accordance with relevant regulations. 
8 Arkadie Brian and Raymond Mallon Vietnam - A Transition Tiger (Australian National University E Press and Asia 
Pacific Press, Canberra, 2003) at 29. 
9 CPV‘s Political Report of the Congress VI (18 December 1986). 
10 Brian and Mallon, above n 8, at 1.  
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Vietnamese law and its legal system is a complex mixture of neo-Confucian concepts of 
‗virtue‘, French colonial legality, and revolutionary and war morality.11 Mixed in with 
this are elements of Socialist state law and Western legal concepts.
12
 More recently there 
have been, post-Doi Moi, efforts to align some elements of commercial law with 
international legal concepts and standards.
13
 Adding to this complexity are two principal 
factors: (1) the multi-dimensional, hierarchical sources of law in Vietnam, and (2) the 
role of the CPV within a one-party state.  
All this effectively creates two levels of law: ‗high level law‘ (from the National 
Assembly, including the National Assembly‘s Standing Committee) and ‗low level‘ or 
subordinate law (decrees, decisions, directives and the like).
14
 In practice, the National 
Assembly passes laws, which are often neither sufficiently debated nor well formulated, 
and sometimes inconsistent.
15
 The effective legislators are the administrators, ranging 
from Ministers to People‘s Committees. All these formulate ‗implementing decrees‘, and 
‗implementing circulars‘ (rules, instructions and directives) for putting laws into effect.  
The other complex factor in the Vietnamese world of law and the legal system is the role 
of the CPV within the State. The CPV maintains a firm control over all government 
systems and society.
16
 There is no fundamental separation of powers, and a considerable 
history (from the revolutionary and war years) of CPV policies such as resolutions of the 
CPV‘s National Congress being used as a directive for law and policy-making progress. 
The CPV exercises control over the appointment of officials and administrators at 
various levels, particularly to the highest positions in the key state organs.
17
 Hence law 
and legal regulation are closely tied to CPV policy, creating a ‗socialist legality‘ - a sort 
of ‗rule by law‘ which permeates all aspects of society. 
                                               
11 John Gillespie ―Undersrtanding Legality in Vietnam‖ in Stephanie Balme and Mark Sidel (eds) Vietnam‟s New 
Order: International Perspectives on the State and Reform in Vietnam (Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2007) 137 at 
139.   
12 Ibid, at 143-146. 
13 John Gillespie ―Concepts of Law in Vietnam: Transforming Statist Socialism‖ in Randall Peerenboom (ed) Asian 
Discourses of Rule of Law: Theories and Implementation of Rule of Law in Twelve Asian Countries, France and the 
United States (RoutledgeCurzon, New York, 2004) 146 at 161. 
14 Legal Document Act 1996 art 2.  
15 CPV Politburo‘s Resolution 48-NQ/TW (2005) on the Strategy of Building and Improving Vietnam Legal System 
by 2010 and Orientation by 2020, at 1.  
16 Gillespie, above n 13, at 148. 
17 Mark Sidel ―Vietnam: Historical Development of the Legal System‖ in Poh-Ling Tan (ed) Asian Legal System: law, 
society, and pluralism in East Asia (Butterworth, Sydney, 2002) 360 at 364.  
 145 
 
Thus Vietnam has a fundamentally socialist influenced legal system. At the same time it 
has a rapidly developing economy and an increasingly sophisticated society.
18
 It is 
notable that before the legal reforms, law did not play a significant role in the political, 
economic and social system in Vietnam. Rather, the CPV policy documents and 
administrative directives were the primary instruments of governance.
19
  
Since the 1990s, Vietnam has actively pursued legal reforms, which have promoted 
(with varying success) a socialist law-based state. Numerous laws and regulations have 
been enacted.
20
 However, there are still considerable inconsistencies between higher 
legislation and subordinate regulation in Vietnam.
21
   
1 The concept of the Socialist Rule-of-Law State in Vietnam  
In Vietnam, the idea of a rule-of-law state was first put forward by Nguyen Ai Quoc in 
1919.
22
 Establishment of the rule-of-law principles in Vietnam has been a slow 
process.
23
 The transition to a market economy was a major factor in promoting this 
move.
24 
The notion of a rule-of-law state was first officially introduced during the 
economic and political reforms (Doi Moi).
25
 The CPV‘s Political Report of the 6th 
National Congress determined that building this state should be one of the main goals of 
political and institutional reforms, in order to meet the requirements of a market 
economy in Vietnam.
26 
The 7
th
 CPV Congress in 1991 introduced a concept of ‗Nha 
Nuoc Phap Quyen‟, translated as ‗rule-of-law state‘ or ‗law-based state‘.27  
                                               
18 John Gillespie and Albert Chen “Comparing Legal Development in China and Vietnam: An Introduction‖ in John 
Gillespie and Albert Chen (eds) Legal Reforms in China and Vietnam: A Comparison of Asian Communist Regimes 
(Routledge, New York, 2010) 1 at 2. 
19 Ibid, at 19. 
20 Ibid, at 11. 
21 Gillespie and Chen, above n 18, at 19. 
22 The collection on President Ho Chi Minh, volume 1 (National Political Publishing House, Hanoi, 2002), at 438.  
23 Nguyen Xuan Tung Đẩy mạnh xây dựng Nhà nước pháp quyền XHCN Việt Nam dưới ánh sáng đại hội Đảng lần 
thứ XI <moj.gov.vn/ct/tintuc/lists/nghin%20cu%20trao%20i/view_detail.aspx?ItemID=4376>. 
24 Randall Peerenboom ―Varieties of Rule of Law: An Introduction and Provisional Conclusion‖ in Randall 
Peerenboom (ed) Asian Discourses of Rule of Law: Theories and Implementation of Rule of Law in Twelve Asia 
Countries, France and the United States  (Routledge Curzon, New York, 2004) 1 at 39.     
25 Vietnam embarked upon the Doi Moi (Reforms) in 1986. According to the CPV‘s Political Report Congress VI (18 
December 1986) the economic reforms involved the replacement of the centrally-planned economy with a socialist-
oriented market economy, national industrialisation and modernisation together with multi-lateralisation and 
diversification of external economic relations, openness and international integration. 
26 Truong Chinh Introduction to the Political Report (The Sixth National Congress of Vietnamese Communist Party, 
1986), part 4. 
27 Gillespie, above n 16, at 151. 
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According to Gillespie, the concept was adopted in Vietnam from the Russian concept of 
‗'пpabobóe гocyдápcтbo‘ and the German principle of ‗Rechtsstaat‘. It was considered 
more as a label than a coherent philosophical foundation for legal reforms.
28
 Vietnamese 
legal literature simply referred to the rule-of-law as legal compliance by all members of 
society, including the State.
29
  
After the concept of a 'socialist rule-of-law' state appeared at the 7
th
 CPV Congress 
(1991),
30
 the Vietnamese government aimed at building its own ‗socialist rule-of-law‘ 
state, borrowing the concept previously used in the former Soviet Union, which was 
notably different from that of Western countries.
31
 One of the most significant 
differences was the principle of centralisation of powers; this is still applied in Vietnam, 
whilst Western countries generally apply the doctrine of separation of powers. Another 
difference is that while all western countries apply the concept of pluralist democracy in 
their politics, Vietnam‘s leadership reconfirmed the one-party ruling system.32  
The 8
th
 CPV Political Report (1996) reaffirmed the necessity of building up a state 
governed by law in Vietnam, and the term ‗socialist state governed by the rule of law‘ 
was accepted into the legal system of Vietnam at the 9
th
 National Congress (2001). The 
concept of  'socialist rule-of-law state' was established as a constitutional principle in the 
2001 Amendment of the 1992 Constitution
33
 thus defining the direction for establishing 
and improving institutional structures in Vietnam.     
Recently, the concept of the 'socialist rule-of-law' state in Vietnam has been defined to 
mean that state management of society is based on the legislation, and that 
administrative intervention in economic activities needs to be minimised.
34
 The state 
                                               
28 Ibid, at 152.   
29 Nguyen Quoc Viet ―The Role of Informal Institutions and the Delegation of Powers to Independent courts‖ (PhD, 
Universität Kassel, 2006), at 56.  
30 The new terminology of rule-of-law (Nha Nuoc Phap Quyen) first appeared in a speech by Do Muoi at the 7th 
National Congress of CPV in 1991. See Amending the Constitution, Establishing a 'Rule-of-Law state' and promoting 
Doi Moi Achievements (1992).  
31 Nguyen, above n 29, at 57-59.  
32 Ibid.  
33 Vietnam Constitution 1992 (amended in 2001), art 2. 
34 In Political Report on the 9th Congress of CPV, building up the socialist law-based state was not only re-mentioned 
but also emphasised at a new level that is ―to build up socialist law-based state must be conducted under the leadership 
of CPV‖ See Resolution of the 8th Conference of the 7th Central Executive Committee (National Politics Publishing 
House, 1995) at 25.  
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promulgates legislation, and organises and governs society by legislation.
35
 The CPV 
Politburo Resolution in 2005
36
 indicated a key goal of building up the 'socialist rule-of-
law' state, along with the improvement of socialist-oriented market economy 
institutions.
37
 One of its main focuses was to build up and improve legal frameworks for 
the organisation and operation of institutions within the political system, in accordance 
with requirements of the 'socialist rule-of-law' state of the people, by the people and for 
the people in Vietnam.
38
  
2 Institutional structures in Vietnam  
Vietnamese institutional structures are marked by the principle of centralisation, not by 
the separation of powers. The institutional structure reflects the principle of a unitary 
state system, maintaining a close control of all delegation of functions, and the structure 
closely supervises the co-ordination of activities between state departments in carrying 
out their legislative, executive and judicial responsibilities.
39
  
The controlling role of the CPV is a key feature of how the state goes about maintaining 
the socialist rule-of-law in Vietnam. Regardless of the introduction of a functional 
separation between the CPV and state organisations, the CPV‘s leadership is still 
supreme.
40
 The Constitution provides that Vietnam is directly and entirely under the 
leadership of the CPV.
41
 The CPV‘s policies and resolutions determine overall strategies 
and direction of socio-economic matters. These strategies and directions are established 
as legally binding directives by the government and then implemented.
 
    
The Constitution 1992  provided that ―state power is unitary, and  controls the delegation 
and coordination of power among state organs in the implementation of legislative, 
                                               
35 Vietnam Communist Party Resolution on building up the country in the transition to socialism (amendment, 
development in the National Congress XI, 2011), at [III (1)]. 
36 CPV Politburo's Resolution 48-NQ/TW on the Strategy of Building and Improving Vietnam Legal System by 2010 
and Orientation by 2020 (2005). 
37 Ibid, at 2. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Vietnam Communist Party, above n 35, at [IV (2)]. 
40 Gillespie and Chen, above n 18, at 17.  
41 Vietnam Constitution 1992 (amended in 2001), art 4. 
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executive and judiciary powers‖.42 The state apparatus of Vietnam is divided into three 
groups: (i) the Legislative branch; (ii) the Executive branch, and (iii) the Judicial branch.  
The Legislative Branch is the National Assembly. It has three fundamental functions: (1) 
it is the supreme legislative organ of the state and the only state organ which has the 
right to promulgate the Constitution and laws;
43
 (2) it has the power to decide the most 
fundamental policies of the country; and (3) it is charged with supreme supervision of all 
activities of the state.
44
 It operates on the basis of democratic centralisation, collective 
discussion, and approval by majority decisions.
45
 Most members of the National 
Assembly are CPV members and the President of the National Assembly is nominated 
by the CPV‘s Central Committee. 
The Government (Cabinet) is the Executive Body of the National Assembly,
46
 and is the 
highest administrative agency of the state.
47
 The Government makes policies either by 
general discussions and majority decisions
48
 or by the authority of individual members 
of the government, including the Prime Minister (PM), Ministers and Heads of 
ministerial-level agencies.
49
 The term ‗Government‘ is specifically used to refer to the 
Executive at the central level (ministerial level), rather than the entire national system of 
state executives, including local authorities or local government.
50
 The basis of 
executive powers in the country in practice rests with both central (ministries) and local 
executive bodies (local people‘s committees).51 
                                               
42 CPV‘s Strategy of building the socialist rule-of-law state within transitioning period (amended in 2011) also 
determined that there were delegation, co-ordination and supervision among government organisations in the 
performance of legislative, executive and judicial powers. 
43 Law on Organisation of the National Assembly 2001 art 1. 
44 Vietnam Constitution 1992 (amended in 2001) art 83. 
45 Law on Organisation of the National Assembly 2001 art 4. 
46 The determination of the government‘s role as the executive body of the National Assembly has been criticised as 
an imperfection and it should be only as the highest executive organ of the state powers. See Pham Duy Nghia 
General Introduction to Law (People‘s Police Publishing House, Hanoi, 2011), Nguyen Thi Hoi and Pham Quang 
Tien ―Improving institutions of the State President and the Government in Vietnam‖ (2011) 187-188 Journal on 
Legislative Study. 
47 Vietnam Constitution 1992 (as amended in 2001), art 109. 
48 Ibid, art 115. 
49 Pham Duy Nghia General Introduction to Law (People‘s Police Publishing House, Hanoi, 2011) at 129.  
50 David Koh, Dang Duc Dam and Nguyen Thi Kim Chung ‗Government Organisation Structure and Excellent Public 
Service: The Case of Vietnam and Some Recommendations for Changes‖ in Jairo Acuna-Alfaro (ed) Reforming 
Public Administration in Vietnam (The National Political Publishing House, Hanoi, 2009) 252 at 269. 
51 Gillespie, above n 16, at 148. 
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Ministers are members of the Government
52
 and thus Ministers are the persons who on 
behalf of the Government perform state administration in one or several specific 
industries.
53
 Thus, ministries (and ministerial-level agencies) are the institutional 
structures supporting ministers.
54
 However, there has been a confused comprehension or 
misunderstanding both in theory and practice in Vietnam by which ministries are defined 
as component structures of the Government
55
 so ministries are entities to perform state 
management,
56
 rather than ministers. The Government‘s Organisation Act 2001 art 2 
provided that the institutional structure of the Government consists of ministries and 
ministerial-level agencies. Therefore, ministries and ministerial-level agencies are 
typically defined as being responsible for performing state management of specific 
industries.
57
        
The judicial branch in Vietnam includes people‘s courts and people‘s procuracies. The 
judicial system reflects the three main levels of the unitary state: the Supreme Court, the 
provincial or city courts, and district-level courts.
58
 The structure of procuracies is also 
designed similarly: the Supreme Procuracy, the provincial or city procuracies, and 
district-level procuracies.
59
 Since 2002, the judicial reforms initiated by the CPV
60
 and 
the National Assembly
61
 have put emphasis on the promotion of the independence of the 
court system. Although the CPV and the state leaders have promoted a more 
independent judiciary,
62
 this does not seem to have been implemented in practice.
63
 The 
performance of the judicial branch, including courts and procuracies, remains under the 
extensive leading role of the CPV.
64
 There has been overused intervention by the local 
                                               
52 Government Act 2001 art 3.  
53 Pham, above n 49, at 128-129. 
54 Pham Hong Thai ―Some discussion on the Government and Ministries‖ (2008) 24 Science Journal of Vietnam 
National University, 201 at 203. 
55 Government Act 2001 art 2. 
56 Pham, above n 54, at 204. 
57 Decree 187/2007/ND-CP (2007) art 1 provided that the ―The Ministry of Information and Communications is a 
Government‘s agency to perform the state management in press, media… telecommunications and Internet…‖. 
58 People‘s Court Act 2002, art 2. 
59 People‘s Procuracy Act 2002 art 1 provided that people‘s procuracies are responsible for performing prosecution 
and supervision of judicial activities in criminal, civil, marriage and family, administrative, economic and labour 
cases. The People‘s Procuracy system is organised into 3 levels, including the Supreme People‘s Procuracy, the 
People‘s Procuracies of provinces and centrally-governed cities and the People‘s Procuracies of districts and cities 
under provincial authority (art 30). In addition, there are Military Procuracies, which are organised into the Central 
Military Procuracy, the Regional Military Procuracies and the Local Military Procuracies.  
60 CPV‘s Resolution 8 on Forthcoming Principal Judicial Tasks (2002).  
61 People‘s Court Act 2002 and the Ordinance on Judges and People‘s Assessors of People‘s Courts 2002. 
62 Nguyen, above n 29, at 134. 
63 Ibid. at 138. 
64 Pham, above n 49, at 269. 
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administrative authority and the CPV into the local judicial performance due to the 
locally-designed structure.
65
 It is difficult to maintain an independent judiciary when the 
financial budgets for the operation and salary of the courts and procuracies is allocated 
and distributed by the local administration authority.
66
     
3 Sources of law and the system of legal documents in Vietnam  
The CPV‘s policies and resolutions include overall strategies and directions for the 
socio-economic development of the country as fundamental means for the 
implementation of public policies. These strategies and directions of the CPV are 
reflected in legal documents so they can be implemented in practice. All legal 
documents must be in line with and not conflict with the CPV‘s policies.67 This is 
different from other judicial systems, where legal documents must not reflect any 
directive from the governing political party and are based on primary principles of 
constitutional legislation.    
Legal documents are the most important, principal and fundamental expression of the 
Vietnamese legal system. All state agencies, in their dealing with legal cases in their 
sphere of responsibility, must abide by these legal documents.
68
 The Legal Document 
Act 2008 provides that:69 
Legal documents are documents issued or jointly issued by state agencies in accordance 
with the authority, formats, sequence of steps and procedures prescribed in this Law or the 
Law on the Promulgation of Legal Documents of People‘s Councils and People‘s 
Committees, which includes common rules of conduct, which have compulsory effect, and 
the implementation of which is guaranteed by the Government to regulate social relations.  
The system of legal documents in Vietnam includes a wide range of documents with 
different levels of authority. These are issued by responsible state organs according to 
legally determined processes. The primary principle of legal authority is that legal 
documents of superior state organs have higher legal authority than those of lower state 
                                               
65 Nguyen Trong Ty ―Some viewpoints of judicial reforms‖ (2005) Hanoi Bar Association 
<luatsuhanoi.vn/index.php?page=productView&viewParent=301&id=520>.  
66 Ibid, at 275. 
67 See Nguyen Thi Hoi ―Current Sources of Law in Vietnam‖ (2008) Journal of Legislative Study 12 (128). 
68 Ibid. 
69 Legal Documents Act 2008, art 1 s 1. 
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organs. For example, the Prime Minister‘s decisions have lower legal authority than 
Government‘s decrees but higher than Ministers‘ decisions and circulars (See Table 1). 
Similarly, more recent legal documents take precedence over older ones promulgated by 
the same state organs.
70
  
Table 1: The hierarchy of Vietnamese legal texts in descending order
71
 
Authority Text 
National Assembly Constitution, Act,
72
 Resolution 
Standing Committee of the National Assembly Ordinance, Resolution 
President Order, Decision 
Government Decree 
Prime Minister Decision  
Ministers and Head of Ministerial Agencies
73
 Circular, Joint Circular
74
 
Justice Council of the Supreme People‘s Court Resolution 
Chief Justice of the Supreme People‘s Court or  
Head of the Supreme People‘s Prosecutor 
Circular  
People‘s Council Resolution 
People‘s Committee Decision 
The supreme position of legal validity lies in the Constitution itself as the primary, 
fundamental code of the country. It is followed by Acts (also Codes or Laws) and 
Resolutions issued by the National Assembly, and Ordinances and Resolutions of the 
National Assembly‘s Standing Committee.  
                                               
70 Legal Documents Act 2008 art 83 ss 2 and 3 provided that:  
2. In the event of legal documents having different rulings on the same issue or problem, those legal documents having superior 
legal effect shall be applied.  
3. In the event of legal documents promulgated by the same State agency but having different rulings on the same issue or 
problem, the rulings of the legal documents promulgated later shall be applied. 
71 Legal Documents Act 2008, art 2. 
72 In Vietnam, the word of ‗Luat‘ is normally translated as ‗Code‘ or ‗Law‘. ‗Luat‘ is primary legislation: in this thesis 
it is translated by ‗Act‘.      
73 Decision and Directive were also legal documents issued by Ministers and head of ministerial agencies until 2008. 
See the Legal Documents Act 1996 (amended in 2002), art 1. 
74 Legal Documents Act 2008, art 20 s 3 provided that: 
3. Joint Circulars are jointly issued by Ministers and head of ministerial agencies to guide the implementation of 
acts, ordinances… decrees, PM‘s decisions concerning functions, tasks, and powers of such Ministers and head of 
ministerial agencies.  
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Legal documents issued by the Government include Government‘s decrees and the 
Prime Minister‘s decisions75 which guide or stipulate the implementation of relevant 
legal documents of the National Assembly and the Standing Committee of the National 
Assembly.
76
 In addition, legal documents issued by members of the Government 
(Ministers and Heads of Ministerial-level agencies)
77
 and Chairmen of Local People‘s 
Committees,
78
 also called subordinate documents, are legal documents of the 
Government, and play an important role. They are very numerous in the Vietnamese 
legal system.
79
  
The majority of legal documents in Vietnam are produced by the Government and 
Ministries, which particularly regulate economic management and specific industries. In 
2008, while the National Assembly promulgated only 28 Acts, the Government issued 
up to 2,641 legal documents.
80
 Ninety five percent of policies issued by the National 
Assembly were prepared and submitted to the Assembly by the Government.
81
   
Administrative documents are different from legal documents
82
 but in practice 
administrative documents and directives have considerable effect in terms of legal 
implementation in Vietnam. These administrative documents are internal directives to 
                                               
75 According to the Legal Documents Act 2008 art 15, PM‘s Decisions are more likely to focus on the stipulation of 
solutions to manage and administer the Government‘s operations and public administration system from the central to 
grassroots levels, working regimes of the cabinet members, Chairmen of People‘s Committees of provinces and cities 
under central management and other issues within the PM‘s authority. 
76 Legal Documents Act 2008, arts 14 and 15. 
77 Legal Documents Act 2008, art 16 provided that:  
Circulars of Ministers and Heads of Ministerial-level agencies shall provide: 
1. Detailed guidelines on the implementation of laws and resolutions of the National Assembly, ordinances and 
resolutions of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly, orders and decisions of the State President, 
decrees of the Government and decisions of the Prime Minister; 
2. Regulations on technical processes and standards as well as techno-economic norms of the industry, sector 
covered by each Ministry or Ministerial-level agency; 
3. Ways to exercise management of the industry, sector covered by each Ministry or Ministerial-level agency 
and other issues upon instruction by the Government. 
78 Decisions issued by People‘s Committees in accordance with the authority, formats, sequence of steps and 
procedures prescribed in the Law on the Promulgation of Legal Documents of People‘s Councils and People‘s 
Committees, which includes common rules of conduct, has local applicable validity and is guaranteed by the 
Government to regulate social relations within localities in the following circumstances: (i) to implement the 
constitution, acts and legal documents of superior state organs, people‘s councils at the same level; (ii) to perform 
state economic management and other policies within the localities; (iii) to carry out specific duties delegated by 
superior state organs‘ documents. See Legal Document Act of People‘s Council and People‘s Committees 2004, arts 
1, 2 & 13. 
79 Pham, above n 49, at 132.  
80 Ibid, at 139. 
81 Ibid, at 131-132. 
82 Legal Documents Act 2008 art 1 s 2 provided that documents which are issued or jointly issued not in accordance 
with the authority, formats, sequence of steps and procedures prescribed by law (Legal Document Act and Legal 
Document Act of People‘s Council and People‘s Committees) are not legal documents. 
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lower-level departments in the administrative structure. While they are not strictly 
enforceable as legal documents, a survey by the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry showed that about 9,470 administrative documents issued in the period 2005-
2008 were used as legal documents.
83
 This illustrates that the executive state organs still 
have significant influence on activities within society by means of non-
legal/administrative documents.
84
 
C Legal Frameworks and Institutional Arrangements for Telecommunications in 
Vietnam 
There was a state monopoly in the telecommunications sector in Vietnam until the mid-
1990s. The sole ministerial agency of the Vietnam Government responsible for 
telecommunications was the Department General of Posts and Telecommunications 
(DGPT).
85
 The DGPT had a dual function. It was the state administrator and business 
operator for telecommunications.
86
 The Government embarked upon liberalisation of the 
telecommunications markets in 1995. The process included the establishment of a 
competitive environment and the establishment of a separate regulator. Further reforms 
in the telecommunications sector were introduced by the CPV‘s Directive 58-CT/TW 
(2000) and the CPV‘s Strategy for Socio-Economic Development in the period 2001-
2010 (2001).  
The Strategy for Socio-Economic Development in the period 2001-2010 (2001-2010 
Strategy) defined the country‘s overall strategic goal as being ―to set the stage for 
accelerated industrialisation and modernisation in accord with a socialist orientation, 
laying the foundation for Vietnam to become an industrialised nation by 2020‖.87 At the 
same time, the 2001-2010 Strategy directed that telecommunications infrastructure 
should be developed and fundamentally modernised.
88
 It also indicated a specific target 
that basic telecommunications (and postal) services should be available for almost all 
                                               
83 For example, the Minister of Information and Communications issued an administrative document 3593/BTTTT-
KHTC (2011) on subsidies for fixed telephone household and individual subscribers.  
84 Pham, above n 49, at 19-20.  
85 DGPT was initially set up, from the Posts, Telecommunications and Radio Bureau belong to the Ministry of 
Transportation under Decree 480/TTg (1955). 
86 Decree 121-HDBT (1987), art 1.  
87 Vietnam Communist Party ―The Strategy for Socio-Economics Development period 2001-2010‖ (2001) the IX 
National Congress, at 1. 
88 Ibid, at [2.3]. 
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communes in the country by the end of 2010.
89
 In addition, the CPV‘s Directive 58-
CT/TW defined the overall target of promoting the development of telecommunications 
and information technology, so as to establish a foundation for socio-economic 
development in the country, improving service quality and reducing service charges to a 
level equal to or lower than the average tariffs of countries within the region.
90
  
1 Improvements in the legal framework for telecommunications 
Following the development of the 2001-2010 Strategy, the Government moved to codify 
relevant goals in law. Accordingly, the government issued a range of legal documents, in 
addition to the national and regulatory documents issued by the Government over the 
previous decade. In the telecommunications industry, the Post and Telecommunications 
Ordinance 2002 was enacted in order to implement many of Vietnam‘s commitments 
under the 2001 Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) with the United States.
91
 The 
Ordinance 2002 was a reinforcement of the policy principles outlined in the 2001-2010 
Strategy with further implementation details and clarifications. It also created rules on 
licensing, market dominance, interconnection, and the delivery of universal services.
92
 
The Telecommunications Act 2009 was enacted to replace the Ordinance 2002 as of 1 
July 2010. This was prompted by Vietnam‘s WTO commitments. The Act provided a 
legal framework for telecommunications regulation, with specific regulatory items to be 
determined in detail by regulatory legal documents. For example, it provided a legal 
basis for foreign and domestic private investors to participate in the telecommunications 
sector. In particular, art 18 indicated that the form, condition and percentage of capital 
contribution in telecommunications services applicable to foreign investors must comply 
with Vietnamese law and Vietnam‘s international commitments, without further 
specifying the maximum foreign investment ceilings for each of the service categories. 
In addition, the Act included provisions for a pro-competitive regulatory regime, 
covering aspects such as regulation of abuse of market power, interconnection rules and 
                                               
89 Ibid, at 4.  
90 CPV‘s Directive 58-CT/TW (2000) on the enhancement of application and deployment of ICT serving the national 
industrialisation and modernisation. 
91 Roy Chun Lee ―Telecommunications in Vietnam‖ (paper presented to the Symposium on APEC‘s New Strategy for 
Structural Reform, Montana, 16 May 2011), at 3. 
92 Nguyen Thanh Ha, Pham Quang Thanh and Jacob Gullish ―Competition Review of the Vietnamese Telecom 
Sector‖ (2005) United States Agency for International Development, at 11 <pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADE784.pdf>. 
 155 
 
access to essential facilities (art 19). The Act also made some amendments related to the 
legal framework and institutional arrangements for universal service delivery in 
Vietnam.   
2 Establishment of a regulator  
The Department General of Posts and Telecommunications (DGPT) was established in 
October 1992
93
 as the government agency to carry out regulatory and policy making 
functions in post and telecommunications.
94
 In 2002, DGPT was restructured and 
became the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT)
95
 with a policy-making 
and regulatory function in the fields of posts, telecommunications and information 
technology.
96
 In August 2007, the MPT was renamed the Ministry of Information and 
Communications (MIC)
97
 and entrusted with the state management of media and 
publishing, which were previously under the state management of the Ministry of 
Culture and Information.
98
  
The Telecommunications Act 2009 established a telecommunications regulator, the 
Vietnam Telecommunications Authority (VNTA) within the MIC. The VNTA was 
established by the merger of two agencies within the MIC - the Department of 
Telecommunications and the Authority of Information and Communications Technology 
Quality Control.
99
 It inherited the regulatory and the consultative roles of these 
departments in making policies. The authority is responsible for regulating the 
telecommunications industry throughout the country.
100
 According to Decision 
35/2011/QD-TTg, the VNTA is an agency within the MIC, charged with performing 
consultative and regulatory functions in the field of telecommunications nationwide,
101
 
                                               
93 Decree 3-CP (1992) on setting up the Department General of Posts and Telecommunications, art 1. 
94 Decree 28-CP (1993) on the organisation and operation of the DGPT, art 2.  
95 Decree 90/2002/ND-CP (2002) the organisation and operation of the MPT; Decree 86/2002/ND-CP on the 
organisation and operation of the Ministries and Ministerial-level agencies.  
96 Decree 90/2002/ND-CP (2002) the organisation and operation of the MPT, art 1.   
97 Decree 187/2007/ND-CP (2007) the organisation and operation of the MIC. 
98 Decree 50/2011/ND-CP (2011) amending and supplementing Decree 187/2007/NĐ-CP (2007) setting up the 
Telecommunications Authority under the MIC; the PM‘s Decision 35/2011/QD-TTg (2011) stipulating functions, 
tasks, powers and structural organisation of the Telecommunications Authority, article 1 provided the 
Telecommunications Authority‘s function of organising the implementation of state management of 
telecommunications nationwide. 
99 Ministry of Information and Communications ―Annoucement of the Establishment of the Vietnam 
Telecommunications Authority‖ (press release, 15 August 2011).    
100 Telecommunications Act 2009, art 10. 
101 PM‘s Decision 35/2011/QD-TTg (2011), art 1.  
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and in charge of regulating competition issues.  It is also responsible for settling disputes 
about shared infrastructure.
102
  
3 The creation of a competitive telecommunications environment  
Vietnam has generally conducted its economic reforms through a variety of relevant 
Acts, including the Competition Act, Enterprise Act and Commercial Act. This has led 
to many changes in terms of the competitive environment in telecommunications.  
Until 1995, there was only one state-owned enterprise providing post and 
telecommunications services throughout the country. The state monopoly was 
effectively terminated in 1996. Vietnam has steadily created a competitive market which 
has resulted in positive consequences for the telecommunications industry. Decree 
109/1997/ND-CP was aimed at enhancing competition. It was also aimed at promoting 
the effectiveness of state administration, and speeding up the development of posts and 
telecommunications business. There were soon three telecommunications operators in 
the telecommunications market instead of the sole state-owned corporation. Saigon Posts 
and Telecommunications Joint Stock Company (SPT)
103
 and Military Electronics and 
Telecommunications Corporation (Viettel)
104
 officially entered the market, and have 
competed with VNPT in the telecommunications market.
105
 New entrants were allowed, 
in order to create a competitive market. However, no private telecommunications 
operators have entered the market.
106
 Competitive activity was limited because the three 
                                               
102 Decree 25/2011/ND-CP art 2, PM‘s Decision 35/2011/QD-TTg (2011) arts 1 and 2.  
103 Saigon Posts and Telecommunications Joint Stock Company is a Joint Stock Corporation, established under the 
direction of the Prime Minister in the document 7093/DMDN (1995) with the initially-registered capital of VND 50 
billion. The charter capital was increased to VND 250 billion (225 billion from domestic shareholders) in 2006 with 
the equity capital from state-owned enterprises of VND 161 billion (approx. 64.4% of charter capital). Apart from the 
two biggest shareholders VNPT (13.43%) and Housing Management Company of District 1 (14.46%), some others 
with the equity shares of around 4% each are Vietnam Investment Fund, Communist Party Unity‘s committee in the 
District 1-Ho Chi Minh City, Financial Department of Communist Party Unity‘s committee in Ho Chi Minh City, Ben 
Thanh Corporation, SAIGONPETRO. SPT‘s charter capital was increased to VND 711 billion in 2010 and the equity 
shares of VNPT (13.43%) and Housing Management Company of District 1 increased accordingly to 14.43% and 
15.53%. SPT is a facility-based operator and provides telecommunications services such as fixed (2002) and mobile 
(2003) services, Internet service (1997), VoIP and leased line services nationwide.      
104 Viettel, established previously as Information Electronics and Equipment Company before being renamed in 1995, 
is the second enterprise having the full licence for providing telecommunications services since 1998, including fixed 
and mobile services, Internet access, VoIP and leased line services in Vietnam. Viettel is the state-owned corporation 
under the Ministry of Defence.  
105 There were no specific regulations on competition either between state-owned or joint-stock corporations 
predominantly financed by state-owned enterprises until the Competition Act 2005.    
106 Decree 109/1997/ND-CP (1997) art 95 states:  
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telecommunications operators were either wholly state-owned enterprises or were 
predominantly financed by state-owned enterprises. The market shares of the two new 
entrants had not increased significantly by the end of 2001.  
Since 2002, enterprises from all types of economic sectors (including private-owned 
providers) have entered the market. By the end of 2011, there were 10 enterprises 
providing fixed telephone services,
107
 7 mobile (2G) service providers (5 of those were 
also 3G mobile service providers)
108
 and 91 ISPs. However, a small number of operators 
still retain dominance over specific markets while others face difficulties in developing 
their market share (See Charts 1, 2 and 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
Operators providing postal and telecommunications services are the state-owned or joint-stock corporation 
predominantly financed by state-owned enterprises, established by the Prime Minister‘s Decisions or by the 
Prime Minister‘s permission…. 
107 Among 10 licensed operators for fixed telephone services there were only 6 operators who provided service in 
reality by the end of 2011. They were Vietnam Post and Telecommunications Group (VNPT), Military 
Telecommunications Group (Viettel), Saigon Postel (SPT), EVN Telecom, FPT and VTC. EVN Telecom, however, 
merged with Viettel on 1 January 2012, in accordance with the PM‘s Decision 2151/QD-TTg (5 December 2011). 
108 4 licences for setting up infrastructures and providing IMT-2000 mobile service (3G mobile) at the frequency band 
1900-2200 MHz were granted to 5 service providers through a contestable bidding process: VinaPhone (VNPT), VMS 
MobiFone (VNPT), Viettel, EVN-Telecom and Hanoi Telecom (EVN-Telecom and Hanoi Telecom were a joint-
bidder and shared a 3G licence). 
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Chart 1: Number of telecommunications operators and ISPs (2005-2011)
109
 
 
Chart 2: Market share (subscribers) of fixed telephone service providers (2011)
110
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
109 See Ministry of Information and Communications Vietnam Information and Communication Technology: White 
Book 2012 (Information and Communications Publishing House, Hanoi, 2012) at 49; Nguyen Thanh Ha, Pham Quang 
Thanh and Jacob Gullish ―Competition Review of the Vietnamese Telecom Sector‖ (2005) United States Agency for 
International Development, at 23. 
110 Ministry of Information and Communications Vietnam Information and Data on Information and Communication 
Technology: White Book 2012 (Information and Communications Publishing House, Hanoi, 2012) at 51. 
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Chart 3: Market share (subscribers) of Internet fixed broadband providers (2011)
111
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III Universal Service Legal Framework and Institutional Arrangements in 
Vietnam  
A The State Monopoly Period of Telecommunications Sector between 1976 and 1994 
In this period, there were neither defined objectives nor any legal framework for 
universal service delivery.
112
 Post and telecommunications services were far from 
universal. Telecommunications services were limited to state institutions, state-owned 
enterprises and some large companies, and were not available to households or 
individuals.
113
  
The Government altered the post and telecommunications management system several 
times to improve the effectiveness of the telecommunications sector.
114
 In 1993, the 
Government established the Vietnam Post and Telecommunications Corporation 
                                               
111 Ibid. 
112 Decree 51/CP (1995) on VNPT‘s Organisation and Operation, art 13 s 2.  
113 General Statistics Office ―Vietnam Economic-social report for ten years 1990-2000‖ (2001) 
<www.gso.gov.vn/default.aspx?tabid=418&ItemID=1466>.  
114 DGPT was initially set up in 1955 under the Decree 480/TTg.  
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(VNPT), a state-owned telecommunications corporation, so as to avoid the overlapping 
responsibilities between state administration and business operations.
115
 This was a 
separate entity, and not linked to any Ministry of the State.
116
 In reality, the relevant state 
agency (DGPT) continued to have a major role in directing business operations.
117
  
In 1994 the functions of state management of telecommunications at the provincial level 
were delegated temporarily by the DGPT to Post and Telecommunication offices which 
were business units of VNPT in the provinces.
118
 This was a further indication that the 
overlapping functions of state management and business interests had not yet been 
separated and that duplications remained unresolved. 
Despite these several changes in the structure of institutional arrangements and legal 
frameworks, there was very little substantive change during the State monopoly period 
(1976-1994). There was no specific framework for universal service delivery, and 
barriers to the development of the sector were not removed.  
B The Period of Liberalisation of Telecommunications Markets: 1995-2001 
During the period 1995-2001, the Government established legal frameworks for creating 
competitive markets in many areas, including the telecommunications sector. From the 
end of 1995 there were notable improvements in institutional arrangements and legal 
frameworks, and an overall liberalisation in the telecommunications sector. It was the 
first time there had been a complete separation of state administration and business 
operations in the telecommunications sector.
119
  
Although no specific objective for universal services was defined in this period, the 
Government determined the general responsibilities of the telecommunications industry 
with regard to universal service delivery. These determinations were aimed at satisfying 
                                               
115 Decree 28/CP (1993) on functions, powers, tasks and structure of DGPT and the PM‘s Decision 249/TTg (1995) on 
setting up the VNPT.   
116 Decree 3/CP (1992) on setting up the DGPT.  
117 History of Vietnam Post and Telecommunication Volume 3 (Post and Telecommunications Publish House, Hanoi, 
2003), at 575. 
118 Ibid.  
119 VNPT was re-established under the PM‘s Decision 249/TTg (29 April 1995) by re-organising relevant departments 
in DGPT so as to carry out post and telecommunication business. DGPT became the state-agency to undertake the 
state management in the fields of posts and telecommunications according to Decree 12/CP (March 1996).  
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the needs of the Vietnamese people for telecommunication services.
120
 The 1995 Decree 
51/CP determined that VNPT was to be responsible for the provision of all basic 
telecommunications services to remote areas, along with the provision of other 
communications services throughout the country.
121
  
Decree 109/1997/ND-CP determined that telecommunications enterprises had specific 
obligations, particularly giving priority to providing and meeting the communications 
requirements of the CPV and the Government.
122
 They would also be entitled to special 
subsidies, compensation and favourable regulation
123
 from the Government for the 
provision of products and services during natural disasters, and for service provision to 
rural, mountainous and off-shore areas.
124
 They were to provide products and services in 
accordance with the regulated price policy of the Government.
125
 This meant that the 
standard pricing frameworks for highly-dependent social and public utility 
telecommunications services
126
 would be determined by the Government.
127
  
This period also witnessed the introduction (1998) of the ‗post and telecommunications 
commune cultural house‘128 as a means of delivering universal services. The ‗posts and 
telecommunications commune cultural house‘ model in Vietnam was a combination of a 
postal and telecommunications shared service centre (along with other services for 
residents in rural communes). These service centres were set up by the dominant 
operator (VNPT), subsidised by universal service funds and supported by local 
                                               
120 Decree 109/1997/ND-CP (1997), art 2. 
121 Decree 51/CP (1995), art 13 s 2.  
122 Decree 109/1997/ND-CP (1997), art 96 s 7 & 10. 
123 Decree 56-CP (1996) on state-owned enterprises providing public-utility services provided favourable regulations 
such as reduction of profit tax for contributing to the enterprise‘s capital (art 5 s 1(a)); exemption or reduction of 
income tax (art 6), and entitlement  to subsidies or subsidised-price for public-utility services (art 14). 
124 There was no specific regulation on these special subsidies, compensation and favourable entitlements. Because 
operators were state-owned companies or companies with equity capital dominated by state-owned shareholders, the 
Government typically ordered them to perform some public utility activities on request and then provided some 
reimbursements directly or simply as deductions from their tax payments.    
125 Decree 109/1997/ND-CP (1997) art 96 s 5.  
126 Such as a residential monthly fee and volume charge for local residential telephone service. See art 4 s 1(b) of the 
PM‘s Decision 217/2003/QD-TTg (2003) on the management of prices of posts and telecommunications services.  
127 Decree 109/1997/ND-CP (1997), art 71 s 1 and 2.  
128 The deployment of ‗posts and telecommunications commune cultural house‘ originated from the 8 th Communist 
Party‘s Resolution V. It has been carried out by VNPT since 1998 and has given special priority to communes 
(administrative divisions in Vietnam) in rural areas that have no public service counter for postal and 
telecommunications services. The purpose has been the provision of basic postal and telecommunications services, 
contribution to the economic and socio-cultural development and to ensure that residents in remote and rural areas 
benefit from postal and telecommunications services. By the end of 2010, there were 8,082 posts and 
telecommunications commune cultural houses nationwide. See ―Report on Evaluation of ten years of establishment 
and operation of posts and telecommunications commune cultural houses (1998-2008)‖, VNPT (2008).      
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authorities (for example reserved places in rural communes, favourable land tax rates, 
and so on).
129
 
Notwithstanding all these changes, the telecommunications sector was unsuccessful in 
meeting its objectives. The performance of universal services in Vietnam during this 
period was limited. By the end of 2001 total subscriptions were 3.049 million for fixed 
telephone service and 1.251 million for mobile service.
130
 The density per 100 
inhabitants was 3.83 for fixed telephone service and 1.57 for mobile service.
131
 This was 
low in comparison with average world and developing countries‘ rates, being about one-
fifth of the average world density.
132
 The level of competition during this period 
remained only moderate. The main reason was the small number of competitors, who 
were either state-owned enterprises or companies with equity capital dominated by state-
owned shareholders.
133
 
The legal framework provided very few specific rules and merely general principles 
about universal service delivery. The provision of universal services in Vietnam during 
this period was the responsibility of VNPT. Until 2002 VNPT compensated itself for 
providing universal services on a nation-wide basis through a mechanism of internal 
cross-subsidies.
134
 It also recovered compensation for the provision of universal services 
from interconnection charges levied on other operators interconnected with its network. 
There was however no specific regulation about what the precise definition of universal 
service costs was, and what percentage of interconnection charges paid to VNPT was 
attributable to universal service cost. 
                                               
129 Organisation, management and operation of ‗posts and telecommunications commune cultural house‘ are defined 
in the VNPT‘s Decision 267/1998/HDQT-BC (1998) (Amended in 2000). 
130 ITU World Telecommunications/ICT Indicators Database <www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/>. 
131 Ibid.   
132 Ministry of Post and Telecommunications History of Vietnam Post and Telecommunication - Volume 3 (Post and 
Telecommunications Publishing House, Hanoi, 2003) at 736. 
133 VNPT and Viettel are 100% state-owned corporations. The third company, SPT, is the first joint-stock company in 
the posts and telecommunications business in Vietnam but the equity capital from non-state shareholders (including 
non-state enterprise, organisations and individuals out of SPT) is less than 29% (31/12/2006). See General Meeting 
SPT‘s Report 2006.   
134 Decree 109/1997/ND-CP (1997) art 96 s 5 provided that telecommunication companies providing 
telecommunication services for rural and remote areas or other telecommunication universal services may be entitled 
to a regime of subsidy, price-subsidy or state-adjustment. However, the main regime for compensating the universal 
service provider was internal cross-subsidy within the telecommunications services of VNPT. VNPT did not do 
separate business accounting reporting for the cost of providing fixed telephone service nationwide. In addition, fixed 
telephone charges were regulated by DGPT. Thus, losses for providing fixed telephone service, especially in 
rural/remote (for commercially non-viable customers) areas, were recovered by revenues from other services.                 
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C Universal Service Legal Framework and Implementation since 2002  
1 Period 2002-2010  
(a) Improvements to universal service legal framework 
The Standing Committee of the National Assembly‘s Post and Telecommunications 
Ordinance 2002 was the first legal document determining the Government‘s policy on 
telecommunications universal service. There followed a range of regulatory documents 
aimed at spelling out the universal service legal framework and various institutional 
arrangements, including the Prime Minister‘s Decisions (2004) on setting up the 
universal service fund (Vietnam Public Utility Telecommunications Service Fund) and 
promulgating in 2006 a five-year universal service programme 2006-2010.  
(b) Universal service institutional arrangements  
Since Ordinance 2002 and the various regulatory documents following it, the roles of 
various people, ministries and local committees have been spelled out much more 
precisely as part of the legal framework surrounding universal service delivery in 
Vietnam. The five key roles and players are: (1) The Prime Minister; (2) The Ministry of 
Information and Communications (MIC); (3) Vietnam Public Utility 
Telecommunications Service Fund (VTF); (4) other ministerial agencies; and (5) Local 
People‘s Committees (Provincial Department of Information and Communications). 
(i) The Prime Minister 
The Prime Minister (PM) is responsible for approving the programme on the provision 
of universal services and stipulating which universal service tasks are entitled to State 
budget funding.
135
 He also makes decisions about the establishment, and determines 
mechanisms for contributing to and using, the VTF‘s financial resources.136 
 (ii) The Ministry of Information and Communications 
                                               
135 Post and Telecommunications Ordinance 2002 art 51 provided that the Government takes the responsibility to 
regulate specific policies and measures for implementation of universal service provision on the basis of requirements 
for socio-economic development and the development of the telecommunication market in each stage. 
136 Telecommunications Act 2009, art 22 s 4. 
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As a policy-making and regulatory body, the Ministry of Information and 
Communications (MIC)
137
 is responsible for state management of information and 
communications, including universal service.
138
 Its main functions are drafting laws, 
strategies and development plans, and promulgating subordinate regulations. In addition, 
the MIC is involved in directing and organising the implementation of relevant legal 
documents and policies, such as investment in telecommunications, resale of 
telecommunications services, programmes on telecommunications universal services, 
and regulation of telecommunications and Internet services quality and prices.
139
 In 
particular, the MIC determines the list of universal service-qualified areas and targeted 
groups that shall be provided with universal service. It is also responsible for organising, 
setting up, approving, managing and directing the performance of programmes on the 
provision of universal services; stipulating the scale of public access points for 
telecommunications services; and stipulating types of subsidies and approving levels of 
subsidies.  
(iii) Vietnam Public Utility Telecommunications Service Fund  
The Ordinance 2002 art 50 s 1(b) established a universal service fund, namely ‗Vietnam 
Public Utility Telecommunications Service Fund‘ (VTF), from contributions of 
telecommunications operators and other financial sources so as to facilitate 
telecommunications operators in providing universal services. Decree 160/2004/ND-CP 
art 49 s 1(b) and s 2 defined further that the VTF is a State non-profit financial 
institution under the direct management of the Ministry of Post and 
Telecommunications.
140
 The VTF has responsibility for collecting universal service 
levies and providing subsidies for programmes and projects to provide universal 
services, organising the selection of operators and projects to provide universal services, 
and monitoring the implementation of universal service programmes, plans and projects.  
The VTF‘s organisation and operation were defined by the Prime Minister‘s Decision in 
2004.
141
 According to Decision
142
 191/2004/QD-TTg
143
 the VTF is responsible for the 
                                               
137 Before 2007 it was the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. See Decree 90/2002/ND-CP (2002). 
138 Decree 187/2007/ND-CP (2007), art 1.  
139 Ibid, art 2 s 9.  
140 MPT was renamed MIC in 2007. See Decree 187/2007/NĐ-CP (2007). 
141 Decree 160/2004/ND-CP (2004), art 49 s 4.  
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implementation of the State's policies on universal service delivery throughout the 
country. Its main tasks are to collect and mobilise universal service financial resources, 
make subsidies to universal service programmes and projects, and co-ordinate the 
delivery and execution of these programmes and projects.  
The VTF's managerial and executive apparatus consists of a Management Board, an 
Inspection Division and an Executive Board. The Management Board comprises five 
members, who are appointed and dismissed by the Minister of Information and 
Communications. All members of the Board of Management are government officials. 
The chairman of the VTF's Management Board is the Minister or a Vice Minister.
144
 
Other members are the managing director and members from relevant departments in the 
Ministry.  
(iv) Other ministerial agencies 
Other government agencies are also involved in the state management of 
telecommunications and universal service policy in Vietnam. Ministries and ministerial 
agencies (within their power and scope of duties) are responsible for cooperating with 
the MIC to carry out the state management of telecommunications in accordance with 
the Government‘s directions.145 In particular, the Ministry of Finance has responsibility 
for collaborating with the MIC in determining cost accounting, collecting universal 
service levies and stipulating the regulations for financial management of the VTF.
146
 
The State Bank of Vietnam is responsible for regulations on the provision of loans at 
below-market rates from universal service funds.
147
 
(v) Local people‘s committees 
                                                                                                                                          
142 PM‘s Decision is a legal document issued by the Prime Minister pursuant to the Constitution, law, resolution of the 
National Assembly, Ordinance and resolution of the National Assembly‘s Standing Committee, Decision of the State 
President, Resolution and the Decree of the Government (Cabinet) so as to stipulate solutions for the state 
management regarding the Cabinet‘s operation and public administrative system from central to local levels as well as 
working regulations of the Cabinet‘s members and Chairmen of People‘s Committees of provinces. See the Legal 
Document Act 2008 art 15 (1) & (2). 
143 PM‘s Decision 191/2004/QD-TTg (2004) on setting up Vietnam Public Utility Telecommunications Service Fund. 
144 Until July 2010, Chairman of VTF‘s Management Board was a Vice Minister. 
145 Telecommunications Act 2009, art 9 s 3. 
146 Ibid, art 22 s 4. 
147 PM‘s Decision 191/2004/QD-TTg art 10 s 2(b). 
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People‘s Committees are responsible for state economic management of 
telecommunications within their local areas. In particular, the Department of Information 
and Communications within the local committees of the provinces and centrally 
governed cities are responsible for the management of universal service delivery in their 
respective localities. They are required to coordinate with the MIC and the VTF in order 
to facilitate the implementation of universal service programmes and projects in 
localities, in a timely and efficient manner.
148
 For example, the MIC‘s Decision 
51/2008/QD-BTTTT on the evaluation and subsidy of universal service costs for period 
2008-2010 art 4 s 5 determined that the Department of Information and Communications 
is responsible for evaluating and certifying the performance of universal service 
providers in localities
149
 quarterly or every 6 months (applicable to provinces and cities 
with small-size universal service performance).
150
 In addition, the Department of 
Information and Communications is responsible for checking, and supervising the 
implementation of universal service contracts between the VTF and universal service 
providers in localities.
151
   
(vi) Persistent issues of universal service institutional arrangements 
In summary, there were some improvements in institutional arrangements for the 
delivery of telecommunications services to rural and isolated areas after the passage of 
Ordinance 2002 along with numerous ministerial regulations. In particular there was the 
establishment of a separate financial institution within the MIC to administer the 
performance of service delivery; along with established structures for administration of 
levy collection and provision of subsidies.  
However, the current institutional arrangements provide weak monitoring and evaluation 
of universal service performance, due mainly to diffuse accountability amongst 
departments involved in the measurement of service delivery. Roles remain unclear and 
give rise to role-conflict. The institutional framework does not support effective public 
and stakeholder involvement. At the same time, the lack of transparent performance 
information and reporting systems is further evidence of unsatisfactory and insufficient 
                                               
148 Ibid, art 10 s 3. 
149 Decision 51/2008/QD-BTTTT (2008), art 4 s 2. 
150 Ibid, art 5 s 1. 
151 Ibid, art 4 s 2 (b).  
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universal service arrangements. Finally, poor systems of performance accountability are 
an obstacle to efficient and effective universal service delivery in Vietnam. 
The diffuse and unclear responsibility of central authorities are shown in the lack of 
regulations on provision of loans at below-market rates to telecommunications 
operators.
152
 According to Decision 191/2004/QD-TTg, the State Bank of Vietnam is 
responsible for promulgating and approving regulations for loans at below-market 
rates.
153
 However, there were no such regulations enacted during the period 2006-2010 
by the State Bank of Vietnam. Instead, the Ministry of Finance determined only a few 
principles and conditions for the provision of loans at below-market rates.
154
 There were 
confused responsibilities among relevant government agencies and little performance 
accountability for inefficient performance of universal service subsidies owing to the 
lack of regulations for loans at below-market rates.   
Nor did the MIC issue any specific regulation on the provision of loans at below-market 
rates. In practice, there was only some in-house guidance issued by the Board of 
Management of the VTF in 2008.
155
 This non-legally binding document did not outline 
clear, specific, transparent and effective processes for loan eligibility, loan terms, and 
evaluation and external monitoring of the effectiveness of the loan programme. This led 
to fragmentation of the process of approving loans at below-market rates and difficulties 
in evaluating the effectiveness of loans at below-market rates and in determining the 
performance accountability of the authorities involved in making those loans.
156
 There 
was also scope for officials to exceed their authority in approving projects for loans at 
below-market rates, unfairness and non-transparency in allowing some loans, and no 
requirements for performance accountability from individuals and institutions involved.   
At the same time, the organisational structure of the VTF reflected diffuse 
accountability, role conflict and did not effectively support public and stakeholder 
involvement. According to Decision 191/2004/QD-TTg, the VTF was a financial 
institution with responsibility to monitor, evaluate and report on the implementation of 
                                               
152 See Chapter Four III.C.2.(c).(v). 
153 Decision 191/2004/QD-TTg (2004), art 10 s 2 (b). 
154 Circular 67/2006/TT-BTC (2006) Part III s 3. 
155 Decision 2/QD/VTF-HDQ (2008) on loans at below-market rates. 
156 Vietnam Public Utility Telecommunications Service Fund ―Evaluation of the Implementation of the universal 
service Programme 2006-2010‖ (prepared for the Ministry of Information and Communications, 2010), at 4. 
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universal service programmes, plans and projects supported by universal service 
funds.
157
 
This situation basically eliminates the function and involvement of the MIC‘s advisory 
departments in monitoring and evaluating the performance of universal service policy. In 
addition, there were no members on the Board from other ministries, 
telecommunications operators, or any external or outside experts. 
In addition, overlapping and ineffective performance between the VTF and provincial 
Departments for Information and Communication also results in ineffective and delayed 
evaluation of service delivery and subsidies. These provincial Departments are involved 
in monitoring and evaluating the delivery of universal services within geographical 
areas. However, their monitoring activities are inefficient. In addition, there is no on-
going adequate supervision and control of the approval processes for annual universal 
service plans, or decisions on the selection of universal service providers and approval of 
subsidies.
158
  
The MIC allocated 0.5% of universal service subsidies for evaluating and certifying 
outputs of the delivery of universal services locally
159
 and delegated the responsibility 
for overseeing and certifying outputs of service delivery by telecommunications 
operators in each province to the Department of Information and Communication.
160
  
Interviews with the group of government officials (see Appendix One) involved in the 
measurement of universal service delivery in Vietnam in 2011-2012 showed that the 
VTF was still involved in this process. It took longer for the VTF to re-check the 
performance information and there was typically disagreement. As a result, the approval 
and provision of subsidies were also delayed.
161
 Up to December 2010 (the end of the 
programme 2006-2010), the VTF had not settled any contracts for universal service 
                                               
157 Decision 191/2004/QD-TTg (2004), art 3 s 4. 
158 Ministry of Information and Communications ―Document 2203/TTr-BTTTT submitted to the Prime Minister for 
the approval of the universal service Programme 2011-2015‖ (2011), at 6. 
159 Decision 14/2008/TT-BTTTT (2008) Part II s 1(a) defined:  
(a) Compensation to provincial Departments for Information and Communication for evaluation and approval of 
universal service delivery in provinces will be 0.5% of subsidies to telecommunications operators for 
maintaining and providing universal services. 
160 Circular 05/2006/TT-BBCVT, Part V s 5(d). 
161 Ministry of Information and Communication, above n 158, at 6. 
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provision but had only prepaid limited amounts to telecommunications operators for 
providing universal services.
162
    
Finally, there has been inadequate evidence-based independent analysis around the 
performance of universal service delivery in Vietnam. This is caused mainly by the lack 
of regulation on performance information and reporting systems. Up to 2009, there were 
no detailed regulations on the provision of universal service public reports.
163
 Some 
important issues relating to reporting data (eg annual reports on universal service levies 
of telecommunications operators to the VTF) were set out only as non-binding 
administrative documents. For instance, the MPT‘s document 398/BBCVT-KHTC in 
2006 required that before 30 April every year, telecommunications operators should 
submit reports to the VTF on the accounting balance of universal service levies for the 
previous year. The VTF in turn was to report in writing, certifying final information 
about these universal service levies.
164
 This, however, has never been done properly and 
there have been considerable differences in information about universal service 
performance released by the VTF and telecommunications operators.
165
 
As a result, stakeholders and the public have had insufficient information about planning 
approval, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation.
166
 Important information relating to 
collection of universal service levies, subsidies, and projects for loans at below-market 
rates between 2006 and 2010 was unavailable and not released publicly until mid-
2012,
167
 in breach of the MIC‘s regulations on public disclosure of this financial 
information.
168
  
Some current regulations on telecommunications reporting (the MIC‘s Circular 
24/2009/TT-BTTTT on information reports applicable to telecommunications 
operators
169
 and 25/2009/TT-BTTTT on comprehensive information reports applicable 
to government departments)
170
 do not require sufficient data on the performance of 
                                               
162 Vietnam Public Utility Telecommunications Service Fund, above n 156, at 3. 
163 Decision 4/2009/TT-BTTTT (2009) on the reports of universal service delivery.  
164 Document 398/BBCVT-KHTC (2006). 
165 Ministry of Finance ―Inspection Report on the financial management at VTF‖ (2011), at [2.1].  
166 Interviews with telecommunications operators‘ officers (the author, December 2011).  
167 The VTF only published this relevant information on their website on 12 April 2012 
<www.vtf.vn/vi/vtci/tttk/2012/04/4F1B657E/>. 
168 Decision 1130/QD-BTTTT (2009) on the regulation of public disclosure of financial information of VTF. 
169 Circular 24/2009/TT-BTTTT (2009).  
170 Circular 25/2009/TT-BTTTT (2009).  
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universal service policy. In particular, these reports are insufficient for any accurate 
statistical monitoring and evaluation of universal service performance (eg fixed 
subscribers were counted on the geographical areas of districts, which are not the same 
as universal service-qualified areas of communes).
171
 In turn, reports of local 
Departments of Information and Communications are mostly dependent on reports of 
telecommunications operators (eg Annexes 5/SB and 5/DB).
172
  
(c) Universal service legal framework and the universal service programme 2006-
2010 
The basic legal framework for universal service delivery in Vietnam was shaped by the 
Ordinance 2002 along with a number of subordinate regulations. However, 
improvements in universal service delivery began to be seen only after the establishment 
of the VTF and the universal service programme 2006-2010. 
The most significant change in the legal frameworks was the precise definition of 
universal services, and the removal of the asymmetric obligation (on VNPT) of universal 
service delivery and the universal service levy on the sole dominant operator. Instead, all 
telecommunications operators were now made responsible for universal service 
delivery.
173
 The financial resources for universal service delivery were to be funded by 
universal service levies on the telecommunications industry. In addition, regulations on 
the administration of universal service delivery, collection of universal service levies and 
provision of universal service subsidies were improved over the period.   
(1) Immediate background to the universal service programme 2006-2010  
From the early 2000s,
174
 the telecommunications industry witnessed the advent of an 
open market and increasing competition among new entrants.
175
 This resulted in a 
                                               
171 Form 5/DB and Form 5/SB of MIC‘s Circulars 24/2009/TT-BTTTT (2009) and 25/2009/TT-BTTTT (2009). 
172 Circular 25/2009/TT-BTTTT (2009), s 4 [30].   
173 Post and Telecommunications Ordinance 2002, art 51 s 3. 
174 Nguyen, Pham and Gullish, above n 92, at 9. 
175 In 2005, Vietnam had 6 facility-based operators providing services based on their own network infrastructure (3 for 
domestic fixed telephone services and 3 for international fixed telephone services), 6 mobile service providers and 13 
ISPs.  
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service boom from 2003 onwards, as well as a significant increase in subscriptions to all 
services
176
 and decreases in service prices.
177
  
Up to 2005 however, Vietnam remained well behind many developing countries.
178
 The 
growth of universal service delivery was slow and imbalanced in Vietnam.
179
 There was 
a considerable disparity in accessibility and availability of telecommunications services 
for residents living in urban and rural areas.
180
 As late as 2005, the average density of 
fixed telephone lines per 100 residents in rural, remote and mountainous areas in 
Vietnam was less than 2%.
181
 The lowest density within these communes was 0.8 per 
100 residents,
182
 compared with the average density of 8.46 per 100 for the country as a 
whole.
183
 There were some 600 rural communes without any telephone.
184
  
Key indicators of telecommunications subscriptions in Vietnam remained low in 
comparison with developing countries, Asia-Pacific economies and average world 
telecommunications density. The ITU database showed (2005) the fixed telephone 
density in Vietnam as being 8.46 per 100 inhabitants, compared with average densities 
of 12.7, 15.1, and 19.1 in developing countries, Asia-Pacific and the world respectively.  
The situation was the same with mobile and fixed (wired) broadband subscriptions. 
These densities in Vietnam were 11.54 and 0.25 per 100 inhabitants, compared with 33.9 
and 3.4 (the world), 22.9 and 1.3 (developing countries) and 22.6 and 2.2 (Asia-
Pacific).
185
 Thus, in 2005 the provision of universal services (telecommunications) was 
still a big challenge for Vietnam (see Figure 4 and 5).   
                                               
176 See Ministry of Information and Communications Information and Data on Information and Communication 
Technology: Vietnam 2010 (Information and Communications Publishing House, 2010) at 39, Nguyen Thanh Ha, 
Pham Quang Thanh and Jacob Gullish Competition Review of the Vietnamese Telecom Sector (United States Agency 
for International Development, VNCI Policy Paper #3, 2005); Ministry of Information and Communications (2011) 
<mic.gov.vn/uploads/20100318/DNhatangmang.xls>. 
177 Vietnam Government ―Official Dispatch to the National Assembly on the Telecommunications Bill‖ (2009), at 1.  
178 Nguyen, Pham and Gullish, above n 92, at 4.  
179 Vietnam Public Utility Telecommunications Service Fund, above n 156, at 1.  
180 Ministry of Information and Communications, above n 158, at 6.  
181 Ibid, at 2. 
182 Ibid.  
183 ITU World Telecommunications/ICT Indicators Database (2000-2010).  
184 Ministry of Information and Communications ―Project submitted to the Prime Minister for the approval of the 
universal service Programme 2011-2015‖ (2011), at 3.  
185 International Telecommunications Union Database: Key Global Telecom Indicators for the World 
Telecommunication Service Sector (2005-2010). 
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Figure 4: Key telecommunications indicators in Vietnam period 2001-2005
186
  
Year Fixed telephone lines Mobile cellular Fixed (wired) broadband 
Total Density per  
100 inhabitants 
Total Density per 100 
inhabitants 
Total Density per 100 
inhabitants 
2001 3,049,925 3.83 1,251,195 1.57 0 0 
2002 3,929,140 4.88 1,902,388 2.36 1,076 0 
2003 4,402,000 5.41 2,742,000 3.37 9,180 0.01 
2004 5,481,000187 6.51 4,960,000 6.03 52,709 0.06 
2005 7,126,900188 8.46 9,593,200 11.54 210,024 0.25 
 
Figure 5: Key indicators of telecommunications subscription in Vietnam (2005)
189
 
Indicators  
(density per 100 inhabitants) 
Vietnam Asia-
Pacific 
Developed 
countries 
Developing 
countries 
World 
Fixed telephone  8.46 15.1 47.2 12.7 19.1 
Mobile  11.54 22.6 82.1 22.9 33.9 
Fixed (wired) broadband  0.25 2.2 12.3 1.3 3.4 
The principal obstacle, among several others, to the effective performance of universal 
service delivery remained the inadequate legal framework, and the lack of detailed 
regulations to determine and allocate the obligations of telecommunications operators to 
provide services or pay levies.  
In practice there was an inequality between telecommunications operators in providing 
universal services.
190
 VNPT continued to be the single telecommunications operator to 
take responsibility for universal service delivery; it was covering all costs for this 
                                               
186 Source: ITU World Telecommunications/ICT Indicators Database (2000-2010), Statistical Handbook of Vietnam 
(2006 & 2010) and Information and Data on Information and Communication Technology: Vietnam White Book 
(2010). 
187 General Statistics Office Statistical Handbook of Vietnam (Statistics Publishing House, Hanoi, 2006) at 115. 
188 General Statistics Office Statistical Handbook of Vietnam (Statistics Publishing House, Hanoi, 2010) at 239. 
189 ITU‘s Key Global Telecom Indicators for the World Telecommunication Service Sector (2005-2010) and Key 
Country Data (2000-2010)  
190 Ministry of Information and Communications, above n 158, at 2. 
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obligation by internal cross-subsidies among its services and between regions, and by 
interconnection charges toward costs of universal service delivery
191
 up to 2005.
192
  
In addition, after the advent of an open market policy and increased competition which 
resulted in reduced prices of services closer to the real costs, VNPT found it difficult to 
maintain the internal cross-subsidy between its services.
193
 The internal cross-subsidy 
thus affected VNPT‘s competitiveness in other service markets.194 This required changes 
in the universal service policy, and the elimination of the internal cross-subsidy. 
Further changes to the legal framework were required once Vietnam become a member 
of the WTO in 2006. Appendix A section 3 of the WTO Regulation Reference Paper, 
which forms part of the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications,
195
 requires any 
member of the WTO to define the universal services it wishes to maintain. Such 
universal service policy and universal service funding arrangements should not be anti-
competitive, should be administered in a transparent, non-discriminatory and 
competitively neutral manner, and should not create more burdensome costs than 
necessary.
196
 However, no particular regulations aiming at meeting these principles were 
enacted.    
(2) The 2006-2010 programme: overall target and specific objectives 
In order to carry out the CPV‘s overall target in the Strategy 2001-2010, the Prime 
Minister‘s Decision 158/2001/QD-TTg 2001 spelled out the objectives for universal 
service delivery by 2010:  
1. Increased quality in all areas of the country;  
2. The density of telephones and Internet users per 100 inhabitants to reach the average 
percentages in the region;
197
  
3. All districts and most communes being connected by optical fibre and other 
broadband infrastructures;  
                                               
191 Decree 160/2004/ND-CP (2004), art 49 s 1 (a).  
192 Ibid. 
193 Ministry of Information and Communication, above n 184, at 3. 
194 Ibid. 
195 WTO Regulation Reference Paper: Agreement on Basic Telecommunications.  
196 See Chapter Two II.D.  
197 PM‘s Decision 158/2001/QD-TTg (2001), art 1 s 2 (b).  
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4. At least 30% of telephone and Internet users having access to broadband;
198
  
5. The fixed telephone density being between 15 and 18 per 100 inhabitants and more 
than 60 per 100 households.
199
  
The Government also committed itself to designing policies and frameworks for 
regulating telecommunication networks in rural, mountainous and remote areas, and to 
defining obligations of universal service delivery and universal service providers.
200
  
After improvements to the universal service legal framework and institutional 
arrangements in 2002, and the establishment of universal service funding, the 
Government approved the first five-year universal service programme. The overall target 
of this programme (2006-2010), as determined by Decision 74/2006/QD-TTg, Art 1, 
Part I s 1, was:
201
 
to secure the delivery of universal services to citizens throughout the country, in which 
the focus is the universal service delivery to mountainous, remote, difficult socio-
economic conditions areas, in order to narrow the gap of telecommunications and 
Internet usage between regions and areas, thus creating good conditions for fostering 
socio-economic development and contributing to ensuring national security and 
defence.  
The programme had a focus on both the development of telecommunications 
infrastructure and enhancement of service use in communes with especially difficult 
geographic and socio-economic conditions.
202
 Some specific objectives of the 
programme were defined in Decision 74/2006/QD-TTg art 1 s I (2):
203
 
- Telephone density in the areas provided with universal services reaching 5 per 100 
residents; 
- 100% communes throughout the country having public telephone service access 
point; 
- 70% communes throughout the country having public Internet service access point; 
                                               
198 Ibid, art 1 s 3 (a).  
199 Ibid, art 1 s 3 (d).  
200 Ibid. art 1 s 4 (d).  
201 PM‘s Decision 74/2006/QD-TTg (2006), art 1 part I s 1.  
202 Ministry of Information and Communications, above n 184, at 4 & 5. 
203 Objectives defined in this Decision 74/2006/QD-TTg were not in line with those in the PM‘s Decision 158 (2001) 
but will be effective because, according to the Legal Document Act, rules on the same issues in the updated legal 
documents issued by the same responsible authority/authorised official with be effective against the older one.   
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- Compulsory telecommunications services with free access for all citizens. 
(3) Selection of universal service providers and contestable bidding process  
In Vietnam, the selection of universal service providers has been a major problem.  
Between 2002 and 2005, there were three principal rulings by the Government on the 
selection process. Ordinance 2002 provided that the selection of telecommunications 
operator(s) to provide universal service should be conducted through one of following 
processes:
204
  
a) The nomination of enterprise to provide universal services on the basis of evaluation 
of the enterprise‘s project; and  
b) A competitive bidding process for the selection of telecommunications operators to 
provide universal services. 
At the same time, Decree 31/2005/ND-CP on producing and supplying all public-utility 
products and services in Vietnam,
205
 art 5 s 4 stated:  
4. Public utility products and services should be distributed through one of three 
methods, the order of priority for methods being as follows:  
a) Bidding;  
b) Government allocated projects; 
c) Direct contracting.  
The Prime Minister‘s Decision 74/2006/QD-TTg 2006 Part VI s 2 stated that:   
a) Universal service programmes are implemented through the Government‘s annual 
plans on universal service delivery; 
b) Plans and projects on universal service delivery are carried out in accordance with 
Government‘s regulations on bidding, and by direct contracting to provide universal 
service products and services in accordance with guidance from the responsible 
authorities. 
                                               
204 Post and Telecommunications Ordinance 2002, art 50 s 2. 
205 Decree 31/2005/ND-CP on producing and supplying public-utility products and services (2005) Annexes A & B 
included public-utility products and services whose supply must be conducted through ‗Government allocated 
projects‘ or ‗direct contracting‘. Annex C listed public-utility products and services that must be supplied through 
bidding process or direct contracting. None of these Annexes included telecommunications public-utility products and 
services. However, there was an open clause that other important products and services could be included in this 
Annex in accordance with the PM‘s Decisions.   
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Thus, the selection of universal service providers and universal service projects in 
Vietnam could be carried out through any of three options: contestable bidding, 
government allocated projects, or direct contracting. However, the 2006-2010 period 
saw only ‗Government allocated projects‘ and ‗direct contracting‘ methods being 
applied to the selection of universal service providers for the universal service 
programme 2006-2010. There was no competitive bidding at all.  
In practice, any legally established telecommunications operator could have become a 
universal service provider. They would receive universal service subsidies through the 
VTF when they supplied telecommunication services under contract with the competent 
authority within the universal service-qualified areas, in accordance with the relevant 
regulations.
206
 During this period, in addition to VNPT, there were only a few 
telecommunication operators providing local telephone service within the areas that 
qualified for universal service subsidies from the VTF. Two principal providers were 
EVN-Telecom and Viettel.
207
  
Given the lack of competitive bidding for service provision and the Government‘s use of 
allocation and direct contracting, considerable confusion arose in the provision of 
telecommunications services. In some situations, more than one operator was contracted 
to provide services in the same universal service-qualified communes, even though these 
are considered as uneconomic business areas for the delivery of services. In other 
situations more than one operator was operating in the same universal service-qualified 
area.  
The absence of contestable bidding in selecting universal service-providers has led to 
inefficient investment and non-economic efficiency in costs and subsidies. Operators 
have had little motivation to reduce their costs in the absence of a competitive bidding 
process. Duplication in deploying infrastructure in the same universal service-qualified 
areas has resulted in overlap and wasted investment. At the same time many households 
have engaged the services of two or even three universal service providers 
simultaneously so as to get more benefits from government subsidies. As a result, the 
                                               
206 Decree 160/2005/ND-CP (2005), art 50 s 1 and PM‘s Decision 74/2006/QD-TTg (2006) Part II. 
207 By the end of 2009, there were four telecommunications operators engaged with the VTF in contracts to provide 
universal services <www.vtf.vn/vi/tintuc/trongnuoc/2010/07/4F1B62AD/>.      
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Government has had to expend two or three times the basic subsidy amount on residents 
or households in universal service-qualified areas.
208
   
Without a competitive bidding process for selecting providers, there is no way of 
knowing whether the most efficient outcome was achieved. For the last five years the 
government has persisted with the allocation of projects and with direct contracting, and 
not utilised the competitive bidding process. The failure to use contestable proceedings 
in determining which enterprises would provide universal services has clearly limited 
the outcomes of the universal service programme. There has been no real effort to select 
the most efficient operators or minimise the subsidies to those providing services.  
Although the Bidding Act 2005 and its related Decrees have been in existence for some 
years, criteria or adequate regulation for the fair selection of universal service providers 
have not been spelled out. The selection of universal service providers and projects of 
universal service delivery have often been based on unclear criteria, such as giving 
―prioritisation to the telecommunications provider with existing telecommunications 
infrastructure in the universal service qualified areas‖.209  
Lack of performance accountability by responsible authorities and officials has meant 
that they have preferred to use allocation of projects and direct contracting, rather than 
the contestable bidding process. This has resulted in uneven treatment of 
telecommunications operators. It has also left open the potential for bribery and 
corruption.       
(4) Financial resources for universal service delivery and allocation of universal 
service levies (2006-2010) 
Ordinance 2002 determined that the Government should ensure compensation for the 
delivery of universal services through interconnection charges (a determined proportion 
of interconnection charges) and subsidies from the VTF, funds from the Government‘s 
                                               
208 Dong Thap Province Department of Information and Communication ―Report 81/BC-STTTT on the management 
of universal service delivery‖ (2010), at 4. 
209 Posts and Telecommunications Ordinance 2002, art 50 s 2. 
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budget, universal service levies and other resources.
210
 This was reinforced in Decree 
160/2004/ND-CP art 49 s 1 which stated:
211
 
1. The Government supports telecommunications operators for delivery of universal 
services through: 
a) Interconnection charges; 
b) Subsidies from the VTF.  
(i) Funding from interconnection charges 
One of the assumptions made by the MIC in setting interconnection charges between 
operators was that the charges should include a ‗reasonable and proportional‘ 
contribution towards the provision of universal services. This contribution should be 
determined transparently, without any discrimination between telecommunications 
operators.
212
 However, in reality the specific proportion of contribution to the VTF was 
neither defined in the legal framework nor included in interconnection agreements 
between telecommunications operators.
213
 On the other hand, Decision 191/2004/QD-
TTg art 6 s 2 (b) determined that interconnection charges of operators (if any) has to be 
paid to the VTF. The Ministry of Finance‘s Circular 110/2005/TT-BTC determined that 
this payment is to be 100% of interconnection charges.
214
 VNPT had qualified revenues 
from interconnection charges to be paid at VND 16.40 billion
215
 to the universal service 
fund in 2005.
216
 The Prime Minister‘s Decision 186/2007/QD-TTg did not count 
                                               
210 Ibid, art 50 s 1.  
211 Decree 160/2004/ND-CP (2004), art 49 s1. 
212 PM‘s Decision 217/2003/QD-TTg art 3 s 2 (a) provided that:  
2. Pursuant to the regulation on the management of service charges applicable to postal and telecommunications 
operators: 
a) Interconnection charges between telecommunications operators shall be defined on the following bases:  
- Interconnection costs; 
- Non-discrimination between telecommunications services, between affiliation of telecommunications 
operators and other telecommunications operators; 
- Reasonable analysis of specific elements of the networks or service segments; 
- Reasonable pursuance to interconnection charges of countries within the region and the world; 
- In case interconnection charges included proportional contribution to the provision of universal 
services, this contribution must be defined reasonably and equally. 
213 PM‘s Decision 39/2007/QD-TTg on the management of postal and telecommunications charges (2007), which 
replaced the PM‘s Decision 217/2003/QD-TTg, art 2 s 2 defined one of the principles of charge management as 
ensuring the provision of universal services. However, this provision was not implemented in practice. 
214 Ministry of Finance Circular 110/2005/TT-BTC (2005) Part 2 s 1.2. 
215 NZD 1 is equivalent to about VND 17,089 <secure.anz.com/IntInetBank/ANZVietnamIB/English/fxRates/fxrates.asp>.  
216 Ministry of Information and Communications, above n 184, annex 1.7. 
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interconnection charges as payments to the VTF by operators nor income from 
interconnection charges as revenue for levy calculation.
217
 
(ii) Funding from the government budget 
The Vietnamese legal framework provided that the Government would contribute a 
kick-off payment to the universal service fund. This reflected a realistic support and 
financial share by the Government in enhancing universal access or universal service 
delivery, such as in some other countries (eg New Zealand, Nigeria and Nepal). 
However, in Vietnam this payment was only made in part.  
Decision 191/2004/QD-TTg art 6 s 1 provided that of the VTF‘s initially registered 
(charter) capital of VND 500 billion, the Government was to provide a one-off 
contribution of VND 200 billion. However, the Government contributed only VND 100 
billion to the VTF‘s registered capital.218 The remainder of the registered capital (VND 
400 billion) was sourced from annual universal service levies on telecommunications 
operators.
219
 
In addition, Decision 74/2006/QD-TTg Part V s 1 (a) and (b) determined that the 
funding for universal service delivery during the period 2006-2010 should be VND 
5,200 billion.
220
 Apart from the VND 5,100 billion to be levied on operators, VND 100 
billion would also be received from the ministries and local authorities. According to 
interviews with the group of participants from the government departments, there is no 
information available to show that this VND 100 billion was ever contributed.
221
  
(iii) Determination of operators to pay levies  
Decree 160/2004/ND-CP art 49 s 3 (a) stated that the Prime Minister was responsible for 
making regulations on the collection of universal service levies from 
telecommunications operators. Decision 191/2004/QD-TTg art 6 s 2 determined that any 
legally established telecommunications operator in Vietnam must contribute to the 
                                               
217 PM‘s Decision 186/2007/QD-TTg, art 1. 
218 Government Office‘s Document 3723/VPCP-KHTC (2009) allowed the VTF to use VND 100 billion of annual 
universal service levies to contribute to its registered (Charter) capital.  
219 Ministry of Finance‘s Document 160/KL-TTr on the inspection of the financial management in Vietnam Public 
Utility Telecommunications Service Fund (2011), at 5.    
220 PM‘s Decision 74/2006/QD-TTg (2006) part V s 1 (a) and (b). 
221 Interviews with officers in VTF and VNTA (the author, December 2011-January 2012). 
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performance of universal service delivery through paying universal service levies to the 
VTF. However, during the period 2006-2010, telecommunications operators who 
provided mobile services (including local and national), international calling, leased-line 
services, and national calling and leased-line services (including fixed local access)
222
 
were liable for universal service levies.
223
 The idea behind this determination was that 
operators providing this range of benefit or high value services should pay for the costs 
of the delivery of universal services.    
The determination exempted some providers of Internet access - such as ISPs (including 
VoIP service providers) - from any obligation to contribute to universal service levies.
224
 
The number of ISPs in Vietnam increased from 19 in 2006 to 91 in 2011 (See Chart 2). 
In addition, annual revenues from Internet service increased significantly from about 
VND 2,158 billion in 2006 to approximately VND 7,150 billion in 2009.
225
 This revenue 
was much higher than the total revenue from national telephone services which stood at 
VND 3,386 billion in 2009 and VND 1,473 billion in 2010.
226
 However, the substantial 
Internet access revenues did not incur universal service levies.  
The determination of telecommunications operators to pay universal service levies 
obviously did not ensure technological and service neutrality, or non-discrimination 
between service providers. The determination in reality was aimed at creating easier 
processes for management authorities
227
 rather than considering the benefit to operators 
and equality between them, who all benefit from the greater network connectivity. The 
management authorities did not need to consider revenues nor calculate levies from 
other service operators.   
There is no obvious reason for different services to be treated differently for universal 
service purposes or for different percentages of revenues for universal service levies. 
The justification for levies should be based on the idea that all operators benefit from 
greater connectivity benefits in exactly the same way as from universal services. 
                                               
222 Ministry of Finance‘s Circular 110/2005/TT-BTC (2005) Part I s 2(a). 
223 PM‘s Decision 191/2004/QD-TTg art 6 s 2(a). 
224 In New Zealand, ISP revenues were also effectively exempt from obligations to contribute to universal service 
levies until 2011. 
225 Ministry of Information and Communications, above n 184, chart 6.1.4.   
226 Ibid, chart 1.7.   
227 Ibid, at 38.  
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(iv) Allocation of universal service levies  
The determination of levies in Vietnam did not have a clear connection to the costs for 
providing universal services. The aggregate amount to be paid from all service providers 
to the VTF was calculated on a fixed percentage of annual service revenues, and not 
linked to either the actual or estimated costs of providing universal services. Decision 
191/2004/QD-TTg art 6 s 2 (a) determined that universal service levies should be 5% of 
mobile service revenues, 4% of international calling and leased-line service revenues 
and 3% of national calling and leased-line service revenues. Outcomes from interviews 
with government officers involved in universal service policy-making and 
administration in Vietnam illustrate that levy rates imposed on operators were defined by 
estimating the pre-determined financial requirement for universal service delivery during 
the whole period 2006-2010 to annually estimated service revenues.
228
  
The determination of universal service levies was not based on actual or estimated costs 
or outputs and inevitably resulted  in either over-collection or under-collection. Without 
a clear connection between levies and the actual or estimated costs of service delivery 
there is an obstacle to the measurement of efficient performance of the universal service 
policy.
229
 Over-collection has a major impact on the financial performace of operators, 
partcularly new and small operators.
230
 The outcomes were over-levying of 
telecommunications operators and the placing of unneccessary financial burdens on the 
industry. In addition, the allocation of the universal service levies based on a fixed 
percentage of service revenue and differing between different service types, was not 
consistent with competitive neutrality. 
The failure in forecasting of receivable financial resources from the industry levies and 
the contributions payable to the universal service programme is still a critically 
important issue.
231
 It has generally resulted in over-levying on telecommunications 
operators. The over-collection of universal service levies was due to a mismatch 
between levels of levies in Vietnam and actual expenditures, regardless of a downward 
                                               
228 Interviews with officers in VTF and VNTA (the author, December 2011-January 2012). 
229 International Telecommunications Union, above ch 2, n 98, at 36. 
230 Interviews with professional and officers from telecommunications operators (the author, December 2011-January 
2012). 
231 Ministry of Information and Communications, above n 158, at 6. 
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revision of levies in 2007. This downward revision of levy was made due to the 
unpredicted increase in revenues of mobile services two years after the implementation 
of the universal service programme. Fixed determination of funding resources resulted in 
ineffective use of resources and variable compliance by the telecommunications 
operators.  
For the period 2005-2006, collected universal service levies were very close to 5% of the 
sector revenues. The levy rate for mobile service revenues was the highest level of 5% of 
gross revenues, but revenues from mobile services were approximately 7.5 times higher 
than those from each of the two other liable services. VND 900 million was paid to the 
VTF from mobile service revenues, compared with VND 121 million from international 
telephone services, and VND 112 million from long-distance services.
232
 Vietnam was 
ranked among the countries with the highest universal service levy. Most countries
233
 set 
contributions to universal service funds at less than 2% of service revenues.
234
   
During the period 2007-2010 the percentages of service revenues for universal service 
levies in Vietnam were lowered to 3%, 2% and 1%, respectively. Decision 
186/2007/QD-TTg art 1 amended art 2 s 2 of Decision 191/2004/QD-TTg as follows:  
a) Every legally established telecommunications operator in Vietnam must contribute 
to the performance of universal service delivery in Vietnam through paying universal 
service levies to the VTF. These payments, from the financial year 2007, will be 
calculated on the revenues from supplying service to customers (excluded 
interconnection charges), including: 
- Mobile services are to be levied at 3% of revenues. 
- International telephone and leased-line services are to be levied at 2% of revenues. 
- National telephone and lease-line services are to be levied at 1% of revenues. 
This revision in the percentages of service revenues for universal service levies was not 
based on actual costs of universal service delivery. Instead, the downward revision was 
simply a proportionate revision of the percentages in the pre-determined budget for 
                                               
232 Ministry of Information and Communication, above n 184, at 92. 
233 Intelecom‘s Research (2011) indicated that universal service levy rates in countries around the world typically 
range from 0.04% (Estonia) to 6% (Malaysia) of service revenues, and about 40% of countries imposed a rate of 1.5% 
or less, and another 28% imposed a rate of less than 1%. 
234 InfoDev Programme of the World Bank, above ch 2, n 8, at 62. 
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universal service, and was due to an unforeseen increase in the revenues from 
telecommunications services. However, the over-collection of funding continued and 
total universal service levies were around 3% of sector revenues. For instance, 
contributions of universal service levies from mobile services in 2010 were nearly 26 
times higher than the total levies from revenues of the other two services.  
Collected universal service levies from mobile services were approximately VND 
1,863.79 billion, in comparison with VND 57.97 billion from international telephone 
service and VND 14.73 billion from national telephone services.
235
 Thus, while the 
percentages of service revenues for universal service levies were revised periodically, 
the rates - as a proportion of total sector revenue - remained high and Vietnam has 
remained among the countries with the highest universal service levies.  
(v) Failure or delay in paying levies 
A further issue is that there has been weak enforcement in regard to operators in breach 
of their obligations, such as failure or delay in paying universal service levies. Decree 
142/2004/ND-CP
236
 on administrative breaches in telecommunications included 
penalties for breaches related to failure to pay, and delayed payment of universal service 
levies. The Ministry of Finance‘s Circular 110/2005/TT-BTC Part II s 3.1 (d) stated that:  
d) Any telecommunications operator, who fails to pay universal service levies to the 
VTF as provided by this Circular, will be penalised in accordance with relevant 
regulations and fined for delayed payments as defined in Decree 142/2004/ND-CP on 
administrative breaches in telecommunications.  
However, the relevant regulations on penalties of the Decree set penalties at a very low 
value. Decree 142/2004/ND-CP provided that a fine between VND 10 to 40 million, 
applicable on the different period of delayed payments (less than 6 months, between 6 
months and 1 year, and more than 1 year) would be imposed on any delayed payment of 
universal service levies to the VTF.
237
 The maximum penalty (VND 40 million) for 
delayed payments for more than 1 year was extremely low. It was therefore financially 
                                               
235 Ministry of Information and Communication, above n 184, at 94. 
236 Decree 142/2004/ND-CP (2004) was replaced by Decree 83/2011/ND-CP (2011). 
237 Decree 142/2004/ND-CP art 16. 
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beneficial for telecommunications operators to delay paying levies, which were normally 
up to hundreds billions of VND per year per operator, for several years.  
In addition, there was no regulation on the application of interest for late payments of 
universal service levies for the period commencing on the due date to the date of 
payment of the whole amount.
238
 The longer the delay in paying universal service levies, 
the more operators would benefit. Some telecommunications operators ignored or 
delayed paying universal service levies for many years.  
The MIC Report in 2011
239
 noted that there were four telecommunications operators
240
 
who did not pay their contributions of VND 150 billion to the VTF (excluding payments 
made in 2010). One company (VTC) did not register in writing for contribution to the 
VTF as required by the MIC‘s regulations, and did not pay the stipulated amount of 
VND 10 billion.  
(vii) Link between universal service levies and the real costs for the delivery of 
services 
In summary, the allocation of levies should be linked closely to the cost of providing 
services so as to avoid over-levying and placing unneccessary financial burdens on 
operators. In Vietnam, however, there is no clear link between the costs of service 
provision and the determination of contributions from operators and their annual service 
revenues. Decision 191/2004/QD-TTg determined in advance the allocation of universal 
service levies. Similarly, universal service levies for the period 2006-2010, which were 
allocated to telecommunications operators at a percentage of service revenues,
241
 were 
determined again in advance.
242
  
During this period levies paid by operators to the VTF were over-collected in 
comparison with the costs determined under Decision 74. According to the MIC‘s 2011 
Report,
243
 the estimated contributions to the VTF between 2005 and 2010 were VND 
                                               
238 Ibid, art 16 s 4. 
239 Ministry of Information and Communications, above n 158, at 4. 
240 They were SPT, EVNTelecom, Hanoi Telecom and Vishipel.  
241 Decision 191/2004/QD-TTg (2004), art 6 s 2. 
242 Decision 74/2006/QD-TTg (2006), art 1.  
243 Ministry of Information and Communications, above n 158, at 4. 
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7,576 billion.
244
 The levies on operators therefore exceeded the universal service funds 
contribution level determined in the Prime Minister‘s Decision by more than VND 2,500 
billion (See Figure 6).  
Figure 6: Allocation of universal service levies by service 2005-2010 (VND billion)
245
     
Year  Total  Mobile 
services 
International 
telephone & leased 
line services 
National telephone 
& leased line 
services 
Interconnection 
charges (additional)  
2005 904,45 656.87 115.76 115.40 16.40 
2006 1,130.80 901.29 121.50 112.35 -4.33 
2007 926.89 826.05 73.82 27.01 - 
2008 1,225.30 1,123.20 77.01 25.08 - 
2009 1,452.89 1,346.93 72.09 33.86 - 
2010 1,936.49 1,863.79 57.97 14.73 - 
2005-2010 7,576.84 6,718.15 518.17 328.44 12.07 
(5) Subsidies from the VTF   
During the period 2006-2010, subsidies from the VTF were made through:
246
  
1. Subsidies for telecommunications operators to maintain and provide universal 
services in universal service-qualified areas;  
2. Subsidies for individuals and household subscribers to use universal services in 
universal service-qualified areas; and  
3. Subsidies for providing compulsory services throughout the country.  
(i) Specification of universal services 
                                               
244 The amount collected from telecommunications operators until 31 December 2010 however was only VND 5,498 
billion. 
245 Ministry of Information and Communications, above n 184, annex 17. 
246 PM‘s Decision 191/2004/QD-TTg, art 7. 
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The universal service legal framework included universal services and compulsory 
services. Ordinance 2002 art 49 stated: 
Public utility telecommunications services include: 
1. Universal services to be provided to every resident at conditions, quality and price 
defined by the responsible government authority. 
2. Compulsory services to be provided as required by the Government for the purpose of 
socio-economic development and protection of security defence. 
Decree 160/2004/ND-CP art 48 provided further details:  
Public utility telecommunications services include universal and compulsory services, 
which are essential telecommunications services for society, ensured by the Government 
and to be provided at conditions, quality and price defined by the responsible authority‘s 
regulations. 
Specific universal services were defined in Decision 74/2006/QD-TTg art 1 Part III:
247
  
1. Universal telecommunications service 
a) Standard telephone service
248
 (with scope, charge and quality as regulated by the 
MPT); 
b) Standard Internet access service
249
 (with scope, charge and quality as regulated by 
the MPT). 
2. Compulsory telecommunications services: 
a) Emergency communication service: medical emergency aid, security – social 
security, fire-fighting; 
b) Telecommunications services for searching, rescuing, protecting and fighting natural 
calamities, as regulated by competent agencies;  
c) Fixed telephone number enquiries; 
d) Telecommunications services serving State‘s emergency activities as regulated by 
competent agencies. 
                                               
247 MPT‘s Decision 43/2006/QD-BBCVT (2006) produced this list of universal services.  
248 Standard telephone service (STS) normally refers to the basic fixed telephone used to speak with people in other 
locations. In Australia, for example, the Telecommunications (Consumer Protection and Service Standards) Act 1999 
s 6 defines the standard telephone service (STS) as being a telephone service fit for the purpose of voice telephony, or  
if voice telephony is impractical for a person with a disability, a form of communication that is equivalent to voice 
telephony. 
249 Standard Internet access services was interpreted as service (data communications, for example) using dial-up 
modem with low speed less than 64 kbps as defined in the Regulation on telecommunications services in PSTN issued 
by DGPT‘s Decision 953/2000/QD-TCBD (2000) art 6 s1(c).  
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It is clear that the concept of public utility telecommunications services as typically used 
in Vietnam distinguishes two different types of service: universal telecommunications 
service (universal service) and compulsory telecommunications services.
250
 The delivery 
of both universal (mainly focused on residents in rural, isolated and exceptionally 
difficult areas)
251
 and compulsory telecommunications services (for residents throughout 
the country)
252
 is ensured by the Government and subsidised by the VTF. Thus, in 
Vietnam the term ‗universal services‘ is used and covers both types of service. However, 
payments for activities serving the Government would not normally be understood as 
universal services. It should be treated as a different scheme and financed by the State 
budget. If funding for government purposes was excluded, the levy rate would 
presumably be reduced and be closer to normal levels. 
For the analysis of subsidies, the definition of universal services focuses on the standard 
(or basic) telephone service and standard Internet access service. These services are 
guaranteed to be available in commercially non-viable areas and affordable to target 
groups of residents in rural, remote and especially difficult areas. These services were 
guaranteed to be provided either at an individual and household level, or communally at 
public telecenters.
253
 This definition of universal services did not designate the 
technology by which fixed telephone services are to be provided. Instead, both fixed 
wired and wireless
254
 telephone services through PSTN or IP network were regarded as 
universal services and subsidised by the VTF for provision in universal service-qualified 
areas. At the same time, the MPT listed both dial-up and broadband Internet access 
services as universal services. 
(ii) Universal service-qualified areas  
                                               
250 Defining the specific scope of universal services to be subsidised by universal service funds differs between 
countries. According ITU, other services that could be entering universal service policies include (1) directories and 
directory enquiry services; (2) support services for Internet subscribers, such as help-lines and training; (3) emergency 
call answering facilities (dispatch of help for emergencies); and (4) special facilities to permit use by people with 
disabilities on par with all other facilities. See InfoDev Programme of the World Bank ―ICT Regulation Toolkit: 
Module 4 Universal Access and Service‖ (2009), s [1.1.3]. 
251 Decision 74/2006/QD-TTg (2006), art 1 s II 2 (a). 
252 Ibid, art 1 s II 2 (b). 
253 Subsidies to telecommunications operators and to residents are discussed further in Part III (C) Section 2 (c) (5). 
254 GPhone is a fixed telephone service using wireless technology (GSM) provided by VNPT in Vietnam to customers 
throughout the country within the area of network coverage of Vinaphone with GSM terminal. 
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Decision 191/2004/QD-TTg art 5 s 2 defined criteria for the determination of target 
areas to be provided with universal services (universal service-qualified areas). Target 
areas, for the period 2006-2010, to be provided with services were defined as 
administrative units of districts or communes. The definition of universal service-
qualified areas was based on:  
(1) The telecommunications density of universal services being significantly lower 
than the national density;  
(2) Exceptionally difficult socio-economic conditions of a region; and  
(3) Further criteria as determined by the MIC.  
Decision 74/2006/DQ-TTg art 1 s IV 1 (a) and (b) made further specifications about 
universal service qualified areas, namely:  
a) Areas to be provided with universal services (universal service-qualified areas) are: 
...  
- Districts with a density of fixed telephone services less than 2.5 per 100 residents at the 
time of determination.  
- Communes: 
+ Located in districts to be provided with universal services; 
+ Communes with exceptionally difficult socio-economic conditions in accordance 
with the Prime Minister‘s regulations, and not located in districts to be provided with 
universal services. 
b) Communes, not located in districts to be provided with universal services and which do 
not have public telephone and Internet service points: the programme will support these 
for investing in  public telephones and Internet service points so as to provide universal 
services throughout the country. 
In summary, universal service-qualified areas were determined as those districts having 
a fixed telephone density of less than 2.5 per 100 inhabitants, and communes either 
located in the districts provided with universal services or having exceptionally socio-
economic difficulties.
255
  
                                               
255 Related to communes having exceptionally socio-economic difficulties, Decision 135/1998/QD-TTg (1998) 
approving a national programme for socio-economic development of remote and mountainous communes having 
exceptional difficulties, listed 1,715 communes having difficulty (1,000 communes having exceptionally socio-
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During 2006-2010 a list of specific universal service-qualified areas was determined 
periodically by the MIC. The Ministry issued six decisions and circulars to determine 
universal service-qualified areas during that time.
256
 According to the MIC‘s 2011 
Report, in 2010 the number of districts in Vietnam with fixed or land-line density less 
than 2.5 per 100, and communes with exceptional socio-economic difficulty to be 
subsidised from the universal service programme, were 203 districts, 904 communes 
(these do not belong to the aforesaid 203 districts) and 41 islands in the country as a 
whole.
257
 These districts and communes had a population of 20.9 million.
258
  
The targeted areas to be provided with universal services were not defined on the basis 
of carefully calculated geographic and cost conditions. The main reason for universal 
service provision in these targeted areas was to subsidise the high costs of providing 
services to them, and because the residents could not afford the price of the services. In 
fact, owing to the inaccurate calculation of target areas, low price services were provided 
where there was really no good economic reason for a subsidised service. Major 
interviewees of all three groups (government departments, telecommunications operators 
and academia) responded that given the low service prices, many people took advantage 
of them until the subsidies were eventually terminated or stopped.
259
 Inappropriate 
definition of target areas resulted in inappropriate beneficiaries of universal service 
provision, and consequent ineffectiveness of the universal service programme.  
In practice, universal service providers often focussed only on the more urban 
communes within the districts of universal service-qualified areas, rather than providing 
universal services in more remote areas (such as communes which did not belong to the 
203 districts of universal service-qualified areas). This resulted in an imbalanced 
performance of universal service delivery between communes. The very low 
development of density of universal service in very remote communes remained, while 
                                                                                                                                          
economic difficulties) and Decision 164/2006/QD-TTg (2006) approving lists of communes having exceptionally 
socio-economic difficulties, border communes and communes in former resistance bases to be covered by the 
programme on socio-economic development in communes having exceptionally socio-economic difficulties in ethnic 
minority and mountainous areas in the 2006-2010 period (Programme No. 135, phase II) (2006) listed 1,644 
communes. 
256 Decisions 41/2006/QD-BBCVT (2006), 09/2007/QD-BBCVT (2007) and 15/2008/QD-BTTTT (2008), Circulars 
05/2009/TT-BTTTT (2009), 21/2009/TT-BTTTT (2009) and 19/2010/TT-BTTTT (2010).  
257 Ministry of Information and Communications, above n 184, at 18.   
258 Vietnam Public Utility Telecommunications Service Fund, above n 156, at 4. 
259 Interviews with personnel from government departments, telecommunications operators and academia in Vietnam 
(the author, December 2011-January 2012). 
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some urban communes achieved 100% of the targeted objectives.
260
 
Telecommunications infrastructure in areas of exceptionally socio-economic difficulty 
developed very slowly, and did not ensure the availability of services for residents.
261
  
In addition, while subsidies assisted development of 2,874,000 new telephone 
subscribers and support for maintaining 3,647,618 fixed telephone subscribers in the 
universal service-qualified areas,
262
 there remained by the end of 2010, 32 communes 
throughout the country without any fixed telephone subscribers and 5 districts with a 
density of less than 5 per 100 residents. 
(iii) Target groups to be provided with universal services 
Apart from targeted areas, there have also been particular groups which have been 
targeted for universal services. These specific groups were outlined in Decision 
191/2004/QD-TTg art 5 s 2. They included all those using telecommunications and 
Internet services at public access points subsidised by the VTF and subscribers - either 
individuals or households - in areas provided with public utility telecommunications 
services.
263
  
The unclear definition of universal service targeted groups has been a particular obstacle 
to efficient and effective subsidies from universal service funds. Subscribers, being 
either individuals or households in universal service-qualified areas, have been entitled 
to subsidies. As a result, the VTF has had to make subsidies to many households using 2 
or 3 fixed telephone lines in accordance with their number of family members, leading 
to a waste of universal service funds.
264
 This issue was indicated by the majority of 
interviewees from government departments and academia in Vietnam.
265
 This has been 
the result of the unclear determination of targeted beneficiaries - either households or 
individuals.  
                                               
260 Dong Thap Province Department of Information and Communication ―Report 81/BC-STTTT on the management 
of universal service delivery‖ (2010), at 1.  
261 Minister of Information and Communications, above n 158, at 6. 
262 Minister of Information and Communications, above n 184, at 9.   
263 Vietnam Public Utility Telecommunications Service Fund, above n 156, at 3. 
264 Dong Thap Province Department of Information and Communication, above n 260, at 4. 
265 Interviews with personnel from government departments and academia in Vietnam (the author, December 2011-
January 2012).  
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There have also been a number of universal service providers in the same geographic 
areas.
266
 These providers enjoyed subsidies from universal service funds according to the 
number of their subscribers, and they have typically tried to increase subscriber 
numbers, regardless of overlap with other providers, so as to receive greater subsidies.  
Owing to the lack of capacity of responsible agencies to monitor and evaluate 
performance, and inadequate reporting by universal service providers, subsidies from the 
VTF were made to multiple operators based on the number of their subscribers. These 
overlapping subsidies conflict with the basic principles of minimised and efficient 
universal service subsidies. It has also resulted in confusion as to the number of 
subscribers per 100 inhabitants, or the subscribers per households in universal service-
qualified areas. Consequently such data has been inaccurate and unsuitable for 
systematic use in budgeting and for making decisions for all the service activities of 
public organisations.   
According to the MIC, one of the outputs from the universal service programme 2006-
2010 was an increase in the fixed telephone density per 100 residents in universal 
service-qualified areas to 16 per hundred, reaching a total of 3,419 million subscribers 
within the total population in the universal service-qualified areas of 20,769,626.
267
 This 
figure is completely inaccurate. It was clear that there was inaccurate information 
because the telephone density in rural areas was significantly lower than that in urban 
areas. For instance, the availability of fixed telephone for urban residents was 17.13%, 
compared with 1.83% for rural residents.
268
 According to the ITU‘s ICT indicator 
database, the density of fixed telephone subscribers for the whole of Vietnam in 2010 
was 16.36 per 100 inhabitants.
269
  
In addition, confused definition of target groups (individuals or households) for the 
delivery of universal services resulted in confused density of fixed telephone per 100 
households. For example, the MIC‘s Report in 2011 stated that 40% of households in 
universal service-qualified areas had fixed telephone service by the end of 2010.
270
 At 
                                               
266 The shortcoming of having more than one universal service provider in a specific geographical area is discussed 
and solutions proposed in section 3 about the contestable bidding process. 
267 Minister of Information and Communications, above n 184, annex 1.4. 
268 Ibid, at 31. 
269 ITU World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators Database (Fixed telephone subscriptions).  
270 Minister of Information and Communications, above n 158, at 4. 
 192 
 
the same time, the 2011 Report on the survey of telecommunications situation in 2010 
throughout the country indicated that the density of fixed telephone per 100 households 
was 41.7.
271
 It was clear that there was inaccurate information because the telephone 
density in rural areas was significantly lower than those in urban areas (see Chart 4).  
(iv) Type of subsidies  
With the universal service programme targeting both universal access and service, 
subsidies from the VTF included very complicated models to cover subsidies for both 
universal service providers and for end-users in rural areas. Some subsidies for operators 
aimed at the improved availability and accessibility of universal services through 
enhancing the development of telecommunications infrastructures to rural areas.
272
 
Others support the affordability of end-users in rural areas by subsidies for using 
universal services, including support for end-user equipment. Some subsidies were made 
to free end-user terminals for subscribers in universal service-qualified areas
273
 and 
loans at below-market rates for universal service providers.
274
 However, these were 
inappropriate and financially inefficient.   
The two main groups
275
 to profit from these subsidies were universal service providers 
for providing services and subscribers (individuals and households) in universal service-
qualified areas. The total subsidy to universal service providers for the period 2006-2010 
was VND 3,812 billion; the total subsidy to individuals and household subscribers in 
universal service-qualified areas was VND 1,878 billion.
276
 Subsidies to individuals and 
households subscribers in universal service-qualified areas were deducted from 
residents‘ monthly telephone bills. Subsidies to providers were direct. Responses from 
some interviewees in government departments,
277
 however, showed that there was no 
sufficient or robust analysis of economically efficient and effective subsidies, which 
                                               
271 Ministry of Information and Communication ―Report on the national survey of telecommunications, Internet and 
broadcasting situation in Vietnam in 2010‖ (Information and Communication Publishing House, Hanoi, 2011), at 51. 
272 PM‘s Decision 74/2006/QD-TTg art 1 Part II s 1 and 2. 
273 MPT‘s Decision 17/2007/QD-BBCVT (2007); MIC‘s Decision 40/2008/QD-BTTTT (2008); MIC‘s Circualr 
23/2009/TT-BTTTT (2009). 
274 PM‘s Decision 191/2004/QD-TTg art 7 s 1(b). 
275 Targeted subsidies can be generally divided into two broad categories: subsidies for universal service providers 
(telecommunications operators) and subsidies for end-users. See Msimang, above ch 1, n 5, at 37.   
276 Minister of Information and Communications, above n 158, at 4. 
277 Interviews with personnel from government departments in Vietnam (the author, January 2012). 
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should not create an unending dependence on subsidies but should be based on the 
objectives of addressing the challenges of isolation and population.
278
  
The amounts to be subsidised varied for different zones of the country - zones (1 to 3) 
being calculated on the basis of least, to those most in need of financial support to 
increase telephone density. Levels of subsidy for the same item were increased from 
zone 1 to zone 3. However, there was no specific definition of zone 1, 2 and 3 either in 
any universal service legal documents on levels of subsidies or on the list of universal 
service-qualified areas.
279
 The subsidies were revised four times during the period 2006-
2010
280
 as determined by the MIC.
281
 These subsidies were structured so as to 
automatically decrease year by year. There was however no economic analysis of the 
effects the subsidies might have had.  
(v) Subsidies to residents in universal service-qualified areas  
Subsidies to residents in universal service-qualified areas were complicated by numerous 
indexed subsidies with different rates in different zones within universal service-
qualified areas. These various types of subsidies reflected a high degree of complication 
and did not have a clear link with the real cost of service delivery, define the maximum 
usage of service to be subsidised, or meet customer demand. This resulted in non-
economic efficiency by providing large subsidies but unsustainable outcomes for the 
universal service programme.      
In 2007, the MPT‘s Decision 17/2007/QD-BBCVT Part 4 detailed subsidies to residents 
in universal service-qualified areas through subsidies for (1) development of new fixed 
telephone and Internet service subscribers, and (2) maintenance of current fixed 
telephone and Internet service subscribers for individuals and households in universal 
service-qualified areas. These subsidies included subsidies from the VTF for 
maintaining fixed telephone and Internet service subscriptions, a one-off payment for 
                                               
278 International Telecommunications Union, above ch 2, n 41, at [5.3.2]. 
279 Lists of universal service-qualified areas for period 2006-2010 were launched in 6 MIC Decisions and Circulars, 
including 41/2006/QD-BBCVT (2006), 9/2007/QD-BBCVT (2007), 15/2008/QD0BTTTT (2008), 5/2009/TT-BTTTT 
(2009), 21/2009/TT-BTTTT (2009) and 19/2010/TT-BTTTT (2010).  
280 Levels of universal service subsidies for the period 2005-2007 was defined in Decision 17/2007/QD-BBCVT 
(2007), for 2008 was launched in the Decision No. 40/2008/QD-BTTTT (2008) and for the period 2009-2010 by the 
Circular 23/2009/TT-BTTTT (2009).  
281 Decision 74/2006/QD-TTg (2006), art 2 s 1(d). 
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terminals of local residential telephone and Internet access service (such as a fixed 
telephone handsets or a modem), and subsidies for free HF (High-Frequency) 
communications receivers for sea-going fishing boats.
282
  
The subsidies for development of new fixed telephone and Internet service subscribers 
covered one-off subscription and installation fees for  telephone and Internet 
283
 and free 
end-user equipment (such as a residential telephone set or modem) for access to 
services.
284
 The recipients were either individuals or households.
285
 The subsidies to 
providers were calculated on the number of new subscribers within given periods. In 
particular, Decision 17/2007/QD-BBCVT Part 4 s 4.3 stated that the subsidy for fixed 
telephone sets was to be VND 100,000, 140,000 and 200,000 in zones 1, 2 and 3 
respectively, and VND 150,000, 210,000 and 300,000 for dial-up modems in zones 1, 2 
and 3 respectively.
286
  
Subscribers were able to purchase handsets for themselves and receive subsidies paid 
through service providers or deducted from their monthly service bills. After 2008 
however, this subsidy for a one-off installation fee was defined as a subsidy to universal 
service providers and applied only for new fixed (wired) telephone subscribers in zone 3, 
with the level of subsidy being increased to VND 300,000 per subscriber.
287
  
At the same time, the Government provided a partial subsidy for the monthly 
subscription fees of every current fixed telephone and Internet service subscriber in 
universal service-qualified areas. Fixed telephone and Internet service subscribers in 
these areas were to pay only the balance between the fixed subsidies from the VTF, 
which varied between the three zones of universal service-qualified areas, and the 
monthly subscription fee, plus monthly calling charges. Individual and household 
subscribers who used both fixed telephone and Internet services at the same time were 
entitled to only one subsidy for monthly subscription fees, similar to the subsidies for 
one-off installation and subscription fees.    
                                               
282 Minister of Information and Communications, above n 184, at 6. 
283 Individuals or households who subscribed both fixed telephone and Internet services at the same time would be 
entitled to only one subsidy.    
284 Decision 17/2007/QD-BBCVT (2007), part 4 s 4.1 and 4.3. 
285 Ibid, at [4.1], [4.3.1] and [4.3.2]. 
286 Since 2008 there was subsidy for broadband modem only.  
287 Decision 40/2008/QD-BTTTT (2008), annex 1 s 1.6. 
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The provision of subsidies for end-user equipment in universal service-qualified areas 
did not enhance economic efficiency. The total subsidy amount was high but resulted in 
duplicated subsidy and did not lead to sustainable outcomes. The total subsidy (2006-
2010) for free fixed (wired and wireless) telephone sets for subscribers in universal 
service-qualified areas was VND 500 billion.
288
 However, a considerable number of 
end-users in universal service-qualified areas unsubscribed from the service after some 
months when subsidies for telephone sets ceased.
289
 This in part, among other reasons, 
contributed to a large decrease in the fixed telephone density soon after the programme 
finished. Interviews with participants in Vietnam showed that the wrong type of 
subsidies for free end-user equipment was the main cause of this issue.
290
 The MIC‘s 
Report in 2012 illustrates unsustainable outcomes of the programme 2006-2010. The 
fixed telephone penetration decreased sharply from 14.37 million in 2010 to 10.17 
million by the end of 2011, with the density per 100 inhabitants from 17.13
291
 to 11.52
292
 
respectively.    
(vi) Subsidies to universal service providers for development and maintenance of 
service delivery in universal service-qualified areas 
Subsidies to universal service providers in Vietnam were different in different zones and 
different categories of items. This produced complicated and sometimes duplicated. The 
determination of varied types of subsidies resulted in a highly complicated process of 
monitoring and providing subsidies to universal service providers. At the same time, 
levels of subsidies, which were set at fixed unit rates and revised over years, were not 
linked to the actual costs of maintaining and providing universal services.  
Decision 191/2004/QD-TTg art 7 s 1 provided that universal service providers were to 
be entitled to subsidies for development and supply of services in universal service-
qualified areas. These subsidies were in the form of loans at below-market rates or direct 
subsidies indexed against performance delivery.  
                                               
288 Minister of Information and Communications, above n 184, at 88. 
289
 Manh Hung ―Dân tự rời mạng ở vùng viễn thông công ích‖ (2010) ICTNews <www.ictnews.vn/home/Internet/77/Dan-tu-
roi-mang%C2%A0o-vung-vien-thong%C2%A0cong%C2%A0ich/32294/index.ict>. 
290 Interviews with personnel from groups of government departments and academia in Vietnam (the author, 
December 2011-January 2012). 
291 See Chapter Four III.C.2.(c). 
292 Minister of Information and Communications, above n 110, at 37. 
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During the period 2006-2010, direct subsidies were made for:
293
  
(1) maintaining fixed telephone and Internet networks for the delivery of universal 
services;  
(2) maintaining the system of public telecommunications service centres in 
universal service-qualified areas;  
(3) developing the number of fixed telephone and Internet service subscribers in 
universal service-qualified areas;  
(4) maintaining the satellite communications system;  
(5) maintaining the coastal HF (High Frequency) communications stations; and  
(6) supplying compulsory services. 
Decision 17/2007/QD-BBCVT Annex 1 Part 1 determined that direct subsidies should 
be primarily for the maintenance of fixed telephone and Internet service subscribers in 
universal service-qualified areas (2005-2007). The total subsidy was calculated on the 
basis of current (‗current‘ was estimated month by month) fixed telephone (either wired 
or wireless) and Internet service subscribers.
294
 Subscribers who used both fixed 
telephone and Internet services at the same time were entitled to only one subsidy 
payment.  
After 2008, there were amendments to subsidies to providers for maintaining fixed 
telephone and Internet networks in universal service-qualified areas. Levels of these 
subsidies for operators to maintain fixed telephone and Internet networks varied between 
wired and wireless fixed telephone, and between fixed telephone and Internet 
(broadband) service subscribers.
295
 However, there was no apparent reason for different 
levels of subsidies with different technology and service subscribers.
296
     
                                               
293 Decision 17/2007/QD-BBCVT (2007), Decision 40/2008/QD-BTTTT (2008) and Circular 23/2009/TT-BTTTT 
(2009). 
294 Decision 17/2007/QD-BBCVT (2007), annex 1 Part 1 s 1.1. 
295 Circular 23/2009/TT-BTTTT (2009), annex 1 part 1 s 1.1. 
296 Decision 40/2008/QD-BTTTT (2008) and Circular 23/2009/TT-BTTTT (2009). 
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Subscribers who used both fixed telephone and broadband Internet
297
 services on the 
same telephone line were entitled to separate subsidies for each of the fixed telephone 
and Internet services.
298
 These subsidies were applicable for no more than one fixed 
telephone and one Internet service in a household. In cases where there was more than 
one subscriber in a household, only those telecommunications operators who had made 
the first subscription, (reckoned as the valid subscription contract) would be entitled to 
these subsidies.
299
   
With regard to public telecommunications and Internet service centres in universal 
service-qualified areas, there were different subsidies to universal service providers for 
maintaining this system between public centres with or without service staff (eg card-
phone booths), providing either telephone or Internet service or both. In addition, levels 
of subsidy for public Internet service centres, with larger numbers of computers, were 
higher than for public centres with lower numbers of computers. Levels of subsidy for 
public centres with service staff were also higher than those without service staff in the 
same zone, and for public centres providing Internet service and those with telephone 
service only.
300
  
The inclusion of posts and telecommunications commune cultural houses (communal 
facilities) as public service centres to be subsidised from universal service funds is a 
distinctive feature in Vietnam.
301
 The total subsidies for these were calculated by the 
month. The level of subsidy to these centres was the same as to a telephone or Internet 
public service centre.  
Decision 51/2008/QD-BTTTT (with regard to subsidies from the VTF for provision of 
universal services period 2008-2010) set guidelines for subsidies to public 
telecommunications service centres (staffed or not staffed). The Decision determined 
who would qualify for subsidies as follows:
302
    
                                               
297 Dial-up Internet subscribers were not allowed for subsidy payment since 2008, according to Decision 40/2008/QD-
BTTTT (2008). 
298 Circular 23/2009/TT-BTTTT (2009), at [1.2 (b)]. 
299 Ibid, at [1.2 (d)]. 
300 Decision 17/2007/QD-BBCVT (2007), annex 1 part 2. 
301 Ibid, annex 1 part 2 s 2.1-2.4. 
302 Decision 51/2008/QD-BTTTT (2008), art 6. 
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- Public telephone service centres (with service staff) established before 2007 within 
universal service-qualified areas;  
- Public telephone service centres (with service staff) established since 2008 in communes 
without public telecommunications service centres as published by the MIC and included 
in the list of direct contracted or tendered by telecommunications operators; 
- Public Internet service centres which are public telephone service centres (with service 
staff) having more than 2 computers connected to the Internet (since 2009, only those 
with Internet access by broadband ADSL) - these all will not be calculated as public 
telephone service centres; 
- Card-phone booths within universal service-qualified areas with fixed (wired) telephone 
lines. 
Along with subsidies for maintaining fixed telephone, Internet networks for the delivery 
of universal services, and maintaining the system of public service centres in universal 
service-qualified areas, universal service providers were also entitled to subsidy for 
developing fixed telephone and Internet service subscribers in universal service-
qualified areas after 2008.  
In summary, current legal frameworks determined different types of subsidies to 
universal service providers and distinguished levels of subsidies between different 
zones. Although levels of subsidy were set at fixed rates and revised over the years, 
these subsidies were not linked to the actual costs of maintaining or providing universal 
services. At the same time, various types of subsidies for both universal service 
providers and individual subscribers in universal service-qualified areas resulted in a 
highly complicated process of monitoring and providing subsidies to universal service 
providers. These problems were compounded by an ineffective system of performance 
indicators related to the delivery of universal services. Some types of subsidies, such as 
subsidies for the delivery of compulsory services and non-refundable subsidies for 
telecommunications operators to develop infrastructure for providing universal services, 
were not implemented in practice.  
(vii) Loans at below-market rates  
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The provision of loans at below-market rates
303
 was another type of subsidy from the 
VTF to universal service providers. This type of subsidy reflects duplication with other 
bank loan schemes and unfair treatment between universal service providers and other 
operators. At the same time, there was confused responsibility, a non-transparent process 
and inadequate regulation, leading to the risk of corruption in approving and providing 
loans.    
Decision 191/2004/QD-TTg art 7 s 1 (b) provided that loans at below-market rates could 
be provided for investment in the construction, upgrade or expansion of 
telecommunications and Internet infrastructures, and other facilities in universal service-
qualified areas.
304
 In addition, Decision 191/2004/QD-TTg art 10 s 2 (b) stated that the 
State Bank of Vietnam, jointly coordinating with the MPT, should guide the process of 
providing loans at below-market rates from the VTF. 
However, during the period 2006-2010, no regulations were issued by the State Bank of 
Vietnam or by the MPT on the terms for the provision of loans at below-market rates. 
Instead, it was the Ministry of Finance which, in Circular 67/2006/TT-BTC on the 
financial management of the VTF, determined some key principles and conditions for 
the provision of loans at below-market rates.  
The Ministry of Finance‘s Circular 67/2006/TT-BTC Part III s 3.1 stated that the subject 
for such loans must be universal service providers and for projects to develop 
telecommunications infrastructure so as to provide universal services. However, the 
Circular did not provide any details on the process nor specific required documents. 
Instead, it indicated only that the process and application documents, such as for capital 
investment involved in the projects, feasible financial plans and the ability to return the 
loans would be based on relevant regulations and on the VTF‘s regulations.305 This did 
not provide a transparent process and gave too much authority to the VTF. At the same 
time, Circular 67/2006/TT-BTC Part III s 3.3 defined the term of loans (up to 10 years) 
and provided that fixed interest below-market rates applied to the whole term of loans. 
                                               
303 Loans at below-market rates from banks and credit institutions are typically provided with lower to zero interest 
rates and a longer term of return. The Ministry of Finance Circular 156/2009/TT-BTC defined the provision of loans 
at below-market rates from the Vietnam Development Bank for projects  (art 6), such as for developing rural traffic 
infrastructures and aquaculture farmers, with zero (0%) interest rate (art 3 s 1) and return within 5 years (art 10 s 2). 
304 Decision 191/2004/QD-TTg (2004), art 7 s 1. 
305 Circular 67/2006/TT-BTC Part III s 3.2 
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The flexible and general term and rate without specific conditions were decided at the 
VTF‘s discretion only. This could possibly lead to unfair approval of loans.     
Circular 67/2006/TT-BTC Part III s 1.2 stated that it is the MPT which identifies 
specific projects for loans at below-market rates from the VTF, in agreement with the 
Ministry of Finance. However, there was only a decision of the VTF (Decision 
2/QD/VTF-HDQL) in 2008 on the provision of loans at below-market rates.  
Decision 2/QD/VTF-HDQL provided a framework and process for evaluating and 
approving loans at below-market rates, term of loans at below-market rates (medium and 
long term but not longer than 10 years), interest rates of loans at below-market rates 
(equivalent to the Government bond rate for 5 years), and authority for approving loans 
at below-market rates (the Director of the VTF approves any loan up to VND 50 billion 
and the Board of Management approves loans of more than VND 50 billion). This 
decision was not legally enforceable because it was not enacted by the responsible state 
authority and therefore could be seen as internal guidance only. In addition, the decision 
did not include a process for external monitoring of loan approvals. In practice, loans at 
below-market rates were mostly decided by the Director of the VTF.
306
 
Between 2006 and 2010, 105 projects with total loans at below-market rates of VND 
517 billion were approved. By the end of 2010, the VTF had evaluated documents for 39 
projects, signed contracts of credit for providing loans at below-market rates to 35 
projects, and settled some 27 projects with the total of VND 125.7 billion.
307
 These loans 
at below-market rates were made for a term of 8 to 10 years at an annual interest rate of 
8.15%,
308
 compared with the annual market interest rate of between 13.5 and 16.2% in 
2008 for medium or long-term loans from commercial banks.
309
  
There was no tight control over the financial management of these loans at below-
market rates. The projects for which they were to be used were fairly broadly defined, 
although the emphasis was on funding the construction of infrastructure. Responses from 
                                               
306 Interviews with personnel from telecommunications operators and government officers (the author, December 
2011-January 2012). 
307 Minister of Information and Communications, above n 158, at 4. 
308 Vietnam Public Utility Telecommunications Service Fund, above n 156, annex 6.  
309 Hoang Vu ―Ngân hàng đồng loạt giảm lãi suất cho vay‖ VNEconomy News (Vietnam, 2008) 
<vneconomy.vn/60636P0C6/ngan-hang-dong-loat-giam-lai-suat-cho-vay.htm>. 
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interviewees from the group of telecommunications operators illustrate that it was not a 
transparent process with clear conditions for approving loans, so it was not easy for 
some operators to access these loans.     
Loans at below-market rates were on occasion made to operators who did not qualify for 
them. For example, the VTF provided the Vietnam Television Technology Investment 
and Development Company (VTC)
310
 with a loan of VND 30 billion in 2007 even 
though the VTC was not eligible under the conditions laid down in Circular 67. The 
VTC was not a universal service provider, nor did it have a project to develop 
telecommunications infrastructure in universal service-qualified areas. However, no 
department was accountable for this misappropriation except the order to refund such a 
loan to the VTF in December 2009.
311
 Lack of effective regulations on performance 
accountability in Vietnam makes it difficult to establish ineffective performance (or 
ignoring of the rules) by the involved agencies. 
In summary, the provision of loans at below-market rates in Vietnam was an inefficient 
type of subsidy from universal service funds. This subsidy reflects unnecessary 
intervention and unfair treatment between operators. Furthermore, it possibly resulted in 
misappropriation by involved government officers and departments in approving loans, 
particularly in the circumstance of inadequate regulations on performance accountability 
and non-transparent process/information systems within the public sector.    
2 Amendments to universal service legal framework and institutional arrangements 
since 2010; the 2011-2015 Programme 
The legal framework was changed on 1 July 2010 by the Telecommunications Act 2009. 
There were some improvements in the universal service legal framework in the new Act. 
The Government now aimed to assist institutions and individuals to participate in 
investing in a fair and competitive environment, creating favourable conditions for 
                                               
310 Vietnam Television Technology Investment and Development Company is a 100% State-owned corporation under 
the direct management of the MIC since 2003, according to the PM‘s Decision 129/2003/QD- TTg. 
311 Ministry of Finance, above n 165, at 15.  
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developing network infrastructure, and ensuring the delivery of telecommunications 
services to remote and border areas and islands.
312
  
The Telecommunications Act 2009 differentiated between the provision of 
telecommunications public utility services and the implementation of public utility 
tasks.
313
 Costs for implementing telecommunications public utility tasks were to come 
directly from the government budget and through direct contracts with the 
Government.
314
 Costs for providing telecommunications public utility services, 
including universal services and compulsory services would be covered by the VTF.
315
 
The Act art 20 s 2 defined which universal services were to be provided to every person 
in accordance with the list of universal service specified services, and the conditions, 
quality and tariffs
316
 as determined by the Government. 
The Telecommunications Act 2009 eliminated any cross-subsidy among 
telecommunications services.
317
 It continued, however, to set the prices for 
telecommunications services.
318
 The MIC determined the methodology for costing of 
telecommunications services jointly with the Ministry of Finance, determining 
exemptions and deductions of service charges aimed at serving universal service 
delivery.
319
  
In order to select the enterprise(s) to provide telecommunications public utility services, 
one of the usual methods was to be used: direct contracting, government allocation of 
projects,
320
 or competitive bidding.
321
 These options remained the same as those in 
Ordinance 2002. Contestable bidding, however, had never been applied in practice,
322
 
                                               
312 Telecommunications Act 2009, art 4 s 1-3.  
313 There was no formal definition of public utility tasks in legal frameworks. However, it is typically interpreted as 
other tasks apart from universal services but essential for public benefit which the Government will define separately, 
require telecommunications operators to provide but funded by the Government budget, not from universal service 
levies.    
314 Vietnam Government, above n 177, at 11.  
315 Telecommunications Act 2009 art 20 s 3.  
316 According to Decree 25 art 38 s 1(1), the Ministry of Information and Communications issues tariffs, tariff 
framework for universal services, interconnection charges. 
317 Telecommunications Act 2009, art 55 s 3.  
318 Ibid, art 54 s 3.  
319 Ibid, art 56 s 1(c).  
320 The Government allocates annually operational delivery assignments to telecommunications companies to perform 
the universal service delivery, by administrative decision without contracts or a contestable bidding process.    
321 Telecommunications Act 2009, art 20 s 4.  
322 Minister of Information and Communications, above n 184, at 19. 
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either in selecting universal service providers or calculating real costs for providing 
universal services.  
The Telecommunications Act 2009 determined the contribution to the VTF on the basis 
of a percentage of revenues of telecommunications operators,
323
 in addition to other 
sources.
324
 The Act made no mention of the proportional contribution from 
interconnection charges or the implementation of telecommunications universal service 
obligations as provided previously in Ordinance 2002.  
Finally, according to the Telecommunications Act 2009, all other provisions for 
implementation were to be determined in due course by the Government, including those 
related to the legal framework for telecommunications universal services and other 
public utility activities.
325
 Other provisions, as in the Ordinance 2002, outline the 
responsibility of the Prime Minister for approving the plans for providing 
telecommunications universal services, and the responsibility of the MIC to submit these 
plans and manage performance.  
(a) Decree 25/2011/ND-CP (2011) 
In April 2011, Decree 25/2011/ND-CP was issued along with other details for the 
implementation of the Telecommunications Act 2009. Decree 25/2011/ND-CP art 14 s 1 
listed the following principles for provision of universal services:  
(a) To develop telecommunications infrastructure, universalise telecommunications 
services throughout the country which have a primary focus on the remote, rural, border, 
island areas, exceptionally difficult areas and those where telecommunications companies 
are not able to do efficient business under market conditions. 
(b) To ensure equal and reasonable service accessibility for every person; and on a case by 
case basis that the Government have clear policies on subsidising the provision of 
terminals and telecommunications services to lower class and poor households,
326
 social-
welfare households and other special social target-groups.
327
   
                                               
323 Telecommunications Act 2009 only provided that contribution to VTF is made from a percentage of revenues of 
telecommunications operators. However, revenues from which services (mobile service) of telecommunications 
operators to be levied are determined by the PM‘s Decision 1643/QD-TTg in 2011 (mobile service).   
324 Telecommunications Act 2009, art 22 s 2 (a).  
325 Ibid, art 63.  
326 According to the PM‘s Decision 9/2011/QÐ-TTg (2011) on the determination of poor and adjunct poor households 
applicable for the period 2011-2015, households with monthly income less than VND 400,000 (VND 4,800,000 per 
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(c) Subsidies for the deployment of telecommunications infrastructure, end-user terminals 
and provision of telecommunications services are to be conducted through universal 
service providers and through manufacturers of end-user terminals, or directly to 
telecommunications service customers.
328
    
With regard to the allocation of universal service levies to telecommunications 
operators, Decree 25/2011/ND-CP art 14 s 3 provides that the industry levies paid by 
telecommunications operators to the VTF, are not to exceed 5% of revenue of 
telecommunications services, and this payment will be accounted for in the business 
costs of operators. From time to time, the Prime Minister will stipulate the list of 
telecommunications services that have to contribute to the VTF, and the percentage to be 
paid from services revenues.
329
 There are no further rules on revenues or universal 
service-qualified revenues in the Decree. Instead, these were defined in Decision 
1643/QD-TTg 2011 approving the universal service programme 2011-2015.   
The Telecommunications Act 2009 established the Vietnam Telecommunications 
Authority (VNTA) within the MIC. Decree 25 art 2(1) (b) defined the VNTA as a 
telecommunications regulator with main responsibility for regulating the 
telecommunications industry throughout the country, including managing ‗the 
performance of universal services‘.330  
The functions of the VNTA included providing advice to the Minister of Information 
and Communications about state administration in the telecommunications industry,
331
 
and dealing with disputes in establishing infrastructure and providing 
telecommunications services.
332
 With regard to the administration of universal service 
delivery, the VNTA has function directing, providing guidance and inspecting the 
delivery of universal services.
333
  
                                                                                                                                          
annum) in rural areas and less than VND 500,000 (VND 6,000,000 per annum) in urban areas are defined as poor 
households. Those with monthly income between VND 401,000 and VND 520,000 in rural areas and between VND 
501,000 and VND 650,000 in urban areas are defined as adjunct poor households. 
327 Decree 67/2007/ND-CP (2007) stipulating policies on support for people entitled to social-welfare support 
(amended by Decree 13/2010/ND-CP).  
328 Decree 25/2011/ND-CP (2011), art 14 s 1. 
329 Ibid, art 14.  
330 Ibid, art 2 (1) (b). 
331 PM‘s Decision 35/2011/QD-TTg, art 1. 
332 Ibid, art 2 s 9.  
333 Ibid, art 2 s 11.  
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In summary, there was no sufficiently clear statement of implemention or monitoring 
roles between the VTF (Decision 191/2004/QD-TTg) and the VNTA (Decision 
35/2011/QD-TTg). Up to 2011 the VTF was a single department of the MIC performing 
both functions of implementing and monitoring the universal service delivery in 
Vietnam. This reflected overlap and an inefficient monitoring mechanism.
334
 After its 
establishment in 2011, the VNTA has the main function of monitoring, but not yet 
specific regulations for implementation. There remained diffuse responsibility between 
the VNTA and the VTF due to the delayed process until March 2013 of amending 
Decision 191/2004/QD-TTg.   
(b) The Prime Minister‘s Decisions 119/2011/QD-TTg (2011) on the deployment 
of rural information and communication services for the period 2011-2020     
The 7
th
 Conference‘s Resolution of the Communist Party‘s Central Committee X (2008) 
on agriculture, farm and rural dwellers, established a target of ―deploying postal and 
telecommunications systems and enhancing the availability of information access for 
rural communities, especially those in mountainous, remote, isolated and island 
areas‖.335 In order to carry out this direction, the Project on the deployment of rural 
information and communications for the period 2011-2020 was introduced by the 
Government in 2011, in accordance with the Prime Minister‘s Decision 119/2011/QD-
TTg. 
Decision 119/2011/QD-TTg art 1 s I (4) set the general aim of developing rural 
information and communications for the period 2011-2020.
336
 In addition, the 
Government aimed to put in place policies to support development in exceptionally 
difficult areas, mountainous, remote, and isolated and island areas through specific 
taxation policies, and legislated for this.
337
 Moreover, Decision 119 confirmed that the 
development of rural information and communications must be uniform and combined 
with other related projects, programmes or plans so as to achieve the targeted densities at 
highly efficient levels and avoid financial redundancy and waste.
338
 In relation to the 
                                               
334 See Chapter Four III.C.1.(b). 
335 Resolution 26 of the 7th Conference‘s Resolution of the Communist Party‘s Central Committee X (2008). 
336 PM‘s Decisions 119/2011/QD-TTg art 1 s I(4). 
337 Ibid.  
338 Ibid, art 1 s I (4). 
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posts and telecommunications commune culture houses, Decision 119 required providers 
to re-arrange and enhance the operational efficiency of the system, closing inefficient 
points and setting up some experimental ‗commune information and communications 
centres‘.339   
(c) Decision 1643/QD-TTg (2011): the universal service programme 2011-2015 
The universal service programme 2006-2010 came to an end in December 2010. 
Outcomes of the programme had been to enhance the availability of access to and use of 
telecommunications and ICT services for citizens in rural, remote and economically 
difficult areas. According to the MIC‘s evaluation, the achievement of the universal 
service programme 2006-2010 could be seen through an increase in some 
telecommunications densities (outputs) in universal service-qualified areas.
340
 This 
contributed to the development of telecommunications infrastructure and services in 
very geographically isolated and socio-economically difficult areas, gradually filling the 
gaps between universal service beneficiaries in different (urban and rural) communities 
in use of telecommunications and Internet services.
341
 In particular, the telephone 
density in universal service-qualified areas reached 16 per 100 inhabitants, three times 
higher than the targeted objective. About 40% of households in the universal service-
qualified areas now had their own fixed home phones, 97% of nationwide communes 
had public points for accessing telephone services, and every citizen was entitled to use 
telecommunications services free of charge. However, some objectives and outputs of 
the universal service programme 2006-2010 were not achieved (See Figure 7).  
 
 
 
 
                                               
339 Ibid, art 1 s IV (3). 
340 Ministry of Information and Communications, above n 158, at 3.  
341 Ibid.  
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Figure 7: Universal service policy objectives and outputs 2006-2010
342
 
No. Description Objectives Outputs 
1 Telephone density in the universal service-
qualified areas 
> 5% 16% 
2 Percentage of communes with public telephone 
service access point 
100% 97% 
3 Percentage of communes with public Internet 
service access point 
70% 55% 
4 Free of charges for using compulsory 
telecommunications services 
100% 100% 
In spite of some achievements in terms of outputs, Vietnam remains well behind many 
developing countries worldwide and its regional competitors, including in its universal 
service provisions.
343
  
The Vietnamese Chamber of Commerce and Industry‘s Report argued that the 
investment rate in small and rural areas was inadequate.
344
 This resulted in a significant 
disparity in the ability to access and use telecommunications services between residents 
living in urban and rural areas (See Chart 4).  
Chart 4: Disparity of telecommunications and Internet service density between the 
country and rural areas in 2010 (per 100 inhabitants)
345
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
342 Minister of Information and Communications, above n 184, at [2.6]. 
343 Nguyen, Pham and Gullish, above n 92, at 4. 
344 Ibid.  
345 Minister of Information and Communications, above n 184, at 31. 
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In terms of affordability of services, Vietnamese end-users pay relatively more than 
those in developing countries. In 2010, Vietnam was 68
th
 out of 118 developing 
countries whose ICT price baskets
346
 represented more than 5% of average monthly GNI 
per capita. Meanwhile such price baskets represented much less than 5% in almost all 
developed countries and in 37 of them, less than 2%.
347
  
Vietnamese people paid 10.8% of their average monthly GNI per capita for the fixed 
broadband sub-basket in 2011.
348
 By comparison it was less than 5% of the GNI per 
capita in almost half of all developing countries
349
 and 1.7% in developed countries.
350
 
In addition, for the fixed-telephone sub-basket
351
 residents in developed countries paid 
around 1% of their average monthly GNI per capita
352
 but Vietnamese people paid 
2.3%.
353
 
The universal service programme 2011-2015 was introduced by the Prime Minister‘s 
Decision 1643/QD-TTg in 2011. The Decision described as an overall objective 
continuing to universalise telecommunications and Internet services to every individual 
and household throughout the country, and at the same time deploying broadband 
telecommunications infrastructure so as to meet the demand for universal services in 
universal service-qualified areas, and consequently closing the gaps between different 
regions and areas in access to telecommunications and Internet services.
354
  
The six principal areas of the Decision were:  
(i) Objectives of the universal service programme 2011-2015: 100% of communes 
to be connected to broadband network; Internet subscriptions of households in 
communes or districts where penetration is less than 2% to more than 5%; and 
                                               
346 ICT Price Basket (IPB) is a unique metric that tracks and compares the cost and affordability of information and 
communication technology services. IPB is measured as a percentage of countries‘ average gross national income 
(GNI) per capita. See International Telecommunications Union, above ch 2, n 37, at [3.1]. 
347 International Telecommunications Union, above ch 2, n 39, at 57-59. 
348 International Telecommunications Union, above ch 2, n 37, at 77. 
349 Ibid, at 74. 
350 Ibid, at 73.  
351 Fixed-telephone price sub-basket is calculated for monthly subscription fee plus 30 local calls of 3 minutes each 
(15 peak and 15 off-peak calls). See International Telecommunications Union, above ch 2, n 39, at 53. 
352 International Telecommunications Union, above ch 2, n 37, at 72. 
353 Ibid, at 77.  
354 PM‘s Decision 1643/QD-TTg (2011), art 1 s I (1).  
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more than 50% communes of 69 poor districts
355
 having public points for using 
Internet services.  
(ii) Definition of universal services: local fixed telephone and Internet access at 
speeds equivalent to or higher than 256 kbps. 
(iii) Specific target groups to be provided with universal services in universal 
service-qualified areas are: (1) customers using telecommunications services at 
public telecommunications service centres in communes within the list of 
exceptionally difficult communes,
356
 and also communes within the 69 poor 
districts, 41 off-shore islands and frontier posts; (2) fixed telephone subscribers 
(households) in exceptionally difficult communes; (3) Internet service subscribers 
(households) in communes within districts having Internet penetrations less than 2 
per 100 households; (4) local fixed telephone subscribers in zone 3 of universal 
service-qualified areas and (5) end-users of HF (High Frequency) wireless 
receivers on fishing boats.   
 (iv) Funding resources, and allocation of universal service levies on 
telecommunications operators: costing for the universal service programme 2011-
2015 estimated as being about VND 7,000 billion, will consist of financial sources 
transferred from the universal service programme 2006-2010 and contributions 
from telecommunications operators (industry levies) at 2% of total revenues from 
mobile telephone services.  
(v) Subsidies for telecommunications operators focus more on maintaining only 
‗new‘ facilities (such as public Internet service provision centres) with service-
staff (such as public telecommunications service centres). Loans at below-market 
rates for projects continue to be provided to operators for upgrading, enhancing 
and developing telecommunications infrastructure in universal service-qualified 
areas but from the VTF‘s Charter Capital only.357  
                                               
355 69 poor districts as indicated in the Government‘s Resolution 30a/2008/NQ-CP (2008) and the PM‘s Decision 
615/QD-TTg (2011). 
356 The list of exceptionally difficult communes, numbering 1,644, was issued under the Prime Minister‘s Decision 
164/2006/QD-TTg (2006) 
357 Decision 1643/QD-TTg (2011) part II s 6 and part V s 2(b). 
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(vi) Subsidies for residents cover for using telephone services by new fixed 
telephone subscribers (households) only but extended to subsidise for free 
computer Internet service subscriptions and user charges for households. Subsidy 
is continuously provided to local fixed telephone subscribers in zone 3 of universal 
service-qualified areas up to the end of 2013. 
(vii) A new type of subsidy is provided for research and development projects for 
manufacturing end-user telecommunications equipment serving the delivery of 
universal services.   
(viii) With regard to the selection of universal service providers, the subsidies for 
development of telecommunications infrastructures and delivery of universal 
services must be specified in planned projects or direct contracts for providing 
universal services. In addition, telecommunications operators will be selected to 
perform these projects or contracts through either direct contracting or competitive 
bidding processes, and competitive bidding processes are to be prioritised.
 358
 
In summary, there were some changes to the universal service legal framework and 
institutional arrangements after 2010. For instance, the universal service programme 
2011-2015 introduced some specific amendments for the delivery of services, such as 
new types of subsidies and different target areas. However, the programme is 
characterised by the same use of high-level targets, an absence of any attempt to identify 
the benefits to be achieved or the likely costs of doing so, and a tendency to add some 
new but inappropriate benefits.  
There has been no attempt to learn any lessons from the past programme and the main 
obstacles to effective performance of delivery since the programme 2006-2010 remain, 
such as the lack of specific regulations for contestable bidding and lack of a link 
between subsidies and the cost of delivery of universal services.  
Moreover, some potential problems arise from this programme, such as new subsidies 
for research and development projects to manufacture end-user equipment and for free 
computers for new Internet subscribers in universal service-qualified areas. These 
                                               
358 Ibid, part 1 s VI (3). 
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subsidies either place too much cost on industry levies or do not reflect international 
experience (subsidies for end-users‘ in-premise equipment such as free computers or 
telephone handsets at the household level).
359
 Other subsidies (subsidies for research and 
developments projects) reflect non-compliance with the Telecommunications Act 
2009
360
 or commitments to the WTO
361
 in terms of non-discrimination and competitive 
neutrality.    
At the end of 2012, two years after the passage of the programme 2011-2015, Decision 
1643/QD-TTg 2011 put the whole programme 2011-2015 on hold. The Prime Minister 
required the MIC to revise and submit another draft decision to replace Decision 
1643/QD-TTg 2011.
362
 The most likely reason for this was the need for major reforms in 
the universal service legal framework and in the programme 2011-2015. The programme 
2011-2015 was launched without comprehensive and effective evaluation of outcomes 
of the programme 2006-2010.
363
 Accordingly, a series of legal documents that the MIC 
has been preparing for guiding the implementation of the universal service programme 
2011-2015 are also delayed by mid-2013.
364
  
IV Obstacles in the Current Legal Framework and Institutional 
Arrangements to Effective and Efficient Universal Service Delivery in 
Vietnam 
This Chapter has examined the development of the universal service legal framework 
and the institutional structures for the performance and measurement of service delivery 
in Vietnam. This review has covered three main periods: 1976-1994, 1995-2001 and 
2002-2011.  
                                               
359 See New Zealand Ministry of Economic Development ―Rural Broadband Initiative: Request for Proposal for Zone 
4 Rural Broadband Initiative‖ (2010), appendix 6: Proposed Contract Principles section 5.2 and ―Rural Broadband 
Agreement between the Ministry of Economic Development and Telecom New Zealand Limited‖ (2011). 
360 Telecommunications Act 2009 art 4 s 2. 
361 WTO‘s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS): Annex on Telecommunications, at [5 (a)]. 
362 Government‘s Office document 1347/TTg-KTN (7 September 2012) requiring revising and submitting the 
universal service programme in the PM‘s Decision 1643/QD-TTg.  
363 MIC‘s Document 127/TB-BTTTT (5 October 2012) announced the conclusion of the Minister of Information and 
Communications concerning the legal framework for the universal service programme 2011-2015. 
364 Decision 1620/QD-BTTTT (4 September 2012) amending the programme for preparing and enacting legal 
documents by the Ministry of Information and Communications in 2012, annex 2. 
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The current legal framework and the institutional arrangements were significantly 
improved in 2002, with key amendments which have attempted to ensure the delivery of 
essential services to every resident. Despite some progress during the programme 2006-
2010, service delivery has remained demonstrably ineffective and economically 
inefficient, due to the inadequacy of both the legal framework and institutional 
arrangements.  
The failures in institutional arrangements are mostly to do with the top-down model of 
funding administration. There is also diffuse accountability, ineffective performance 
information and reporting systems, non-transparent administration, lack of effective 
external monitoring, and lack of involvement of the public and stakeholders.  
Issues relating to the legal framework centre on the inadequacy of economically cost-
effective requirements with regard to funding arrangements. As a result, gains from the 
programme were inconsistent, often not sustained, and incurred high costs to the 
telecommunications industry. The programme has also resulted in a plethora of 
institutions, all of which are cost centres, with considerable inefficiency and general 
wastage of resources.     
The key persistent issues - solutions for which will be proposed in Chapter Five - have 
been identified:    
(1) In many countries throughout the world, including New Zealand, there has been a 
steady progression from complete government monopoly in telecommunications to a 
situation where Government has divested itself almost completely from the delivery of 
telecommunications services, including universal services. This was not yet the case in 
Vietnam up to 2002. 
(2) The movement from a sole state-owned incumbent (VNPT) to a multi-provider 
competitive market, and further market reforms of regulations after 2002 resulted in 
some initial improvements of the sector. However, there were no specific regulations to 
enhance essential telecommunications service delivery to rural and isolated areas. 
Furthermore, the Government continued to cover all costs for service delivery through 
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the state-owned incumbent, utilising an internal cross-subsidy mechanism for this up to 
2005.      
(3) The current model of the administration and institutional arrangements for 
performance and measurement of universal service delivery in Vietnam since 2005 has 
remained a top-down one and does not reflect features of the best practice: transparency, 
effective monitoring and performance accountability. In addition, its funding 
arrangements do not aim at or give sufficient attention to economic efficiency, cost-
effectiveness and competitive neutrality. 
(4) The institutional arrangements reflect weak monitoring and evaluation of universal 
service performance, due to diffuse accountability amongst departments involved in the 
measurement of service delivery, overlapping and diffuse responsibilities and role-
conflict, ineffective stakeholder and public involvement, a lack of transparent 
performance information and reporting systems, and poor systems for accountability. 
(5) The diffuse, overlapping and unclear statement of accountability, responsibility and 
functions occurs amongst the authorities involved. This is most notable at central 
authority level (between the MIC and other responsible Ministries). It is repeated 
between central authorities (the MIC) and local authorities (provincial Departments of 
Information and Communications in the Provincial People‘s Committee). There is 
similar confusion between regulators/policy-makers (the MIC) and the separate 
institution administering the performance of service delivery (the VTF). In addition, 
there is poor coordination, overuse of authority, and lack of performance accountability 
between authorities and officials. All this is a reflection of the confusion and lack of 
clarity in current universal service institutional structures. 
(6) Effective performance information and reporting systems, which play an important 
role in improving the effectiveness and efficiency of public administration and public 
policy, have been a big challenge to universal service institutional administration 
structures in Vietnam. There have been difficulties in determining financial resources, 
allocating levies and providing subsidies by the state authorities entrusted with the 
responsibilities. Any effective external monitoring process has been basically 
eliminated, either by the action/inaction of government authorities or, more broadly, by 
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lack of access to information by the public or stakeholders who pay universal service 
levies.  
(7) There has not been a clear link between determination of financial resources and 
allocation of universal service levies to telecommunications operators and the real cost 
of service delivery. Nor has attention been given to ensuring cost-effective delivery. At 
the same time, the allocation of levies to telecommunications operators and 
determination of levy rates has often reflected discrimination in selection of operators 
and inappropriate determination of revenues and imposed levies. This has resulted in 
over-collection of levies and created unnecessary financial burdens for operators. In 
addition, there has been no effective regulation to ensure timely payment of levies and 
penalise any breach of overdue payments for levies.    
(8) The process of selecting universal service providers has not reflected best practice. 
Without specific regulations for applying contestable bidding processes, the process of 
selecting universal service providers and projects to be subsidised from the VTF has 
been mainly carried out through direct contracts and government-allocated projects.  
There has been no analysis applied to potential cost reduction. The lack of transparent 
criteria for service and project allocation has the potential for corruption.       
(9) Subsidies to two main target groups, with a complicated set of determined levels for 
maintaining and providing services to residents in universal service-qualified areas, did 
not reflect cost-based modelling and have not been linked to the real costs, nor have they 
reflected appropriate types of subsidies. Economically inefficient and ineffective 
subsidies also reflect confused and unclear determination of target groups to be entitled 
to subsidies in universal service-qualified areas. In addition, there have been 
inappropriate distinctions in subsidies between target groups in different zones and 
inconsistent criteria in the universal service programmes. This has resulted in ineffective 
and inefficient subsidies, and unsustainable outputs/outcomes.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PROPOSALS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF  
UNIVERSAL SERVICE DELIVERY IN VIETNAM 
 
I Overview  
The many issues preventing effective and economically efficient delivery of universal 
services in Vietnam have been itemised in the concluding section of Chapter Four. 
This Chapter will propose practical solutions to remedy the problems concerning 
universal service delivery in Vietnam. Particular attention will be paid to those key 
elements that underlie a best practice universal service model as illustrated in Chapter 
Two. The key areas that this Chapter will traverse are: 
Part 1: universal service institutional arrangements;  
Part 2: allocating universal service levies;  
Part 3: contestable bidding process; and  
Part 4: universal service subsidies.  
In this Chapter, specific proposals concerning amendments to current laws and 
regulations will be presented. Most of these proposals could be made immediately with 
amendments to subordinate legislation (Decrees, Prime Minister‘s Decisions and 
Ministerial Legal Documents). Others are more long-term reforms in that they could be 
made by amending the Telecommunications Act 2009 during the National Assembly‘s 
next term of office (after 2016).
1
 Some proposals are in the form of a re-drafting of 
specific articles or sections of current regulations, while others are stated as summaries 
of general changes to be made in legal frameworks.    
                                               
1 The National Assembly‘s Resolution 20/2011/QH13 (2011) determined the National Assembly programme for 
enacting Acts and Ordinances for the period 2011-2016 with 123 Acts and 6 Ordinances but excluded the amendment 
of the Telecommunications Act. Therefore, the Telecommunications Act could be proposed for amendment, only after 
2016. 
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II Institutional Obstacles to Effective and Efficient Universal Service 
Performance Management in Vietnam  
This part will review the institutional arrangements for universal service implementation 
in Vietnam. Evaluation and monitoring of universal service implementation and the 
underlying reasons will be examined and suggestions proposed for removal of the 
following obstacles: (1) diffuse accountability among departments involved in universal 
service policy due to unclear definition of roles and role-conflict (advisor/approver); (2) 
lack of sufficient public and stakeholder involvement; and (3) lack of sufficient 
performance information and reporting systems. 
The current universal service scheme and universal service fund model in Vietnam 
requires a high level of administrative capacity with strong accountability mechanisms. 
Such a universal service model requires institutions to be organised to meet shared and 
consistent objectives, and then activities to be allocated and delivered so as to achieve 
those objectives. The model also requires an identification of the most efficient universal 
service providers, what amounts should be spent, and how the financial resources 
required should be levied on operators.  
The current universal service institutional arrangements in Vietnam reflect weak 
monitoring and evaluation of universal service performance. The institutional 
arrangement framework does not encourage public involvement, and the lack of 
transparent performance information and reporting systems are evidence of 
unsatisfactory and insufficient institutions. Poor accountability is another problem. 
A Principles for Improved Institutional Arrangements   
This section will note some key principles about performance management within 
institutions. They form the basis for the specific proposals about institutional reforms in 
section D.  
Performance management of public policies revolves around three main and related 
activities: Measuring performance, incorporating performance data/information in 
documents and procedural cycles (performance information and reporting), and using 
 217 
 
this performance information for allocating resources and maintaining levels of 
performance accountability.
2
   
Performance accountability enables governments to understand how public programmes 
may fail or succeed and find mechanisms that can enable programmes to perform better.
3
 
A focus on performance accountability in the public sector reflects a growing emphasis 
on promoting transparency.
4
 Among numerous means by which transparency can be 
achieved, one important approach is using performance information systems that can 
demonstrate sufficiently to the public/stakeholders what an organisation is actually doing 
and has achieved.
5
 Performance accountability requires public agencies to provide an 
account of their performance outputs/outcomes either through reports being made to 
external, independent organisations such as an auditor or a published report to the public 
at large.
6
 
Monitoring and evaluation involve performance measurement and performance 
information, which is a powerful tool to improve the way government organisations 
deliver public policies and programmes.
7
 Performance measurement is a precursor to 
effective and informed management.
8
 Performance measurement is mostly related to the 
generation, collection, analysis, reporting and utilisation of information about the 
operation of public organisations and programmes, including performance information 
about inputs, outputs and outcomes.
9
  
Performance information plays an important role in contributing to the attainment of 
organisational goals,
10
 in the decision-making process, and contributes to systematic and 
in-depth evaluation of public policies and programmes.
11
 Such evaluation of policy 
                                               
2 Geert Bouckaert and John Halligan Managing Performance: International Comparisons (Routledge, New York, 
2008) at 69.  
3 Ibid.  
4 Daniel Kaufman ―Myths and Realities of Governance and Corruption‖ (2005) Social Science Research Network, at 
81 <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=829244>. 
5 Peters, above ch 2, n 228, at 16.  
6 Ibid.  
7 Marelize Gorgens and Jody Zall Kusek Making Monitoring and Evaluation Systems Work: A Capacity Development 
Toolkit (World Bank, Washington, 2009) at 1.  
8 State Service Commission and the Treasury ―Performance Measurement: Advice and examples on how to develop 
effective frameworks‖ (2008), at 7. 
9 Thomas, above ch 2, n 247, at 1.  
10 Steven Van De Walle and Wouter Van Dooren ―Introduction: Using Public Sector Performance Information‖ in 
Wouter Van Dooren and Steven Van De Walle (ed) Performance Information in the Public Sector: How It is Used 
(Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2008) 1 at 3. 
11 Thomas, above ch 2, n 247, at 41.  
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performance ensures informed decision-making about programmes based upon periodic, 
systematic and objective investigation into their efficiency and effectiveness in serving 
their objectives.
12
 In addition, performance reports can support decisions to undertake a 
more in-depth evaluation of the operation of a programme. These evaluation findings 
can then ideally flow into the planning, budgeting and performance measurement 
systems.
13
  
An ideal performance measurement system requires, among other things, a system of 
obtaining relevant, meaningful, balanced and valued information. It also needs to be 
integrated with planning and budgetary processes, and embedded in the organisation, 
focused on outcomes, utilising a cost-effective set of measures and using measures that 
are reliable, consistent, comparable and controllable.
14
 
Performance information and reporting of public programmes and how money is spent 
will help to demonstrate the accountability of government officers to the public, and 
build public trust in government institutions.
15
 However, many public organisations give 
little thought to what the public wants to know about performance and little 
consideration is given to how performance should be reported to the public.
16
 Moreover, 
performance reports are circulated only within responsible government departments and 
the very few reports that are made available to the public are usually poorly presented 
for public consumption.
17
 This results in lack of sufficient engagement of public and 
major stakeholders in the performance measurement of public policies.  
B The Situation in Vietnam 
Diffuse accountability and role conflict in monitoring and evaluation of universal service 
performance are obstacles to capability and competence of involved organisations. Both 
the VTF and the provincial Departments for Information and Communications are 
                                               
12 Ibid.  
13 Paul Thomas ―Why is Performance-based Accountability so Popular in Theory and Difficult in Practice?‖ (paper 
presented to the World Summit on Public Governance: Improving the Performance of the Public Sector, Taipei, 1-3 
May 2007), at 7. 
14 Thomas, above ch 2, n 247, at 15.  
15 Ho, above ch 2, n 248, at 194. 
16 Ibid, at 195. 
17 Ibid.  
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involved in monitoring the delivery of universal services within the geographical areas. 
However, their monitoring activities are often inefficient.  
Inadequate performance of universal service provision is often presented in a positive 
light and benefits viewed as always outweighing failures. Furthermore, there is on-going 
inadequate supervision and control of the approval processes for annual universal 
service plans, together with decisions on the selection of universal service providers and 
funding allocations.  
The current organisational structure of the VTF involves major role conflicts and 
basically eliminates the advisory functions and involvements of the MIC‘s advisory 
departments in monitoring and evaluating the performance of universal service policy. 
At the same time, there are no members on the VTF‘s Board of Management from other 
ministries, or from telecommunications operators or any external or outside experts. 
In addition, there is inadequate evidence-based and independent analysis of the 
performance of universal service delivery in Vietnam, and a basic lack of oversight of 
the departments involved in universal service policy. Lack of essential information also 
makes it difficult, even impossible, to involve the public, including contributors to 
universal service funds, in the measurement of activities. As mentioned previously, there 
was no detailed regulation on provision of universal service public reports until the end 
of 2009.
18
 Some important issues relating to reporting data (eg annual reports on 
universal service levies of telecommunications operators to the VTF) were set out only 
in administrative documents of the MIC (2006) which had no legally binding force and 
therefore, were not seriously followed even by the universal service administrator.  
The MIC‘s document 398/BBCVT-KHTC (2006) required that before 30 April every 
year, telecommunications operators should submit reports to the VTF on the accounting 
balance of universal service levies for the previous year, and that the VTF in turn should 
report in writing, certifying final information about these universal service levies. This, 
however, has never been done properly and there have been considerable differences in 
information about universal service performance released by the VTF and 
                                               
18 Decision 4/2009/TT-BTTTT (2009) on the reports of universal service delivery.  
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telecommunications operators.
19
 Accordingly, the public and stakeholders have not had 
sufficient information about planning approval, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation.
20
  
Information relating to universal service levies, subsidy of universal service funds, and 
projects for loans at below-market rates from universal service funds between 2006 and 
2010 was unavailable to the public until mid-2012,
21
 regardless of the regulations on 
public disclosure of such financial information as determined by the MIC‘s regulations 
in 2009.
22
  
Some current regulations on the telecommunications reporting system
23
 are unable to 
ensure sufficient data on the performance of universal service policy. In particular, these 
reports were insufficient for any accurate statistical monitoring and evaluation of 
universal service performance. For example, fixed subscribers were counted based on 
the geographical areas of districts rather than on universal service-qualified areas of 
communes.
24
  
In turn, reports of local Departments of Information and Communications are mostly 
dependent on reports of telecommunications operators (eg annexes 5/SB and 5/DB).
25
  
C Some Ideas from New Zealand Institutional Arrangements for Reforms in Vietnam  
Universal service institutional arrangements in New Zealand, though not perfect, 
demonstrate some key useful factors that could contribute to reforms of universal service 
institutional arrangements in Vietnam. A strong focus on performance management, and 
performance accountability within public agencies for the delivery of public services has 
been a core characteristic of New Zealand public management.
26
 Performance 
management has become critical for all public agencies, including the Commerce 
Commission.
27
 Performance measurement has put a strong focus on agencies acting 
                                               
19 Ministry of Finance Document 160/KL-TTr (2011), at 5.  
20 Interviews with personnel in telecommunications operators (the author, December 2011-January 2012). 
21 VTF only published relevant information on their website at the first time on 12 April 2012 
<www.vtf.vn/vi/vtci/tttk/2012/04/4F1B657E/>. 
22 Decision 1130/QD-BTTTT (2009) on the regulation of public disclosure of financial information of VTF. 
23 MIC‘s Circular 24/2009/TT-BTTTT (2009) on information reports applicable to telecommunications operators and 
25/2009/TT-BTTTT on comprehensive information reports applicable to government agencies.  
24 Form 5/DB and Form 5/SB of MIC‘s Circulars 24/2009/TT-BTTTT (2009) and 25/2009/TT-BTTTT (2009). 
25 Circular 25/2009/TT-BTTTT (2009), s 4.   
26 Cook, above ch 3, n 195, at 14. 
27 State Service Commission and the Treasury, above n 8, at 8.  
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within and according to the law, and on accountability for outputs and outcomes.
28
 In 
addition, the overall emphasis has been on the broader and joint responsibilities of 
related agencies.
29
 
The Public Finance Act 1989 and the Crown Entities Act 2004 require compliance with 
robust performance measurement and reporting systems for all public sector agencies in 
New Zealand.
30
 Public sector agencies have been required to inform others about 
progress being made towards outcomes, build more robust evidence-based data upon 
which decisions can be made, and report performance results in a verifiable, 
comprehensive and simple way.
31
 Enhanced performance measurements are expected to 
lead to a greater integration between internal management information systems, 
management reporting, and external budget related and accountability documents.
32
 
Public and stakeholder engagement with performance measurement has been an 
important part of performance management in New Zealand. This not only drives the 
performance measurement of public sector agencies themselves but also underpins the 
process of delivering performance information needed by internal and external 
stakeholders.
33
  
Policy-making processes in New Zealand are open to public review. The Commerce 
Commission‘s regulatory decision-making processes, for example, are open and 
transparent, and stakeholders are able to provide input before a final decision is made. 
The opportunity for affected parties to make cross-submissions
34
 illustrates a two-way 
transparent engagement in the decision-making processes of the Commerce 
Commission. Public and stakeholder involvement in the proceedings of the Commerce 
Commission reflects symmetric rights of submission and cross-submission rather than 
simply a process of consultation.
35
 
                                               
28 Dormer and Gill, above ch 3, n 197, at 4. 
29 Ibid, at 5. 
30 State Service Commission and the Treasury, above n 27. 
31 Ibid, at 7. 
32 Gill, above ch 3, n 206, at 6. 
33 New Zealand Government, above ch 3 n 200, at 23.  
34 Through cross-submissions, one stakeholder (eg telecommunications operator) can submit its viewpoint on another 
stakeholder‘s submission.    
35 Quigley, above ch 3, n 215.   
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The monitoring and evaluating mechanism for universal service performance is designed 
and carried out by the Commerce Commission. The Commission has general 
responsibility for monitoring and information dissemination in the telecommunications 
sector and for overseeing the final outcomes of long-term benefits of 
telecommunications services for end-users as provided in s 9A of the 
Telecommunications Act 2001.
36
 The Commission, being functionally and operationally 
independent of the Government, therefore has considerable scope to make its own 
judgments on how policy can be most efficiently implemented. In addition, the 
monitoring function of the Commission is undertaken on a regular basis, releasing 
information through quarterly reports and through an annual set of comprehensive 
statistics, commentary and analysis of telecommunications markets. This clear statement 
of responsibility within a transparent process for the Commission to perform and 
monitor the universal service delivery in New Zealand minimises the risk of non-
compliance with the law and facilitates performance accountability.    
The Commission also carries out an evaluation of Telecom‘s compliance with the 
service quality standards for universal service delivery. At the same time, inquiries, 
studies and reviews into any matter that relates to the long-term benefits of 
telecommunications service end-users (eg TSO Reviews in 2007 and 2009) may be 
carried out. All these reports and information are available to the public and ensure 
sufficient evidence-based analysis for decision-making, including those related to 
universal service delivery. The monitoring function is also ensured through the 
assessment of compliance with TSO instruments that must be completed within a 
determined period (60 working days) after the end of each financial year.
37
  
D Proposals for Improvement of the Universal Service Institutional Arrangements in 
Vietnam  
Proposals for improvement of universal service institutional arrangements in Vietnam 
involve enhanced monitoring and performance accountability in the administration and 
measurement of universal service delivery. These proposals are aimed at establishing a 
clear statement of responsibilities and removal of duplication or conflicting roles among 
                                               
36 Telecommunications Act 2001, s 9A. 
37 Ibid, s 80. 
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involved state organisations. Other suggestions relate to enhancing the performance 
information system, transparency and stakeholder involvement, which in turn should 
also contribute to efficient monitoring and performance accountability of involved 
institutional authorities and government officers.         
Firstly, there should be a clear statement of the roles and responsibilities of all 
departments involved with universal service performance in Vietnam. There should be 
an independent department to monitor and evaluate the overall universal service policy 
in Vietnam, and another department to make annual plans, collect levies and make 
subsidies. Overlapping functions in evaluating outputs of universal service delivery 
should be removed.   
The telecommunications regulator (the VNTA) should have the function of monitoring 
and evaluating universal service policy and programmes, and a leading role in the 
strategic team for setting universal service policies, including five-year universal service 
programmes. The VNTA thus would have an overarching policy, planning and 
programmes monitoring role. The VTF should be responsible for making annual plans, 
collecting universal service levies, selecting universal service providers through a 
competitive bidding process, entering into contracts, and allocating subsidies of 
universal service grants to support the provision of universal services. Accordingly, the 
VTF would also have a function of monitoring the performance of contracts by universal 
service providers and grant recipients. The role of local Departments for Information and 
Communication in evaluating universal service performance at the local level, including 
information about outputs and subsidies, should be consolidated by way of reporting 
back to the telecommunications regulator (the VNTA).  
Secondly, transparency must be initially improved among government organisations 
involved in universal service delivery and then promoted strongly in the 
telecommunications industry (stakeholders) and amongst the public. Transparency 
requires a clear statement of the exact functions of responsible departments. Relevant 
regulations need to be established by the MIC to measure and hold departments to 
account for their performance. This would further enhance decisions on collecting 
universal service levies and providing subsidies.  
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It is proposed that a comprehensive amendment of the MIC‘s Decision 51 (2008)38 be 
made so as to require a transparent auditing mechanism for reporting by universal 
service providers on expenditures on universal service projects, and terminating local 
evaluation and certification of universal service performance (outputs of universal 
service delivery of universal service providers) by provincial Departments of 
Information and Communication. This suggestion for improvement is in line with the 
proposal for retrospective subsidies based on the net cost of providing universal 
services.
39
  
The local certification of universal service outputs by provincial Departments of 
Information and Communication is not effective and has led to duplication of the 
processes of re-evaluation and approval by the VTF. The VTF in fact has played the 
final role in checking and approving the outputs of universal service delivery,
40
 which 
have already been certified by the provincial Department of Information and 
Communication. The duplicated process of evaluation and approval typically resulted in 
delayed subsidies from the VTF to universal service providers even when universal 
service providers‘ reports were certified.41 In addition, the certification by the local 
Department of Information and Communications has been based mainly on the reports 
of universal service providers
42
 even though they have not had sufficient evidence-based 
performance information, nor technical competence nor qualified personnel. This has 
resulted in delays and disagreement in certified outputs between local departments and 
operators. The VTF has had to work with them again to clarify and reach an agreement 
around data with regard to outputs. As a result, subsidies annually and for the whole 
universal service programme 2006-2010 were delayed and are incomplete.
43
        
Thirdly, the conflict in roles of the advisory-approving function in the structure of the 
VTF‘s Board of Management should be avoided and the stakeholder/public involvement 
in the performance of universal service delivery should be improved. Decision 
                                               
38 Decision 51/2008/QD-BTTTT (2008).  
39 See Chapter Five V.D. 
40 Decision 51/2008/QD-BTTTT (2008), art 4 s 3(a). 
41 VNPT‘s document on universal service subsidies (2011). 
42 Decision 51/2008/QD-BTTTT (2008), art 4 s 2(a).   
43 Two years after finishing the five year universal service programme 2006-2010, the subsidy of universal service 
funds for the whole period was not finally calculated and one of the main obstacles to this delayed determination was 
related to shortcomings of evaluation and certification of the local Department of Information and Communication 
about outputs of universal service delivery.     
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191/2004/QD-TTg art 8 s 1 (a) should be amended so as to remove the clause which 
states that the Chairman of the VTF‘s Board of Management must be the MIC‘s Leader 
(Minister or Vice-Minister). In addition, no member of the VTF‘s Board of Management 
should hold office as the VTF‘s CEO, or vice versa. The structure of the VTF‘s Board of 
Management should include members from government departments and external 
stakeholders (such as independent professionals).  
Other amendments to Decision 191/2004/QD-TTg should require that the number of 
members is a number of 5 or 7, including a Chairman, and members must have 
substantial experience or knowledge, and significant standing in at least one of the 
following fields: the operation of a sector of the telecommunications industry, business 
or financial management, law or public administration. Members should not be a 
director of, or concerned in, or take part in the management of a telecommunications 
operator or a service provider. Finally, each member of the VTF‘s Board of 
Management should be appointed by the MIC‘s Minister for a fixed term of office and 
work on a part-time basis, except for the Chairman. The Charter on the VTF‘s 
organisation and operation issued by the MIC‘s Decision 7 (2005)44 art 10 s 1 should be 
amended accordingly.  
This proposal is also based on relevant international experience of universal service 
fund‘s boards of management in other countries, which may be suitable for and 
adaptable to the Vietnam situation. For example, half of the members of Pakistan‘s 
universal service fund state-owned company‘s board are nominees of stakeholders.45 
India‘s universal service fund board was designed as an allied organisation of the 
Department of Telecommunications (DOT) for administrative purposes only, but to 
otherwise make it truly autonomous in performing and measuring the delivery of 
universal services. The board has an administrative role but also advisory and 
monitoring functions, with representatives from the Ministry of Finance, DOT, the 
Planning Commission, industry, consumers and outside experts.
46
 In Australia, the 
Telecommunications Universal Service Management Agency (TUSMA) was established 
                                               
44 Decision 7/2005/QD-BBCVT (2005) stipulating the Charter of VTF‘s organisation and operation. 
45 This could be found in Pakistan‘s Ministry of Information Technology‘s Universal Service Fund Policy (2005)  
<www.usf.org.pk/FCKeditor/editor/filemanager/connectors/aspx/UserFiles/USF-Policy.pdf> 
46 Indian Report of the Steering Committee on Information and Communications for the tenth five year plan (2002-
2007) (Government of India, Planning Commission (2002), at [21].    
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on 1 July 2012 as a body corporate.
47
 It is mainly responsible for entering into contracts 
and making grants to support the provision of public-interest telecommunications 
services.
48
 It also has the function of monitoring the performance of contractors (eg 
universal service providers) to provide public-interest telecommunications services, and 
of grant recipients.
49
 The TUSMA‘s members include a Chair and 4 to 6 other 
members.
50
 A person who is a director or concerned in or taking part in the management 
of telecommunications operators cannot be appointed as a TUSMA member
51
 and a 
person must not hold office both as a TUSMA member and as the CEO.
52
 
Fourthly, the performance information and reporting system for universal service 
delivery should be specified and improved in law. In particular, it is proposed to amend 
and insert a new clause in the Telecommunications Act 2009 art 21 s 2 to determine the 
responsibility for establishing or improving the key performance information systems for 
universal service delivery, especially universal service budgeting preparation processes. 
It would read:  
e) To establish the key performance information systems (indicators) used for the 
performance of universal service delivery, including the budgeting preparation process, 
and allocation of universal service levies and subsidies. 
Accordingly, Decree 25/2011/ND-CP and Decision 35/2011/QD-TTg should state that 
this function mainly belongs to the VNTA (in coordination with VTF). At the same time 
relevant regulations such as the MIC‘s Circulars 24 (2009)53 and 25 (2009)54 should be 
amended and further relevant reports (information and indicators related to the 
performance of universal service delivery) be publicly released.  
These proposals should lead to improvement of the performance of universal service 
programmes in Vietnam, especially the process for budgeting, decision-making, 
allocating levies to telecommunications operators, and subsidy. The performance 
                                               
47 Telecommunications Universal Service Management Agency Act 2012 s 36(1). 
48 Ibid, s 31. 
49 Ibid, s 29(1). 
50 Ibid, s 37. 
51 Ibid, s 38(4). 
52 Ibid, s 38(6). 
53 Circular 24/2009/TT-TTTT (2009) on the statistics reports of posts and telecommunications (applicable to 
operators)   
54 Circular 25/2009/TT-TTTT (2009) on the statistics reports of posts and telecommunications (applicable to 
government departments involved the performance of universal service delivery).  
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information system will also be used as a signalling device that clarifies shortcomings of 
previous universal service programmes/projects and identifies steps to be taken to 
address problems and improve subsequent programmes‘ performance. Along with clear 
objectives, financial performance information would be useful in the budgeting process 
and subsidies. Government-wide systems of performance information should tightly link 
performance results to universal service resource allocation.  
Furthermore, performance information systems should provide more relevant, 
meaningful, balanced and valued information than just general numbers.
55
 The 
appropriate performance information would enable residents in universal service-
qualified areas to have wider choices in taking up services. The public availability of 
performance information and citizens‘ action/choices based on this data can also serve to 
put the spotlight on underperforming universal service providers, thereby serving as a 
motivator for future action to improve performance. If the information is accurate, both 
individuals and groups will benefit. 
In addition, in order to ensure performance information about the universal service 
delivery being available to the public and stakeholders, it is proposed to amend and 
insert into Decision 191/2004/QD-TTg a new section after s 4 (s 4a) of art 3. This will 
define the responsibility of the VTF to ensure sufficient information is made public, such 
as (1) collected universal service levies, (2) projects entitled to subsidies or loans at 
below-market rates from universal service funds; (3) performance results (outputs), and 
(4) results of subsidies from universal service funds to universal service providers and 
beneficiaries in universal service-qualified areas.  
These reports should be publicly available on the VTF‘s official website no later than a 
fixed number of working days (30 working days, for example) after the last day when 
subsidies for the previous period of universal service delivery must be completed as 
provided by the MIC‘s regulations (eg art 8 of Decision 51/2008/QD-BTTTT). A similar 
section should be inserted in Decision 7/2005/QD-BBCVT on the organisation and 
operation of the VTF (art 6).  
                                               
55 How to develop performance measures and indicators (performance information systems) could be learnt from the 
New Zealand experience. See generally State Services Commission and the Treasury ―Performance Measurement: 
Advice and examples on how to develop effective frameworks‖ (2008) <www.ssc.govt.nz/performance-
measurement>.  
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The suggestion is modelled on the New Zealand experience with TSO information 
disclosure requirements (Telecommunications Act 2001 Parts 2B and 3). Information 
related to TSO schemes - including TSO net costs and TSO levies allocated to each 
telecommunications operator - are publicly available not only with the final TSO cost 
calculation but also with the draft of the TSO cost allocation. Engagement of the public 
and stakeholders, who have a material interest, is also gained through conferences held 
by the Commerce Commission. All these enable the public and stakeholders to make 
submissions or cross-submissions. In particular, the Commerce Commission must give 
public notice of any draft of a TSO cost allocation determination no later than a fixed 
number of working days after the end of the fiscal year (s 78 (c)).  
Information in the draft TSO cost allocation includes TSO costs, the amount of each 
TSO provider‘s TSO-qualified revenues, the amount of each liable person‘s TSO-
qualified revenues, the revenues that will be used for the purpose of calculating the TSO 
levies by each liable person, the methodology applied in making the determination, and 
the reasons for the determination (s 88). The Act also requires the Commerce 
Commission to hold conferences for discussion of such drafts, and the Commerce 
Commission is required to extend an invitation to any person who has a material interest 
(ss 89, 93B and 94I).  
The final TSO cost allocation determination must include - apart from the same 
information as in the draft - information about the percentage of the net cost and the 
specified amount to be paid by each liable person (s 91(f)). The Commerce Commission 
must give public notice of that final determination and provide a copy of that final 
determination to all liable persons (s 90).
56
 
III Obstacles in Determination and Allocation of Universal Services Levies  
Arrangements for determination and allocation of universal service levies in Vietnam are 
inefficient and ineffective. There are six principal reasons: (a) the calculation of levies 
based on a fixed percentage of service revenues, differing between different service 
types; (b) failure to determine the amount required to meet the costs of projects to be 
carried out in the coming year/years; (c) the determination of operators paying for 
                                               
56 Telecommunications Act 2001, Part 3.  
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universal service levies being based on specific services; (d) the high rate of levies in 
proportion to service revenues, along with unforeseeable market developments and no 
deduction of reasonable amounts from gross revenues resulting in over-collection; (e) 
insufficient regulation for enforcing payment of universal service levies; and (f) 
information about collected levies not being available to the public.  
A Principles for Improved Determination and Allocation of Universal Service Levies   
As noted in Chapter Two, the universal service fund model should not be anti-
competitive if administered in a transparent, non-discriminatory and competitively 
neutral manner so as not to be more burdensome than necessary.
57
 Determining which 
operators are liable to pay universal service levies must ensure technological and service 
neutrality and not discriminate between providers. It is desirable that all 
telecommunications and Internet access service providers (including VoIP service 
providers) are required to pay universal service levies.
58
 Allocating universal service 
levies to telecommunications operators should reflect as closely as possible the actual 
costs of universal service delivery. In addition, levies should not be determined as a 
fixed percentage, but should instead be based on the costs or outputs. 
Collecting levies should be based on net (after-tax) revenues, or at least based on 
revenues minus required interconnection payments to other telecommunications 
operators.
59
 Deduction of some parts from gross revenues avoids the potential for double 
levying of some operators and of imposing a heavy burden on new entrants, who are 
often levied more heavily than early-entry operators and typically face heavier net 
interconnection outflows than do well-established operators.
60
  
B Universal Service Determination and Allocation in Vietnam  
As discussed in Chapter Four, the selection of telecommunications operators to pay 
universal service levies in Vietnam does not reflect competitive neutrality. Only those 
telecommunications operators who provide mobile services (including local and 
national), national and international telephone and leased-line services were defined as 
                                               
57 WTO Regulation Reference Paper, which forms part of the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications.  
58 InforDev Programme of the World Bank, above ch 2, n 8, at [5.2.2]. 
59 Ibid.  
60 Ibid.  
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levy payers for the period 2006-2010. After 2011, only mobile services providers are 
contributors to universal service funds. This determination exempted providers of other 
services from any obligation to contribute to universal service delivery, including fixed 
line local service providers and ISPs.  
The determination of universal service levies does not have a link with the real costs for 
the provision of universal services and is not based on accurate performance information 
analysis. Aggregate amounts to be paid by all service providers to the VTF are 
calculated as a fixed percentage of annual service revenues
61
 and are not linked to either 
the actual or estimated costs of providing universal services. This resulted in over-
collection of levies and unneccessary financial burdens on the industry. The MIC‘s 2011 
Report illustrates that the allocated universal service levies to telecommunications 
operators exceeded the universal service funds requirement determined in the Prime 
Minister‘s Decision by more than VND 2,500 billion.62 The over-collection of universal 
service levies has been caused by the high rates of levies and the failure in the 
forecasting of receivable financial resources from telecommunications industry levies.
63
  
Finally, there has been insufficient regulation to deal with operators who breach their 
obligations, such as failures or delays in paying universal service levies. Some 
telecommunications operators ignored or delayed paying universal service levies for 
many years.  
C Key Ideas from New Zealand Experience for Improvements of Levy Allocation in 
Vietnam 
The determination of telecommunications operators‘ liability for universal service levies 
(liable person) in New Zealand is based on interconnection between networks. Network 
operators who are interconnected are assumed to benefit from the existence of universal 
service. A ‗liable person‘ is  any operator whose network is interconnected with a fixed 
PSTN operated by Telecom, who provides a telecommunications service in New 
                                               
61 See Chapter Four III.C.1.(c). 
62 Ministry of Information and Communication, above ch 4, n 184, at 13. 
63 See Chapter Four III.C.1.(c). 
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Zealand to end-users by means of some component of a PSTN that is operated by that 
person.
64
  
In order to identify operator eligibility for the definition of ‗liable person‘, the 
Commerce Commission decided in 2003 that these operators needed to (1) own a 
network that interconnected to Telecom‘s fixed telephone network; and (2) provide 
telecommunications services to end-users in New Zealand by operating a component of 
a PSTN located in New Zealand.
65
 Networks were ‗interconnected with a fixed PSTN 
operated by Telecom‘ when there was a ‗direct physical‘ interconnection between the 
originating and terminating networks in order to allow an exchange of PSTN traffic 
between networks.
66
  
With regard to the ‗provision of telecommunications services to end-users in New 
Zealand by operating a component of a telephone network‘, the Commission determined 
that an Internet service provider (ISP), which is interconnected with Telecom‘s fixed 
PSTN for the purpose of providing voice services to end-users in New Zealand by means 
of a component of a PSTN operated by the ISP is to be counted as a liable person.
67
  
This illustrates that the determination of operators to pay universal service levies in New 
Zealand is more equitable with regard to competitive neutrality and non-discrimination 
between operators in terms of technology and services, because New Zealand does not 
distinguish between different services. Since 2011-2012, all retail and wholesale voice 
and broadband service providers, mobile voice operators, and ISPs (excluding pure 
resellers) are liable persons.   
Allocating universal service levies to telecommunications operators in New Zealand 
prior to the Telecommunications Amendment Act 2011 was based on the cost of 
universal services provided by the universal service provider (Telecom).
68
 In order to 
ensure cost-effectiveness, the cost was defined as the unavoidable net incremental cost 
                                               
64 Telecommunications Act 2001, s 5. 
65 Commerce Commission, above ch 3, n 246, at [477]. 
66 Commerce Commission, above ch 3, n 260, at [420]. 
67 Ibid, at [487].  
68 Allocating universal levies based on the actual cost of universal service delivery still reflects the best practice, 
possibly. Due to some obstacles of econometric or mathematic methodology in determining the actual cost in practice 
and potentially never-ending debates, an alternative solution (eg reverse auction) could be seen as an option for 
regulators. However, actual costs could still be served in some stages of a reverse auction process, particularly in 
determining reserve price for bidding.    
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to an efficient service provider for providing the service to commercially non-viable 
customers.
69
 This determination of cost was interpreted as the minimum additional cost a 
universal service provider would incur if it chose to serve non-viable customers. 
Moreover, the allocation of such universal service levies was prospective and linked 
with outputs (the number of commercially non-viable customers). This helped to avoid 
overcharging or creating unused collected levies.  
The revenues eligible for determining universal service levies were interpreted as the net 
revenue.
70
 Intra-industry revenues were deductible from revenues in calculating 
universal service-qualified revenues. Revenue from intra-industry sales is defined as any 
amount payable to other carriers for the provision of services (telecommunications 
services)
71
 or amounts payable to non-liable persons for the purchase of 
telecommunications services provided to the non-liable person from a liable person.
72
 
Revenues received by the universal service provider (Telecom) from the provision of the 
universal service were not mentioned as a deductible amount from TSO-qualified 
revenue.    
Finally, along with a new approach of TDL which replaced universal service levies, a 
minimum threshold of qualified revenue was used in determining the liable persons to 
pay for TDL. Service providers are defined as liable persons to pay for TDL if they meet 
the definition of ―liable person‖ in s 5 of the Telecommunications Act 2001, traded in 
the preceding financial year, and met the minimum telecommunications revenues of 
NZD 10 million
73
 (the minimum for becoming a liable person for TDL for the period 
2010-2011 had been NZD 5 million).
74
 The application of a minimum threshold of 
qualified revenues for paying universal service levies would be helpful to small or new 
entrants, which contributes to the improved competitive environment.      
                                               
69 Telecommunications Act 2001, s 5.  
70 Commerce Commission, above ch 3, n 260, at [448]. 
71 Commerce Commission, above ch 2, n 151, at [16].  
72 Ibid, at [17].  
73 Commerce Commission, above ch 3, n 367, at [4].  
74 Commerce Commission, above ch 2, n 151, at [9].  
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D Proposals for Improvement of the Legal Framework with regard to the Allocation 
of Universal Service Levies in Vietnam  
The determination and allocation of universal service levies for telecommunication 
operators in Vietnam does not ensure competitive neutrality. Likewise, the percentage of 
service revenues for the universal service levy is high, and is not linked with actual costs 
of universal service delivery. Proposals to improve the legal framework with regard to 
the determination and allocation of universal service levies are set out below. These 
proposals aim at mitigating payment of universal service levies and ensuring competitive 
neutrality among telecommunications operators.  
1 Clear statement of key principles for determination and allocation of universal service 
levies 
Universal service legal frameworks in Vietnam should include a clear statement of non-
discrimination and competitive neutrality, mitigation of levies and the avoidance of 
unnecessary financial burden on telecommunications operators in determining and 
allocating universal service levies. These principles should be included in the highest 
legal document of the universal service programme, which would be a clear and stronger 
directive for the ministerial documents and involved entities in determining and 
allocating universal service levies. It is proposed to amend and insert a new clause in 
Decision 1643/QD-TTg (2011) art 1 Part V s 1. The clause would say: 
The determination of universal service levies and financial resources for universal service 
programmes must ensure the principles of non-discrimination, minimise levels of 
universal service levies and not create unnecessary burdens on telecommunications 
operators.  
This inclusion of a clear statement in the Prime Minister‘s Decision would create a 
primary guideline for further details in the same Decision. At the same time it would 
require the responsible agencies (such as the MIC and the Ministry of Finance) to abide 
by and reflect these principles in their guidance regulations for providing universal 
services. Moreover, the performance of the VTF and any involved agency must comply 
with and be held accountable for its performance in accordance with these regulations. 
This proposal may help immediately for the implementation of universal service 
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programme 2011-2015. However, this statement of key principles for the determination 
and allocation of universal service levies should ultimately be included in the 
Telecommunications Act, once amendment is possible after 2015. This also reflects the 
universal service policies of many countries where they function as a primary principle 
to minimise distortion in market development and competition.    
2 Competitive neutrality in identifying telecommunications operators to pay universal 
service levies  
The determination of telecommunications operators to pay universal service levies 
should ensure non-discrimination and competitive neutrality of technology and services. 
Any telecommunications operator who operates and/or interconnects to any component 
of a public telecommunications network so as to provide telecommunications services in 
Vietnam, including the transmission of voice, data, SMS, or any other content, should 
contribute to universal service levies. Decision 1643/QD-TTg 2011 part V s 1 (a) should 
be amended to read: 
Every telecommunications service and Internet service provider (including digital content 
services providers) that provides service in Vietnam by means of any component of a 
public telecommunications network that is operated by such a provider, shall pay 
universal service levies.  
This would help to ensure that there is no levy discrimination, no matter what model of 
technology or transmission a network provider is using.
75
 The reason for requiring all 
service providers to contribute to universal service costs is that all providers benefit from 
the network effect. This proposed amendment is also in line with the 
Telecommunications Act 2009 art 14 s 1 (e) and s 2, which indicates that all 
telecommunications service providers, with or without infrastructures, must abide by 
universal service obligations and contribute universal service levies to the VTF, among 
their other responsibilities and obligations.  
                                               
75 This proposal is in line with the ITU‘s recommendation and international experience, and also the empirical 
experience of the New Zealand TSO policy (this can be seen in the Telecommunications Act 2001, and the 
Amendment Act 2011 s 5 and s 80). 
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In addition, Vietnam can learn from the experience of the New Zealand universal service 
delivery in determining service providers liable for paying universal service levies.
76
 I 
suggest inserting into the Telecommunications Act 2009 art 22 a new section after s 2 (s 
3), which would read:  
3) The service providers liable to pay universal service levies are those who:  
(a) provide a telecommunications service in Vietnam, including the transmission of 
voice, data, SMS, or any other content but not including broadcasting; and 
(b) operate a component of the public telecommunications network over which the 
telecommunications service is provided; and 
(c) operate a component of a public telecommunications network that falls on the 
public side of the network demarcation point; and 
(d) provide a telecommunications service that is publicly available, not limited to a 
private use. 
This will help the administrator of universal service delivery in Vietnam to identify 
potential and liable operators for the payment of universal service levies, and ensure 
competitive neutrality and non-discrimination between operators with regard to 
technology and service.     
3 Non-discrimination of operators and mitigation of levies in determining and allocating 
universal service levies 
Several amendments to legal frameworks are proposed to ensure non-discrimination of 
operators, mitigation of levies and the avoidance of unnecessary financial burden in 
determining and allocating universal service levies in Vietnam.  
The percentage of service revenues for universal service levies determined in Decision 
1643 Part V s 1 (a) should be decreased to a rate between 0.7% and 1.0% of revenues, 
without distinction between different services. This proposal aims to ensure minimum 
levels of universal service levies, and not place unnecessary burdens on 
telecommunications operators.  
                                               
76 The full text can be found in the Telecommunications Act 2001, the Amendment Act 2006 and the Amendment Act 
2011 Part 3 subpart 2. 
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Revenue information on which levy rates are set is inconsistent. For example, the MIC‘s 
Report in 2011 to the Prime Minister indicated that universal service levies collected in 
2010 from mobile service revenues were VND 1863.79 billion (3% of universal service-
qualified revenues), which implies that universal service-qualified revenues from mobile 
service were in the region of VND 62,300 billion. This number was not consistent with 
the ICT White Book of the MIC 2010 in which revenues from mobile services were 
reported as being much higher, at about VND 80,000 billion in 2010. However, when 
the estimated calculation of universal service levies for the period 2011-2015 was used, 
universal service-qualified revenues from mobile service were VND 51,080 billion in 
2010 and 58,476 billion in 2011.
77
 Revenues from mobile services in 2010 and 2011 in 
Vietnam in fact were about VND 118,700 billion in 2010 and VND 112,300 billion in 
2011 respectively.
78
 This resulted in an inaccurate estimated allocation of levy to service 
providers.  
Meanwhile, financial resources required for 2011-2015 universal service delivery were 
estimated as being about VND 7,000 billion. If subtracted from the unused transferrable 
amount from the previous five year universal service programme (about VND 1,881 
billion),
79
 levies needing to be charged to telecommunications operators would be about 
VND 5,119 billion. Using the estimated rate of growth in mobile revenues, as BMI 
index80 recommended in the MIC‘s Report, estimated revenues from mobile services 
each year of 2011-2015 would be VND 112,300 billion, VND 128,561 billion, VND 
143,211 billion, VND 153,808 billion and VND 161,298 billion respectively.  
In summary, the total universal service-qualified revenue from mobile services (2011-
2015) would be VND 699,178 billion. If the trend of decreasing revenues from other 
services remains constant, then collection of universal service levies for 2011-2015 from 
revenues of other service providers such as ISPs and fixed line operators, whose 
revenues in 2011 were about VND 9,594 billion (USD 468 million) and VND 7,544 
                                               
77 Ministry of Information and Communications, above ch 4, n 184, at 154. 
78 Ministry of Information and Communications, above ch 4, n 110, at 47. 
79 See above ch 4, n 158. Total universal service levies for 2006-2010 estimated at VND 7,571 billion, and total 
subsidies for the period 2006-2010 estimated as VND 5,690 billion. This means the transferable amount would be 
around VND 1,881.668 billion.  
80 BMI (Business Monitor International) growth rates estimated for the period 2011- 2015. See Ministry of 
Information and Communication, above ch 4, n 158, at 161. 
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billion (USD 361 million) respectively,
81
 the percentage rate of universal service levy 
should be set at less than 1.0%. Therefore, the determination of the rate for universal 
service levies at 2% is unrealistic and results in the creation of unnecessary burdens on 
telecommunications operators. This percentage could be reduced to about 0.7% because 
there remains a large unused sum of collected universal service levies from 2006-2010 
(See Figure 8).    
Figure 8: Estimated universal service levies on telecommunications and ISPs for the 
period 2011-2015
82
 
Description 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
Estimated growth rates according to BMI 
(%)83 
14.48 11.40 9.93 7.40 4.87  
Revenues from mobile services 2011-2015 
(VND billion) 
112,300 128,561 143,211 153,808 161,298 699,178 
Revenues from ISPs 2011-2015 (VND 
billion) 
9,594 10,987 12,240 13,145 13,785 59,751 
Revenues from fixed line operators 2011-
2015 (VND billion) 
7,544 8,404 9,238 9,921 10,404 45,511 
Estimated percentage rate of levy      0.64% 
Estimated levies 2011-2015 (VND billion)      5,119 
Collected levies transferrable from the 
programme 2006-2010 (VND billion) 
     1,881 
Financial resources required for the 
programme 2011-2015 (VND billion) 
     7,000 
It is proposed to amend Part VI s 5 of Decision 1643/QD-TTg to read:
84
 
                                               
81
 Ministry of Information and Communication, above n 78, at 47. 
82 The author estimated universal service levies on telecommunications and ISPs for the period 2011-2015 by using 
the universal service-qualified revenues of services from data of revenues officially launched by the MIC in 2011, 
which was different from data in the project enclosed with Document 2203/TTr-BTTTT (2011) submitted to the Prime 
Minister for the approval of the universal service programme 2011-2015.     
83 See above n 80. 
84 PM‘s Decision 1643/QD-TTg Part VI s 5 provided:  
 
5. Revising the collection of universal service levies from telecommunications operators: 
Based on the financial demand and estimated collection of universal service levies the Ministry of Information and 
Communications, in coordination with the Ministry of Finance, revises the percentage of service revenues for 
universal service levies.  
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The annual consideration and revision of such percentage of service revenues for universal 
service levies by the Ministry of Information and Communication and the Ministry of 
Finance should be submitted to the Prime Minister for approval, based on the current 
fiscal situation and developments, and collection of universal service levies within the 
previous year.  
Firstly, this amendment will define more clearly the responsibility of the ministries 
involved in the delivery of universal services in annually evaluating and revising the 
percentage of universal service levies in line with the current situation of universal 
service levy collection. This would ensure sufficient collection of financial resources for 
universal service delivery, but not create burdens more than necessary on 
telecommunications operators. The lack of such clear detailed regulation in the universal 
service programme 2006-2010 has led to the failure of the responsible Ministries to 
evaluate and revise annually the rates of universal service levies; there was only one 
revision during these 5 years. Therefore, when revenues from mobile services increased 
sharply there was over-collection of universal service levies in comparison with pre-
determined financial resources.   
Secondly, the same rate of universal service levies (0.7%) should apply to every 
telecommunications operator who meets the criteria for payment of levies instead of 
different rates of levies for different services. The determination of services should be 
amended in accordance with the definition and classification of telecommunications 
services.
85
  
This amendment would help to eliminate inconsistencies between telecommunications 
operators and revenues of telecommunications services to be used for calculating 
universal service levies, and the relevant classification of telecommunications services in 
general. For instance, Decision 1643/QD-TTg Part V s 1(a) currently determines 
universal service levies at 2% of revenue from mobile telephone services. At the same 
time, the MIC‘s Circular 5/2012/TT-BTTTT art 5 (2) uses an approach of ‗mobile 
telecommunications services‘ (including basic and value-added telecommunications 
services) and classifies, among others, telephone service, facsimile service, data 
                                                                                                                                          
 
85 The MIC‘s Circular 5/2012/TT-BTTTT 2012. 
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transmission service and Internet access service. Internet access service includes dial-up 
Internet access with download speeds less than 256 kbps and broadband Internet access 
with the download speeds higher than 256 kbps. This reflects an unclear statement of 
service revenues to be used for determining universal service levies as in Decision 
1643/QD-TTg, whether from telephone (or calling) service of mobile 
telecommunications services, or including revenues from other services. This again 
illustrates that the determination of fixed percentages of specific service revenues for 
universal service levies is out of touch with current technology and service integration. 
Decision 1643/QD-TTg Part V s 1 (a) should be amended to read:  
Collection of universal service levies from service revenues of service providers should be 
0.7% of net revenues of telecommunications services.  
The traditional idea of universal service policy, in which funding for universal service 
delivery was subsidised by the revenues from services with higher benefits, becomes 
unrealistic within the integrated environment of technology and services, and within a 
competitive environment.
86
 International experience in this area - including New 
Zealand
87
 - shows that universal service funds are levied equally on service revenues of 
service providers.
88
 This allocation does not distinguish between different services such 
as fixed, wired, wireless and mobile.   
Thirdly, some amounts from revenues of telecommunications operators, such as intra-
industry transactions and revenues from provision of universal services, should be 
excluded in calculating universal service levies. A new subsection (d) in Decision 
1643/QD-TTg Part V s 1 would read:
89
 
                                               
86 Xavier, above ch 2, n 4, at 48. 
87 See Chapter Three III.C.3.(d). 
88 InfoDev Programme of the World Bank, above ch 2, n 8, at [5.2.2]. 
89 Decision 1643/QD-TTg Part V s 1 provided:  
1. Financial resources for the universal service programme:  
a) Levies from telecommunications operators: 2% from revenues of mobile service; 
b) The remaining funds transferred from the universal service programme 2006-2010 in accordance with the 
PM‘s Decision 74/2006/QD-TTg; 
c) VTF‘s Charter capital. 
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d) Any amount receivable from universal service funds for providing universal services in 
universal services-qualified areas, and intra-industry transactions, should be subtracted 
from net revenues for calculating universal service levies.   
This amendment would ensure that amounts related to the provision of universal services 
and the payments from other operators would be subtracted from the revenues for 
calculating universal service levies. The proposal is modelled on the New Zealand 
universal service legal framework and its implementation. Section 93F 
Telecommunications Act 2001 provides that any part of revenue that is received for 
performing any obligation under a universal service instrument should be excluded from 
universal service-qualified revenues.
90
 At the same time, in order to avoid a ‗double-
count‘ of some revenues, the intra-industry transactions should be deductible from 
annual revenues for calculating universal service levies.
91
  
With regard to longer term improvements in determining universal service levies, it is 
suggested inserting into the Telecommunications Act 2009 art 22 a new section after s 3 
(s 4) about general principles for determining universal service levies and 
telecommunications operators for paying universal service levies, which would read:  
The collection of universal service levies from the percentage of service revenues of 
operators as defined in section 2 (a) of this article, including determining rates of universal 
service levies and operators for paying universal service levies must ensure general 
principles of competitive neutrality of technology, operator and service, and not place 
unnecessary burdens on telecommunications operators. 
Fourth, it is proposed to include a minimum threshold of revenue of a service provider in 
paying universal service levies, as in New Zealand
92
 and Japan.
93
 This suggestion is also 
the most practical approach to a minimum size limit for either annual revenue or market-
share,
94
 is suitable for Vietnamese conditions and objectives, and would enhance 
                                               
90 This is also to be found in the Telecommunications Amendment Act 2011 s 5 and s 80 which determines that any 
amount paid to liable persons by the Crown as compensation for the cost of complying with a TSO instrument will be 
excluded in revenues for calculating universal service levies - TDL. 
91 This could be found in the annual determination of TSO levies for the period 2001-2002, at [504].  
92 This is outlined in the Telecommunications Amendment Act 2011 s 80.  
93 In Japan, telecommunications service providers who interconnect with universal service providers (Eligible 
Telecommunications Carriers) and earn over JPY 1 billion have to pay universal service levies <www.itu.int/ITU-
D/asp/CMS/Events/2010/Thailand-Broadband/Session1b_Mamoru_Udaka.pdf >. 
94 InfoDev Programme of the World Bank, above ch 2, n 8. 
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competition because it would help new and small operators to develop their market-
share in a competitive environment. However, this would require amendments to various 
legal documents.
95
  
In the first instance, a new section (s 5) should be inserted into Decree 25/2011/ND-CP 
art 29, which would read: 
The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Information and Communications jointly 
determine the minimum level service revenue of a service provider liable for paying 
universal service levies. The minimum level service revenue of a service provider being 
liable to pay universal service levies is the minimum net revenue attained in the previous 
fiscal year.  
In the second instance, a new clause should be inserted into art 1 Part V s 1 of Decision 
1643/QD-TTg, which would read: 
Service revenues used for calculating and collecting universal service levies based on the 
fixed percentage of such service revenues as provided in section 1(a) are greater than or 
equal to the minimum level service revenue of a service provider being liable for paying 
universal service levies.  
In addition, art 2 s 2 of the same decision requires a new clause inserted which reads: 
The Ministry of Finance jointly with Ministry of Information and Communication 
determines the minimum level service revenue for paying universal service levies.  
How to determine and what should be the minimum level service revenue for universal 
service levies in Vietnam could be learnt from the experiences of New Zealand and 
Japan. However, for a realistic proposal of the minimum level service revenue in 
Vietnam it should be a balanced calculation of revenues or market-share of operators 
with requirements of not only promoting small-sized or new operators to develop in the 
competitive market but also ensuring sufficient financial resources for subsidies of the 
universal service delivery in Vietnam.  
                                               
95 Decree 25/2011/ND-CP and PM‘s Decision 1643/QD-TTg. 
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Alternatively, art 2 s 1(e) of Decision 1643/QD-TTg relating to responsibility of the 
MIC in performing universal service programme could be amended as follows: 
The MIC is to be the main body – in coordination with the Ministry of Finance – 
responsible for reporting to the Prime Minister on the annual revision of the percentage of 
service revenues for paying universal service levies according to the current performance 
of universal service delivery, and for determining the minimum level service revenue of a 
service provider liable for paying universal service levies.    
4 Transparent performance information 
It is proposed to insert in Decision 1643/QD-TTg art 2 s 1(g) a new section that would 
read:
96
 
The Ministry of Information and Communication shall publish annual reports in detail 
about collected universal service levies, subsidies of universal service funds and the 
results of universal service delivery no later than 90 working days after the end of each 
financial year. 
This proposal would enhance transparency, accountability, and effective monitoring of 
the performance of agencies involved in universal service policies, and operators liable 
for paying universal service levies. It would also meet the WTO‘s requirements 
regarding universal service fund administration and anti-competitive practices.
97
 This 
would establish a public information environment similar to that for universal service 
delivery in New Zealand, where information relating to the calculation of universal 
service levies must be released to the public, especially to stakeholders, for discussion, 
evaluation and monitoring. Prior to the Telecommunications Amendment Act 2011 the 
New Zealand Commerce Commission had to prepare a draft universal service cost 
allocation determination and give public notice of the draft, including the closing date 
for submissions, no later than 80 working days after the end of each financial year. No 
later than 20 working days after the closing date for submissions, the Commission had to 
                                               
96 Decision 1643/QD-TTg art 2 s 1 (g) provided the responsibility of the MIC ―to determine the regulation on the 
report of universal service programmes; in coordination with relevant agencies to investigate, monitor and evaluate 
results of the universal service programme so as to report to the Prime Minister‖.  
97 According to the WTO Regulation Reference Paper, which forms part of the WTO Agreement on Basic 
Telecommunications, a member of WTO has the right to define the universal service policy it wishes to maintain and 
such universal service policy will not be regarded as anti-competitive per se, if it is administered in a transparent, non-
discriminatory and competitively neutral manner and not more burdensome than necessary for such universal services. 
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prepare a final universal service cost allocation, publish that final determination and give 
a copy of that final universal service cost allocation to all liable persons and universal 
service providers.
98
 The Telecommunications Amendment Act 2011 continued to re-
confirm requirements for public information release and public submission in relation to 
both draft and final universal service liability allocation determination.
99
     
5 More enforceable regulations with stronger penalties for breach in collecting and 
paying universal service levies   
It is proposed to enact more enforceable regulations with stronger penalties to be 
imposed for any failure to pay or late payment of universal service levies in Vietnam. It 
is proposed to amend and insert some new clauses into Decree 25 (2011) and Decree 83 
(2011) which define the application of interest for late payments
100
 of universal service 
levies, application of additional solutions (such as to force the implementation of 
payments, or cancellation of the license to provide telecommunications services as 
determined in art 2 of Decree 83). In particular, a new section (s 4) with 4 subsections 
should be inserted into Decree 25 (2011) art 14, which would read: 
(a) Each service provider must pay to the VTF the amount of universal service levies due 
not later than 20 working days after the date that the determination is publicly notified or 
determined by the responsible agency‘s decision;  
(b) If any service provider liable for paying the universal service levy fails to pay the 
whole amount of that levy by the date specified in the decision of the responsible agency 
the service provider must pay interest on the unpaid amount at 0.05% per day (18.25% per 
year) for the period commencing on that working day to the date of payment of the whole 
amount.  
 (c) Interest will be calculated in monthly instalments for each month, or part of each 
month, that the payment is due;  
 (d) The amount of any unpaid levy or interest is recoverable in any court of competent 
jurisdiction as a debt due to the Government. 
                                               
98 The full text can be found in the Amendment Act 2006 ss 87-91. 
99 Telecommunications (TSO, Broadband, and Other Matters) Amendment Act 2011 ss 84 and 87. 
100 Ministry of Finance‘s Circular 61/2007/TT-BTC (2007) Part II (B) ss 2 and 4 provided interest for late payments of 
due tax at 0.05% per day (equivalent to 18.25% per year) calculated on the due tax.  
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At the same time, it is proposed to amend and insert a new clause into art 10 (4) of 
Decree 83 (2011):    
(a) Enforcing the refund of any wrong subsidy/payment for any breach as defined in 
section 2 (a) and section 3 (b) of this article; 
(b) Enforcing payment of any unpaid universal service levies for any breach as defined in 
section 2 (d) of art 10. The offender must pay interest on the unpaid amount at the rate of 
0.05% per day (18.25% per year) calculated from the date payment is due as provided in 
Decree 25/2011/ND-CP art 14 (4). 
This proposal for improvement would ensure full and adequate universal service levy 
collection in Vietnam and generate sufficient financial resources for the delivery of 
universal services. This proposal is based on the experience of developed countries, 
including New Zealand and Australia.
101
 
IV Lack of Contestable Bidding for Selecting the Most Economic, Cost-
Effective Universal Service Provider and Projects of Universal Service 
Delivery 
One of the principal shortcomings in the present system in Vietnam is the lack of 
contestable bidding for selecting the most economic, cost-effective universal service 
providers and projects of universal service delivery. Even though contestable bidding 
was included in Ordinance 2002 and the subordinate legislation for the performance of 
universal service programmes, it has never been applied in practice in selecting universal 
service providers and projects of universal service delivery.    
A Contestable Bidding for Selecting Universal Service Provider and Projects  
Contestable bidding has been identified as one possible method of identifying the most 
efficient universal service providers and minimise the universal service subsidies against 
the cost estimated.
102
 It is probably the best way to arrive at the actual subsidy amount to 
                                               
101 The New Zealand Telecommunications Act 2001 arts 14, 94 and the Australian Telecommunications (Consumer 
Protection and Service Standards) (Late Payment of universal service levy) Amendment Determination 2005. 
102 See Chapter Two II.D.4.(a). 
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be subsidised for universal service delivery.
103
 There are an increasing number of 
countries which apply contestable bidding for universal service delivery, more recently 
for their rural broadband projects.
104
  
Reverse auctions
105
 can be designed in two main forms, either sealed bid auctions or 
‗open outcry‘ auctions. A sealed bid auction typically requires the submission of secret 
bids and has a single bidding round.
106
 By contrast, an ‗open outcry‘ bidding process 
enables bidders to see what others are bidding
107
 and there is public discussion about 
elements of the bidding proposals. Thus, an open outcry auction has a descending bid 
intention.
108
  
The structure of an auction needs to be designed in line with specific objectives of the 
auction. Some key issues are: (1) geographic areas for which projects of universal 
service delivery are to be auctioned; (2) setting up reserve prices; and (3) eligibility 
standards for auction participants.  
Firstly, the regulators must define the geographical areas for which the universal service 
project will be auctioned. These could be some existing standard units such as 
administrative units (communes) established by the government or the area served by an 
existing central office.
109
 Determining small geographic areas can minimise the 
disparateness of customers within each area, allow more precisely required 
compensation and mitigate problems related the performance of the contract.
110
 By 
contrast, defining a large area for which universal service projects are to be auctioned 
and requiring the universal service provider to serve an area, such as a province, can 
make it difficult to meet a widespread service requirement within a reasonable period of 
time.
111
 In addition, larger geographic areas can also deter auction entry.
112
 However, 
                                               
103 Sepulveda and Tetraul, above ch 2, n 168, at 89. 
104 Most recently, some of these countries are the United Kingdom, New Zealand and the United States. In the United 
Kingdom, for example, the third round of contestable biddings for rural broadband projects was opened in 22 March 
2013. See Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs ―Rural Development Programme for England and 
Broadband Delivery UK: Applicant‘s Handbook - Expression of Interest Round Three‖ (2013).  
105 Different from the traditional auction, the bidding winner for the projects of universal service delivery is the bidder 
with the lowest requirements for subsidies. 
106 Trevor Roycroft ―Reverse Auctions for Universal Service Funding?‖ (2008) Roycroft Consulting Economic and 
Policy Analysis, at 12 <www.roycroftconsulting.org/Roycroft_Consulting_Auction_White_Paper_2-1-08.pdf>.  
107 Ibid.  
108 Ibid, at 13. 
109 Weller, above ch 2, n 170, at 663.   
110 Ibid.  
111 Ibid. 
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small geographical areas can mean that the number of auctions required will make 
administration too complex, and the possibility of synergies across areas would 
increase.
113
   
Secondly, eligibility standards for potential auction participants and selection of 
successful providers with a large number of potential auction participants or only a few 
serious bidders will impact on how the contestable bidding process is designed.
114
 
Eligibility standards for determining potential auction participants (and for selection of 
the successful bidders) should be focused on the ability of the candidate bidders to meet 
service quality standards.
115
 The technical capabilities associated with the basic service 
offering and service quality must be clearly identified.
116
 Other capacities relating to 
financial viability should be considered accordingly. At the same time, the issue of 
single winner or multiple winners should be addressed. If there are multiple winners - 
more than one bidder comes up with a proposal which is equal or practically equal to 
another bidder - then there should be an equitable allocation of ‗wins‘.  These should be 
allocated in different geographical areas and avoid any duplication of infrastructure in 
universal service-qualified areas.   
Thirdly, the setting up of a reserve price, which is a level of subsidy that the auction 
participants bid on, presents a difficult issue and may reintroduce the complexity of cost 
modelling into the auction process.
117
 The regulator may use an existing (current price 
ceiling) subsidy level for a specific area and multiply by a predetermined number
118
 or 
use publicly available cost models
119
 as the reserve price,
120
 and the bidder with the 
lowest requirements of subsidies below the reserve would be the winner.   
B The Situation in Vietnam 
Currently a system of competitive bidding in the selection of universal service providers 
is not employed in Vietnam. At the same time there is little or no evidence of using cost 
                                                                                                                                          
112 Rycroft, above 106, at 7.  
113 Weller, above n 109, at 663.  
114 Roycroft, above n 106, at 7.  
115 Roycroft, above n 106, at 8.  
116 Ibid.  
117 Ibid, at 10.  
118 Weller, above n 109, at 665  
119 Roycroft, above n 106, at 10.   
120 International Telecommunications Union, above ch 2, n 55, at 39. 
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information or performance results to support decision-making on universal service 
provider selection, so as to enhance universal service policy objectives such as 
efficiency and effectiveness. This conclusion came from interviews with participants 
from the group of policy-makers.
121
 The bases for decision-making about the selection 
of universal service providers remain unknown.
122
  
Very general regulations on competitive bidding are a core cause of its absence. 
Although the Bidding Law 2005 and its related decrees have been in existence for some 
years, criteria or adequate regulation for the fair selection of universal service providers 
have not been carefully spelled out. The selection of universal service provider and 
projects of universal service delivery has normally been based on unclear criteria, such 
as giving ―prioritisation to the telecommunications provider with existing 
telecommunications infrastructure in the universal service-qualified areas‖.123 In 
addition, Decree 31/2005/ND-CP on purchasing public services clarifies three 
purchasing methods which public organisations can choose for the delivery of public 
services by outsiders. These are government allocated projects,
124
 direct contracting, and 
competitive bidding.
125
 The 2005-2010 period witnessed only ‗Government allocated 
projects‘ and ‗direct contracting‘ methods being applied to the selection of  universal 
service providers for the first five-year programme.   
In addition, government regulations on selecting universal service providers
126
 have not 
created transparent processes and criteria, nor required strict accountability from public 
managers, and consequently many of them have not employed cost-effective approaches 
or competitive bidding. Public managers can freely apply the direct contracting method 
for selecting universal service providers and avoid competitive bidding requirements 
altogether. These include publishing their requirements or inviting operators to enter into 
competitive bidding, and rating each tenderer according to their capacities. At the same 
                                               
121 Interviews with officers in the VTF and the VNTA, and the Ministry of Planning and Investment (the author, 
December 2011-January 2012). 
122 By the end of 2009, there were four telecommunications operators engaged with the VTF in the contract of order to 
provide telecommunications universal service.      
123 Ordinance on Posts and Telecommunications 2002, art 50 s 2. 
124 The Government allocates annually operational delivery assignments to telecommunications companies to perform 
the universal service delivery, by administrative decision without contracts or a contestable bidding process.    
125 Decree 31/2005/ND-CP (2005) on producing and providing public utility products and services and Decision 
256/2006/QD-TTg (2006) promulgating the Regulation on tendering, ordering and assigning the implementation of 
producing and providing public utility products and services.    
126 Ibid.    
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time, given the CPV‘s determination of the dominant role of SOEs in providing 
universal services and giving these operators direct contracts to provide universal 
services, public managers are not in a position of real accountability.  
The present process for selection of universal service providers does not satisfy the 
principles of equity and non-discrimination among telecommunications enterprises. 
Currently, only large telecommunication corporations and state-owned enterprises or 
those partly owned by the state, are selected. The absence of effective competition for 
universal service projects has resulted in disagreement between the MIC and the 
telecommunication operators over many aspects of the universal service programmes 
especially programme costs, price of universal service, and funding allocation and 
distribution. Unfair selection practices have also allowed the existence of direct 
contracting or government allocated projects, which create the potential for corruption.  
C Competitive Bidding Process in New Zealand   
Competitive bidding for the provision of universal service was not used in New 
Zealand until 2011.
127
 This was an area where New Zealand universal service 
arrangements did not reflect the best international practice, and did not help mitigate the 
net costs for the universal service delivery of local fixed telephone between 2002 and 
2009.
128
 Although Telecom is regulated as the sole TSO service provider, within a 
framework which ensures cost-effective approaches, transparency and accountability, it 
is still difficult to avoid conflict and disagreement between the Commerce Commission, 
levy payers and Telecom. The main reason for this is difficulty in defining accurate 
prices for the cost of the TSO service. There are disputes and concerns from TSO levy 
payers about inaccurate prices, not only of TSO programmes but also the cost for each 
TSO service.  
Having a single TSO provider for all telecommunications service, without any 
contestable proceedings, is potentially an unfair system if other operators providing 
alternative services cannot be TSO providers nor ask for subsidies.
129
 
                                               
127 Since 2011 this has changed somewhat with regard to the deployment of rural broadband infrastructures. 
128 See Chapter Three III.C.5.(a). 
129 After the roll-out of RBI and UFB in New Zealand, if Telecom still requires compensation for local fixed TSO 
services it is assumed that other alternative service providers will possibly compete and reduce the TSO net cost, and 
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Telecommunications operators providing alternative services at lower costs than that 
TSO provider do not get any compensation.
130
 In addition, due to the model of 
nominating a single TSO provider for one telecommunications service without 
contestable bidding, the cost for provision of TSO services is unlikely to be reduced. As 
indicated in Chapter Three, the net cost for provision of TSO services provided by 
Telecom increased over time,
131
 while the number of commercially non-viable 
customers to be served with support of TSO levies decreased. The data on the net cost 
calculated for TSO compensation of Telecom‘s local residential telephone service 
steadily increased from 2001, from NZD 34.72 million for the fiscal year 2001-2002 to 
NZD 62.8 million in 2006-2007.
132
  
While the cost for providing TSO service has increased over time and led to an increase 
in compensation to the TSO provider, annual investment for the rural fixed network has 
not developed proportionately. Telecom‘s average annual level for rural fixed network 
access infrastructure investment decreased to less than half the depreciation allowance 
for an equivalent efficient replacement network between 1996 and 2006.
133
 Telecom‘s 
planned rural expenditure in 2006 was NZD 59 million, including NZD 8.5 million on 
its cellular network and NZD 16.5 million on broadband infrastructure.
134
 Telecom 
invested only about NZD 34 million in rural fixed network access infrastructure, 
compared with the estimated TSO net cost for 2006-2007 of NZD 62.859 million.
135
 
                                                                                                                                          
the Government may have to re-consider the nomination of only Telecom as TSO fixed residential telephone service 
provider.   
130 TSO Review in 2007‘s submissions from operators (not Telecom) criticised the nomination of a single TSO 
provider (Telecom) while a large number of service providers were now capable of providing similar local services. In 
addition, there was an increasing variety of ways in which end-users in New Zealand could access telephone service 
and a wide range of alternative voice services: broadband, wireless access services and home phone service via the 
mobile network. Hence, it would be unfair if other operators were forced to subsidise Telecom, their competitor, for 
providing a basic voice telephone service when they had already built their own network capable of delivering a 
similar local service (See Vodafone New Zealand Limited ―Submission to the Ministry of Economic Development on 
TSO Discussion Document‖ (2007).  
131 Increasing costs over time in New Zealand was explained partly due to the consequence of the use of an economic 
model that included the cost of capital, which resulted in disputes between operators (Vodafone) and the Commerce 
Commission about the determination of TSO net cost 2004-2005. This shows that avoiding a contestable bidding 
process to select TSO providers may not help to lower or minimise the net cost of providing TSO service and could 
possibly result in years of disputes related to the determination of the TSO net cost.     
132 Final determination for TSO Instrument for Local Residential Telephone Service for periods 2001-2002 and 2006-
2007.  
133 Network Strategies Report: Capital investment in Telecom's rural network (2007). 
134 New Zealand Telecom Limited ―Telecom to spend NZD 59 million on Rural Network‖ (press release, 20 June 
2005). 
135 Commerce Commission, above ch 3, n 323, at 7. 
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Telecom‘s investment in rural areas was therefore equivalent to less than half the 
amount of local TSO net costs.
136
 
To deal with such issues, New Zealand has since 2011 applied contestable bidding for 
performance of universal broadband programmes and adjusted its regulations for the 
TSO service provision toward the minimisation of subsidies. The bidding process was 
designed as a two-stage auction.
137
 Bidders publicly discussed elements of their 
proposals, and placed competitive pressures on other bidders and lowered industry 
contributions.  
D Proposals for Improvement of the Legal Framework with regard to Contestable 
Bidding Processes in Vietnam  
One of three main problems related to the subsidy of universal service funds is the lack 
of reverse auctions for selection of the most economic and cost-effective universal 
service providers. There is no statement of compulsory or absolutely prioritised 
contestable bidding process in selecting universal service providers and projects of 
universal service delivery.
138
 At the same time, there is no adequate legal framework for 
reverse auctions in Vietnam. The existing legal framework for bidding focuses on 
bidding performance of construction projects, but excludes projects for provision of 
public services. There is no specific regulation that could be applied so as to facilitate a 
reverse auction for the delivery of universal services.  
It is proposed to improve the contestable bidding arrangements for universal service 
delivery so as to minimise subsidies and levies. The current arrangements for subsidies 
from universal service levies in Vietnam distinguish subsidies for deployment of 
telecommunications infrastructure in universal service-qualified areas, from subsidies 
for providing (universal service provider) and using (households/individuals) universal 
services in universal service-qualified areas. The proposals focus on how to define the 
requirement to apply reverse auctions for projects for deploying infrastructure in 
universal service-qualified areas (development of universal access), and on 
                                               
136 Ministry of Economic Development, above ch 3, n 331, at [221].   
137 The two-stage bidding process is also applied for rural broadband projects in the United Kingdom. See Department 
for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs ―Rural Development Programme for England and Broadband Delivery UK: 
Applicant‘s Handbook - Expression of Interest Round Three‖ (2013), at 12-13. 
138 See Chapter Four III.C.1.(c).(3). 
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improvements of specific regulation for effectively implementing reverse auctions for 
universal service delivery.   
1 Contestable bidding must be absolutely prioritised 
Reverse auctions for universal service delivery should be absolutely prioritised over 
direct contracting and government allocated assignments. It is proposed to amend the 
introduction to art 1 of the Bidding Act 2005
139
 and insert a new section (s 4):  
This Act requires contestable bidding to select the contractors for provision of consulting 
services, purchasing goods, provision of public services, and the provision of 
installation/construction services in relation to the following projects: 
… 
4) Projects for the installation, development and extension of telecommunications 
infrastructure in universal service-qualified areas and projects for the provision of 
universal services to householders/individuals in universal service-qualified areas using 
universal service funds. 
At the same time, art 20 s 4 of the Telecommunications Act 2009 needs to be amended 
as follows:  
4) The selection of service operators to provide universal services (including installation, 
development and extension of telecommunications infrastructure in universal service-
qualified areas) must be conducted in the following order: contestable bidding, direct 
contracting and government allocated projects.  
Direct contracting and government project allocation of universal service delivery are 
applicable only if contestable bidding cannot be done due to specific conditions as 
determined by the MIC in the regulation on the implementation of universal service 
programmes, such as having a single qualified service provider in a specific geographical 
universal service-qualified area.  
                                               
139 The Bidding Act 2005 art 1 provided that: 
 
This Act requires contestable bidding (reverse auction) to select the contractors for provision of consulting 
services, purchasing goods, provision of public services, and the provision of installation/construction services 
of the following projects: 
1. Projects of development investment using more than 30% government budget… 
2. Projects using government budget for purchasing products for ordinary operation of state organs, political 
organisations…;  
3. Projects using government budget for purchasing products for repairing, innovating equipment, facilities, 
buildings of state-own enterprises. 
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In addition, art 5 s 4 of Decree 31 (2005)
140
 Annex C (including universal services in 
annex C in which contestable bidding and ordering are applicable for selecting service 
providers) should be amended to read:  
Contestable bidding is compulsory and the first option for selection of all public utility 
service providers. Other options such as direct contracting or government allocated 
projects are applicable only if contestable bidding is impossible due to there being only 
one qualified service provider in the specific geographical area.  
Accordingly, it is proposed to amend Decision 1643/QD-TTg Part VI s 3 (b) which 
distinguishes between projects for development and extension of telecommunications 
infrastructure in universal service-qualified areas. It would read: 
Service providers engage in projects or contracts for development of telecommunications 
infrastructure and provision of universal services in universal service-qualified areas 
through the contestable bidding process. Other options such as direct contracting or 
government allocated projects are applicable only if contestable bidding is impossible.  
2 Improved specific regulations to implement contestable bidding 
The Government should issue a separate Decree guiding the implementation of the 
Bidding Act 2005 and selecting the contractor(s) for providing public services, including 
providing universal services. Alternatively, art 1 of Decree 85/2009/ND-CP
141
 could be 
amended to read that the selection of service providers for public utility services should 
be done and prioritised through contestable bidding. In addition, Decision 1643/QD-TTg 
art 2 s 3 should be amended by insertion of a clause stating that the MIC is to be the 
main body - in coordination with the MPI - for issuing a Joint Circular
142
 to guide the 
process on contestable bidding (reverse auction) for projects of universal service 
delivery.
143
  
This Joint Circular needs to provide a comprehensive framework for reverse auction 
design and processes. It should be an open, transparent and non-discriminatory tender 
                                               
140 Decree 31/2005/ND-CP stipulating production and provision of public utility services and goods.  
141 Decree 85/2009/ND-CP guiding on the implementation of the Bidding Act 2005 and selection of contractors for 
construction project as defined in the Construction Act.  
142 See above ch 4, n 74. 
143 This suggestion is in line with Decree 85/2009/ND-CP art 76 s 8 which provides that ministries may issue detailed 
instructions on some articles of the decree (if necessary) but not contrary to relevant articles in the decree.  
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process seeking the selection of the most economically advantageous offer, designed to 
minimise the cost of investment and the associated universal service funds, whilst still 
ensuring an appropriate level of service.
144
  
The Joint Circular should explicitly spell out the key objectives for introducing reverse 
auctions for universal service projects in Vietnam, such as (1) increasing consumer 
choice and benefits to customers in terms of pricing, service innovation and service 
quality in universal service-qualified areas; (2) improving infrastructure in universal 
service-qualified areas and ensuring open-access to government-subsidised (universal 
service-funded) infrastructure; (3) providing more equitable access to universal service 
subsidies and promoting non-discrimination; (4) reducing the underlying costs of 
delivery of universal services; and (5) encouraging collaboration and mutual leveraging 
off existing assets. These objectives could be used as the guiding principles to underpin 
the details in the Joint Circular.
145
    
The Joint Circular should clearly establish the determination of geographical units in the 
universal service-qualified areas. These geographical determinations would then be 
utilised in auctioning projects for universal service delivery, and as units for estimating 
the cost of universal service delivery. This geographic determination must not be the 
same as the definition of universal service-qualified areas as stated in Part IV s 1 of 
Decision 1643 (2011).
146
  
Geographic areas should be sizeable population density areas, served by telephone 
exchanges with a determined number of total lines. This would allow bidders to value 
more precisely projects, and assist the VTF with contract management. It is proposed to 
adopt the subscriber cluster model from the New Zealand experience to calculate the net 
cost of universal service delivery.
147
 Bid invitations should include location data for 
exchanges and cabinets
148
 in universal service-qualified areas.  
                                               
144 European Commission ―State aid no. N 157/2006 - United Kingdom: South Yorkshire Digital Region Broadband 
Project‖ (2006), at 10.  
145 An example of this can be found in the Australian Communications Authority‘s Universal Service Obligation 
Contestability Guidelines, 2001 and New Zealand Government‘s documents for Rural Broadband Initiative 2010.  
146 See Chapter Four III.C.2.(c).(iii).  
147 A full outline of this can be found in the annual determinations for the TSO Instrument for Local Residential 
Telephone Service. <www.comcom.govt.nz/telecommunications/>.  
148 See TSO Instrument for Local Residential Telephone Service <www.comcom.govt.nz/telecommunications/>.  
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The Joint Circular should clarify the potential service providers eligible to participate in 
reverse auctions, and define the eligibility standards for auction participants without 
discrimination of ownership, technology or services, and ensure a reasonably large 
number of potential auction entrants. It is also proposed to adopt the practice 
recommended by the European Commission, that geographical areas to be auctioned 
should have a single winner and any one operator can be a bidding participant for a 
number of geographical areas to be auctioned.
149
 This would avoid the situation of 
duplicated and overlapping investments by numerous operators in the same 
economically non-viable (high cost) areas. In addition, it would also enable regulators to 
choose the most economically efficient universal service provider in a certain number of 
areas, rather than a single universal service provider for all high cost areas throughout 
the country.      
The Joint Circular should also clearly state that either single or joint bidders should be 
eligible to participate. The Circular, in the case of joint bidders, should include specific 
requirements which ensure that, should the joint bidders be the winners, this will not 
lead to the creation of a duopoly in universal service-qualified areas, and will instead 
encourage competition. Based on the New Zealand experience in performing contestable 
bidding for rural broadband in 2010-2011, the Joint Circular should include an article 
determining principles of open access requirements, including any-to-any connectivity, 
neutral technology, low cost to change providers and non-discrimination between 
service providers.
150
 
This requirement would ensure that access to universal service funded infrastructure 
would be available to competitors to deliver their own competing retail services. Service 
providers, other than universal service providers, can use it to offer services as a re-seller 
of wholesale end-to-end service over DSL, wholesale end-to-end wireless broadband 
service, or as a mobile virtual network operator, or as a roaming partner to extend their 
mobile network without the need to invest separately in towers. This would ensure an 
immediate boost to rural competition from different technologies and service providers. 
                                               
149 European Commission ―State aid no. N 201/2006 - Greece: Broadband access development in underserved 
territories‖ (2006), at 5. 
150 See Chapter Three III.C.5.(c).(v). 
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These suggestions are based on the New Zealand
151
 and Indian
152
 experiences of 
universal service delivery. 
3 Determining the reserve price for contestable bidding  
It is proposed that the Joint Circular should provide that the reserve price should be 
determined on a maximum subsidy per subscriber connected and based on previous 
build-outs. At the same time, the maximum grants for the winners must be in line with 
the affordable financial resources of collected universal service levies, ensure 
minimising of grant requests, and avoid duplication of networks and infrastructure. 
International experience is that a contestable bidding process has helped to significantly 
lower subsidies, as the lowest bidding price has often been significantly lower than the 
reserve price. In Columbia, for example, the average winning subsidies of the bid 
winners was 45% of the maximum subsidy offered.
153
 The average winning subsidies in 
Peru were 22% of the maximum subsidies offered in 1999 and 47% in 2000.
154
 In India, 
average winning subsidies were 25% and 70% of the maximum subsidy offered in 
2007.
155
 In New Zealand, although the grant awarded to the joint bidders (Telecom and 
Vodafone) was NZD 285 million (maximum grantable costs), the so-called ‗Community 
Collaboration Savings‘ approach indicates that any savings in each region would 
possibly be used for addition to infrastructure in that region. This means that more rural 
infrastructure could be built if the actual construction costs are less than planned.
156
  
4 Designing contestable bidding structure and process  
The Joint Circular should include a clear and comprehensive contestable bidding 
structure and process, namely ‗open-outcry‘ auctions for projects of universal service 
                                               
151 The full text can be found in the website of New Zealand Ministry of Economic Development, Rural Broadband 
Initiative: Request for Proposals for the Zone 4 Rural Broadband Initiative in 2010. 
152 Similarly in India, the restriction of the number of service providers to a maximum of three under universal service 
schemes for subsidy of infrastructure-sharing in universal service-qualified-areas was seen as anti-competitive and 
discriminatory. The full text can be found in the Indian Ministry of Communications Information Technology‘s 
Guidelines for Implementation of Universal Service Support and TRAI‘s Recommendations on Infrastructure Sharing 
in 2007. 
153 Wallsten, above ch 2, n 172, at 4.  
154 Andrew Dymond and Sonja Oestmann ―Rural Telecommunications Development in a Liberalising Environment: 
An Update on Universal Access Funds‖ (Intelecon Research and Consultancy, 2002), at 3.  
155 Wallsten, above n 153.  
156 This is to be seen in the Rural Broadband Agreement between the Ministry of Economic Development and 
Telecom New Zealand Limited (2011), Schedule 4: Payment Schedule and Process s 13.  
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delivery. This enables various bidders to see what others are bidding, and makes public 
the various elements of their proposals. And at the same time it creates a descending bid 
design.  
The bidding process should be in two stages: an Expression of Interest (EOI) stage and a 
Request for Proposals (RFP) stage. The two-stage bidding process would enable the 
responsible agency in Vietnam (the MIC or the VTF) to gather adequate and sufficient 
information about the interest, intent and initial estimates of potential bidders. This 
would help them make more informed decisions when finalising an RFP. At the same 
time, potential bidders would have more time to prepare detailed proposals. This method 
would also provide greater flexibility for operators to take into account developments 
with regard to the scope and character of the universal services being auctioned. 
Likewise it would enable a larger number of potential bidders to express interest in 
participating at relatively low cost.  
The Joint Circular should include the instruction that potential bidders should during the 
EOI stage provide the following information about their technology approach for serving 
in universal service-qualified areas: an indication of the prices they intend to charge at 
both the wholesale and retail levels;
157
 the regions of the country (universal service-
qualified areas) they are interested in bidding for; and when they would be ready to 
submit RFPs. After the assessment of EOIs, a RFP would be released and include the 
major contents, among them such detail as (1) the regions for which bids are being 
sought; (2) the minimum service level requirements; (3) the minimum level of open 
access requirements; (4) standards and interconnection requirements; and (5) the criteria 
upon which bids will be assessed.      
The evaluation of proposal and the selection process should be divided into four stages: 
(1) determining the preliminary shortlist of proposals through the assessment of 
proposals against the ‗Eligibility Criteria‘; (2) evaluating proposals in the preliminary 
shortlist against the ‗Evaluation Criteria‘ and identifying one or more preferred 
providers; (3) substantive negotiation with preferred providers on all key terms of the 
formal agreements;  preferred providers could be requested to submit a revised offer 
                                               
157 European Commission ―State aid no. N 201/2006 - Greece: Broadband access development in underserved 
territories‖ (2006), at 3-4.  
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which would remain open for acceptance by the responsible agency (the MIC or the 
VNTA); and (4) final selection and contract with the preferred suppliers.
158
  
V Subsidies to Universal Service Providers and Residential Subscribers in 
Universal Service-Qualified Areas 
Other obstacles to effective and efficient performance of universal service delivery are 
related to subsidies to universal service providers and residential subscribers in universal 
service-qualified areas.
159
 These subsidies are currently made through: (1) subsidies for 
projects for development of telecommunications infrastructure in universal service-
qualified areas
160
 and research and development projects for end-user equipment using 
for universal service delivery;
161
 (2) subsidies for residents in universal service-qualified 
areas to use universal services (this subsidy is paid through universal service providers 
and deducted from monthly telecommunications service bills of subscribers); (3) 
subsidies for telecommunications operators to provide universal services in universal 
service-qualified areas; (4) providing loans at below-market rates to projects for 
development of telecommunications infrastructure in universal service-qualified areas; 
and (5) subsidies for providing compulsory telecommunications services
162
 in the whole 
country.        
                                               
158 A full description of this is to be found in the New Zealand Government‘s Rural Broadband Initiative: Request for 
Proposals for the Zone 4 Rural Broadband Initiative in 2010.  
159 Community facilities such as schools are not targeted groups to be subsidised from universal service funds in 
Vietnam. Instead, there are separate programmes to support deployment of Internet access infrastructures to these 
groups through different resources, ODA projects or sponsored by service providers. For instance, Viettel 
Telecommunications Group has had a memorandum with the Ministry of Education since 2008 to roll out a 
programme (namely Connecting Education Network) in terms of which Viettel will provide free and permanent 
Internet ADSL access infrastructures for 100% of primary and secondary schools, kindergartens, community 
education centres, training and educational institutions; reducing up to 70% the connection costs for optical fibre 
connections to universities and colleges etc. In addition, broadcasting service providers may be subsidised from 
universal service funds for their investment in digital facilities for broadcasting programmes or channels containing 
essential information to remote, isolated, islands and exceptionally difficult areas (see the PM‘s Decision 119/QD-TTg 
(2011) approving the project for development of rural information and communications for the period 2011-2020, art 
1 Part VI s 4 (b)).  
160 This type of non-reimbursed subsidy from universal service funds for projects for development of 
telecommunications infrastructure in universal service-qualified areas was not carried out during the period 2006-
2010. 
161 This type of subsidy from universal service fund was added in 2011, according to Decision 1643/QD-TTg.   
162 Compulsory telecommunications services include telecommunications services for the purpose of rescue and 
disaster prevention, emergency callings, fixed telephone directory and telecommunication services for urgent activities 
(Decision 1643/QD-TTg Part III s 2).  
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A Underlying Principles for Improved Subsidy from Universal Service Funds  
One of the most important decisions of regulators is how to provide subsidies from 
universal service funds efficiently and effectively. Generally the determination of 
subsidies should ensure the best possible benefits for universal service funds.
163
 In 
addition, subsidies should be given the highest priority on universal access projects.
164
 
The focus on universal access projects is relatively achievable and realistic for subsidies, 
particularly in countries with low telecommunications density and level of usage of 
universal services.
165
  
The determination of precise target groups of the population (beneficiaries) and target 
areas plays an important role in improving efficient and effective subsidies. Universal 
service policy has typically been focused on relatively small areas, using census data to 
ascertain the number and location of households.
166
 Definition of target groups for 
subsidies should be based on geographical areas divided into differently targeted 
areas.
167
  Target groups and target areas should be those that are most at risk of ‗market 
failure‘, where the telecommunications operators cannot economically provide the 
required services without subsidies.
168
  
Types of subsidies must be in line with the regulatory objectives of telecommunications 
policies, such as competitive neutrality of technology and service. Subsidy to service 
providers should encourage operators to enter the market but not create an unending 
dependency on subsidies
169
 nor limit the technology choice of residents.
170
 At the same 
time subsidies to subscribers should accurately interpret the needs and preferences of 
customers. This in turn helps facilitate the sustainability of the outcomes of universal 
service programmes. 
                                               
163 Townsend, above ch 2, n 184, at 78. 
164 Ibid, at 77. 
165 Ibid, at 73. 
166 Laffont and Tirole, above ch 2, n 128, at 238. 
167 Weller, above ch 2, n 170, at 648. 
168 Townsend, above n 163. 
169 International Telecommunications Union, above ch 2, n 55, at 35. 
170 Townsend, above n 163, at 74. 
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The calculation of subsidy levels should ideally be based on relevant costs and assumed 
demand.
171
 Regulators should ensure that they are not providing more in subsidies than 
is warranted by the actual social benefit the subscriber will receive. The regulator should 
determine the actual universal service cost so that they can allocate minimum levies to 
operators and subscribers.
172
 Cost-based modeling and competitive bidding are two 
common ways for determining level of subsidies. Using the cost-based model to identify 
costs at the level of specific areas is a very demanding requirement,
173
 and sometimes 
ineffective due to the lack of the necessary cost information.
174
 Instead, a competitive 
bidding process is typically designed to efficiently allocate subsidies to operators 
requiring the lowest subsidy.
175
 This is particularly effective where the regulator does 
not have sufficient capacity to determine the cost of universal service rollout 
independently, or where due to information asymmetries the regulator cannot properly 
assess the cost of providing universal services.
176
    
B The Situation of Universal Service Subsidies in Vietnam 
The two main groups supported by the universal service policy in Vietnam are universal 
service providers providing services in universal service-qualified areas, and subscribers 
(individuals or households) using universal services.
177
 A good policy will increase the 
availability of service access through subsidies to telecommunications operators, and the 
affordability of service through subsidies to end-users in universal service-qualified 
areas. However, there remain the following obstacles to efficient and effective universal 
service subsidies to providers and to residents:  
(1) lack of contestable bidding for the  selection of  projects for the development 
and expansion of infrastructure in universal service qualified areas;
178
  
(2) inappropriate definition of universal service-qualified areas;  
                                               
171 International Telecommunications Union, above n 169, at 35. 
172 International Telecommunications Union, above ch 2, n 55, at 38. 
173 Cost-based modelling is used for funding universal service delivery in many countries, including New Zealand and 
Australia. 
174 International Telecommunications Union, above ch 2, n 55, at 39. 
175 Muente-Kunigami and Sabater, above ch 2, n 102, at 36. 
176 International Telecommunications Union, above n 169, at 36.  
177 Other groups also enjoy subsidies from universal service policy are every citizen in using compulsory (such as 
urgent calling) telecommunications services and specific people in using HF wireless receivers on deep-sea fishing 
boats. See Part I s 2 (d) and Part II s 2 (c) of Decision 1643/QD-TTg.     
178 See Chapter Five III. 
 260 
 
(3) confused definition of targeted groups (individuals or households; cultural, 
postal and telecommunications centres in rural communes);  
(4) inappropriate types of subsidy (loans at below-market rates, research and 
development projects, free equipment); and  
(5) no links with the real cost of providing universal services. 
The definition of the areas targeted for being subsidised from universal service funds in 
Vietnam is not based on appropriate geographic and high-cost criteria. Instead, universal 
service-qualified areas are defined by the density of subscribers and the socio-economic 
conditions. This determination of universal service-qualified areas has resulted in 
subsidies not being in line with the net cost (full or partial) of providing universal 
services, nor efforts to minimise such a net cost. At the same time, universal service 
delivery has focused only on the achievement of required density
179
 in universal service-
qualified areas without any adequate consideration of the cost-effective subsidies from 
universal service funds.    
The unclear definition of universal service targeted groups has been another obstacle to 
efficient and effective subsidies from universal service funds. Subscribers being either 
individuals or households in universal service-qualified areas have been entitled to 
subsidies. At the same time, there have been a number of universal service providers in 
the same geographic areas.
180
 These universal service providers enjoy subsidies from 
universal service funds according to the number of subscribers, and they have typically 
tried to increase their universal service subscribers, regardless of overlap with other 
universal service providers, so as to receive higher subsidies. This has resulted in 
overlapping subsidies and conflict with the basic principles of mitigating universal 
service subsidy (and consequently universal service levies). This has also resulted in 
confusion as to the number of subscribers per 100 inhabitants or the subscribers per 
households in universal service-qualified areas.   
                                               
179 With the definition of universal service-qualified areas as those with fixed telephone subscribers less than 2.5 per 
100, the objective of the universal service programme 2006-2010 required increasing the density in these universal 
service-qualified areas to 5 per 100. 
180 The shortcoming of having more than one universal service providers in a specific geographical area is discussed 
and solutions proposed in section 3. 
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Inappropriate types of subsidy such as loans at below-market rates, free end-user 
terminals for subscribers, and research and development projects for end-user equipment 
for universal service programme should be abandoned. These types of subsidies are 
either duplicated or unfair (loans at below-market rates), costly with no sustainable 
outcomes (free end-user terminals for subscribers at household level), inconsistent with 
commitments made by Vietnam to WTO or with the Vietnam Telecommunications Act 
2009 (research and development projects). In addition, there have not been any subsidies 
to projects for the development and expansion of infrastructure in universal service 
qualified areas through contestable bidding processes, except by the way of loans at 
below-market rates.  
C Universal Service Subsidy in New Zealand  
In New Zealand subsidy to the TSO service provider has been based on the cost of 
providing TSO services (cost-based modelling). The cost measure was defined as 
―unavoidable net incremental cost to an efficient service provider for providing services 
required by the TSO instrument to commercially non-viable customers‖.181 This cost is 
the difference between the long-run costs an efficient service provider would incur with 
and without the obligations imposed by the TSO instrument. Furthermore, an efficient 
service provider is defined as one ―producing a given quantity and quality of service at 
the lowest possible cost‖.182 Finally, the subsidy to the TSO service provider can be 
made only after calculating the net cost and allocating it to telecommunications 
operators.  
The system for TSO subsidy in New Zealand was superior to that in Vietnam, as a result 
of the alignment between the payment to the TSO provider and the efficient cost of the 
TSO service. The TSO payment was simply the notional ‗loss‘ incurred by universal 
service providers due to providing TSO services to residents in ‗high-cost areas‘. From 
2010, the calculation of the TSO cost for residential telephone service was done at the 
national level and compared with the overall provision of such TSO service.  
                                               
181 Commerce Commission, above ch 3, n 246, at [30]. 
182 Ibid, at [39]. 
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Although the legal framework did not directly mention who would be beneficiaries of 
the TSO scheme, the Telecommunications Act 2001 s 70(1) describes the purpose of 
Part 3 of the Act as facilitating the supply of certain telecommunications services to 
groups of end-users within New Zealand to whom those services might not otherwise 
have been supplied on a commercial basis, or at a price that was considered by the 
Minister of Communications to be affordable to those end-users.
183
 Therefore, targeted 
groups for the TSO policy could be interpreted as end-users in high-cost areas, also 
referred to as ‗commercially non-viable customers‘ (CNVCs),184 where a TSO provider 
would not provide service without compensation from the TSO scheme.  
A specification of geographical areas is involved in the determination of CNVCs and 
essential for calculating TSO costs. CNVCs were identified on the basis of a ‗cluster-of-
customers‘. Each cluster, in calculating the net cost of the TSO instrument, would be 
identified as either ‗viable‘ or ‗non-viable‘ and the total of the net costs of all the non-
viable clusters determines the total TSO net cost.
185
  
D Proposals for Improvement of the Universal Service Legal Framework in Vietnam 
with regard to Subsidies  
Improvements for the short-term (the period of 2011-2015) subsidies to universal service 
providers and to household/individual subscribers in universal service-qualified areas 
can be achieved by amendments of Decision 1643 (2011). This would ensure effective 
and efficient subsidies to the targeted beneficiaries in the more precisely defined and 
targeted geographical areas. Amending types of subsidies should help to lower the costs 
of subsidies, avoid discrimination between beneficiaries and maintain the results of the 
previous universal service programme 2006-2010. In particular, subsidies for universal 
service providers as defined in Part II Section 3 of Decision 1643 (2011) should be 
based on the net cost for maintaining and providing universal services in universal 
service-qualified areas.
186
 The Telecommunications Act 2009 and relevant regulations in 
all subordinate legal documents should be also amended to require a contestable bidding 
                                               
183 The Minister of Communication however has never made such a determination. 
184 Telecommunications Act 2001, s 5.  
185 Ibid, s 50. 
186 Suggestion for using the net cost will be proposed in further detail in the long-term suggestions for improvements 
of subsidies. 
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process for the selection of the most economic, cost-effective universal service provider 
with the lowest subsidy required, for every project for developing and extending the 
telecommunications infrastructure in universal service-qualified areas. There follow 
seven principal proposals, all of which are of relatively equal importance.   
1 Loans at below-market rates from universal service funds 
Availability of loans at below-market rates should be removed. In the short term - as a 
suggested improvement during the five-year universal service programme 2011-2015 - It 
is proposed to issue specific regulations on the process of providing loans at below-
market rates from universal service funds for projects to install, develop and extend  
telecommunications infrastructure in universal service-qualified areas. Firstly, art 2 s 2 
of Decision 1643/QD-TTg should insert a new clause which would read that the 
Minister of Finance jointly with the Minister of Information and Communications issue 
a Joint Circular guiding the process and the mechanism for providing loans at below-
market rates to universal service projects. At the same time, it is proposed to amend 
Decision 191/2004/QD-TTg art 7 s 1 (b) so as to avoid discrimination between universal 
service providers and other operators who have projects to develop or upgrade 
telecommunications infrastructures in universal service-qualified areas:  
b) Providing loans at below-market rates to telecommunications operators and ISPs to 
invest in new deployment, upgrading, extension of telecommunications infrastructures in 
universal service-qualified areas.  
The Joint Circular187 should provide a comprehensive framework for the process and 
mechanisms for providing loans at below-market rates to universal service projects. At 
the same time, it must ensure a transparent process, with criteria for selecting projects 
and operators, and ensuring competitive neutrality and non-discrimination between 
service providers. It must also state clearly that only projects to develop 
telecommunications infrastructure in universal service-qualified areas are eligible for 
loans at below-market rates from universal service funds. However, the Joint Circular 
should state that the cost of the implicit subsidy element that telecommunications 
operators receive from loans at below-market rates (such as the balance of interest rates 
                                               
187 See above ch 4, n 74.  
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between normal loans from commercial banks and loans at below-market rates from the 
VTF) needs to be included in the reserve price.
188
 Alternatively, bidders should make 
their own arrangements for funding capital works without any loans at below-market 
rates from universal service funds. Otherwise, operators with loans at below-market 
rates from universal service funds will have an unfair advantage over operators without 
loans at below-market rates from the VTF, such as double dips or putting lower bid 
prices in any contestable bidding process. 
Other essential financial issues to be covered in the Joint Circular would include 
defining the period of loans at below-market rates, interest rates, accountability for 
making decisions, specific guidance on requisite documentation, maximum level of 
loans at below-market rates, the period for reimbursement, and the management of loans 
at below-market rates.
189
 The promulgation of such a Joint Circular would help the 
effective and transparent use of universal service funds as investments from the public 
budget, and also ensure competitive neutrality and equity between telecommunications 
operators. This is because the majority (80%) of the Charter‘s190 universal service 
funds
191
 was made up of contributions from universal service levy payers during the 
period 2006-2010.
192
 Transparent processes for evaluating and selecting projects for 
awarding loans at below-market rates would help to avoid decisions which result in 
unfair and discriminatory subsidies or subsidies to ineligible projects or operators.  
The long-term suggestion is to remove s 6 from Part II of Decision 1643/QD-TTg 
regarding loans at below-market rates from universal service funds for projects for 
development of telecommunications infrastructure in universal service-qualified areas. 
The application of loans at below-market rates from universal service funds had negative 
effects, such as providing funds to non-eligible projects and operators - due to lack of 
                                               
188 See Chapter Five III.D.  
189 General regulation of the Joint-Circular guiding the process and the mechanism for providing soft-loans from 
universal service funds to universal service projects could use relevant regulations from the Ministry of Finance‘s 
Circular 156/2009/TT-BTC (2009) guidance on the loans from the Vietnam Development Fund for projects to develop 
rural transport infrastructures.  
190 Charter‘s VTF organisation and operation issued by the MIC‘s Decision 7/2005/QD-BBCVT (2005).  
191 PM‘s Decision 1643/QD-TTg Part V s 2(b) states loans at below-market rates were provided from the Charter‘s 
universal service funds. 
192 Decision 191/2004/QD-TTg art 6 s 1 defines that the Fund's Charter Capital was VND 500 billion, of which the 
State budget capital is VND 200 billion (to be allocated in 2 years as from the time the Fund starts operation) while 
the remaining amount is added from annual contributions of telecommunication enterprises (defined in art 6 s 2) in the 
first three years as from the time the Fund starts operation so as to acquire sufficient charter capital. In fact, VND 400 
billion of the Fund's Charter Capital was contributed from universal service levies.  
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transparency and sufficient regulation - while some operators and projects were eligible 
but could not obtain loans at below-market rates. At the same time, projects for 
telecommunications infrastructure in universal service-qualified areas (rural and islands) 
should be eligible for loans at below-market rates from State Commercial Banks and 
Social Development Banks, as are other projects for rural development.
193
            
2 Subsidies for research and development projects 
It is proposed to remove this type of subsidy from universal service funds for research 
and development projects of end-user telecommunications equipment for the universal 
service delivery.
194
 This type of subsidy does not fit well with WTO commitments about 
telecommunications services, or with international experience of universal service 
policies and is not consonant with the Telecommunications Act 2009.
195
 The business of 
producing telecommunications products, including research and development projects 
for producing telecommunications end-user equipment, should not be regulated or 
subsidised in any way that results in an unfair and anti-competitive market. Producers 
having telecommunications equipment subsidised from universal service funds have 
advantages when their products are purchased and used in the market. At the same time, 
subsidies for research and development projects to produce specific end-user equipment 
for universal service programmes may possibly result in only a single product being 
available, and limit the choice of customers. The selection of the end-user terminals to 
be used by customers should be left to the customer, including those living in universal 
service-qualified areas, rather than decided by the Government or regulatory authorities 
through subsidies for producing either terminal or access equipment. 
                                               
193 According to art 4 s 2 of the State Bank‘s Circular 6/2009/TT-NHNN (2009) guidance on loans at below-market 
rates for projects in poor districts as defined by the Government‘s Resolution 30A/2008/NQ-CP (2008), enterprises 
have projects to develop their business in 61 poor districts and qualified conditions as defined in the State Bank‘s 
Decisions 1627/2001/QD-NHNN (2001), 127/2005/QD-NHNN (2005), 783/2005/QD-NHNN (2005) will be entitled 
to loans at below-market rates from State Commercial Banks. 
194 PM‘s Decision 1643/QD-TTg Part II s 5. 
195 This proposal of the Ministry of Information and Communication was opposed by some ministries, such as the 
Ministry of Finance. However, the Prime Minister finally decided to include this type of subsidy from universal 
service funds.  
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3 Subsidies for cultural post and telecommunications centres 
A statement in the legal framework that cultural post and telecommunications centres are 
automatically entitled to subsidies from the VTF is unnecessary.
196
 It is recommended to 
remove the clause in s 1(d) Part II of Decision 1643 (2011) which defined the cultural 
post and telecommunications centres as projects eligible for subsidies from universal 
service funds. That section states at the moment:  
d) Subsidies for enhancing quality and availability to provide telecommunications services  
at the cultural post and telecommunications centres in communes of the Government‘s 
Programme 135 phase II
197
 and frontier posts. 
This proposal is in line with international experience and the circumstances in Vietnam, 
where the cultural post and telecommunications centres no longer operate under the 
telecommunications legal framework and are separate from telecommunications.
198
 
Instead, subsidies for development of telecommunication infrastructure and for 
providing universal services at cultural post and telecommunications centres should be 
regulated as projects for development of telecommunications infrastructure in universal 
service-qualified areas.  
Alternatively, subsidies for the development of telecommunication infrastructure and for 
providing universal services at any cultural post and telecommunications centre in rural 
communes within universal service-qualified areas would be included in subsidies for 
maintaining and providing universal services as public telecommunications service 
centres.  
                                               
196 See Chapter Four III.C.1(c)(5)(vi). 
197 PM‘s Decision 135/1998/QD-TTg 1998 approved the national programme for socio-economic development of 
remote and mountainous communes having exceptional difficulties (Programme 135). In 2006, PM‘s Decision 
164/2006/QD-TTg approved the lists of communes qualifying exceptionally socio-economic difficulties, border 
communes and communes in former resistance bases to be covered by the programme on socio-economic 
development in communes qualifying exceptionally socio-economic difficulties in ethnic minority and mountainous 
areas in the 2006-2010 period (Programme 135 phase II). 
198 The system of cultural post and telecommunications centres in rural communes was operated entirely by the 
Vietnam Post Corporation, in accordance with the PM‘s Decision 674/2007/QD-TTg approving the establishment of 
Vietnam Post Corporation, MIC‘s Decision 16/2007/QD-BTTTT, setting up Vietnam Post Corporation (Vietnam Post 
Corporation since 1 January 2008), and relevant regulation in the Postal Act 49/2010/QH12 (2010) and Decree 
47/2011/ND-CP. 
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4 Subsidies for computers 
Subsidies for end-user devices (computers) at the household levels in universal service-
qualified areas do not reflect economic efficiency or ensure sustainable outcomes but 
create unnecessary financial burdens on operators to pay levies.
199
 Thus, it is proposed to 
remove subsidies for computers for household subscribers in universal service-qualified 
areas because they have no necessary link to universal service.
200
 Subsidies should 
include only monthly subscription fees plus a maximum data allowance for Internet 
service users at household levels. In addition, targeted areas should be defined more 
precisely as communes where the Internet density is lower than 2 per 100 households. 
Decision 1643/QD-TTg Part II s 2 (b) should be amended and read:  
Providing subsidies for Internet subscribers (households) with 100% of monthly 
subscription fee plus a fixed and determined data allowance for Internet subscribers 
(households) in communes where the Internet density is lower than 2 per 100 households. 
The latter suggestion is based on the idea that the geographical areas should be smaller 
and more precise so as to provide subsidies directly to the more targeted and prioritised 
areas with a low density of subscriptions. Some communes, normally more central or 
urban communes, in districts with Internet subscription lower than 2 per 100 household, 
would have higher penetrations. The existing section states that ―communes within 
districts with Internet density lower than 2 per 100 households‖ will be entitled to 
subsidies from universal service funds. The wide and unfocused small-size geographical 
areas will result in unfocused and poorly prioritised subsidies.  
Concurrently, while spending on subsidies might be higher, universal service providers 
have preferred to provide services and develop subscriptions in the more central or urban 
communes rather than remote or isolated communes (higher-cost areas). As a result, 
communes with a lower density of Internet subscriptions may not get an expected 
increase, while such densities in the central or more urban communes may increase more 
quickly. 
                                               
199 See Chapter Four III.C.1(c)(5)(v). 
200 This new type of subsidy for computers is included in Decision 1643/QD-TTg (2011) for the period 2011-2015.   
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The proposal for the removal of subsidies for end-user equipment is based on the 
practical experience of Vietnam‘s universal service delivery over the programme 2006-
2010. Providing free telephone sets for fixed telephone subscribers in universal service-
qualified areas resulted in higher and duplicated costs from universal service funds. 
However, the type of subsidy did not ensure the maintenance of sustainable outcomes of 
the universal service programme. The fixed telephone density in Vietnam, which 
reached to 17.13 per 100 inhabitants in 2010,
201
 of which the density in rural areas was 
about 16 per 100 inhabitants,
202
 dropped to 11.46 per 100 inhabitants in 2012.
203
 In 
addition, subsidising computers at the household level would be extremely expensive. 
Thus universal service programmes could pay for computers to be installed at public 
access points, rather than in households. Subsidies for local residential telephone 
subscribers from TSO levies in New Zealand excluded costs for any customer‘s 
premises equipment, including telephone sets.
204
 Similarly, in New Zealand, subsidies 
for operators to carry out the projects for rolling out the rural broadband infrastructure 
from 2011 through the contestable bidding process did not cover any costs for customer 
premises equipment.
205
 
5 Subsidies for monthly subscription fee of fixed telephone  
Subsidies for fixed telephone end-users reflected discrimination between subscribers of 
the programme 2006-2010 and those in the programme 2011-2015 in universal service-
qualified areas. This distinction of subsidies between existing and new subscribers is 
inconsistent with policy objectives and would lead to negative consequences, such as 
unsustainable outcomes of the programme 2011-2015. Thus, Part II s 2 (a) of Decision 
1643/QD-TTg should be amended with a more specific description of subsidies without 
distinction between current or new subscribers in universal service-qualified areas, as 
follows:  
                                               
201 See Chapter Four III.C.1(c)(v). 
202 See Chapter Four III.C.2(c). 
203 International Telecommunications Union ICT Indicators Database (2013) <www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/>. 
204 This can be seen in annual determinations of the net cost for local residential telephone in NZ over the period 
2001-2010, the compensation to TSO service providers was the net cost for providing TSO service and excluded any 
cost for providing free telephone sets.  
205 Rural Broadband Initiative: Request for Proposal for Zone 4 Rural Broadband Initiative (2010) Appendix 6: 
Proposed Contract Principles section 5.2 and the Rural Broadband Agreement between the Ministry of Economic 
Development and Telecom New Zealand Limited (2011).  
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Providing subsidies for the monthly subscription fee for fixed telephone (100%)
206
 plus a 
limited (minimum) minute allowance of local fixed calls for all fixed residential telephone 
subscribers (household or individual) in universal service-qualified areas (communes in 
the Government‘s Programme 135 Phase II). 
The current s 2 (a) in Part II of Decision 1643/QD-TTg defines the subsidy from 
universal service funds for charges for using universal services as applying only to ‗new‘ 
fixed telephone subscribers (household).
207
 The determination that the only beneficiaries 
for subsidies from universal service funds are new subscribers resulted in an unnecessary 
and unfair distinction between existing subscribers and new ones. Both current and new 
residential subscribers who are located in the same universal service-qualified areas 
should have equal rights to enjoy subsidies from the universal service policy. In 
addition, the elimination of the subsidy for current fixed telephone subscribers in the 
universal service-qualified areas would have a negative effect on the key objective of the 
universal service programme 2011-2015, and not maintain the positive outcomes of the 
universal service programme 2006-2010. Without subsidies for using universal services, 
the household or individual subscribers in the same universal service-qualified areas 
(communes in the Government‘s Programme 135 Phase II)208 would not be able to 
afford to use universal services and would unsubscribe from such services.  
The existing section of Decision 1643/QD-TTg is too general in its description of 
subsidies for subscribers ‗using telephone services‘ in universal service-qualified areas. 
It can be interpreted as meaning that subsidies will include charges for national and 
international calls from fixed telephones, or calls from fixed telephone to mobiles. This 
has led to misunderstanding by subscribers in universal service-qualified areas that 
subsidies may cover other services such as international, mobile and national calls. As a 
result, many households used these services and then disputed their liability to pay for 
the calls. In 2011, 465 households in Bac Ha communes (Lao Cai mountainous 
province) were sued by a universal service provider (VNPT) but they claimed that the 
                                               
206 In Vietnam, there are two separate components of fixed telephone service charges: (1) A fixed monthly 
subscription fee (VND 20,000); and (2) calling charges per minute. I suggest subsidising 100% of costs for the fixed 
monthly subscription fee (VND 20,000) plus minimum local fixed calling minutes. Other costs will be paid by 
subscribers.     
207 The universal service programme 2011-2015 continues to provide subsidies for the target group of 
individual/household fixed telephone subscribers with a monthly subscription fee for new but not for existing 
subscribers in universal service-qualified areas. 
208 See above n 197.  
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operator did not explain clearly about which telecommunications services were excluded 
in the subsidies of the universal service scheme.
209
  
Subsidies for using universal service telephone services should be limited to monthly 
subscription fees, plus a minimum allowance for local fixed calling minutes. Therefore, 
the subsidies for all subscribers in universal service-qualified areas in Vietnam to use 
universal services should be more clearly defined, and such subsidies should include a 
monthly subscription fee
210
 adding a limited or minimum number of fixed local calling 
minutes.  
6 Subsidies for subscribers in zone 3 to use fixed telephone service 
Decision 1643/QD-TTg Part II s 2 (d) provides that the fixed telephone subscribers in 
zone 3 of universal service-qualified areas of the universal service programme 2006-
2010 would be beneficiaries of universal service funds up to the end of 2013 only. It is 
recommended to remove the expiry date (the end of 2013) for subsidies for using 
universal services of fixed telephone subscribers in zone 3, which was extended from the 
universal service programme 2006-2010. Decision 1643/QD-TTg Part II s 2 (d) should 
be amended in the same way for Part II s 2 (a), which would then read: 
Providing subsidies of 100% of monthly subscription fees plus a limited (minimum) 
minute allowance for local fixed calls for all fixed residential telephone subscribers 
(household or individual) in zone 3 of universal service-qualified areas as identified in the 
universal service Programme 2006-2010. 
The proposal for more clearly defining and more detailed types of subsidies for ‗using 
telephone services‘ of subscribers in zone 3211 of universal service-qualified areas is to 
ensure equal rights between residents in zone 3 and others within universal service-
qualified areas to enjoy subsidies from universal service funds. This would maintain the 
positive outcomes of the universal service programme 2006-2010. Subsidy for using 
universal services for household or individual subscribers in zone 3 of the universal 
                                               
209 Quoc Hung and Hoang Nguyen ―Phút chốc trở thành con nợ‖ Online Culture Newpapers (Vietnam, 8 August 
2011) <www.baovanhoa.vn/DOISONG/print-38095.vho>. 
210 Monthly subscription fee for fixed local telephone service in Vietnam determined by the MIC as VND 20,000 over 
the whole country.  
211 Among three categories of zones 1, 2 and 3 in universal service-qualified areas with different subsidies from 
universal service funds during the programme 2006-2010, only subscribers in zone 3 will be subsidised by universal 
service funds, but only until the end of 2013 only according to Decision 1643/QD-TTg.     
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service-qualified areas (programme 2006-2010) should be the same as for those 
households or individual subscribers residing in communes in the Government‘s 
Programme 135 Phase II as defined in s 2 (a) of Decision 1643/QD-TTg.  
In addition, it is proposed to remove the expiry date of subsidy (the end of 2013). There 
should not be any difference between subscribers located in universal service-qualified 
areas in the programme 2006-2010 and those in areas (communes in the Government‘s 
Programme 135 Phase II) in Section 2 (a) of the programme 2011-2015.  
The elimination of the subscribers in zone 3 of universal service-qualified areas of the 
last five-year universal service programme 2006-2010 as beneficiaries of universal 
service funds after 2013 would have a negative effect on the key objectives of the 
universal service programme 2011-2015 for maintaining the results from the last five 
year universal service programme 2006-2010. Without subsidies for using universal 
services, the household or individual subscribers in these areas may not be able to afford 
to use universal services and would soon unsubscribe from such services.  
For reforms after 2015, this subsidy (together with subsidies to subscribers in other 
universal service-qualified areas) should be removed and combined in a single subsidy 
to universal service providers, which should be based on the net cost (loss) for 
maintaining and providing universal services to residential subscribers in universal 
service-qualified areas. 
7 Delayed subsidies from universal service funds 
It is recommended to apply a penalty interest rate on delayed payment to operators by 
the VTF.
212
 A new subsection (c) should be inserted into art 8 s 2 of Decision 
51/2008/QD-BTTTT:  
(c) Within a fixed number of working days (eg 10 working days) after the date of the 
approval of universal service outputs performed by a universal service provider 
throughout the country in the previous quarter, the VTF must provide subsidies on the 
total approved outputs, after subtracting any amount to be paid by the VTF to universal 
service provider in advance.  
                                               
212 See Chapter Five III.D. 
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With regard to any amount that is not subsidised to the universal service provider before 
the expiration of the fixed number of working day period (eg 10-working day period), the 
VTF must pay to the universal service providers interest on the unpaid amount of 
subsidies at 0.05% per day (18.25% per year) (as at 11 working days after the date of the 
approval) plus 5% for the period commencing on that working day to the date of payment 
of the whole amount. 
It is proposed to significantly reform long term subsidies of universal service funds, 
applicable in on-going universal service programmes after 2015. The Vietnamese 
Government should not continue with subsidies from universal service funds for both 
universal service providers and for households or individuals in universal service-
qualified areas to use universal service. Instead, the legal framework should be amended 
and state that subsidies from universal service funds will be for universal service 
providers only, and based on the net cost of providing universal services in universal 
service qualified areas. Determining the level of subsidy must ensure ‗economic 
efficiency‘ and minimise payments, which then helps to minimise universal service 
levies imposed on telecommunications operators. Furthermore, the net cost for providing 
universal services must be interpreted as losses incurred by universal service providers 
in the provision of universal services in universal service-qualified areas, where the cost 
of supplying services exceeds earned revenues, and must be subject to independent 
audit.
213
 In particular, the Article 20 s 3 Telecommunications Act 2009 should be 
amended to read:  
3. Subsidies for the delivery of universal services are financed by the universal service 
fund (the VTF) and conducted through  
(a) projects for development of telecommunications infrastructure in universal service 
qualified areas; and 
(b) projects for maintaining and providing universal services in universal service-qualified 
areas.  
Article 20 s 4 would then read:  
                                               
213 The Telecommunications Act 2001 s 83 stated that TSO service provider‘s calculation of the net cost submitted to 
the Commerce Commission must enclose a qualified auditor‘s report.   
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4. The selection of projects for development of telecommunications infrastructure in 
universal service qualified areas is conducted through a contestable bidding process. 
Inserting s 5 into art 20 which would read: 
5. The selection of projects for maintaining and providing universal services in universal 
service-qualified areas is conducted in the following order:  
(a) Contestable bidding; 
(b) Direct contracting;  
(c) Government allocated projects.  
Subsidies for projects for maintaining and providing universal services in universal 
service-qualified areas as defined in subsections (b) and (c) are based on the net cost of 
maintaining and providing universal services in universal service-qualified areas.  
Article 22 s 2 (a) would read: 
Universal service levies will be imposed retrospectively on the service revenues of 
telecommunications operators.  
Decision 191/2004/QD-TTg art 7 s 2 should be amended and the first paragraph, which 
allows the VTF to use temporarily idle capital not originating from the State budget of 
universal service funds (unused universal service levies) to purchase government bonds, 
should be removed.  
Accordingly, subordinate legal documents of the Government, the Prime Minister 
(Decision approving the five year universal service programme) and the MIC must 
provide detailed and comprehensive frameworks with regard to performance, including 
the following main issues: the relevant regulations for contestable bidding processes for 
projects for the development of telecommunications infrastructure in universal service 
qualified areas and for projects (when it is applied) for maintaining and providing 
universal services in universal service-qualified areas must be improved. At the same 
time, specific regulations to use the net cost for determining levels of subsidies (cost-
based modelling) for projects for maintaining and providing universal services must be 
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revised and addressed. Secondly, calculating the net cost must be defined by using a 
proxy cost model with an effective system of cost information. The subsidies from 
universal service funds must be in accord with unavoidable incremental costs for 
providing such universal services in universal service-qualified areas. Such unavoidable 
incremental costs must be defined as ―additional costs, such as a universal service 
provider would incur if it chose to provide universal services to an extra subscriber or 
group of subscribers in universal service-qualified areas‖. 
In summary, the lack of a clear link between subsidies and the actual costs of universal 
service delivery, and inappropriate types of subsidy, were the primary obstacles to the 
efficient administration of the universal service scheme in Vietnam. Proposals for the 
removal of inappropriate types of subsidy would simplify administration of the scheme 
and lower levies. Expenditures should in principle be based on the actual costs of 
universal service delivery. However, a contestable bidding process
214
 could be a more 
realistic solution due to challenges in determining the actual costs of delivering universal 
services in Vietnam, particularly for projects to develop telecommunications 
infrastructure in rural areas.         
VI Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined a series of proposals as solutions for improving universal 
service delivery in Vietnam. Four principal areas - institutional arrangements, funds 
allocation, contestable bidding processes and funds subsidy - have been analysed, and 
solutions proposed which would enhance efficiency and effectiveness in universal 
service delivery.   
These solutions are divided into immediate and long-term proposals. They are based on 
international universal service fund experiences and models, and on best practice models 
from other jurisdictions. 
The obstacles to efficient and effective performance and measurement of universal 
service delivery in Vietnam are largely due to a lack of clear and detailed regulatory and 
legal structures, and low rates of compliance with existing legal frameworks. In 
                                               
214 See Chapter Five IV.D. 
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particular, major issues around institutional arrangements are related to lack of 
transparency, confusing and overlapping accountability, and insufficient performance 
information and reporting systems. Proposals for improvements of the administration 
and institutional arrangements for performance and measurement of universal service 
delivery therefore focus on and aim to ensure closer similarity to the best practice 
indicators: transparency, effective monitoring and performance accountability. On the 
other hand, suggestions for improvements of funding arrangements centre on solutions 
to enhance economic efficiency, cost-effectiveness and competitive neutrality in 
determining resources, allocating levies and providing subsidies.  
If the short and long-term solutions proposed here were carried out they would:  
(1) clearly spell out the roles and responsibilities of the various Ministries and 
organisations involved with universal service, removing conflicts of interest and 
allocating specific roles and functions to organisations;  
(2) create more efficient and effective pathways for universal service providers to 
enter into and continue in universal service delivery, with particular attention to 
setting up structures for contestable bidding for universal service projects and 
programmes and establishing competitive neutrality; 
(3) set up closer monitoring of financial management, and more robust penalties 
regime for non-compliance with reporting and financial requirements; 
(4) lead to the establishment of a subsidy and levies model based on actual costs of 
providing universal services, projects and programmes.   
These would be the hoped for and measurable outcomes of these proposals for 
comprehensive reform of the universal service administration model in Vietnam. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
 
The focus of this thesis has been on identifying obstacles to effective and economically 
efficient delivery of universal services in Vietnam, and to propose solutions through 
substantial improvements in legal and regulatory frameworks and institutional structures. 
The obstacles relate to some key criteria of best practice models for performance-based 
management (management for outcomes) of public policies and programmes, such as 
cost-effectiveness, transparency, performance-based accountability, enhanced public and 
stakeholder involvement and a competitive environment.    
This thesis has examined the delivery of telecommunications universal services in 
Vietnam and New Zealand. It has found that in Vietnam there are many shortcomings of 
both legal frameworks and institutional structures for the management and measurement 
of universal service delivery. Failures in institutional structures mostly stem from the 
top-down model of funding administration due to overlapping institutional 
responsibilities, ineffective arrangements for external monitoring, performance 
information and reporting systems, and minimal involvement of stakeholders and the 
public. Obstacles to efficient and effective delivery of universal services are mostly 
related to principles of cost-effectiveness and competitive neutrality between operators 
in terms of allocating levies and providing subsidies. The New Zealand universal service 
scheme offers valuable lessons, which, with some revision, could contribute to the 
improvement of universal service delivery in Vietnam.    
Chapter Two provided an overview of universal service fundamental concepts, including 
the rationales and objectives of universal service policies to enhance essential and public 
services to all citizens, challenges to governments in improving mechanisms for 
collecting and disbursing universal service funds in an environment of increasing 
competition amongst service providers and the multiplication of technologies for the 
delivery of services. The funding mechanisms should meet the primary requirements of 
cost-effectiveness, competitive neutrality of technology and service, non-discrimination 
and encouraging a competitive environment. The institutional arrangements for 
 278 
 
management and measurement of universal service delivery needs to ensure 
transparency, economic efficiency, performance accountability, effective public and 
stakeholder involvement, and effective performance information and reporting systems.  
In Chapter Three the New Zealand universal service scheme was described. The chapter 
paid particular attention to the legal framework and institutional arrangements since 
2001, with particular regard to five important issues: (1) transparent performance 
information and reporting systems, (2) effective performance accountability, (3) public 
and stakeholder engagement; (4) economic cost-effectiveness, and (5) competitive and 
technological neutrality.  
The New Zealand universal service model reflects features closer to the best practice: 
transparency, effective monitoring with public and stakeholder involvement, and 
effective performance accountability. Moreover, universal service funding arrangements 
are aimed at economic efficiency, cost-effectiveness and competitive neutrality. These 
features of the New Zealand experience, together with international benchmarks for 
efficient and effective universal service structures and delivery (Chapter Two), serve as 
a basis for proposing solutions for improvements of universal service legal frameworks 
and institutional arrangements in Vietnam (Chapter Five).   
Chapter Four reviewed the evolution of the legal framework and institutional 
arrangements for the delivery of universal services in Vietnam. The chapter identified 
the key obstacles to the effective and economically efficient performance and 
management of universal service delivery, and described significant defects in the legal 
framework and institutional arrangements. The universal service institutional structures 
in Vietnam are overly complex, and lack transparency, and well-defined functions and 
powers and essential skills for modern performance management. The legal framework 
is inadequate, highly discretionary, and fails to strike an appropriate balance between 
social policy and economic efficiency.  
The universal service funding mechanism, including allocating universal service levies 
and providing subsidies, is not linked to the real costs for the delivery of universal 
services. Inappropriate types and determination of subsidies reflect a lack of competitive 
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neutrality, discrimination between operators, excessive universal service levies, and a 
failure to target funding to areas of the greatest need.  
Based on the earlier analysis, Chapter Five made substantial proposals for the reform 
and restructuring of universal service institutions and regulations in Vietnam. These 
proposals are divided into proposals for effective and transparent institutional 
arrangements, and suggestions for changes to the legal framework for economically 
effective, non-discriminatory and pro-competitive funding arrangements, including 
allocating levies, regulation of contestable bidding, and improving subsidies.  
Due to the complexity of the multi-layered legal system in Vietnam described in Chapter 
Four, most of these proposals are in the form of amendments to Government and 
ministerial legal documents, which would enhance the delivery of universal service 
within the current and next five-year programmes. Other suggestions relate to more 
significant long-term reforms requiring amendments to legislation by the National 
Assembly. Identified reforms as set out in the thesis, if applied in Vietnam, would lead 
to an effective and economically efficient USO delivery model, particularly minimising 
levies placed on the telecommunications operators and maximising the sustainable 
outputs of the USO programmes.  
The delivery of universal services in telecommunications, as noted throughout this 
thesis, is based on social and political objectives and on policies of governments, which 
are seeking to establish minimum-cost public good services for their citizens. The 
delivery of universal services, unless it is totally controlled by government agencies, 
takes place at the interface between government policy and markets. Ensuring a fair and 
competitive market place, and at the same time guaranteeing the political and social 
objectives of telecommunications universal service, demands a suitably regulated and 
monitored environment. This thesis has identified shortcomings in the institutional 
arrangements for universal service delivery in Vietnam, and makes proposals for 
improved legal, regulatory and institutional arrangements consistent with both the socio-
political objectives of universal service and a competitive market.  
There are major challenges to establishing and monitoring the suggested reforms. In 
Vietnam the contextual challenge lies in winning the willingness of the government in 
 280 
 
the socialist economy to be much more involved in reforming the industry and the 
industry players, and then monitoring the reforms closely. The implementation of 
reforms has also to be prioritised with the realities of the government‘s programmes and 
financial expenditures. It also challenges the government to be involved with other 
nations and markets. Such reforms should include allowing competition from private 
operators, whether domestic or foreign. While the operators are wholly or largely 
government-owned or controlled, the incentives for minimising levies and improving 
efficiency are largely muted - governments is on both sides of the transaction. The 
political challenges are openly acknowledged, but were beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Addressing them is itself a challenge for the future.  
It is clear that major changes are needed in the Vietnamese institutional arrangements 
and delivery model. Best practice models rely primarily on key aspects such as 
transparency, accountability, public access to information, skilled financial management 
and competition. When these aspects become foundational to the Vietnamese model it 
will be economically efficient and meet the needs of its citizens for access to modern 
telecommunications services.  
 
__________________________________________ 
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APPENDIX ONE: THE LIST OF INSTITUTIONS OF INTERVIEWEES 
CONCERNING LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNIVERSAL SERVICE 
DELIVERY IN VIETNAM
215
 
 
 
Nr Name of Institution 
1 Vietnam Public Utility Telecommunications Service Fund - Ministry of Information and 
Communications (VTF - MIC) 
2 Vietnam Telecommunications Authority - Ministry of Information and Communications 
(VNTA - MIC) 
3 Vietnam Posts and Telecommunications Group (VNPT) 
4 Viettel Group (Viettel)  
5 Vietnam Maritime Communication and Electronics (Vishipel)   
6 Saigon Post and Telecommunications Corporation (SPT) 
7 Vietnam Telecom Service Company (Vinaphone) 
8 University of Economics in Ho Chi Minh city (UEH) 
9 Posts and Telecommunications Institute of Technology (PTIT) 
10 Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) 
 
                                               
215 In accordance with ethics protocols, the names and positions of the interviewees are not listed here. That 
information could be made available to examiners if necessary for examination purposes.  
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APPENDIX TWO: GENERAL QUESTIONS TO BE POSED TO 
PARTICIPANTS IN VIETNAM 
 
Interviewees are to be asked the following questions. Based on the replies of the 
interviewees, further discussion may take place. The order of the questions is flexible. 
A. General objectives of the legal framework for universal service obligations  
1 What are the objectives of the legal framework for universal service obligations 
and how are these objectives expected to be attained? Are you aware of any 
evaluation of the outcomes of the universal service policy? Details?  
2 What challenges do policy-makers face in evaluating and balancing the economic 
efficiency of the legal framework for universal service obligations with social 
objectives? How do other factors (for example, politics, history, geography or 
culture) affect the legal framework for universal service obligations in 
telecommunications? 
3 How can the legal framework for universal service obligations be improved and 
made more effective/economically efficient?  
B. Definition and scope of universal service obligations 
1 What criteria should be established to determine the scope, region and targeted 
end-users to be provided with universal telecommunications service?  
2 How can the approach of basic or standard telecommunications services (standard 
telephone service and standard Internet access service) be determined in the legal 
framework for universal service obligations? 
3 Should universal service obligations be extended to include broadband services in 
the competitive environment of the telecommunications industry? What potential 
issues could arise if broadband services were included in the legal framework for 
universal service obligations? 
C. Funding mechanism 
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1 What are the possible funding sources for the cost of provision of universal 
telecommunications services and how should these sources be determined and 
funding subsequently allocated to telecommunications operators? What is the 
basis for the calculation of those levies? Is the process transparent?   
2 How can the legal framework for universal service obligations be as transparent as 
possible, and do no create more burdensome than necessary? How should the 
funding sources be effectively subsidised for telecommunications operators 
providing universal services to end-users living in universal service regions?  
3 How is the net cost for the provision of universal telecommunications services 
calculated? Could the methodology be improved?  
4 How does the administrator decide on projects to be funded from the universal 
service fund? Is that process contestable by the operators? Are there clear criteria 
for project selection? What proportion of the annual revenues of the fund is 
subsidised in each year?  
D. Competition policy: 
1 What is the impact of the legal framework for universal service obligations on 
competition policy in terms of social welfare and economic efficiency objectives?   
2 Is there any conflict between the universal service policy and its implementation 
and the competition policy in telecommunications? What could be done to ensure 
that the legal framework for universal service obligations does not stifle 
competition? 
3 How can the legal framework for universal service obligations be competitively 
neutral and non-discriminatory in terms of technology, service and service 
provider?  
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